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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
Wednesday, October 5, 1955 
The House of Delegates was called to order in Hotel Paxton, 
Omaha, Nebraska, at 9 :30 o'clock A.M. by Chairman Jean B. 
Cain of Falls City. 
JEAN B. CAIN : Gentlemen, the House of Delegates will now 
be in order, and this is the roll call by Secretary George H. Turner. 
(Roll call by Secretary George H. Turner.) 
JEAN B. CAIN : There being a quorum present, we will pro-
ceed with the order of business. 
The following committees have been appointed. 
Rules and Calendar, Donald F. Sampson, Central City, chair-
man. 
Committee on Hearings: C. Russell Mattson, chairman; 
Charles F. Adams, Aurora; Carl Wiilard, Grand Island; Milton 
C. Murphy, North Platte; Hans J. Holtorff, Gering. 
The duties of these committees, I believe, are understood by 
the committees. The Committee on Rules and Calendar has 
charge of the order of business and any changes that are mad~ 
in reports and so forth must be approved by the Rules and Cal, 
endar Committee. 
The Committee on Hearings will receive resolutions which 
will be referred to it as presented and it will act on those resolu-
tions and report back later this afternoon. 
Your attention is called to the fact that only delegates are 
privileged to have the floor at this meeting. Anyone having a 
resolution who is not a member of the House of Delegates must 
ref er that resolution to the Committee on Hearings and it must 
first be presented to that committee. That committee will report 
to the House of Delegates. 
If there are no objections, the deliberations of this House of 
Delegates will be governed by Roberts Rules of Order. 
If the calendar is as printed and meets your approval, a 
motion to that effect is in order. 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: I move that the calendar as printed 
be adopted for the program of this business meeting. 
VOICE: Second. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Gentlemen, you have heard the motion. 
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Are there any remarks? The motion is that the calendar as 
printed be accepted. 
All in favor say aye. 
Opposed, no. The motion is carried. 
The next order of business is a statement of the president 
of the Association, Honorable John J. Wilson. 
PRESIDENT JOHN J. WILSON: Gentlemen, there is not much 
to report at this time, but there ai·e two items that I would like 
to have you give serious consideration to. 
During the year we have tried to arrange for newspaper 
publicity. Columns have been prepared and have been furnished 
to the newspapers, and what I have to say in this regard should 
be a matter of first order for each and every one of you. 
Reference has been made in the report of the Committee on 
Public Service to the newspaper columns which are being furn-
ished to all of the newspapers of the state. These are columns 
devoted to legal subjects and are designed to make the readers 
of the papers aware of the fact that legal problems are involved 
in nearly every phase of everyday living. 
The columns are well prepared and interesting. As of now 
three separate releases have been made. Some of the papers of 
the state have welcomed these columns, while others have rejected 
them entirely. Some editors regard them as advertising and 
have written us letters criticizing the columns. Some editors 
have written constructive letters of criticism, while other letters 
received by me and our Secretary border on the insulting. 
Some of the editors have voiced opposition to the use of our 
columns because lawyers do not advertise, even to the extent of 
carrying a professional card in the newspapers. This is a matter 
over which we as local lawyers have no control. The use of pro-
fessional cards in newspapers is not permissible under the canons 
of ethics under the American Bar Association. 
Under our constitution these canons are the rules of conduct 
for the Nebraska lawyers. 
The canons are now in process of being revised, and it may 
well be that this restriction will be relaxed, but until a change is 
made we are bound to respect them. 
We know that the officers of the Nebraska Press Associa-
tion are opposed to the use of these columns and are exercising 
influence to see that member papers do not use them. By con-
trast, the Press Association officers in Missouri favor the plan, 
and as a result one hundred seventy-one newspapers in Missouri 
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are using columns prepared by the Missouri State Bar Associa-
tion, and Kansas has had a similar experience. 
The value of these columns is best tested by the fact that 
the greatest farm paper in the midwest, the Nebraska. Fa.rmer, 
has eagerly welcomed our column, and commencing with the 
first issue of that paper in November legal columns prepared by 
your Association will be a regular feature of that paper. 
Already we have in the hands of the publishers of the Ne-
b raska Farmer sufficient articles for a six months publication. 
More are in the process of preparation, and the Nebraska Farmer 
is willing and prepared· to make our legal discussions a valid 
feature for years to come. 
The same situation should exist as to the country weeklies, 
but it does not. This publication of Bar Association columns can 
be a success in Nebraska as it has been in other states. It will 
succeed however only if you see that it does. It is a problem of 
everyone in this room. 
The articles are prepared and are being sent out by our 
secretary every two weeks. You can get them in your local paper 
if you will make the effort. 
This is something about which each of you must see his own 
editor and put the thought directly to him that this is preventive 
law rather than trying to create law business. 
This phase of public relations is your job, not the job of 
your officers or the Executive Council. If each of you would go 
to your local editor and tell him that you want this material used, 
I doubt that many will refuse. They may call it advertising; we 
do not think it is. Rather, it is a sincere effort on the part of 
your Association to make the general public aware of the fact 
that legal rights and liabilities are attached to nearly everything 
we do. In this respect if the editor in your town wants to take a 
purely selfish view and classify these columns as advertising, for 
which he would like to be paid, it might do no harm to remind 
him that he already receives a considerable amount of legal ad-
vertising and that as to some notices that we now publish in 
his columns, just as effective service could be had by posting 
a notice on a telephone pole. 
A word from you who live in the area served by the papers 
might change the picture. Much of the public relations program 
can be done by your officers and your Committee on Public Re-
lations, but this phase of the activity is yours and yours alone. 
Its success and failure really depend on what you are willing to 
do about it, and, gentlemen, that is a serious matter, a fight 
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that might exist, but which we don't want; but I believe that by 
sitting down and visiting with these editors, this job can be 
carried over. If we carried paid advertising the expense would 
exhaust our treasury. There are some three hundred newspapers 
in this state, and if you carried a sizeable ad of twenty or twenty-
five dona.rs in each newspaper your dues will be used for in-
stitutional advertising and nothing else. 
If we thought that this was advertising it would be a dif-
ferent story. Other states have felt that it is not advertising, 
that it is only preventive medicine, telling the public how to 
guard their everyday living. 
The other matter is in connection with a Mineral Law In-
stitute held in Boulder, Colorado, during the month of July. 
When we were advised that a Mineral Law Institute was going 
to be held in the Rocky Mountain area it was too late to have an 
Executive Council session so as to be a co-sponsor of this institute. 
But your Executive Council directed that the president and 
secretary of your Association attend this institute to see whether 
it merited our sponsorship, to see the value which it could have, 
and whether it was successful or not. 
If I am n~t mistaken there were something like twenty-five 
states represented at this first institute held between the 21st 
and 23rd of July. Lawyers from practically every oil company 
were present, or, rather, nearly every oil company had it's chief 
counsel present. 
The different types of mineral concerns had representatives 
there. It was thought that if two hundred and fifty registered 
it would be a success. Over five hundred and fifty registered. 
It was one of the greatest institutes that I have ever attended. 
There were some twenty-five from Nebraska there. I am sure 
more would have been there if they had had ample notice or known 
the ·magnitude of the institution. Everyone present thought it 
was something that should be made a permanent organization. 
At two different luncheons the representatives of the various 
states and the law schools got together and felt that a non-profit 
organization should be incorporated with representation to the 
Bar Associations that were the sponsors, and giving the law 
schools a right to have representation. 
It is to meet again next year in Boulder, and I am firmly 
convinced that while all the lawyers in the state may not want to 
attend such an institute, we do have many lawyers who today are 
practicing oil law. We have some mineral law, and this is one 
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opportunity at no expense to the Bar Association to be a part of 
a great institution. 
I therefore have prepared a resolution which I would like 
to have the House of Delegates consider. 
"Whereas, the first meeting of the Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Institute, held at Boulder, Colorado, bet\veen July 21st and 
July 23, 1955, proved to be an outstanding success and drew an 
attendance far in excess of the expectations of the original spon-
sors of such institute, and 
"Whereas, it has been determined that the Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Institute shall become a permanent organization, 
incorporated by the sponsors thereof, with all the states in the 
area interested in the mineral law participating, and 
"Whereas, the Nebraska State Bar Association has been 
asked to join as a sponsor the Rocky Mountain Law Institute, 
and having been assured that no financial obligation was en-
tailed by such sponsorship, 
"Be it now resolved, that the House of Delegates of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association approve the sponsorship of the 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute by the Nebraska State 
Bar Association, and the officers of the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation be authorized and empowered to sign the articles of 
incorporation of such institute and arrange for representation of 
this Association upon the governing body of the institute." 
PRESIDENT WILSON : I move the adoption of the resolution, 
Mr. Chairman. 
c. RUSSELL MATTSON: I second the motion. 
H.ARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, is this institute sponsored 
by our Association or is it sponsored by the University? 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Mr. Cohen, each Bar Association, it would 
be Kansas, Missouri, Wyoming, Montana, North and South Da-
kota, and Nebraska, and maybe there ·will be one or two other 
states, will have a representative, and each law school within 
those states will also be given the opportunity to be a sponsor 
or member of the corporation. 
It was started last year by Dean King of Colorado Law School 
and sponsored by some of the major oil companies who have dis-
trict or home offices in the city of Denver. 
But it will be taken out of their hands and put in the hands 
of a group where everybody has an equal voice in conducting the 
institute in the future. 
HARRY B. COHEN : Well, the point I make is, it would be 
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run and sponsored and operated by either Bar Associations or 
law schools. 
PRESIDENT WILSON : Well, it probably will have about fifteen 
or twenty directors or representatives on the board and it will 
be run by them; both Bar Association representatives and law 
school 1·epresentatives. 
JEAN B. CAIN: All in favor of the motion indicate by saying 
aye. 
Opposed, no. The motion to adopt the resolution prevails. 
We now have the report of the secretary-treasurer, both as 
secretary and treasurer. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: It was quite a pleasure for once to be 
able to report as secretary-treasurer that we are not in the red 
as has been the practice for a number of years. 
The books of the Association have been audited by the firm 
of Martin and Martin, certified public accountants of Lincoln. 
They report that the audit covers the period of October 1, 1954 
to September 24, 1955. We closed the books for the Association 
year six days early in order to permit an audit to be made and a 
report ready for submission at the annual meeting. Had we 
waited until the 30th of the month we probably could not have 
had the report because our meeting this year is so early in 
October. 
Cash receipts during the period amount to $42,391.95. 
Disbursements $39,737.43, producing an excess of receipts 
over disbursements of $2,654.52. 
This amount is reflected in the cash balance which increased 
from $653.25 at the close of the last audit on October 1, 1954 to 
a present total of $3,307.77 as of the close of this audit period. 
The principal items of receipts of course are the dues of 
members, amounting to $37,430.00 for active members, $4,865.00 
for inactive. 
The auditors break down the disbursements into classes. 
They report that the major items of disbursements are salaries 
and payroll tax, $10,326.30. Office supplies, printing, postage 
and stationery, $1,561.18. 
Officers' expense, $2,298.55. Expense of the delegates to 
the American Bar Association, $1,016.66. 
The annual meeting expense, $4,857.08. 
Publication of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,958.61. 
Activities of the Public Service Committee, $4,556.43. 
The cost of our Tax Institute last December, $2,266.58. 
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All cash receipts were deposited in the bank, receipts for 
dues were verified by the auditors by reconciling the membership 
cards issued by number. 
The bank balances were verified by independent correspond-
ence with the banks. Cash disbursements were verified by an 
examination of the cancelled checks and when feasible by an in-
spection of the original documents supporting the disbursements. 
In the opinion of the auditors the funds of the Association 
have been properly accounted for during the period under review. 
As to the cash balance on hand, Mr. Kotouc, the chairman 
of the Committee on Budget and Finance, will later in the day 
report the recommendations of that committee as to the handling 
of a cash balance. 
Mr. Kotouc is unable to be here this morning, but I will ask 
Mr. Sampson to have his item laid over until afternoon. 
JEAN B. CAIN: What will you do with the report? 
JUDGE SPENCER: Move it be approved. 
JEAN B. CAIN: It is moved that the report of the secretary-
treasurer be approved and adopted. 
Is there a second to the motion? 
THOMAS c. QUINLAN: I will second the motion. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks? 
All those in favor of the motion will indicate by saying aye. 
Contrary by saying no. The report is approved and adopted. 
We will now receive resolutions from delegates. Anyone 
have any resolutions to present? 
Again I call attention to the fact that anyone who is not a 
delegate can submit their resolutions to the Committee on Hear-
ings. 
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: Mr. Chairman, upon the request of some 
attorneys I will present this resolution. 
"Resolved, that the House of Delegates of the Nebraska State 
Bar Association approve the amendments of Section 4 of Article 
VIII of the Nebraska state constitution which will be submitted 
to the people in 1956 at the general election under the recently 
enacted law L.B. 307, which measure will permit the legislature 
to absolve real estate taxes and assessments delinquent ten years 
or more. 
"Be it further resolved, that the lawyers of Nebraska are 
urged to take the initiative in explaining the measure to the 
voters to the end that the electorate can make an intelligent deci-
sion on the matter on November 8, 1956." 
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As you probably know, the constitution prohibits the re-
mission of any taxes. That's Article IV, Section 4-Section 4, 
Article VIII. Other states have a statute of limitations on delin-
quent real estate taxes. 
The amendment to the constitution which was authorized by 
the last legislature will be voted on in 1956, and this is to simply 
give it our backing. 
I shall present the resolution to the Resolutions Committee. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: You are introducing it as your own? 
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: I will sponsor it, yes, sir. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Then it does not need to go to the Resolu-
tions Committee; you can move its adoption. 
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: Some of you attorneys, I think, know 
more about the matter that is involved, particularly those of you 
who examine a lot of abstracts. 
I think that the subject is rather simple and does not need 
much consideration; and I therefore move the adoption of this 
resolution by this body. 
THOMAS c. QUINLAN: I second the motion. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks? 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Mr. Chairman. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Sampson of Central City. 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Point of order. Is that motion in or-
der at this time? 
JEAN B. CAIN: It is so ruled that the members of the House 
of Delegates can introduce resolutions direct from the floor with-
out being referred to the Committee on Hearings. Is that cor-
rect, Mr. Turner? 
GEORGE H. TURNER: That is correct. 
JUDGE SPENCER: I move as a substitute motion that the reso-
lution be referred to the Committee on Resolutions for study and 
recommendations. 
VOICE: Second the motion. 
JEAN B. CAIN : You heard the substitute motion, that the 
resolution be referred to the Committee on Hearings. 
aye. 
Are there any remarks? 
All those in favor of the substitute motion indicate by saying 
Opposed, no. The motion is carried. 
Are there any other resolutions to be submitted? 
(There was no response.) 
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REPORT OF COMMITTEES 
The House of Delegates received, considered and acted upon 
the reports of standing and special committees. A full transcript 
of the discussion of each report is on file in the office of the 
secretary, as the official record of the proceedings of the House 
of Delegates. Printed herein are the reports including amend-
ments to the original reports as adopted by the House of Dele-
gates. 
The report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies was 
presented by Bert L. Overcash, chairman of the committee. The 
report, which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows: 
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Agencies 
In accordance with the resolution of this committee adopted 
in 1954 recommending that the governor convene a conference on 
administrative procedure in the State of Nebraska, Governor 
Crosby late in 1954 established such a conference and designated 
Honorable Paul White, District Judge of Lincoln, chairman. The 
governor appointed nineteen members of the bar, including four 
members of this committee, to assist Judge White in this work, 
and it is contemplated that the conference will complete its work 
and draft legislation for consideration at the 1957 session of the 
legislature. It is anticipated that the Governor's Conference Com-
mittee will prepare an administrative procedure act for presenta-
tion to the legislature. 
This committee has tendered the Governor's Committee full 
cooperation in this project, and conferences have been held with 
Judge White with reference to such assistance. Your chairman 
and Judge White have met with Governor Anderson, and he has 
agreed that the conference should continue with its work. It is 
expected that the members of our committee will be called upon 
by Judge White to assist in the studies involved in this program. 
A subcommittee of this committee headed by Mr. Franklin L. 
Pierce has continued the studies reported by this committee in 
1950 regarding appeals from administrative agencies. There is 
great need for simplification and uniformity in this field, and it 
is hoped that legislation which may be proposed will reflect this 
need. 
The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure com-
pleted its work this year and adopted forty-four recommendations 
for improvement of administrative procedure on a federal level. 
In recent years one agency of the state, the Railway Commis-
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sion, has adopted and placed in effect a set of Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, copies of which were distributed to the bar. Cer-
tain states such as California and Massachusetts have adopted ad-
ministrative procedure legislation. 
It is recommended that this special committee be continuecl 
for fhe next year in order that its assistance and coopemtion may 
be available to the Governor's Confe'rence. 
Bert L. Overcash, Chairman 
Paul P. Chaney, Co-ordinator 
George C. Holdrege 
Louis A. Holm.es 
Walter D. James, Jr. 
Russell E. Lovell 
Jack W. Marer 
Franklin L. Pierce 
Robert E. Powell 
William A. Sawtell, Jr. 
Einar Viren 
David D. Weinberg 
Richard D. Wilson 
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship was 
presented by Lloyd L. Pospishil, chairman of the committee. The 
report was amended after discussion by eliminating the recom-
mendation of the Committee on American Citizenship with respect 
to the award of individual citations, and was adopted as amended. 
The full report of the Committee on American Citizenship follows: 
Report of the Committee on American Citizenship 
Your Copunittee on American Citizenship recommends the 
adoption of a program in which every Nebraska lawyer will be 
encouraged to participate. The objectives of this program are 
four-fold: (1) To furnish unto interested lawyers an even greater 
incentive to participate in numerous activities, the general pur-
pose of which is to promote a high standard of citizenship, especi-
ally among the youth of this state; (2) To compile statistics con-
cerning such activity by the lawyers of Nebraska; (3) To apprise 
the general public, through the office of the public service direc-
tor, of the tremendous amount of such service which is being gra-
tuitously rendered to the public by the Bar; and (4) To grant 
appropriate recognition unto those lawyers, who, during the past 
year, have done the most to develop and foster American citizen-
ship in their respective communities. 
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In order to facilitate the effective administration of such a 
program, it is recommended that the president of the Association, 
with the cooperation of the previous chairman of the Committee 
on American Citizenship, appoint one lawyer from each of the 
judicial districts of Nebraska, and one member at large who will 
serve as chairman of that committee. This would constitute a 
committee of nineteen members. Each member from a judicial 
district would, in general, be in charge of that district. 
The committee would prepare an appropriate letter to be for-
warded to each lawyer in Nebraska, in which there would be en-
closed a questionnaire, seeking information concerning the activi-
ties of that particular lawyer, as well as other lawyers in that 
area, in the field of citizenship. Upon the completion and return 
of such questionnaire to the chairman of the committee, an effort 
would be made to ascertain which lawyer in each judicial district 
has made the greatest contribution in the promotion of citizenship 
in that district during the past year. Reliance would be made, 
not only upon the questionnaires, but also upon the personal know-
ledge of the committee member from that district, as well as from 
such other sources as the American Legion, which likewise is active 
in this field in practically every community in the state. When 
the chairman will have received all of this information, he, would 
forward all that which pertains to the lawyers of a given district, 
to the chairman from that district for study, anaylsis, and recom-
mendation. Such chairman would then present to the committee 
the five most representative lawyers, indicating the order in whicru 
he makes his preference. The Committee on American Citizenship 
would meet at a later date in order to select the most worthy rep-
resentative from each district, based upon his activities during 
the previous year. 
The eighteen lawyers thus selected would then be recom-
mended to the Nebraska State Bar Association for awards to be 
presented to them either at the opening session of the annual 
meeting or at the time of the annual banquet, in the discretion of 
the officers and House of Delegates of this Association. The 
award would be in the nature of a citation for outstanding ac-
complishments in the field of American citizenship. The presen-
tation would be made by the chairman of the Committee on Ameri-
can Citizenship. 
The public service director would assist in sending out the 
letters and questionnaires to the lawyers of Nebraska. The ques-
tionnaires would be returned to the chairman of the committee. 
The director also would assist in sending out a follow-up letter, if 
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necessary, and in obtaining the citations for presentation at the 
annual meeting. He could utilize all of the information secured 
in this manner by apprising the general public of the great serv-
ice which the lawyers of Nebraska are rending in the various 
communities each year. Especially could he send to each news-
paper in the judicial district an account of the accomplishments 
of the lawyer honored from that district for that year. 
This committee would assist in the maintenance of an eff ec-
tive speakers bureau among the lawyers of the state. Each mem-
ber of this committee would be chairman of his own judicial dis-
trict. He, in turn, could organize each county in his district for 
this purpose, as well as for any other purpose in order to better 
achieve the objectives of the Committee on American Citizenship. 
Such a program, if properly administered, should cause the 
public to hold the legal profession in higher esteem, and should 
result in giving credit where credit is due. It should also provide 
a greater incentive among lawyers, so inclined, to participate to 
an even greater extent in the development and promotion of high 
standards of American citizenship. Lawyers, since time immem-
orial, have done much in this direction, such as, for instance, 
writing the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of 
the United States; in the field of legislation and public adminis-
tration; in combating Communism and subversive activities; in 
gratuitousy assisting aliens to become citizens; in honoring in-
dividuals who have become U. S. Citizens; in assisting on local 
board, such as school, selective service, village, city and veterans 
boards ; in providing legal assistance, both in the office and in 
the courts, to indigent parties; in Boy Scout work; in assisting 
with oratorical and essay contests on the American Constitution 
and the American way of life, junior baseball, Boys' and Girls 
County Government; Boys' and Girls' State; in speaking on 
Memorial Day and on other dedicatory occasions; in eliminating 
corruption in government and juvenile delinquency; in conscienti-
ous law enforcement, and in assisting young people in their ef-
forts to become good and law abiding citizens. The specific phases 
of activity along this line are legion, and the lawyers have parti-
cipated in all of them but, for some reason, the Bar has not been 
given proper credit or recognition therefor, and therein it seems 
that our public relations program may have broken down. 
Attached to this report is a suggested letter and question-
naire to be forwarded to each member of the Bar immediately 
after the annual meeting, should this report be approved and 
adopted by the Association. 
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The committee has concluded that the reports, previously 
submitted by similar committees, would probably be unworkable, 
especially without the very active participation of the public serv-
ice director therein, because, too much reliance was placed therein 
on the cooperation of the schools of the State of Nebraska who, in 
the opinion of the committee, are already overloaded with extra-
curricular projects continually being submitted to them for con-
sideration by outside organizations. It was felt that reliance 
should not be placed on the cooperation of the schools as a basis 
for the activities of this committee but rather on the lawyers of 
Nebraska who, as individuals, could continue to render a great 
service in the field of American citizenship. It, therefore, is 
recommended that the report of previous committees for the years 
of 1953 and 1954 be set aside and that, in lieu thereof, the instant 
report be adopted for immediate action.• 
Lloyd L. Pospishil, Chairman 
Paul H. Bek, Coordinator 
C. M. Kingsbury 
John M. Brower 
Thomas M. Davies 
Clarence C. Kunc 
John F. McCarthy 
John H. Keriakedes 
L. R. Frerichs 
Frank J. Mattoon 
Robert C. Bosley 
CITATION 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the NE-
BRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION does hereby proudly 
recognize and highly commend 
JOHN DOE 
for distinquished service rendered by him in the field of AMERI-
CAN CITIZENSHIP during the past year. 




President, Nebraska State Bar 
Association. 
Chairman, Committee on 
Citizenship. 
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Dear Fellow Attorney: 
In Re: Committee on Ame1·ican Citizenship. 
The Nebraska State Bar Association has just adopted a pro-
gram on American citizenship in which every lawyer in the state 
can participate, if he wishes to do so. The details of that program 
were set out in the official report of the Committee on American 
Citizenship at the last annual meeting of this Association. Please 
ref er to it for information and guidance. 
Even though lawyers, since time immemorial, have rendered 
great service to their communities, especially in the field of Ameri-
can citizenship, yet unfortunately the legal profession as such, 
is not held in high esteem by the general public. One of the pur-
poses of this program is to correct this erroneous impression on 
the part of the lay public. 
This committee seeks information concerning the numerous 
activities in which Nebraska lawyers participate, the general ef-
fect of which is to improve the standaTds of American citizenship. 
The enclosed questionnaire is for this purpose. Please complete 
it and return it to the undersigned. The committee then will com-
pile and analyze all of this information. Or if you know of other 
lawyers in your community who are entitled to recognition for 
their work in this field, please give us their names. 
The public service director will utilize so much of this in-
formation as will apprise the general public of what lawyers have 
been doing and are doing in this field. Certainly this should tend 
to improve our public relations. 
On the basis of this, and other reliable information, one 
lawyer from each judicial district who has done outstanding work 
in this field will be recognized. Such recognition will be made at 
the annual meeting of the Association (where a citation will be 
presented), and in the newspapers of the judicial district in which 
that lawyer resides. This should provide an even greater incen-
tive for lawyers to render service in this field. It also should 
place the legal profession in higher repute with the general public. 
The period for which this report is to be made will be from 
July 1, 1955, to July 1, 1956. Therefore please return the ques-
tionnaire on or before July 15, 1956. 
The success or failure of this program will depend entirely 
upon the cooperation of the Bar. Your assistance in this regard~ 
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Chairman, Committee on American 
Citizenship, Nebraska State Bar 
Association. 
Address: ............................................. . 
. Judicial District: ............................. . 
QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING YOUR ACTIVITIES IN 
THE FIELD OF PROMOTING AMERICAN CITIZEN-
SHIP FROM JULY 1, 1955, to JULY 1, 1956. 
(Note : If the space allotted is inadequate, please furnish addi-
tional information on a separate sheet of paper). 
1. LEGISLATION: 
(a) Did you serve in Congress or the legislature? 
(b) If so, for what periods? 
(c) What legislation did you sponsor and/or support which 
would be conducive to improving American citizenship? 
2. JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: 
(a) Do you hold a judicial position? 
(b) If so, describe it. 
( c) Did your work tend to improve the administration of 
justice, or eliminate crime, corruption and/or combat 
juvenile delinquency? 
(d) If so, in what manner? 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE WORK: 
(a) Have you held an administrative post? 
(b) If so, what kind and during what periods? 
(c) Did your work tend to improve the efficiency of ad-
ministration of government or "clean up" graft and 
corruption? 
( d) If so, in what regard? 
4. MEMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITTEES: 
(a) Name the organizations and committees of which you 
are a member. 
(b) As a member of such organizations or committees, just 
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what have you done to improve the standards of Ameri-
can citizenship? 
5. AMERICANISM VS. COMMUNISM: 
(a) Have you engaged in any activity, the basic purpose 
of which was to combat Communism and subversive ac-
tivities? 
(b) If so, just what have you done? 
6. VETERANS: 
(a) If you are a veteran of a war, have you, as such, done 
anything to improve the standards of American citizen-
ship? 
(b) If so, just what did you do? 
7. PUBLIC SPEAKING: 
(a) If you have done any public speaking, did you speak on 
such occasions and subjects as would foster American 
citizenship? 
(b) If so, in what manner and to what extent? 
8. YOUTH ACTIVITIES: 
(a) Have you been a leader in youth activities, such as Boy 
Scouts, junior baseball, Boys' and Girls' County Gov-
ernment, contests on the American constitution, etc.? 
(b) If so, just what have you done in this connection? 
9. CITIZENSHIP CANDIDATES: 
(a) Have you gratuitously assisted citizenship candidates? 
(1) If so, to what extent? 
{b) Have you arranged to honor individuals who have just 
been granted their citizenship? 
(1) If so, in what manner and to what extent? 
10. ACTIVITIES ON LOCAL BOARDS: 
(a) Have you served on local boards, such as school boards, 
selective service boards, village boards or city councils, 
veterans service committees, or as service officer? 
(b) If so, describe the character and extent of this activity 
on your part. 
11. GRATUITOUS LEGAL ASSISTANCE: 
(a) How much legal service have you rendered gratuitously 
both in the office and in the courts in behalf of indigent 
persons? 
(b) Describe the nature and the extent of it. 
12. MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES: 
(a) Detail just what you have done. 
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13. OTHER LAWYERS DESERVING RECOGNITION: 
(a) Give their names and addresses. 
(b) Short resume of their activities. 
14. REMARKS: 
Report of the Committee on Cooperation with the 
American Law Institute 
The report of the Committee on Cooperation with the Ameri-
can Law Institute was presented by Judge Harry Spencer, chair-
man of the committee. The report, which was approved by the 
House of Delegates, follows: 
The thirty-second annual meeting of the American Law In-
stitute was held at Washington, D. C., on May 18, 19, 20 and 21, 
1955. The chairman of the committee was in attendance for the 
four days. 
The material covered at the sessions were the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute, Re-
statement of the Law, which included Tentative Draft No. 3 of 
Agency, Tentative Draft No. 2 of Trusts, and Tentative Drafts 
No. 3 and No. 4 of the Model Penal Code. As previously reported, 
the 1952 session officially adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The 1955 session considered some amendments set out in Supple-
ment No. 1 which had been approved by the editorial board. As 
of this date, only one state, Pennsylvania, has adopted the code. 
It is the understanding of your committee that some amendments 
are being offered in Pennsylvania and that there is some work 
being done on the code in New York State. Inasmuch as the 
code is designed to replace a substantial number of Uniform Acts 
in that it comprehensively covers sales, commercial paper, bank 
deposits and collections, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills 
of lading and documents of title investment securities and secured 
transactions, it is the thought of your committee, as expressed 
previously, that it would be unwise for us to recommend the 
adoption of the code in Nebraska until its adoption and use in 
some of the more highly commercialized states had demonstrated 
its general acceptance. 
Tentative Draft No. 10 of the estate and gift tax part of 
the Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute was submitted, 
discussed and approved with some minor changes. 
Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Restatement of the Law, Second, 
of Agency was presented by Dean Seavey and discussed at length 
PROCEEDINGS, 1955 165 
by the membership. Some suggestions were made which are to 
be further considered by Dean Seavey. 
Austin W. Scott, the reporter for Restatement of the Law, 
Second, of Trusts, presented Tentative Draft No. 2 which included 
two Chapters-Chapter 1, "Definitions and Distinctions," and 
Chapter 2, "The Creation of a Trust.'' These also were discussed 
at length and were tentatively adpoted by the Association. 
Herbert Wechsler, the reporter on the Model Penal Code, 
Louis B. Schwartz and Paul W. Tappan, associate reporters, pre-
sented Tentative Draft No. 3 and Tentative Draft No. 4 of the 
Model Penal Code. Tentative Draft No. 3 covered proposals for 
the sentencing and treatment of young adult offenders under the 
Model Penal Code. This was discussed at great length but no 
definite action was taken. This material will undoubtedly be 
covered by a further draft at a subsequent session. 
Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Model Penal Code covered Arti-
cles 1, 2, 4 and Article 207. Article 4, "Responsibility," was dis-
cussed at some length, as was Article 207 covering "Sexual Of-
fenses.'' With specific reference to sexual off ens es, the crime 
of adultery is eliminated from the Model Penal Code, as is sodomy 
between two competent adults. The latter created considerable 
controversy but was adopted by a small majority of those present. 
The debate, however, was such that I am certain that the reporter 
will discuss this matter further with the editorial board and it 
is possible that changes will be made at a later session. 
The institute is continuing and expanding its work in the 
field of continuing legal education. This is a joint project with 
the American Bar Association. It is suggested that those of our 
members who are not familiar with this program on continuing 
legal education should familiarize themselves with the publica-
tions of this committee. It is hoped that there will be a display 
of these publications at our annual meeting. 
It is the opinion and 1·ecommendation of you1· committee that 
the Committee on Cooperation with The American Law Institute 
continue to keep in close touch with the work of the institute, 
lending such service as it is ca:pable of in the promotion of its 
work in procuring for the membe1·s of the Bar and the public the 
greatest possible benefits; that future committees consider the 
fact that the restatements are undergoing revision and that fur-
ther work should be done on the Nebraska Annotations to the 
Restatements; and, further that the committee be authorized, at 
Association expense, as deemed advisable, to have a -rnember there-
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of in attendance at the next annual meeting of the American Law 
Institute. 
Harry A. Spencer, Chairman 
Chauncey E. Barney 
Robert H. Beatty 
Kenneth B. Holm 
Lyle E. Jackson 
L. R. Stiner 
John W. Yeager 
Harvey M. Johnsen 
Robert G. Simmons 
Laurens Williams 
Report of the Committee on Crime and 
Delinquency Prevention 
The report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Pre-
vention was presented by Alfred G. Ellick, chairman. Each of 
the several recommendations of the committee was submitted sepa-
rately and all were approved by the House of Delegates. The 
report of the committee follows: 
Your Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention has 
met three times in Lincoln since the last meeting of this Associa-
tion and sub-committees have met elsewhere on a number of 
occasions. Our work has been divided into the following fields. 
PAROLE AND PROBATION 
Under the chairmanship of Robert A. Nelson a sub-committee 
prepared and drafted a bill to create a state-wide probationary 
system. This was recommended by our committee in its 1953 
report and the recommendation was approved by the Bar Associa-
tion at its annual meeting in that year. The bill prepared by Mr. 
Nelson and his sub-committee was introduced as L.B. 210. With-
out detailing its provisions, suffice to say that it created a state 
probation system, the cost of which would be borne by the state in-
stead of by the individual counties, and which would be supervised 
by the Department of Justice. A hearing on the bill was held 
before the legislative judiciary committee, at which time mem-
bers of our committee took an active part in explaining its pro-
visions and the need for its enactment. At the same time a hear-
ing was held on L. B. 268 which was largely prepared by Judge 
Stanley Bartos and which divided the state into eleven separate 
probation districts. 
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Both bills were eventually killed in committee. We believe 
that this was extremely unfortunate, since there seems to be no 
dispute whatsoever about the dire need of a state probation sys-
tem. The only problem arises out of the mechanics of setting 
one up. The bill sponsored by our committee was first submitted 
to Hon~ C. G. Perry, chairman of a committ€e appointed by the 
District Judges Association to prepare a similar bill, and special 
pains were taken to draw the bill in such a way that it would 
not be objectionable to members of the judiciary. We realize the 
problem is a difficult one and that there are many conflicting 
viewpoints which must be reconciled. Nevertheless we believe the 
ultimate objective is extemely worthwhile and should be pursued. 
We recommend, therefore, that this committee continue its 
efforts toward drafting and securing the adoption of a bill 1which 
will establish a state-wide probation system. 
REVISION OF LAWS RELATING TO SEX OFFENDERS 
Under the chairmanship of James F. Brogan of Madison a 
subcommittee of our committee spent considerable time studying 
the laws of this state relating to sex offenses. A tremendous 
amount of material was gathered together relating to this prob-
lem and the views of judges, law enforcement officials, correc-
tional institution officials and others were obtained. No over-all 
revision of our sex psychopath laws was proposed for the reason 
that there was insufficient time to do so. However, our com-
mittee was instrumental in securing the defeat of L. B. 84 and 
L. B. 85 which would, in our opinion, have weakened rather than 
strengthened our procedures for dealing with sex offenders. We 
endorsed L. B. 542 which changed the definition of a sexual psy-
chopath. 
This is a problem which currently is causing a great deal of 
concern, and sometimes even hysteria. As lawyers it is our duty 
to make certain that a proper perspective and balance is main-
tained so that, on the one hand, sex offenders are properly pun-
ished or treated as the individual case may require and, on the 
other hand, their legal rights are protected. We recommend 
further study of our laws relating to sex offenders with a view 
toward determining whether corrective legislation should be in-
troduced at the next legislative session. 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
In this committee's report of last year we made certain con-
crete recommendations and proposals dealing with the responsi-
bility of lawyers in the field of juvenile delinquency. We pointed 
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out the lawyer's unique position in domestic relations problems 
and the tremendous opportunity he has to encourage families to 
remain intact so that children can be reared in a home-like and 
religious atmosphere. Approximately 85 per cent of all cases of 
juvenile delinquency can be traced to some fundamental defect of 
family structure. We also pointed out the lawyer's responsibility 
in adoption cases and dependency hearings. 
While we believe that most lawyers, as individuals, are mak-
ing some contribution to community efforts to combat juvenile 
delinquency, our studies have shown that in their professional life 
neither individually nor collectively are they offering much help 
in solving this problem. A survey of a number of midwestern 
states reveals that in only one instance has the state bar associa-
tion any kind of an educational program in this field. The Ameri-
can Bar Association only this past winter decided to place the 
subject under the jurisdiction of its family law section. It is 
apparently another indication of the reluctance of lawyers to act 
in concert to help solve a common problem. 
We recommend a program, under the sponsorship of this 
conimittee, to inform attorneys of their responsibilities in this 
field and of the many ways in which, during the course of their 
professional practice, they can help combat juvenile delinquency. 
OTHER MATTERS 
We are pleased to report that largely through the efforts of 
William J. Hotz, Jr., of our committee the American Bar Associa-
tion's Special Committee on the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice has tentatively selected Nebraska as one of the first states 
to be studied in its survey project. The survey, if authorized, 
\Vill be financed by the Ford Foundation and should prove of 
great benefit to the lawyers of this state. 
Other matters have been recommended in previous reports 
upon which our committee took no action this year. Among these 
is the transfer of the criminal investigation division from the 
Highway Department to the Department of Justice; also passage 
of a medical examiner's bill which would result in the employment 
by the state of a trained medico-legal investigator who would be 
on call to any county in the state to help in the investigation of 
a violent or unknown death. We recommend that steps be taken 
by the committee to secure the adoption of these proposals. 
Alfred G. Ellick, Chairman 
James F. Brogan 
John E. Deming 
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Robert G. Fraser 
Jack H. Hendrix 
William J. Hotz, Jr. 
Robert A. Nelson 
Louis J. Patz 
Theodore L. Richling 
James I. Shamberg 
Hugh Stuart 
William H. Line 
Harry N. Larson 
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The report of the Committee on County Law Libraries was 
presented by Joseph T. Votava, chairman. The report, which was 
approved by the House of Delegates, follows: 
Report of the Committee on County Law Libraries 
The committee held a meeting at Grand Island on December 
9, 1954. Most of the committee members were present. The meet-
ing was also attended by last year's committee chairman, Mr. 
Charles B. Paine. Mr. Paine not only gave us the benefit of his 
experience but also turned over to us a complete survey made by 
his Committee of the County Library Situation. 
The survey does not portray a very encouraging picture. 
There are some county libraries. Some additional libraries are 
being installed but progress is very slow. An analysis of the 
survey compels only one conclusion: If the lawyers in the county 
actually want a central library, a library is started and maintained. 
County commissioners almost invariably cooperate by appropriat-
ing all or matching funds to start and continue such a library. 
The statutes to that end are adequate. The only thing lacking is 
a real desire of the local attorneys to want a central library. 
Acting upon the foregoing conclusion so clearly disclosed, 
your committee decided that a program of education is the only 
way to further the idea of county libraries. Therefore we an-
nounced that any member of the committee would be available to 
discuss the matter at any of the county or regional meetings of 
the Bar; that apparently there is no burning desire for a county 
library is evidenced by the fact that no county or regional associa-
tion placed the subject on its program. 
As a further means of convincing the lawyers that they can-
not practice law without law books readily available, and that a 
county library is the only feasible method to that end, your com-
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mittee decided in each issue of the N ebmska Bar Journal to have 
an article on this subject. As you have noted, such articles are 
being published. This appears to be the best way to bring home to 
the lawyers the benefits of a central library and ignite in the 
hearts of some of them a desire to have it. 
We believe that every average county should have a library 
and that eventually it will have it; but first the lawyers in the 
community must be convinced of the needs and benefits of such a 
library. 
La\vyers are constitutionally conservative and hold on to the 
past. Older lawyers especially, who have either accumulated a 
large library or who have practiced law with a limited number of 
law books, are hard to convince. The future of central libraries 
rests with the younger members of the Bar who realize the need 
of a fu.ll working law library and who feel the initial cost and 
expense of subsequent maintenance. These younger lawyers are 
the ones who must take the lead in this project. 
Only an educational program will move the lawyers to action. 
Lawyers cannot be forced; but facts do convince them. We there-
fore 1·ecommend that the c01nmittee be continued and that the need 
and benefit of a central library be brought home to our lawyers 
again and again and again by discussions before Bar meetings and 
by articles in our Journal. 




Lloyd E. Christensen 
John C. Coupland 
0. E. Drake 
Donald C. Hosford 
Joseph C. Hranac 
Earl J. Lee 
J. Jay Marx 
Raymond B. Morrissey 
Bernard B. Smith 
Wayne 0. Stoehr 
Archibald J. Weaver 
The report of the Special Committee on the Investigation and 
Disposition of Charges was presented by Clarence A. H. Meyer, 
chairman of the committee. The report, which was approved by 
the House of Delegates, follows : 
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Report of the Special Committee on Rules Governing 
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The House of Delegates at its meeting of October 13, 1954, 
approved the proposal of the Special Committee recommending 
amendment of Section 7-114, Reissue Revised Statutes, 1943, and 
the committee therefore arranged for the drafting and introduc-
tion of the necessary bill at the sbcty-seventh session of the Ne-
braska legislature. The bill, L. B. 27, was referred to the Com-
mittee on Judiciary, and representatives of your Special Committee 
appeared before the legislative committee on behalf of the bill. It 
was passed early in the session and signed by the governor. 
The House of Delegates at its 1954 meeting also adopted a 
motion providing that the Supreme Court of Nebraska be re-
quested to give consideration to amending Article XI of the rules 
creating, controlling and regulating the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation, to the end that the disciplinary procedure therein set 
forth be improved. In accordance with those instructions, your 
Special Committee prepared recommended changes to Article XI, 
and these were submitted to the Judicial Council, since that group 
is charged with the duty of making recommendations tending to 
the simplification of the pleadings, practice and procedure of the 
judicial system of the State of Nebraska. We then met with the 
Judicial Council on June 17, at their invitation, and at that time 
a final draft of proposed changes was agreed upon, and this draft 
was submitted to the Supreme Court with the recommendation of 
the Judicial Council that it be adopted by the court. 
The draft was adopted by the Supreme Court on June 24, 
1955. 
Early in 1955 there came to the attention of your Special 
Committee a revised draft of the proposed Rules of Court for 
Disciplinary Proceedings prepared by a committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. This draft was considered by the committee, 
but since adoption of those proposals would entail such a f unda-
mental change in the procedure now followed in this state, it was 
the conclusion of the committee that their adoption should not 
be considered at this time. 
We recommend that the Special Conunittee on Rules Govern-
ing Investigation and Disposition of Charges of the Nebraska State 
Bar Association be dissolved. 
Wilber S. Aten 
Donald F. Sampson 
Daniel Stubbs 
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Varro E. Tyler 
Arthur A. Whitworth 
Raymond G. Young 
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Chairman 
Appendix to Report of Special Committee on Investigation 
~-and Disposition of Charges 
AMENDED ARTICLE XI 
ARTICLE XI. 
INVESTIGATION AND DISPOSITION OF CHARGES 
1. DISTRICT COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; MEMBER-
SHIP; TERM. The Supreme Court shall appoint a Committee on 
Inquiry in each district court judicial district, of not fewer than 
three (3) members and two alternates who shall serve for such 
term as shall be designated. One member shall be designated as 
chairman, and one as vice-chairman to serve as chairman in the 
event of the disqualification or unavailability of the chairman. 
Where the chairman determines that a regular member is dis-
qualified or unavailable, he shall select an alternate to serve. 
2. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; MEMBERSHIP; TERM. 
The Supreme Court shall appoint a committee to be known as the 
Advisory Committee, which shall consist of one member from 
each Supreme Court judicial district and a chairman at large. The 
members of such committee shall serve for such term as shall be 
designated. 
3. INITIATION OF CHARGES. (a) All charges of unpro-
fessional conduct on the part of any member of the Association 
shall be first made to the Committee on Inquiry in the district 
where such member resides, or to the secretary-treasurer of the 
Association or the clerk of the Supreme Court who shall forward 
them to the proper Committee on Inquiry; but in all cases where 
such committee has information of conduct appearing to be un-
professional it shall forthwith undertake the investigation pro-
vided for in Section 5 of this Article even though charges have 
not been filed with the committee. (b) Where the initial charges 
are lodged with a Committee on Inquiry such committee shall 
forthwith advise the secretary-treasurer of such fact. 
4. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; DISQUALIFICATION OF 
MEMBERS; POWERS OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE. (a) In 
the event that the chairman is unable to assemble a full committee 
because of unavailability or disqualification of regular members 
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and alternates, or where a majority of the members of the com-
mittee, for reasons stated request it, the chairman shall forthwith 
report the matter to the Advisory Committee for disposition, and 
such committee shall have power to (1) direct that the members 
of said Committee on Inquiry who are not disqualified shall pro-
ceed and determine such matter~ and in t1:1at connection the Ad-
visory Committee may review and disallow claims of disqualifica-
tion by members and alternates of Committees on Inquiry; or, 
(2) direct that the matter shall be referred to some other Com-
mittee on Inquiry in which case the Committee on Inquiry to 
which it is so referred shall have full power and jurisdiction to 
the same extent and in like manner as if said matter had arisen 
in its district and had been originally lodged with it; or, (3) take 
jurisdiction of and determine said matter to the same e:i..'ient and 
with like power as the original Committee on Inquiry might have 
done if no disqualifications existed as to any of the members there-
of; or, (4) direct the appointment of an investigator, who shall 
submit his report, as directed by the Advisory Committee, either 
to a Committee on Inquiry or to the Advisory Committee, after 
which such committee shall proceed with appropriate disposition 
of the charges. 
(b) The investigator referred to in subdivision (4) above 
shall be selected by the secretary-treasurer, with the approval of 
the president. Investigators shall be paid their expenses and 
such per diem as may be approved by the president. 
(c) When charges are lodged with a Committee on Inquiry, 
or with the Advisory Committee, the committee concerned shall 
report progress on handling of the charges to the secretary-treas-
urer on the last day of the first full calendar month elapsing 
after receiving the charges and each month thereafter, and shall 
similarly report final disposition of the charges. If such report 
is not received by the fifth day of the month, the secretary-
treasurer shall request that the report be forwarded forthwith, 
and if it is not received within ten days thereafter he shall report 
such fact to the court. At the direction of the president, the 
secretary-treasurer shall similarly advise the court if the reports 
received by him indicate unreasonable delay at any stage in the 
handling of disciplinary proceedings. 
5. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; INFORMAL INVESTIGA-
TION. It shall be the duty of the Committee on Inquiry, upon 
having information of or upon receiving charges of unprofessional 
conduct on the part of a member, to make an informal and pri-
vate investigation of the matter; and upon being satisfied that 
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any such information is 'Yithout foundation or that such charges 
are without merit, the committee shall take no further action 
except to dismiss the charges; but if it is not so satisfied, the 
Committee on Inquiry shall forthwith advise the secretary-treas-
urer of such fact and may, if it deems it advisable, request the 
appointment of an investigator. If the president approves the 
request for an investigator, one shall be selected and paid in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Section 4 (b) of this Article. 
6. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; INFORMAL INVESTIGA-
TION. In case the Committee on Inquiry shall determine that 
there is no reasonable ground to believe the members charged 
guilty of an offense which justifies disciplinary action, the person 
or persons making the initial charges may lodge with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court an informal charge supported by affidavits 
or other prima facie evidence. The clerk of the Supreme Court 
shall thereupon obtain from the Committee on Inquiry the written 
charges, statements, answer, affidavits or documents filed with 
it and a report of the said Committee on Inquiry, and shall refer 
all of such documents to the Advisory Committee for review and 
recommendation. 
7. COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY; FORMAL CHARGES; 
HEARINGS; POWERS; REPORT. (a) If, however, a Com-
mittee on Inquiry, after making said informal and private investi-
gation, concludes that there is reasonable ground to believe that 
the member against whom the charges are made is guilty of an 
offense which may require and justify disciplinary action, said 
committee shall immediately reduce or cause the charges to be 
reduced to writing in the form of a simple, unsworn statement, 
specifying with particularity the facts which constitute the basis 
thereof, and shall serve a copy of said written charges upon the 
said member; and the committee shall hold a hearing upon twenty 
(20) days' notice to the said member and the person making the 
charges, at which hearing the parties may be heard and may file 
with the committee any statement, answer, affidavit or document 
and produce other evidence. At all such hearings, the investiga-
tor, if one be appointed in the case, shall at the request of the 
committee conduct the examination of the witnesses and introduc-
tion of evidence for the committee. Notice of the time and place 
of hearing shall be given to the parties by registered mail ad-
dressed to their last known residence or place of business. The 
committee or the chairman thereof may continue and adjourn 
hearing and proceedings from time to time and in case where 
such orders of continuance or adjournment are made the com-
mittee or chairman shall give notice thereof to the party making 
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the charges and respondents by registered mail or personal notice 
unless such parties were present in person or by counsel when 
such order of continuance or adjournment was announced. 
(b) If the Committee on Inquiry finds that there is reason-
able ground to believe the said member guilty of the misconduct 
charged, it shall thereupon transmit to the clerk of the Supreme 
Court the committee's report of investigation, a transcript con-
taining the charges, and any statement, answer, affidavits or docu-
ments submitted and filed, and shall accompany the same with a 
complaint prepared, verified by any member or members of the 
committee, and ready for filing in the Supreme Court. The com-
plaint shall be made in the name of the state on the relation of 
the Nebraska State Bar Association. 
8. ADVISORY COMMITTEE; REVIEW OF RECORD; RE-
PORT. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall thereupon refer the 
entire record including the report of the Committee on Inquiry, 
the transcript and the complaint to the Advisory Committee for 
review. The Advisory Committee shall have authority to hold 
further hearing at which the person or persons making the initial 
charges and the member charged shall have a right to be heard; 
but the Advisory Committee may direct disposition of the charges 
and complaint without further hearing. If the Advisory Commit-
tee determines that no probable cause for disciplinary action 
exists, it shall so report to the clerk of the Supreme Court and the 
matter shall stand dismissed unless otherwise directed by the 
Supreme Court. If the Advisory Committee determines that prob-
able cause for disciplinary action exists, it shall transmit its 
report, the report of the Committee on Inquiry, the transcript, 
and the complaint submitted by the Committee on Inquiry, to-
gether with such amendments thereto as to it may seem proper, to 
the clerk of the Supreme Court who shall forthwith enter the 
same upon the docket of the court as an original action. 
9. COMMITTEE-POWER OF SUBPOENA AND TO AD-
MINISTER OATHS. Committees on Inquiry and the Advisory 
Committee within their respective jurisdictions are empowered to 
issue writs of subpoena, including subpoena duces tecum, in the 
name of the State of Nebraska, requiring the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses and parties, and the production of records, 
books and papers, at hearings before said committees ; to adminis-
ter oaths to parties and witnesses and to take their sworn testi-
mony or their unsworn statements as the committee may decide; 
and to certify to this court, for appropriate action by the court, 
any refusal of a party or witness to comply with the requirements 
of a subpoena or to testify or answer questions at a hearing. 
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10. Unless requested by the member charged neither the 
hearings, records or proceedings of the Committee on Inquiry or of 
the Advisory Committee shall be made public, nor shall any pub-
licity be given thereto prior to the filing of a complaint in the 
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court. 
11. No complaint in any case shall be filed with the Supreme 
Court until charges shall have first been presented to the Com-
mittee on Inquiry and considered by the Advisory Committee as 
herein provided. 
12. Upon the filing in the Supreme Court of a complaint for 
disciplinary action as contemplated and provided by this Article 
against a member of the Association, the Supreme Court in its 
discretion may either designate the attorney general or appoint 
any attorney of the court to prosecute the action. The attorney 
general or attorney so appointed may in his discretion prepare and 
file an amended or new complaint, and in case he has in his pos-
session evidence which in his opinion warrants disciplinary action 
on any additional charge or charges, he may incorporate such ad-
ditional charge or charges in the complaint and prosecute same 
regardless of the fact that such new charge or charges have not 
been presented to the Committee on Inquiry or considered by the 
Advisory Committee. 
13. Actual expenses incurred by the District or Advisory 
Committees in connection with hearings prior to the filing of a 
complaint in the Supreme Court shall be borne by the Association. 
14. In addition to the duties heretofore imposed upon the 
Advisory Committee, the said committee shall confer and advise 
with the Committees on Inquiry, and shall promulgate uniform 
rules of practice and procedure for the hearings and disposition 
of charges before such committee. The Advisory Committee is 
further empowered in its discretion at the request of any mem-
ber of the Association, to express its advisory opinion or give its 
interpretation upon rules of professional conduct where such ques-
tion has not been previously determined and is not pending in 
any proceeding for a determination thereof. 
15. The provisions of this Article shall be cumulative and 
not exclusive. 
The report of the Committee on the Judiciary ·was presented 
by Robert Van Pelt, chairman of the committee. The report, 
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows: 
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Report of the Committee on Judiciary 
The Committee on Judiciary concluded for 1955 to put forth 
its greatest effort in the drafting and support of the bills recom-
mended by last year's committee. These provided for an increase 
in the judicial salaries of district and supreme Court judges and 
for a retirement system for those judges. The salary bill was 
introduced by Senators Brower, Beaver, Bedford, Adams and Cole 
as Legislative Bill No. 58. The retirement bill was introdued 
by Senators Kotouc, lVIartin and Otto as Legislative Bill No. 38. 
Legislative Bill No. 58 was i·ef erred to the Miscellaneous Appro-
priations Committee and Legislative Bill No. 38 was ref erred to 
the Judiciary Committee. Members of your committee assisted in 
the presentation of these bills to the legislative committees. The 
bar is also deeply indebted to the Honorable John W. Delehant, 
United States District Judge for Nebraska, who made an appear-
ance and excellent presentation on behalf of each of these bills. 
We are pleased to report that both bills with amendments 
that were approved by the committee and others interested in the 
legislation, were enacted and were s_igned by the governor. Each 
becomes effective September 18, 1955. 
We will not prolong this report by setting forth the names 
of the members of the legislature and others who rendered valu-
able support in the enactment of this legislation. It was pleasing 
to the committee, however, to find widespread support among 
both laymen and lawyers for this legislation. The officers of the 
District Judges Association and its legislative chairman were at 
all times most cooperative. 
The committee felt that the effectiveness of its efforts should 
not be diluted by supporting bills other than the two above named. 
We did assure the county judges and their association that if they 
did not receive deserved consideration from the 1955 legislature 
that the committee would recommend that the Bar Association 
assist them in presenting their matters to the 1957 legislature. 
We 1·ecommend that the Bar Association cooperate with the 
County Judges Association in their efforts to raise the standarc1..s 
of eligibility for county judges and in securing compensation for 
those occupying this important off ice, commensurate with its 
duties and responsibilities. 
Charles F. Adams 
Auburn H. Atkins 
Robert A. Barlow 
Jean B. Cain 
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Thomas F. Colfer 
James D. Conway 
E. B. Crofoot 
J. D. Cronin 
Lowell C. Davis 
George L. DeLacy 
Robert H. Downing 
Daniel J. Gross 
Maynard M. Grosshans 
Earl Hasselbalch 
Maurice S. Hevelone 
Leon L. Hines 
Thomas J. Keenan 
William H. Lamme 
James A. Lane 
Alexander McKie 
Robert R. Moodie 
T. Simpson Morton 
Earl J. Moyer 
George A. Munro 
Milton C. Murphy 
Greydon L. Nichols 
Kenneth M. Olds 
William S. Padley 
William B. Quigley 
Alfred D. Raun 
Varro H. Rhodes 
Philip H. Robinson 
Merle M. Runyan 
Ernest S. Schiefelbein 
Abel V. Shotwell 
George A. Skultety 
Walter H. Smith 
Edward L. Vogeltanz 
Robert Van Pelt, Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Legal Aid was presented by 
Robert M. Spire, chairman. The report, which was approved by 
the House of Delegates, follows: 
Report of the Committee on Legal Aid 
Your committee has continued its investigation of the status 
of Legal Aid services in Nebraska, and sul;>mits the following 
report: 
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The Omaha Legal Aid Clinic is jointly sponsored by the 
Creighton University College of Law, the Omaha Bar Association, 
and the Omaha Barristers Club. The office of the clinic is located 
in the Creighton College of Law building. 
The Lincoln Legal Aid Clinic is jointly sponsored by the 
Nebraska University College of Law, the Lincoln Bar Association, 
and the Lincoln Barristers Club. The office of the Clinic is 
located in the Nebraska College of Law building. 
The Legal Aid Clinic of Cheyenne County has been newly 
organized during the year under the guidance of eight members of 
the Cheyenne County Bar Association. The work of the clinic is 
handled by volunteer members of the Cheyenne County Bar As-
sociation on a rotating basis. 
The purpose of these three clinics is to provide free legal aid 
services to persons who are financially unable to pay for legal 
services which they require. It is the opinion of yoU1· committee 
that necessary legal aid services are being rendered satisfactorily 
in the three areas in which these clinics operate. Your committee 
repeats its prior recommendation that local Bar Associations 
should designate certain of its own members to handle legal aid 
services on a rotating basis. In this connection, you')' committee 
urges local Bar Associations to follow the example set this year 
by the Cheyenne County Bar Association in order that proper 
legal aid services may be available throughout the state. 
Edward F. Carter, Jr. 
Albert W. Crites 
Robert V. Denney 
Tyler B. Gaines 
Joseph Ginsburg 
Richard Hunter 
Lynn D. Hutton, Jr. 
Sam Klaver 
Ralph S. Kryger 
Milton A. Mills, Jr. 
Robert D. Moodie 
Charles B. Paine 
C. Firman Samuelson 
Rodney R. Smith 
Thomas C. Quinlan, Coordinator 
Robert l\f. Spire, Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Legislation was presented by 
Theodore J. Fraizer, chairman of the committee. The report, 
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows : 
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Report of the Committee ori Legislation 
The Committee on Legislation devoted its interest during the 
1955 session of the Nebraska legislature to those measures which 
previously had received favorable recommendation by the various 
committees of this Association, the Executive Council and the 
Judicial Council. 
The committee has been composed largely of individuals who 
were chairmen of special committees of the Association or who 
had expressed particular interest in certain legislative matters. 
The several 'recommendations of the Judicial Council were 
embodied in Legislative Bills 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 
178 and 179, all of which have been enacted into law. 
I 
The recommendations of the Judiciary Committee for in-
creases in the salary of our judges were enacted into law in L. B. 
58, and that for a judge's retirement plan was adopted in L. B. 
38. The responsibility for the adoption of thei:;e measures was 
due largely to the activities of Mr. Robert Van Pelt, who is a 
member of this committee and is also chairman off the Judiciary 
Committee. 
A provision that municipal judges must be qualified members 
of the bar in good standing was approved in L. B. 494. 
In L. B. 27, certain details in disbarment procedures were 
amplified. 
Mr. J. A. C. Kennedy particularly interested himself in L. B. 
49 which modified the required vote for corporate reorganization. 
The taxation section proposed implementing changes in the 
inheritance tax laws which was the responsibility of Flavel A. 
Wright, and which are now found in L.B. 275 and 276. 
The original recommendations of the Oil and Gas Law Com-
mittee were introduced in L. B. 198, but later withdrawn when 
the proposals contained in this bill were embodied in other oil 
and gas legislation sponsored by the industry. Mr. Floyd E. Wright 
coordinated these matters in behalf of his Oil and Gas Committee 
with members of the industry. 
Although all of the foregoing legislative bills which have been 
proposed or sponsored by the Association received favorable ac-
tion, certain other measures did not become law. These were a 
proposal in L. B. 210 for a statewide parole system; an expert 
witness proposal in L. B. 332; a tort claims act, L. B. 350, and a 
proposal that a surviving spouse may i·eceive wages of the de-
ceased employee up to $500.00, free of debts. 
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Legislative Resolution 43 recommending to the Congress of 
the United States the adoption of the Reed-Walter amendment to 
Article V of the U. S. Constitution was referred to the Legislative 
Council Committee for study. 
The proposed recodification of the Nebraska highway laws 
was deferred because the proposed Uniform Vehicle Code was still 
under revision by the national commissions interesting themselves 
in this subject. 
Several individual lawyers made recommendations to the com-
mittee which were received after the House of Delegates deter-
mined which measures should receive the support of the Associa-
tion. These proposals which are worthy of further study involve 
the waiving of privilege in Sec. 25-1207, R. S. Neb. 1943, and clari-
fication of the Mechanics Lien Law in Sec. 52-101, R.R. S. 1943. 
We recommend for consideration the f orm:ulation and adop-
tion of an interpleader procedure which would largely follow the 
federal rules, including jurisdictional amount. 
We also recommend for consideration the matte,r of the au-
tho,rity of guardians, appointed and qualified under authority of 
other jurisdictions, being able to receipt for payments due under 
Nebraska workmen's conipensation benefits, and from estates 
being administered in Nebraska without 1·equfring the procedures 
set forth in Sec. 38-801, R.R. S. Neb. 1943. 
Charles F. Bongardt 
0. E. Cassem 
George A. Healey 
J. A. C. Kennedy 
Clarence A. H. Meyer 
Robert Van Pelt 
Flavel A. Wright 
Floyd E. Wright 
Theodore J. Fraizer, Chairman 
JEAN B. CAIN: The report of the Joint Conference of Law-
yers and Accountants. Mr. J. D. Cronin. Could you make your 
report at this time, Mr. Cronin? 
JULIUS D. CRONIN: The Committee on the Joint Conference 
between Lawyers and Accountants has not taken any action nor 
has there been any activity this past year due to the uncertainties 
incident to the effort nationally to change the regulation with 
respect to who may practice tax law. 
Some years ago however either the Bar Association or the 
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accountants instituted the practice of having the two committees 
meet at a dinner meeting in an informal gathering for the pur-
pose of discussion of common problems. 
Last year it was the Bar Association's turn to entertain the 
committee from the Accountants Association, but due to circum-
stances beyond our control no meeting was held. 
This year, and last month, we did have a joint meeting here 
in Omaha between the two committees. No action of any kind 
was taken, but mutual problems were discussed. That is the only 
activity of the committee for the past year. 
JEAN B. CAIN : You move the adoption of the report? 
JULIUS D. CRONIN: I move the adoption of the report, Mr. 
Chairman. 
VOICE: Second the motion. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks? 
(There was no response.) 
JEAN B. CAIN: All in favor of the motion indicate by saying 
Aye. 
Contrary No. 
The motion is carried. 
At this point in the proceedings of the House of Delegates 
the following action was taken: 
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. C. Russell Mattson, chairman of the 
Committee on Hearings, has an announcement he would like to 
make at this time. 
Mr. Mattson. 
c. RUSSELL MATTSON: Mr. Chairman, if the committee 
would meet with me at the table designated for our convenience 
during the luncheon period, I think we can dispose of at least this 
one resolution before us. 
JEAN B. CAIN : Is there anything else to come before the 
House of Delegates at this time? It seems that there are no other 
committee chairmen available for reports this morning. We had 
hoped to get some of those reports out of the way this morning 
because there will be some reports this afternoon that will take 
some time. 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Mr. Chairman. 
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JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Sampson. 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: At what time during our program 
do you wish to take up any new matters or suggestions of members 
of the Association? 
JEAN B. CAIN; I think now would be a splendid ti.ine for 
that. 
Won't you come forward so that they can all hear you, Mr. 
Sampson? 
DONALD F. SAMPSON: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. Two or 
three years ago I know a number of you who are here were on 
the committee that recommended an increase in the Bar Associa-
tion dues. I was very much in favor of it. One of the purposes 
was that we would have a public service director and consider-
able talk about putting out the pamphlets for distribution to the 
public. 
A number of those pamphlets have been put out, five, I think, 
to be specific. I think they are fine. We bought one of the 
display cases and pamphlets and have had them in our office, and 
the reaction, the acceptance and comments, and, I might say, the 
business that they have brought have been wonderful. I am 
very much in favor of it. 
We felt that it was no more than good public relations that 
those pamphlets be put in other places where they were available 
to the public. Some discussion this morning about the difficulty 
that you have getting things into the newspapers, getting things 
before the public. We thought that placing them in banks was 
a splendid place. It so happens that we do not have any banks 
in our country who are practicing law; they are all cooperative 
with the lawyers. They welcomed and appreciated the display 
racks and pamphlets. 
It gives the Bar Association, it seemed to us, an opportunity 
to disseminate these pamphlets to a wider segment of the public 
than was possible just by having them in our own offices. Now 
I come to the purpose of my remark. 
On the face of the display box it says "Distributed by cour-
tesy," I believe, "of the Nebraska State Bar Association," or some-
thing like that. It says the same on the bottom of each of the 
pamphlets, but we lawyers have to pay for them. It is not very 
much, I will grant that, a penny apiece, but it just seems to me 
that that was one of the purposes of raising our dues. They are 
not going to do any good as long as they are lying down in the 
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secretary's office in Lincoln. It just does not seem to me that 
the individual lawyers who would take the initiative in getting 
them distributed ought to have to carry even the penny apiece 
financial burden in addition to paying their dues. And I believe 
if it is proper I would offer a motion that the Nebraska State 
Bar Association pay for or furnish the pamphlets free of charge 
to members of the Association for distribution in their offices or 
at public appearances made by them or in other public institutions. 
JEAN B. CAIN : Is there a second to the motion? 
LAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Williams. 
LAURENS WILLIAMS: I rise to a point of order. I believe 
that under our articles only the Executive Council can decide how 
the Association's money shall be spent. 
I would suggest the form of your motion might be changed 
in the form of a recommendation or request of the council, but I 
believe that is up to the council. 
.JEAN B. CAIN: Any other remarks? 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Mr. Chairman. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Mr. Wilson. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Having been chairman of the Public 
Service Committee one year and president of your Association 
another year, these pamphlets came up during my year as chair-
man of a Committee on Public Service and were distributed pri-
marily during my year as the president, and the second issue of 
pamphlets are now published. 
It is a question of what you are going to use your money for. 
It has not been uncommon to have orders of a thousand or more 
pamphlets come in from lawyers. If we would give each lawyer 
who wants to display these racks and these pamphlets one thou-
sand, they cost the Association fifteen dollars. We are charging 
ten dollars per thousand but we a1·e spending fifteen dollars. If we 
spend fifteen dollars of every lawyer's dues on these pamphlets 
and racks, then we have five dollars with which to run your As-
sociation. 
Now it is a question the manner in which the Association 
should be run. It has been the custom of some of the associations 
and some of the county organizations to take up a small collection 
and buy the display racks and buy the pamphlets and make them 
available. When banks buy the pamphlets we have been charg-
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ing them the actual printing. When we have been furnishing 
them to the lawyers for display we have been charging them a 
penny apiece. 
It is just a question of how your funds are going to be used. 
We can spend twenty-five thousand dollars very easily furnishing 
these pamphlets which I think are wonderful. I know in my 
office many persons are picking them up. Clients like them. I 
think it is a wonderful thing, but I believe that is part of the 
public service that the lawyers are going to have to carry on for 
themselves, and I say that not to start a discussion but just as 
a matter of explanation. 
When this was discussed the first time by the Public Service 
Committee a year ago we wanted to know just how far the Bar 
Association could go in furnishing free pamphlets. A recom-
mendation was made to the Executive Council that twenty-five 
free pamphlets could be given to each member of the Bar and 
not break the Bar Association on the theory that lots of them 
would not ask for the twenty-five free copies. If each lawyer 
asks for twenty-five copies we are then financially embarrassed 
to carry on your institutes, to carry on your other public service 
work, and it is up to the Executive Council then to decide how 
they are going to spend your money which comes in the nature of 
dues for an entire program for this Association. 
I think it is out of the question to furnish them free beyond 
the twenty-five. Just sit down with your pencil and start figur-
ing how much it would cost us, and I think everybody could come 
up with the answer. I wish we could furnish them free, and I 
wish we had some way to furnish them. 
Now the Lincoln banks and the Omaha banks have in many 
instances bought in quantities of ten thousand each and have 
furnished them as a part of their public service. The Scottsbluff 
Bar, for instance, took up a small collection among the lawyers 
and made them available to the banks at the expense of the 
lawyers of the Scottsbluff Bar. That has been true of other Bars. 
That is something that I think has to be left to the Executive 
Council, but I want to answer you as to where I think your mone~r 
is going if we carry out our idea, which I think is a good one, Don~ 
but it's a financial impossibility. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any other remarks? 
HALE MCCOWAN: I propose a substitute motion that the 
matter of the distribution and cost of the pamphlets be ref erred 
to the Executive Council for their consideration. 
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JEAN B. CAIN : Do I hear a second? 
VOICE: Second. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks? 
JEAN B. CAIN: All in favor say aye. 
Opposed, no. The motion is carried. 
The report of the Committee on Public Service was presented 
by Elmer M. Scheele, chairman of the committee. The report, 
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows: 
Report of the Committee on Public Service 
Your Committee on Public Service has attempted in the past 
year to carry on a comprehensive public relations program. 
This program is designed to develop a better understanding 
between the public generally and the lawyers of the state with 
respect to the service lawyers are qualified to provide the public. 
We have also tried to educate the public to recognize situations 
in their daily lives in which they would do well to engage the 
services of a lawyer. We have tried to convince the public that 
the legal profession is dedicated to public service. 
We recognize that a planned program in public relations can 
never be a substitute for exemplary conduct on the part of bench 
and bar. We have tried to present a dignified display to the public 
of the true meaning of the law, courts and lawyers. We have 
solicited and encouraged the assistance of local bar associations in 
carrying out this day to day program. 
We feel that the term "public relations" is only another name 
for what clients and the general public think of us as lawyers. 
We have attempted to foster and develop a better understanding 
between lawyers and the public generally. 
After a proposed program had been carefully worked out by 
the members of the Public Service Committee its details and esti-
mated cost were presented to the Executive Council of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association on December 12, 1954. This pro-
gram as approved by the Executive Council has since been carried 
into effect. 
1. Pmnphlets. Three entirely new pamphlets for public dis-
tribution have been prepared, printed and distributed. 
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a. "Will You Be Next?" This pamphlet prepared in 
its original form by William H. lVIeier of Minden, Nebraska, 
describes in laymen's terms what to do in case of an auto-
mobile accident and advises the public how to safeguard 
their driver's license. 10,000 copies have been printed and 
are available for distribution. 
b. "Buying and Selling Real Estate" was written by 
John B. Cassel of Ainsworth, Nebraska, and 10,000 copies 
have been printed. 
c. A special pamphlet designed for the private use and 
edification of our members only and not for public distribu-
tion entitled "Confidentially Mr. Attorney, Take a Look in 
the Looking Glass" was written by Robert R. Wellington of 
Crawford, Nebraska. A sufficient supply to furnish each 
member of the Association with a copy of this pamphlet has 
been printed and distributed to members only. 
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10,000 reprints each of the original pamphlets "Joint Ten-
ancy" and "Wills" have been printed along with 5,000 reprints of 
the pamphlet "Are You Sure You Want to Sign That?" 25 copies 
of each pamphlet intended for public distribution will be furnished 
each member without charge and additional copies are available 
at one cent each. Requests should be addressed to Secretary 
George H. Turner. 
2. Pamphlet Racks. A quantity of handsome fabricated 
pamphlet racks has been obtained. These are intended for use in 
distributing the pamphlets through the medium of displaying them 
as handouts in law offices, banks, trust companies, building and 
loan associations and other public places. An adequate supply is 
available at a cost of $2.00 each postage prepaid. Orders should 
also be addressed to Secretary George H. Turner. 
3. Jurors Manual. 20,000 copies of a revised and "dressed 
up" pocket size Manual for Jurors in Nebraska have been printed. 
20,000 copies of the original manual have been distributed as a 
public service to persons called as jurors in the district courts of 
Nebraska. Over 2,000 copies have been furnished at the request 
of 117 schools throughout the state for use in classes in which the 
principles of our jury system are taught. 
4. Television Programs have been an innovation during the 
past year. Viewers on KMTV Omaha's "Better Living" afternoon 
program have seen 15 Bar Association-sponsored bi-weekly pro-
grams. The time for this program has been donated by KMTV. 
Subjects facluded in some of the pamphlets together with other 
matters intended to acquaint the public with the value of a law-
yer's services have been presented by members of the Association 
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from various parts of the state. A similar series of 10 programs 
has been presented over KHOL-TV, Axtell, Nebraska. The favor-
able public response of these programs has been indicated by a 
flood of requests for copies of the Bar Association pamphlets. 
5. Legislative Bill Service. Another innovation during the 
past year was the weekly furnishing of a mimeographed synopsis 
of each bill introduced in the 1955 session of the Nebraska legisla-
ture. This service showed the nature of all bills introduced and 
the standing of each bill during its consideration before commit-
tees and on general and select file. The service also listed the 
sections of the statutes amended or repealed by bills introduced at 
the end of each month. A sampling of the members indicates that 
the members feel this service is worthwhile and desire that it be 
continued each year the legislature is in session. Our president, 
.John J. Wilson deserves special recognition for his efforts in the 
preparation and distribution of this service. 
6. The committee continued its cooperation with the exten-
sion department of the University of Nebraska in furnishing law-
yers for speakers at various farm study group meetings. The 
work of the Speakers Bureau was continued and with the coopera-
tion of lawyers throughout the state a large segment of the ge:neral 
public was reached. 
7. News !terns. Twenty-six special news items have been 
prepared and are available for publication in daily or weekly news-
papers throughout the state. A sample story is captioned "Should 
You Have a Will?" It is urged that all of our members contact 
the editors of their local newspapers in an effort to obtain a wide 
circulation of these news items. 
We have continued to receive exce11ent general news coverage 
in both the daily and weekly press throughout the state. Each 
member can be of service in promoting a continuation of the ex-
cellent press relationship the Association now enjoys. 
8. During the past year the Association's film "Living Under 
Law" has been shown 23 times, including a showing at Boys State. 
The committee has been searching for a suitable new film but as 
yet has not purchased one. A film "Decision for Justice," a 26-
minute dramatization of one of Chief Justice John Marshall's most 
famous decisions Marbwry vs. Madison is on loan for a period of 
90 days. This film was originally shown on nationwide television 
as part of du Pont's "Cavalcade of America" series. This film is 
available and may be obtained from Secretary Turner at any time 
prior to December 1, 1955. 
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9. Recommendations. All of the 1·ecomrnendations made by 
the previous Committee on Public Service have been complied with 
during the past year. It is recommended that the present pro-
gram be continued in full force and effect as a minimum public 
service program to be supplemented in any manner the new com-
mittee shall deem advisable and in the best interests of the As-
sociation. 
Milton R. Abrahams 
John B. Cassel 
James J. Fitzgerald 
William H. Meier 
Pliny Moodie 
Henry Grether 
Robert R. Wellington 
Elmer M. Scheele, Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice was 
called up for consideration in the absence of James J. Fitzgerald, 
chairman of the committee. Since the report of the committee 
contained no recommendation, the report was received and filed. 
The report of the committee follows: 
Report of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Your Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law reports 
as follows: 
Your committee followed up on the citation against the George 
S. May Co. discussed in last year's report, and one of the mem-
bers of the committee, Robert G. Simmons, Jr., was appointed as 
a special assistant attorney general with authority to follow the 
matter through. 
One other reference has been received by the committee from 
the Executive Council but the facts developed to date are not 
sufficient to warrant any concern by the Committee on Unau-
thorized Practice. At the present time, the matter is being held 
by the committee to determine if there are additional facts which 
should be considered. It is hoped that a final 1·ecommendation 
may be forthcoming before the annual Bar Association meeting. 
J. D. Cronin, Coordinator 
H. L. Blackledge 
Ernest A. Hubka 
Daniel D. Jewell 
Donald F. i\foGinley 
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Daniel E. Owens 
C. M. Pierson 
Robert G. Simmons, Jr. 
James J. Fitzgerald, Jr. Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Expert Medical Testimony 
was presented by George Healey for Earl M. Cline, chairman of 
the committee. The report, which was approved by the House of 
Delegates, follows: 
Report of the Special Committee on Expert Medical Testimony 
I 
Such of the members of this committee as were able to be 
present met with a committee from the Nebraska State Medical 
Association on January 10, 1955. Present at the meeting, repre-
senting the Nebraska State Medical Association, were Dr. Harold 
S. Morgan of Lincoln, Dr. J. P. Gilligan of Nebraska City, Dr. 
Harley Anderson of Omaha, Dr. William Wright of Creighton, 
Dr. Earl Leininger of McCook and Merrill C. Smith of Lincoln. 
The subject of medical expert testimony was discussed in full, 
and following this meeting, a draft of a bill was made, and the 
same was introduced at the last session of the Nebraska state leg-
islature. Hearings were held on this bill, and the bill was killed 
by the committee to which it was referred. 
Earl Cline, Chairman 
George A. Healey 
George Boland 
Earl J. Moyer 
Fred S. White 
Harold A. Prince 
Frank A. Hebenstreit 
The report of the Committee on the State Tort Claims Act 
was presented by George Healey, chairman of the committee. 
The report, which was approved by the House of Delegates, fol-
lows: 
Report of the Committee on Tort Claims Act 
A Tort Claims Act was prepared and the bill introduced in 
the 1955 legislature. Although it was presented to the committee, 
it met opposition, and the Judiciary Committee failed to let the 
bill go out of committee. 
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This committee feels that such a State Tort Claims Act is 
an advisable thing for Nebraska, an improvement over present 
procedure, and a desired method for handling such claims. 
It is the recommendation of this committee that the matter 
be given thought by the House of Delegates at its next meeting. 
James H. Anderson 
George B. Boland 
John E. Dougherty 
Frederick H. Deutsch 
Daniel J. Gross 
Ralph D. Nelson 
George Healey, Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Legal Education was pre-
sented by 0. E. Shelburn, chairman. After discussion it was 
agreed that, since the report of the committee contained no recom-
mendation, it should be received and filed. At a subsequent 
session of the House of Delegates it was moved that the recep-
tion of the report of the Committee on Legal Education be with-
drawn and that the report be referred to the 1956 Committee on 
Legal Education for further consideration. This motion prevailed. 
The report of the Committee on Budget was presented by 
Otto Kotouc, Jr., chairman of the committee. The statement of 
Mr. Kotouc in submitting the report follows : 
MR. CAIN: The report of the Committee on Budget and Fin-
ance, Otto Kotouc of Humboldt, Nebraska, chairman. 
OTTO KOTOUC: Our secretary-treasurer, George H. Turner, 
advises that the Nebraska State Bar Association has unexpended 
funds this year approximating three thousand dollars. In recent 
years our Association has not been so financially fortunate. 
Therefore as a committee we recommend that a sum of per-
haps two thousand dollars be segregated in a sinking fund and 
invested in U. S. saving bonds. It is anticipated that in subse-
quent years additional funds may be similarly set aside. Scholar-
ships to Nebraska law schools may be granted from the income 
of this fund, or the income expended to otherwise promote the 
objectives of our Bar Association. 
Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of the above recommenda-
tion. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Do I hear a second? 
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: I'll second it. 
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JEAN B. CAIN: Are there any remarks? 
JEAN B. CAIN : All those in favor of the motion say aye. 
Opposed, no. The motion is carried. 
The report of the Advisory Committee was presented by 
Raymond G. Young, chairman. The report, which was received 
by the House of Delegates, follows: 
Report of Advisory Committee 
During the year the Advisory Committee held meetings on 
October 16, 1954, March 26, June 18 and September 23 and 24, 
1955. 
Further evidence was taken by it in three cases, and records 
reviewed by it in three other cases of proceedings before Commit-
tees on Inquiry. The committee rendered six advisory opinions. 
It considered two applications for reinstatement and decided to 
adhere to its policy of not appearing in support of or resistance 
to such applications unless otherwise directed by the. Supreme 
Court. 
The Chairman of the Advisory Committee, as a member of 
the Special Committee on Rules Governing Investigation and Dis-
position of Charges, attended and participated in the meetings of 
the Special Committee which prepared recommended changes in 
Article XI of the Supreme Court Rules. Such proposed changes 
were submitted to and approved by the Judicial Council. The 
amended Article XI which embodies the Revised Rules on Investi-
gation and Disposition of Charges was adopted by the Supreme 
Court on June 24, 1955, and appears at Pages 32 to 36 of the 
program of this annual meeting. 
In substance, the changes made are as follows : Each Com-
mittee on Inquiry will consist of three members and two alter-
nates. Charges may be lodged with the Committee on Inquiry, 
the secretary-treasurer of the Association, or the clerk of the 
Supreme Court. The lodging of charges with a committee is to 
be reported to the secretary-treasurer of the Association. The 
determination of claims of disqualification is simplified. In ap-
propriate cases investigators may be employed. Upon request an 
investigator may examine witnesses and introduce evidence before 
a Committee. Committees are required to make frequent periodi-
cal reports of matters pending before them. 
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It is believed that the amendments represent important im-
provements and will result in more efficient and expeditious ad-
ministration. 
During the year the Supreme Court rendered judgment of 
disbarment in three cases, and administered censure in one case. 
One complaint is pending in court, awaiting report of the referee. 
A summary of the activities of the District Committees on 
Inquiry follows : 
In nine of the eighteen districts no charges were made and 
no matters are pending. These are Districts 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 
15 and 18. 
Minor disagreements were satisfactorily adjusted, one in 
each of Districts 7, 11and16. 
One case is pending in District 2. 
In District 3 (Lincoln) formal hearings were had in two 
cases. Both were dismissed for lack of merit. One case decided 
by the committee resulted in the filing of a complaint in the Su-
preme Court. Two matters of disagreement were satisfactorily 
adjusted. Investigation resulted in two dismissals for lack of 
merit. Two matters of minor importance are under investiga-
tion. 
In District 4 (Omaha) four meetings were held. Four 
matters were disposed of by dismissal or adjustment. One formal 
complaint was filed and two matters are presently under investi-
gation. 
In District 6 investigation resulted in two dismissals for lack 
of merit. 
In District 12 charges are pending in one case. One matter 
which was referred from District 11 because of the disqualifica-
tion of the Committee of that District was dismissed because of 
insufficient evidence. 
In District 13 in two cases formal hearings were had, com-
plaints were prepared and, with the transcripts, were sent to the 
clerk of the Supreme Court. One of the cases is now pending in 
the court, the other before the Advisory Committee. 
The Advisory Committee recommends that each chairman 
call a meeting of the regular and alternate members of his Com-
mittee on Inquiry for the purpose of discussing and making a 
study of the Amended Rules, and of formulating questions or sug-
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gestions to be submitted to the Advisory Committee as an aid to 
it in preparing rules for a simplified and uniform procedure. 
Plans are being made for a conference to be held at a central 
point in the state, at which the members of Committees on Inquiry 
and of the Advisory Committee and other interested lawYers may 
discuss and consider ethical problems and disciplinary procedures. 
Suggestions as to time, place and subject matter of such con-
ference will be gladly received by the Advisory Committee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Charles F. Adams 
Raymond M. Crossman 
George B. Hastings 
James G. Mothersead 
Lloyd L. Pospishil 
Frank D. Williams 
Raymond G. Young, Chairman 
The report of the Committee on Oil and Gas Law was pre-
sented by Dan Monen for James D. Conway, chairman of the 
committee. The report, which "\Vas approved by the House of 
Delegates, follows : 
Report of the Special C-0mmittee on Oil and Gas Law 
The Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law of the Nebraska 
State Bar Association makes the following report and recom-
mendations: 
The previous Special Committee on this subject made a very 
extensive study of oil and gas law changes. The 1954 committee 
was headed by Mr. Floyd E. Wright, chairman. The 1955 com-
mittee took steps to follow this report and the recommendations 
made by the previous committee and received valuable assistance 
from Mr. Paul L. Martin, a member of the Executive Council, 
in this regard. A number of bills were drafted covering the sub-
ject matter of the 1954 report and recommendations, and Mr. Paul 
L. Martin and your chairman appeared before the committees of 
the legislature in connection with these bills. We were not suc-
cessful in obtaining legislative committee approval on all of these 
bills, but quite a lot of the subject matter was accepted and ap-
proved, and adopted by the legislature as law. 
Without going into the details of the bills passed, they are 
enumerated as L. B.· 36, L. B. 37, L. B. 59 and L.B. 62, all of 
which became law in September of 1955. 
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Valuable assistance was rendered the committee by Senators 
A. A. Fenske, Otto Kotouc, Sr., Donald F. McGinley and D. J. 
Cole. 
There was also introduced and passed L. B. 548 which con-
cerned the authority to enter pooling and unit agreements on 
school lands. 
COMMENT 
The legislature also enacted L.B. 216 which is known as the 
severance tax on oil and gas, and provides for a levy of 2 percent 
upon the value of such oil and gas taken from the ground, which 
law is effective commencing January 1, 1956. The benefits of 
this tax inures to the permanent school fund as established in 
Article 7, Section 4 of the constitution of the State of Nebraska. 
Your committee took no part in this legislation, as it had no 
authority from the Bar Association to do so. The same is re-
ported herein merely for information concerning legislation en-
acted which concerns oil and gas matters. 
Recommendation No. 1 of the predecessory committee con-
cerned appropriate legislation for the need of a conservation law. 
The oil and gas industry independently drafted appropriate legis-
lation for a conservation act and the members of this committee 
were invited to an open meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska, on Decem-
ber 1, 1954, covering this subject matter. Your committee did 
not participate in the drafting of the proposed legislation as it 
was felt that the industry and its various counsel were far better 
equipped to propose this legislation due to their experience in 
other states on conservation legislation concerning oil and gas. 
When the conservation law (L. B. 34) came up for considera-
tion before the committee of the legislature, your chairman and 
Mr. Paul L. Martin, member of the Executive Council, appeared 
before the committee consistent with the report and recommenda-
tions approved at the annual meeting of the Bar Association on 
October 13, 1954. 
A controversy arose in this legislative hearing and opposition 
to the bill was voiced by a number of independent producers prin-
cipally concerning the pro-ration feature of the bill, which is also 
referred to as ratable take. The introducers of the bill in open 
committee hearing amended the bill to eliminate this particular 
feature, but other controversies existed even after the elimination 
of this feature which may be summarized by saying that certain 
Nebraska producers objected to being policed by legislation con-
cerning the drilling and production of oil and gas in Nebraska. 
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The Committee of the Legislature hearing this bill killed the 
bill in committee. 
It was expressed by some opposing the bill that it was too 
early to adopt a conservation law in Nebraska. While this matter 
is a subject for the industry it.self and the legislature, there are 
many features of a so-called conservation law pertaining to legal 
procedure that the members of the Bar would be vitally interested 
in, and if and when a conservation law is to be adopted, the Special 
Committee on Oil and Gas Law can be of valuable assistance con-
cerning the legal procedure phases of such a bill. 
It is, therefo1·e, recommended that in connection with any 
futu1·e proposals of a conservation law bill that the legal procedure 
phases thereof be closely st·udied by members of the Special Oil 
and Gas Com.mittee and appropriate action be taken by said com-
mittee with reference to the legal procedu1·e parts of the bill. 
The new committee to be appointed following this annual 
·meeting will, of course, have a fuff,l year to study matters, con-
cerning oil and gas and 1nake appropriate recommendations with 
·reference thereto, and make recommendations for submission to 
the next session of the legislatUJ·e cornmencing in January of 1957. 
This special committee should be continued in the future due to 
the fact that the oil and gas industry is rapidly developing in the 
State of Nebraska, and many legal problems concerning oil and 
gas will originate in the futUJ·e in which the members of the Bar 
will be vitally interested and in which the Nebraska Ba1· Associa-
tion should take an active inte1·est. 
Arthur 0. Auserod 
Robert J. Bulger 
L. M. Clinton 
Daniel Monen, Jr. 
Wendell E. Mumby 
John W. Stewart 
S. E. Torgeson 
I van Van Steenberg 
John H. Wiltse 
James D. Conway, Chairman 
The House of Delegates next received the report of the Com-
mittee on Hearings. which was presented by C. Russell Mattson, 
chairman. The report of the committee follows : 
JEAN B. CAIN : The next report is the Committee on Hear-
ings and Resolutions, C. Russell Mattson, chairman. 
' C. RUSSELL ·MATTSON: Mr. Chairman and members of the 
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House of Delegates. Your Committee on Hearings met and con-
sidered matters to be ref erred to it. 
The only matter to be considered by the committee was a 
resolution offered to the House of Delegates by Honorable Joseph 
Votava. This relates to the Association approving a proposed 
amendment of the Section 4, Artiele VIII of the constitution of 
Nebraska, which would permit legislative action to absolve 1·eal 
estate taxes and assessments delinquent ten years or more. 
The resolution also relates to the lawyers being urged to ex-
plain the measure to the voters before November 8, 1955. 
Upon consideration your committee reports that it recom-
mends opposition to adoption of the resolution, feeling that it 
contains subject matter which should have neither the approval 
or disapproval of this Association. 
JEAN B. CAIN : The report will be accepted and filed. 
C. RUSSELL MATTSON: Our recommendation related to a 
resolution of Mr. Votava, and I suggest that some action be taken. 
We merely recommended opposition, and I think it calls for a 
vote now from the House on the resolution itself. 
JEAN B. CAIN : Is there a motion on it? 
c. RUSSELL MATTSON: Well, Mr. Votava moved the adop-
tion of the resolution this morning and then it was 1·eferred to 
us. We have reported it back, recommending opposition to adop-
tion of the resolution. 
JUDGE SPENCER: He had moved adoption but there was a 
substitute motion that took the place of the motion, so there is 
nothing before the House. 
c. RUSSELL MATTSON: I move that the report of the Com-
mittee on Hearings be adopted. 
JUDGE SPENCER: I second the motion. 
JEAN B. CAIN : It has been moved and seconded that the 
report of the Committee on Hearings be adopted. 
Are there any remarks? 
(There was no response.) 
JEAN B. CAIN: All in favor say aye. 
Opposed, no. Motion carried. 
JEAN B. CAIN: The H9use of Delegates will stand adjourned. 
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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
THURSDAY MORNING SESSlON 
October 6, 1955 
The opening session of the 56th annual meeting of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association was called to order at 10 o'clock 
A.M. in Hotel Paxton, Omaha, Nebraska, by President John J. 
Wilson of Lincoln. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Gentlemen, the 56th annual meeting of 
the Nebraska State Bar Association will now come to order. In-
vocation will be pronounced by the Reverend Edward W. Stimson, 
minister of Dundee Presbyterian Church. 
REV. EDWARD W. STIMSON: Let us pray. Almighty God, 
Lord of justice and righteousness, who throughout all ages has 
sought to educate and discipline Thy children in the ways that 
are right, and of whose pure justice all our laws and justice are 
human approximations, we invoke Thy blessing upon this meet-
ing of the Nebraska Bar Association. 
Inspired by Thy spirit, may we catch anew the vision of 
higher justice, renew our ideals for practice at the Bar and in 
the counseling room; that principle may ever take precedence 
over expediency, and that divine balance between justice and 
mercy may be more clearly seen. 
Make us faithful in the performance of our civic duty to the 
highest we know, as Thou dost ever inspire our best. We pray 
humbly in Thy name. Amen. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: The address of welcome this morning 
will be delivered by Tom Kelley, president of the Omaha Bar. 
Mr. Kelley. 
THOMAS P. KELLEY: Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Omaha 
Bar and the city of Omaha, it gives me great pleasure to welcome 
you back again for the Bar Association meeting, the 56th annual 
meeting. 
It is always a great pleasure to renew old acquaintances and 
make some new ones every year, and we certainly hope that you 
enjoy your stay with us this time. 
We also hope that if we can be of any assistance to anyone, 
that you do not liestitate to call on us. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Thank you, Tom. 
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The response by Murl Maupin of North Platte. 
MURL MAUPIN: President Wilson, Mr. Kelley, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Nebraska Bar Association. It is a pleasure to 
have this opportunity of responding to the words of welcome of 
the president of the Omaha Bar Association. We are indeed 
thankful to you, we of the outstate Bar, for the trouble and the 
efforts that you have gone to provide the program we have ahead 
of us. 
I, in examining the program, noticed that it has been pre-
pared with care and considerable thought, particularly from the 
standpoint of the type of social entertainment and the timing of 
the events. 
It is noted that this evening we have the cocktail hour, where 
probably preparations will be made for the Kaff ee Klatch to fol-
low tomorrow morning for the ladies. 
"Kaffee Klatch," as you know, in the language from which 
the term comes means coffee with gossip. 
So without further ado I again thank you. I am sure that 
you have arranged a delightful social program to go with this 
splendid program which we have for the Association. 
We are indeed grateful to you. Thank you. 
PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS 
At this point in the program of our annual meeting it is re-
quired by the constitution of our Association that the president 
deliver an address. Since I am a believer in supporting the con-
stitution, I shall endeavor to comply with this requirement. 
At previous annual meetings I have observed that some of 
our presidents in the past have, at this point, modestly turned 
the duty of presiding over to a vice-president who then proceeded 
with great dignity to introduce the president so that he in turn 
might proceed to make an address. This I shall not do for two 
reasons. First, I feel no urge of modesty which requires me to 
ask another to introduce me. You have probably guessed from 
the proceedings so far in which capacity I address you. The sec-
ond reason is that under our present form of organization there 
are no vice-presidents. 
In scanning the records of the proceedings of the associa-
tion in earlier years, I find that presidents in the past have de-
voted themselves to such learned subjects as "The Sufficiency of 
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the Common Law"; "The Grim Condition" and "Guides to Con-
stitutional Construction." Sprinkled along the way have been 
not a few presidential addresses suggesting ways of improving 
the judiciary. 
I have decided that while a learned address might be of some 
interest to some of you, a more useful service can be rendered if 
I spend my allotted time in rendering an account of my steward-
ship during the period you have honored me by permitting me to 
serve as your president. 
My address shall be in the nature of a report of the state of 
affairs of your association and accomplishments achieved during 
the past year. I find in my contacts with our members that many 
of the members would like to know more about the way your 
organization operates, and for that reason let me briefly describe 
your Association to you. 
The officers of your Association consist of a president, chair-
man of House of Delegates and secretary-treasurer. There is an 
Executive Council and also a House of Delegates. 
The Executive Council consists of one member from each 
Supreme Court judicial district, three members at large, the im-
mediate past president and the president and chairman of the 
House of Delegates. 
The House of Delegates is composed of thirty-five delegates 
elected from eighteen district court judicial districts, the eleven 
members of the Executive Council, two association delegates to 
American Bar Association and the six section chairmen. 
This is the second year the House of Delegates has functioned. 
It is its duty to receive and act upon the reports of all committees 
of the Association which they did yesterday, thereby leaving time 
available during the two days of our annual meeting for section 
meetings. The section reports are also subject to approval by 
the House of Delegates. 
The Executive Council is the executive organ of your Associa-
tion. It has sole authority to approve expenditure of funds and 
contracting obligations. It constitutes the nomination committee, 
provides programs and entertainment, fixes compensation of of-
ficers, fills vacancies in offices, authorizes clinics and provides the 
program at the annual meeting. 
Your Association has sponsored many clinics and institutes 
for which no charge has been made. It has made available certain 
publications without cost, including the weekly log or bill digest 
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during the past legislative session. Speakers are furnished to 
your district bar meeting upon request and the expenses of such 
speakers are paid by your Association. 
There are eighteen committees whose functions cover nearly 
every conceivable task that could be wished for and all did a 
magnificent job trying to do for you those things which will im-
prove your Association and your relations with the public gener-
ally. 
Two clinics were held during the year. The first was the an-
nual federal tax clinic which held instructive meetings during De-
cember at Alliance, Grand Island and Omaha under the leadership 
of the Section on Taxation, and the other clinic was on new legis-
lation which consisted of one-day meetings held at North Platte, 
Kearney, Lincoln and Omaha. 
A Section on Practice and Procedure and a Section on Muni-
cipal and Public Corporations are meeting for the first time this 
year. The Executive Council appointed the Executive Committees 
for these sections and helped them organize. Each has a wonder-
ful program for you at their first meeting this afternoon. 
I want to call your attention to the work of the Committees 
on Judiciary and Legislation. Their reports are printed in the 
annual program and need not be discussed in detail here. After 
several attempts in the past, salaries of the judiciary were raised 
and a retirement system for judges was adopted. A splendid 
tribute is also due the nine members of your association who serv-
ed in the last legislature, who, with your support, succeeded in 
these fine accomplishments. 
Many other committees were successful in their attempts to 
have legislation either enacted or defeated. The efforts of these 
lawyers are worthy of your commendation. Their reports show 
their activities in detail. 
At the beginning of my year as president, I outlined my 
duties into the following four fields: 
1. The Association and what could be done for it; 
2. The judiciary, and what accomplishments we might make; 
3. To carry on a legal educational program for lawyers; and 
4. The individual lawyer. 
It is my thinking that what we did for your Association, we 
did for each member thereof. We are the only organization de-
dicated to justice. It has often been said the bench is no better 
than its bar. We can be proud of such a fine organization and 
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of the high standards and fine bench. We must be careful, whether 
lawyer or judge, that we do not leave a mar or stain on the 
trestleboard. 
In Nebraska every lawyer and judge is proud of his posi-
tion and almost universally is held in high esteem by the public 
and his fellowman. 
The public relations of the Bar Association can only succeed 
so far as everyone is willing to help. Like a good reputation, good 
public relations must be earned. No paid advertising, no press 
agentry or public relations committee and no public service pro-
gram can substitute for a sound lawyer-client relationship. If 
people are to have faith and confidence in you as lawyers, they 
must first know a lawyer and appreciate what he can do. Thus 
the individual lawyer-client relationship is the doorway to public 
respect and good will. 
During the past year we have attempted to express to the 
public what lawyers can do and to make it easier for the public 
to acquaint themeslves with lawyers. 
There are two television stations carrying items of public 
interest in legal matters. KMTV, Channel 3 at Omaha, on the 
"Better Living Program," and KHOL-TV at Axtell have made 
their stations available. Both programs are of the "interview" 
type, conducted by a moderator from the station staff who dis-
cusses with a lawyer, furnished to the program by your Associa-
tion, some legal topic of interest to the public. The moderator 
and the lawyer participant each receive a script for the program 
prepared by your Committee on Public Service which is the basis 
of the interview. It is not expected that either be bound by the 
exact language of the script. Both are free to present the pro-
gram in their own words. 
The stations have been most helpful in placing the programs 
in the hands of e}...'iremely competent moderators and the la,vyers 
who have been asked to participate have responded generously. 
We appreciate the interest these ti.vo television stations have sti-
mulated in this field. These programs are being well received 
by the public, judging by the correspondence received by your sec-
retary. 
We now have columns appearing in some of the weekly news-
papers in the state. The columns are directed to problems which 
might happen to anyone. These columns are designed to warn the 
public of possible legal complications in every-day life. They 
constitute "preventive law." They state that they are for the 
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purpose of informing the public and not to advise the public. 
Each column suggests to the reader that he should consult his 
lawyer about any problems he might have. 
The Nebraska Farmer, with the largest circulation of any 
farm paper in our area, will be soon carrying bi-monthly legal 
articles for reader interest which has been prepared on behalf of 
your Association. The first article will appear in the early No-
vember, 1955, issue. These articles will be more in detail than 
the articles in the weekly papers. They will be properly illustrated 
and will be attractive in their makeup. 
Two new pamphlets of interest to clients have been distri-
buted to you during the past month, as well as the pamphlet 
"Confidentially, Mr. Attorney." The Public Service Committee 
spent many hours on these publications, and if properly distri-
buted they will help cement good will with the public and will 
bring clients to your office. 
Your president and secretary have met with various com-
mittees of the Nebraska State Bankers Association during the 
winter months, and as a result of these contacts we began to 
really know each other and understand the mutual problems of 
the two professions. Your Association was asked to furnish 
speakers for various bankers' meetings, and we have received 
many fine remarks for the cooperation accorded them. The 
speakers were highly praised. 
When the time for introduction of bills in the legislature 
was approaching, the Nebraska State Medical Association, through 
an appropriate committee, and the Committee on Expert Medical 
Testimony of your Association met in a joint conference to work 
out an expert medical-testimony bill. The bill was prepared and 
approved by the Nebraska State Medical Association and the Exe-
cutive Council of your Association. The bill was introduced in 
the legislature. While the bill sponsored by the joint committees 
met with defeat, fine professional relations began to be formed, 
and now the lawyers and medics feel that they need each other's 
support. In this regard the legal section of the American Bar 
Association is holding a legal-medic clinic in Omaha on October 
17th. Member of your own Association are appearing with other 
distinguished experts in the fields of law and medicine. 
During July of this year a mineral law institute was held at 
the University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado. It was spon-
sored by the Colorado Bar Association, Colorado Mining Associa-
tion, Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association and University of 
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Colorado School of Law. Your Association was asked to join as 
a sponsor, but due to the short notice of the institute we were 
unable to have a meeting of the council and secure authorization 
for such sponsorship. However we were accorded the status of 
sponsors and have been asked to be a part of a nonprofit corpo-
ration to sponsor annual mineral law institutes. This was one of 
the finest institutes I have attended. The registration exceeded the 
hopes of the committee more than two-fold. It was declared a 
success and will be conducted again next year in Boulder. I hope 
that all lawyers interested in oil and mineral laws will attend. 
Despite the late announcement this year, Nebraska was well 1·ep-
resented. 
The Supreme Court was requested to act upon the report of 
the Committee on Rules Governing Investigations and Disposition 
of Charges which recommended some changes in the disciplinary 
procedure. The court approved the changes. The changes appear 
in the appendix to the report of the Committee on Rules Govern-
ing Investigations and Disposition of Charges. Much credit is 
due the members of the committee for this work as well as to 
the members of the Advisory Committee and the members of the 
Judicial Council. I have a strong feeling that these changes will 
provide a more workable procedure to avoid the public criticism 
we have sometimes received due to excessive delay in the conduct 
of disciplinary proceedings. 
It was my pleasure to attend the mid-winter and annual 
meetings of the American Bar Association. The National Con-
ference of Bar Presidents met before each of these meetings. 
Many helpful suggestions -were made by representatives of other 
associations, and by threading these new ideas into our program 
we can keep abreast of plans for an ever-helpful Association. 
I attended the annual meetings of the State Bars of Kansas, 
South Dakota and Missouri as the representative of your Associa-
tion. Every courtesy that could be offered was accorded Sue and 
me. We enjoyed their hospitality and exchanged ideas on how an 
organization for lawyers should be conducted. Public service was 
of the utmost importance in their future plans and must be the 
major item in ours. 
One of the highlights of my year as your president was to 
be one of the honored guests of the Nebraska State Medical 
Association where I was accorded a place on the program and 
given an opportunity to address their assembly. The time has 
come when the members of our professions should be working 
toward the sanie end. I think we are making progress. 
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The officers and some members of your Association have 
been serving in an advisory capacity for the Northwest Regional 
meeting at the American Bar Association to be held in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, October 12-15, 1955. Meetings of this character en-
able lawyers to meet other lawyers and to acquaint themselves 
with new views on legal subjects. A fine program has been 
planned and all are urged to attend. 
Since this is the two hundredth anniversary of John Marshall, 
who was a remarkable human being, Revolutionary soldier, 
statesman, diplomat and "the Great Chief Justice of the United 
States" from 1801 until 1835, let us commemorate the enduring 
contributions he made to our national heritage. 
John Marshall, fourth chief justice of the United States, was 
a product of the Virginia frontier. He was born on September 
24, 1755, in a long cabin deep in the forest of a portion of Prince 
William County, Virginia. 
After service in the Revoluntionary War, John Marshall turn-
ed to law and politics. 
He soon became a leading member of the Richmond bar, noted 
not for his· mastery of precedents or statutes but rather for a 
supreme skill in isolating the crucial point of a case, and in ad-
dressing to that point an argument beginning with a premise of 
broad principal and proceeding by rigorously logical steps to reach 
the inevitable conclusion that favored his client's cause. 
At the persuasion of George Washington, Marshall ran for 
Congress and served one term in the House of Representatives. 
He declined the office of secretary of war but became President 
Adams' secretary of state. In that capacity he virtually presided 
over the affairs of the expiring administration while President 
Adams spent his time at his ill wife's side. The grateful Presi-
dent then nominated Marshall as chief justice and the Senate 
confirmed the nomination, although without enthusiasm even from 
the Federalist members. 
Although Marshall's appointment to the Supreme Court at-
tracted little favorable reaction, his role as chief justice soon be-
came evident. He tried to protect the court and the federal judi-
ciary generally against attacks by members of the new Jeff er son 
administration and Congress, who viewed the courts as a strong-
hold of the defeated Federalists. He persuaded his colleagues on 
the court to reduce the number of their separate opinions in de-
ciding cases in favor of single opinions for the court as an entity, 
and he strove to achieve unanimity among his brethern. He sue-
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ceeded to a remarkable degree in moulding the court to his own 
image, which was accomplished by subtle and persuasive quali-
ties of leadership. 
The tenure as chief justice was not serene. Almost the en-
tire period was one of conflict involving the court in great issues 
of the day. Sometimes the conflict was with the Executive. Near 
the beginning the court was pitted against the President in a tense 
struggle for power that was disguised as a minor lawsuit. 
It will be remembered that in Marbury vs. Madison, Marshall's 
opinion disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds-the court 
could not grant a writ of mandamus since the pertinent provi-
sion of the Judiciary Act, which purported to add to the court's 
constitutional, original jurisdiction was unconstitutional in this 
respect. Thus it can be said that there was no occasion to con-
sider the question whether a cabinet officer was amenable to such 
a writ. But Marshall did, and where he came out we all know. 
He formulated his conclusions as follows: 
. . . where the heads of departments are the political or confiden-
tial agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the 
president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive pos-
sessed a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more 
perfectly clear, than that their acts are only politically examin-
able. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual 
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally 
clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a 
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. 
To say that this pronouncement was gratuitous is now quite 
academic. The vitality of its influence is the important thing, 
and there can be scant doubt that, like the decision of the English 
judges in the famous case of Ashby vs. White, it has been a stout 
support for the rule of law. It has meant in round terms that 
executive officers, subordinate only to the President himself, are 
answerable in the courts of law for denial of the legal rights of 
an individual. This is also a landmark case on the power of a 
court to hold an act of the legislature unconstitutional. 
While serving as chief justice, there were many important 
decisions by the court which have influenced our government. 
In another famous case, McCulloch vs. Maryland, where the 
interpretation of the Constitution and the doctrine of implied 
powers were involved, Chief Justice Marshall said: 
The people of all the States have created the general government, 
and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation. The 
people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented 
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in congress. and, by their representatives exercise this power. 
When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax 
their constituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when 
a State taxes the operations of the government of the United 
States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own con-
stituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It 
acts upon the measures of a government created by others as 
well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with them-
selves. The difference is that which always exists, and must 
always exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the 
action of a part on the whole; between the laws of government 
declared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when 
in opposition to those laws, is not supreme. 
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of 
mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government 
of the Union, though limited in its powers. is supreme within 
its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, 
from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers are dele-
gated by all; it represents all, and acts for all . . . . The nation, 
on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its 
component parts. 
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It was in such cases just cited and many others which 'vere 
decided while Marshall served as chief justice that have been 
important factors in developing and maintaining the historic lib-
erties of the people of the United States. 
It is for these reasons that a wider public knowledge and 
appreciation of the work and achievements of such a great chief 
justice are desirable today in order to strengthen the moral, so-
cial and political structure of our nation, and to help in the pre-
servation and protection of the lives, liberties, and property of 
all our people. 
It is proper and fitting that we dedicate a part of our annual 
meeting to the memory of John Marshall for the inspiring role he 
played in our national life. 
Today I hope you will all attend the luncheon in this room 
where the Honorable John D. Randall, chairman of the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association, will address the mem-
bers in commemoration of the life of John Marshall and will in-
troduce a film titled "Decision for Justice." The film is based 
on the case of Marbury vs. Madison in which the court established 
its right to declare acts of Congress invalid. 
It has been a great pleasure and a wonderful experience for 
me to be president of this fine organization. My tasks were 
eased by the help of my good friend and your able and efficient 
secretary, George H. Turner. His staff has been most helpful 
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at all times. My contacts with the lawye1·s of this state and the 
many friends I met through bar activities of other states and the 
American Bar Association will be a lasting memory. Please ac-
cept my thanks for all the help and assistance you have given me 
this past year. It has been greatly appreciated. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: We will now have the report of the 
secretary-treasurer. 
Report of the Secretary-Treasurer 
GEORGE H. TURNER: It is somewhat of a pleasure to be able 
for once at least to report that we operated exclusively with black 
ink this year, which is a little unusual. 
The accounts of the Association have been audited by the firm 
of Martin and Martin, certified public accountants of Lincoln, 
and it covers the period October 1, 1954, to September 24, 1955. 
We closed the Association year six days early in order the audi-
tors might complete their examination of the books in time for a 
report to be made at this meeting. 
The audit disclo_ses that cash receipts during the period 
amounted to $42,391.95 and the cash disbursements $39,737.43, 
which produced an excess of cash receipts over disbursements of 
$2,654.52. 
This amount is reflected in the cash balance which increased 
from $652.25, as of the close of the previous audit in October of 
'54, to a balance of $3,307.77 at the close of this audit. The 
principal items of receipts, of course, were the dues of members, 
and amounted to $37,430.00 from active members and $4,865.00 
from dues of inactive. 
Principal items of disbursements mentioned by the auditors 
are salaries and payroll taxes of $10,326.30; office supplies, print-
ing, postage and stationery, $1,561.18 ; officers' expenses, $2,-
298.55; the expense of the representatives of the Association in 
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, $1,016.16; 
the expense of the 1954 annual meeting, $4,857.08; the publica-
tion of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,958.61, which incidentally 
includes, as you know, the total cost of the publication of the one 
issue of the Review which contains the proceedings of our annual 
meeting; the expense for the public service program, $4,556.43 ; 
and the expense of the December Tax Institute, $2,266.58. 
All the cash receipts were deposited in the bank, receipts for 
dues were verified by reconcilation with the membership cards 
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issued. The bank balances were verified by independent corres-
pondence with the bank; cash disbursements were verified by 
examination of cancelled checks, and, when feasible, by inspection 
of the original documents supporting the disbursements. 
The report concludes; "In our opinion the funds of the As-
sociation have been properly accounted for during the period 
under review." 
This report was submitted yesterday to the House of Dele-
gates, where it received approval; and was also submitted yes-
terday afternoon to the Executive Council for its approval. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: We wm now have the report of the 
American Bar Association delegates. The Honorable Clarence A. 
Davis and Laurens Williams. 
CLARENCE A. DA VIS : As one of the two delegates of this 
Association to the American Bar Association it has been my privi-
lege for three or four years now to give a report of the annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association. 
I have particularly enjoyed it and enjoy that privilege this 
year because it is such a good excuse to come home and see as-
sembled here such a tremendous group of acquaintances. There 
is hardly anybody in the room that I do not call by his first name. 
The 77th meeting of the American Bar Association was held 
this year in Philadelphia, as you probably know. I think that 
the Association rather outdid itself because of the celebration of 
the John Marshall bicentennial. That was a tremendously im-
pressive meeting. A lot of you were there; many more of you, of 
course, were not. But Philadelphia after all is the original cradle 
of American liberty and of the government of the United States. 
So you have in the first place of course all of the background 
of Independence Hall and of the events that grew out of the 
early days of Philadelphia, so there rises first an emotional stimu-
lating appeal from those circumstances. 
Then our friend Lloyd Wright was President of the Ameri-
can Bar this year. He has been to many of our conventions here, 
and many of you know him. I think Lloyd as President rather 
outdid himself, with the aid, of course, of a lot of people, the 
Board of Governors and so on. But it is the first time in the his-
tory of the American Bar when there were present at one ses-
sion, at one meeting of that Association, the President of the 
United States, the Vice-President of the United States and the 
Chief Justice of the United States. 
210 NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
The ceremony in celebration of Marshall held on the mall 
of Independence Hall, which incidentally is to become a great na-
tional shrine right in the heart of Philadelphia, ultimately to be 
several blocks square, with these old buildings as the focal point 
of the shrine, where addresses by the President of the United 
States and the Vice-President of the United States before a crowd 
estimated at twenty-five to thirty thousand people, stretching 
away for hundred of yards in every direction, was a very, very 
inspiring thing. 
Those of us who were there, I am sure, wi11 never forget that 
setting and the occasion for it. 
Now the American Bar Association is growing constantly to 
be a great institution. Many of you belong to it. Many more of 
you do not, I am sorry to say. The American Bar Association has 
a membership now well past fifty thousand, perhaps fifty-five, 
but after all there are about two hundred thousand lawyers in 
the United States. I never miss an opportunity to say that it is 
only through the American Bar Association, and it ought to be an 
organization that represents more than a majority of the lawyers 
of the United States, that the protection of the law can make 
itself heard in the councils of the nation. We do very well as it 
is, and I think that the American Bar Association by and large 
has the confidence of the Congress and of the public, that after 
all we are sti11 subject to the attack that it is just a minority 
group. 
The American Bar, as you know, and I repeat time and again, 
is just as democratic in organization as is the Nebraska Bar As-
sociation, governed by a plan of a House of Delegates on a repre-
sentative basis, which as you know we have largely adopted here 
in our own state, and consequently I think all of us owe to the 
profession which nurtured us and to the greatest profession in 
the world an obligation to support the American Bar Association. 
Now I can not hope here in the very few minutes that I want 
to report from the Philadelphia meeting to even enumerate the 
tremendous number of matters that come before the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar. After all there are numerous 
sections of the American Bar, each of them in turn highly special-
ized and divided into sub-committees and sub-sections. There 
are literally dozens of committees for special purposes of one kind 
and another. Short of taking the agenda of the House of Dele-
gates and about a day's time, I do not think anyone could give you 
any rundown on what happens at a meeting of the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar. All that Laury Williams and 
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I can hope to do is take three or four of the things that appealed 
to us as high spots and give you some idea of what goes on. 
We undertook to divide the fields just a little bit, so I am 
going to tell you in just a few words of the Section of Adminis-
trative Law, because that field on a nation-wide basis is the thing 
which profoundly affects the practice. 
So far in Nebraska we have not been afflicted with quite as 
much legislation through administrative agencies as has been 
the country at large. Yet the procedures that are necessary to 
maintain due process in the connection with the extension of 
government by administrative legislation are things worthy of the 
careful thought of all of us. 
It is largely the American Bar Association's sponsoring of 
the administrative procedure act which brought some order out 
of the chaos that existed after the setting up of these numerous 
agencies, largely during the '30's. As time goes on the question 
is how we can refine that still more to keep the legal processes 
behind the fences, with which we are all familiar. 
This year as you probably know from the papers the Hoover 
Commission has completed its report on government operations 
throughout the government, and, among others, legal process 
and procedures in government. 
I will not discuss it all, the very elaborate plan which that 
commission set up for the institution and control and regulation 
of the legal staffs of the various government departments, in-
cluding the Department of Justice, to try to keep some harmonious 
system working between the various departments as they function 
throughout the country. But the commission has gone much 
farther in an attempt to aid this administrative law question by 
suggesting without recommendation, unanimously, at least to the 
commission, the establishment of an administrative court which 
in turn would have jurisdiction over many of the appeals of these 
in the so-called independent agencies and administrative tribunals. 
That is far too elaborate to discuss even in any one day's address, 
let alone in the few minutes I am to report to you. But it marks 
another march down the road towards maintaining due process 
of law and towards maintaining an orderly system of law under 
the administrative process. 
It has seemed to me as this thing goes on, as we lawyers 
from time to time shudder more and more about the lack of regu-
larity, about the inadequacy of the hearings which we are af-
forded, about the possible prejudice of hearing examiners and 
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the people who are hearing these, and the-I want to say par-
tisan, but I don't mean politically partisan-the tendency of the 
agency to sustain its own people at all stages. The more of that 
we see the more the Bar reacts toward the judicial process. 
Now they come with the suggestion of administrative court, 
and I have felt that we are approaching the time when it is quite 
possible that the administrative procedure is going to be absorbed 
into and become a part of the judicial processes of the United 
States. The sooner that day comes in my judgment the better, 
because this judicial process of ours has been developed over 
several hundred years, and I do not think we are going to improve 
it by any supposed shortcuts. 
So much for that general subject. 
Then of course the whole field of unauthorized practice is 
still a hot subject in the American Bar Association. I am leaving 
to Laury the discussion of those phases of what we call unauth-
orized practice in connection with taxes and treasury. I would 
just like to tell you, however, the American Bar Association is 
very active against unauthorized practice in the real estate field, 
banking field, the insurance field, where we are now looking into 
the question of gratuitous advice that is so freely given in con-
nection with the estate planning and the writing of insurance poli-
cies. That field is getting a lookover, and that one I know treads 
on toes of lawyers that are right in this room. 
So it goes, and again I repeat that the only way to handle 
these things, is to handle them on a top level on a national basis. 
It is pretty difficult to handle them locally. 
The other thing Jack discussed very well in his presidential 
address and in the remarks that he made that followed is the 
John Marshall celebration. 
It is not too often that we get such a logical opportunity to 
portray the place of the legal system in organized society, the 
place of the lawyer, and the fundamentals of the American con-
stitutional system as we get in connection with this commemor-
ation of the birth of John Marshall. 
As mentioned already, the American Bar Association cele-
bration, I think Jack has done very well in bringing it to us here, 
but we all know that organized society cannot exist as we know 
it without an independent judiciary and without the supremacy 
of that judiciary as an independent umpire free to restrain the 
executive just as freely as it is to restrain the individual. 
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That is so fundamental and so basic, yet I am shocked as 
we go about the country to find out how little of that fundamental 
conception our youngsters, and some not so young, have acquired 
as they have gone through our educational system. 
So this year we have a great opportunity right here in Ne-
bi·aska, utilizing the celebration of Marshall's birth as our ex-
cuse to hold meetings in high schools and before various other 
groups emphasizing the theme of Ma:rbury v. Madison, if you 
will, the general theme of necessity of judicial supremacy to main-
tain an organized society. Into that, of course, fits exactly the 
anti-communist theme where there is no restraint upon execu-
tive and arbitrary power. 
It seems to me that the local Bar Association, the county 
Bar Associations of the state, would render a very great service 
to themselves and to the profession of the law and to the ultimate 
welfare of the country if they would take as their project the 
presentation to the schools and the various other groups of these 
various fundamental things that we all know so well. It seems to 
me that that is a program which reflects credit upon us, and 
which can be very easily undertaken simply by a few aggressive 
members of the Bar in their home towns, explaining what this bus-
iness of the law and this business of the judges is all about in 
language that people can understand. 
That is the theme of the American Bar Association this year. 
It is the theme of this Association as the president has laid it 
down, and I hope you will make it your theme. 
Now that is pretty fragmentary, but I am glad to have the 
opportunity to say I am glad to be back with you. Thanks. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Davis. And now we 
will have Laury Williams' report. 
LAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. President, members of the Nebras-
ka State Bar Association. I have been attending annual meetings 
of the American Bar Association for lo these many years, and 
while I have realized over these years that, as Clarence has indi-
cated, the American Bar Association is a great and growing or-
ganization, it was not until the honor and the privilege came 
to me of representiµg the Nebraska State Bar Association in the 
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association that I really 
began having an appreciation of first the scope of the activities 
of the American Bar Association, and secondly, the importance to 
the American lawyer of each of those activities. 
As Clarence has indicated, the membership of the Association 
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has been growing. I can give you a precise figure. As of Au-
gust 25th the American Bar Association had 58,002 members 
with fully paid-up dues. That was a substantial increase. Over 
7,700 applications for membership were processed during the 
past year. But here in Nebraska unfortunately we haven't been 
keeping pace. There were 2,327 active members of this Assoc-
iation eligible for membership in the American Bar Association 
as of the close of the last fiscal year of the American Bar As-
sociation, but only 603 Nebraska lawyers or 25.9 percent of the 
Nebraska lawyers were members of our great national prof es-
sional organization. 
We ranked twenty-third in the forty-eight states in the per-
centage of our members who were members of the American 
Bar Association. 
The American Bar Association Membership Committee had 
set up quotas for new members last year. Our quota was eighty-
five and we had forty. I suggest to you that we need to put 
forth a little more active effort in the line of membership in this 
great organization. 
It takes a lot of money to operate the American Bar Assoc-
iation. Last year the income of the Association almost exclusively 
from dues was about eight hundred thousand dollars, but the 
expenditures including that of the American Bar Association 
Journal ran, I believe, within about thirty thousand dollars of 
the income. While it is true that the dues are an element of ex-
pense for all of us, it seems to me that we owe a duty to our 
profession to lend our financial aid through membership, as well 
as our aid in other ways, to the national organization which speaks 
for us. Whether we are members or not, they are going to speak 
for us; and when we are members we have a voice in determin-
ation of what they say. So I want first to suggest to you who 
are not members that there may be something of an obligation 
to become a membe1~ 
First of all, the annual meetings. I think no lawyer can at-
tend an annual meeting of the American Bar Association with-
out coming away feeling that he has had true spiritual uplift 
as a result, and he has gained much of very practical experience 
which will be of real value to him in his daily practice. That 
is true no matter in what area of the law your particular in-
terests lie because the annual Bar Association sections and com-
mittees embrace, I assure you, every field and phase of the law. 
At the annual meetings you have the opportunity to hear some 
of the most effective and able lawyers in the country, who are 
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-expert in particular fields advise you, so to speak, of better ways, 
easier ways to do a better job for your client. 
The annual meetings of the Association are scheduled well 
in advance. Next year it will be held at Dallas, Texas, August 
27th to 31st. Now while it gets warm in Texas, the TID..-as dele-
gation kept assuring us that everything in Dallas is air condi-
tioned. So next year it is Dallas, August 27th to the 31st. 
Then the following year the American Bar Association re-
peats what it did back in the 1920's. We first meet in New York 
City about July 8th for the business meeting, and then adjourn 
for about two weeks, when we reconvene in London, England. 
Now here is a beautiful opportunity to take that trip abroad 
and have Uncle Samuel pay a substantial part, depending on your 
tax bracket, of the expense of that European trip that your wife 
has always wanted to take. 
In 1958 Los Angeles, California; and in 1959, Washington, 
D. C.; and in the meantime, of course, the regional meetings con-
tinue. Next week one will be held at St. Paul, Minnesota, and 
then November 27th to the 30th at New Orleans, Louisiana. 
This year marked the active opening, so to speak, of the 
American Bar Center in Chicago, staffed by approximately one 
hundred full-time employees of the American Bar Association. 
There too is housed the American Bar Foundation. In fact 
the Foundation owns the building, which, by the way, cost ap-
proximately $1, 750,000, and which was given one of the out-
standing architectural awards this past year because of the beauty 
of the building, its functional set-up and the fact that it is very 
efficiently designed, and yet carries with it great dignity, great 
beauty. 
You don't have to be a member of the American Bar As-
sociation to see that building. I suggest that any lawyer who 
would spend an hour or two would invest it wisely when you 
are in Chicago by taking the time to go out and go through that 
building. It is magnificent. I believe it will make you e:i..'ireme-
ly proud not only of our profession but of your national organ-
ization. 
The American Bar Association, or Foundation, has now start-
ed several major projects. First of these is a study of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the United States, something 
which I think we'll all agree is long overdue. Then they are 
starting a study of canons of ethics to determine if there should 
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be revisions. They are preparing a source book on the back-
ground of rights of citizens under the Bill of Rights and under 
our Constitution. Another study is being undertaken in coop-
eration with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in certain areas. I wanted to get that in in 
order to say one of the greatest honors which has come to Ne-
braska lawyers in the past year has been the election of Barton 
H. Kuhns of the Omaha Bar to the presidency of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. A very 
great tribute to one of our very great lawyers. 
Turning now, I want to make one other thing clear. The 
Federal Bar Association, of which Clarence Davis has just been 
elected president, is a national organization of over two hundred 
lawyers, most of them career people in government. That is a 
great honor also. 
Now I want to talk for just a moment about the problem 
of social security for lawyers. That has been a matter of in-
terest and concern to the profession since 1938. The traditional 
stand of American lawyers has been that we want no part of 
social security, that it is a type of government regimentation 
which will, how I have never understood, somehow control the 
American lawyer so that we will lose our traditional independence. 
That stand has obviously been changed. Many, many lawyers, 
and I know there are lot of them in this room, some of them on 
the platform, desire social security coverage and have had it for 
many years by simply converting what were retainers into sal-
aries, et cetera. Obviously some of the younger men at the Bar 
see the problem differently than do the older members of the Bar, 
At the February meeting of the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar in Chicago, the House of Delegates in part rnversed 
the previous stand of the Association and endorsed social security 
for lawyers on a voluntary basis, on the basis that each lawyer 
might decide for himself whether he wanted coverage under social 
security. 
Those of us who have had some occasion to look at the prob-
lem of social security coverage not from the standpoint of the 
member of the profession or of individuals but from the stand-
point of government will, I think, in the main agree with those 
members of Congress, who have lived with this problem, some 
of them since its infancy, who find it very difficult on an in-
tellectual basis to understand how it can be a rational approach 
when no other profession and no other people in America are 
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given the optional coverage, Christian Science practitioners, I 
think, are the only exception. The whole concept of social se-
curity from the government standpoint is mandatory coverage. 
Now the American Bar Association House of Delegates, I 
think, is obviously aware of the problems created in the area 
I have mentioned, and so at the Philadelphia meeting they adop-
ted a resolution which in effect asks each state Bar Association 
to poll its members, to submit questions which will be prepared 
by the Board of Governors of the American Bar, so that each 
lawyer may voice his own personal opinion as to what he wants. 
That poll undoubtedly will be taken by our State Association. It 
will be very helpful to the House of Delegates of the American 
Bar Association to have a full and complete return on that poll. 
I hope that when it comes out every Nebraska lawyer will fill out 
that questionaire and send it in, so that those of us who represent 
this Association in the House of Delegates may be governed in 
our voting by the will of the majority of our lawyers here. 
Now this problem of social security cuts into the ne::...1; prob-
lem I want to mention, and that is the problem of retirement in-
come for self-employed. 
As you know, for many, many years the tax law has permit-
ted employers to create pension plans for employees and take cur-
rent tax deductions for the contribution they make to the pen-
sion fund. The individual employees are not deemed to receive 
any taxable income until the time comes when they receive, us-
ually after retirement, their annuity, their pension from the fund. 
This, of course, in a time of high surtax brackets is a very im-
portant tax benefit, because not only is there deferment of tax 
on the current contribution of the employer, but there is addit-
ionally no tax currently on the earnings, the increment to and of 
the fund itself. So those two things combine to mean that the 
dollars in profit of an employee under a pension plan are normally 
very much greater than they would have been if, instead of pen-
sion, the employee received additional salary in amount equal 
to the contribution made in his behalf by his employer. That 
type of thing has enabled corporate executives, for example, to 
create for themselves substantial retirement plans on a tax-free 
basis. 
This year is the first time that Congress has apparently be-
gun to look with some favor on that type of plan, because the 
Ways and Means Committee this year, by divided vote, it is true, 
adopted a modified plan which would permit lawyers if included 
in social security on a mandatory basis, which is where social se-
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curity comes into this, to set aside up to ten percent of their 
earned income annually on certain qualified investments tax free, 
with a maximum of seventy-five hundred a year and a maximum 
of one hundred thousand during their lifetime. 
Now contrary to what you read in the press, that bill was not 
reported out to the House of Representatives. It has simply been 
voted on by the committee, put into what is called the "Bob-tail 
Bill." I venture to express an opinion that it will not be reported 
out in the current form. I expect Ways and Means will recon-
sider each of the bills currently in that, so that the future of the 
bill is in doubt. Yet it is started; it is on the way; progress has 
been made. I feel that is all I can say about that. If you want 
the details I will be glad to get all the testimony in full detail on it. 
Now a word about continuing legal education, the joint un-
dertaking of the American Law Institute and the American Bar 
Association, the joint committee of the two groups. We want to 
mention that Harvey Johnson of our own Bar was one of the 
charter or original members of that committee. 
This year we started publication of a new practical magazine 
for the general practitioner. It is called The Practical Lawyer. 
You can find the details about it at the display booth outside. 
When that project was undertaken and under consideration 
we decided that if we could get five thousand subscriptions we 
would be on the way, and it would be a great thing. There are 
now over twelve thousand subscribers. We have so many requests 
for back issues from lawyers who started buying it at the third 
or fourth or fifth issue that we are out of print. We did not print 
enough. I commend it to you. I suggest that you get a copy and 
take a look at it. I suspect that twenty-five thousand American 
lawyers are going to be subscribing to that "how to do it" prac-
tical handbook approach that is in that magazine. 
It is not Law Review style. There are plenty of learned 
erudite Law Review articles. These are practical articles in the 
field of the general practitioner. I want to mention that the 
American Bar Association group life insurance program now has 
been adopted and is in effect. If you want the details write to 
headquarters in Chicago. 
Now Clarence assigned me, apparently without my realizing 
it, Circular 230. Since I am in the middle of the government 
side. I'm going to refrain, except to say that what happened this 
year in the area, as far as the recommendations and urging of 
the accountants that Circular 230 be amended, is that nothing 
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has happened. The Treasury Department has not as of now 
taken any steps to change or amend Circular 230. 
Finally I want to simply say that I think that in my prof es-
sional life nothing has done so much, has contributed so much, 
nothing has so enriched, I think, my professional life as has mem-
bership and participation in the affairs of the Nebraska State 
Bar Association and the American Bar Association. The two 
complement each other. 
I suggest to you also that few things have more enriched my 
personal life than have membership and participation in the af-
fairs of those two organizations, because of the friendships and 
personal relationships developed in the course of it. So I want 
to conclude by urging that every Nebraska lawyer who is not 
currently a member of the American Bar Association become such. 
He will find his professional and personal life better, in my view, 
as a result of it. Thank you very much. 
PRESIDENT WILSON : Thank you, Laury, for this fine re-
port of the activities of the American Bar Association. 
\i\T e now have a r~port on the House of Delegates meeting of 
yesterday, Mr. Turner. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: Jean Cain, the Chairman of the House 
has asked me to make this report in his stead. 
Report of the Chairman of the House of Delegates 
The House of Delegates met on Wednesday, October 5, 1955, 
to receive and act upon reports of Committees of the Association. 
The first order of business was a report by the president of the 
Association, John J. Wilson, who at the same time introduced a 
resolution concerning the endorsement by the Nebraska State 
Bar Association of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 
The resolution was adopted in the following form 
WHEREAS the first meeting of the Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Institute held at Boulder, Colorado, July 21 to 23, 1955, 
proved to be an outstanding success and drew an attendance far 
in excess of the expectations of the original sponsors of such in-
stitute, and 
WHERE.AS it has been determined that the Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Institute shall become a permanent organization 
incorporated by the sponsors thereof with all states in the area 
interested in mineral law participating, and 
WHERE.AS the Nebraska State Bar .Association has been 
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asked to join as a sponsor of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, and having been assured that no financial obligation 
was entailed by such sponsorship, 
BE IT NOW RESOL YED that the House of Delegates of the 
Nebraska State Bar Association approves sponsorship of the Rocky 
iliountain Mineral Law Institute by the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation, and the officers of the Nebraska State Bar Association 
be authorized and empowered to sign the Articles of Incorporation 
of such institute and arrange for representation of this Assoc-
iation upon the governing body of the institute. 
The House received the report of the Committee on Admin-
istrative Agencies and approved its recommendation that the 
committee be continued in order that it might assist and be avail-
able to the Governor's Conference on Administrative Procedure. 
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship recom-
mended a program of issuing citations for service to members 
of the bar and also contained a recommendation that the reports 
of previous committees for the years 1953 and 1954 be set aside 
and approval previously given thereto be rescinded. The latter 
part of the committee's recommendation was adopted but the 
House declined to approve the proposed program of issuing cita-
tions to members of the bar for civic activity. 
The recommendation of the Committee on Cooperation with 
the American Law Institute that this committee keep in close 
touch \vi.th the work of the American Law Institute and render 
such service as possible to that organization was approved. The 
House also approved the recommendation of the committee that 
consideration be given to the publication of possible annotations 
to the Restatement. The House also approved the recommenda-
tion of the committee that a member be designated to attend the 
annual meeting of the American Law Institute. 
The House approved the several recommendations of the 
Committee on Ctime and Delinquency Prevention. These recom-
mendations are: 
1. That the committee continue its efforts toward drafting 
and securing the adoption of a bill which will establish a state-
·wide probation. 
2. That further study be made of our laws relating to sex 
offenders with a view to recommending corrective legislation. 
3. Sponsorship by the committee of a program to inform 
attorneys of their responsibilities combatting juvenile delinquency. 
4. That the transfer of the State Criminal Investigation 
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Division from the Highway Department to the Department of 
Justice be approved, together with a law relating to medical ex-
aminers. 
The recommendation of the Committee on County Law Li-
braries that the committee be continued was approved. 
The chairman of the Committee on the Revision of Rules 
Governing Disciplinary Proceedings reported that substantial 
amendments to the rules had been adopted by the Supreme Court, 
and recommended the dissolution of the committee. This recom-
mendation was adopted. 
The House of Delegates approved the report of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary and received the statement of the chair-
man advising that a test case is contemplated to determine the 
validity of LB 38, the Judicial Retirement Act. 
The reports of the Committees on Legal Aid and on Legis-
lation were approved. 
Mr. Sampson discussed the distribution of pamphlets and 
moved that this distribution in the future be without cost to the 
members of the bar. Mr. McCown moved as a substifute that the 
question of the distribution of pamphlets be referred to the Ex-
ecutive Council. The substitute motion prevailed. 
The House approved the report of the Committee on Public 
Service and received the report of the Committee on Unauthorized 
Practice. 
The report of the Committee on Expert Medical Testimony 
was presented by Mr. George Healey in the absence of the chair-
man, which report was received, and on motion of Mr. Healey the 
House voted to continue the committee. 
The report of the Committee on State Tort Claims Act was 
adopted. The reports of the Committee on Legal Education and 
the Advisory Committee were received and filed. 
Chairman Otto Kotouc of the Committee on Budget and Fi-
nance reported for that committee with the recommendation that 
in view of the favorable financial condition of the association the 
House of Delegates recommend to the Executive Council that 
$2000.00 be placed in a sinking fund and invested in U. S. Sav-
ings Bonds with the expectation that additional funds be added 
in subsequent years, the proposed sinking fund to provide schol-
arships to further the objectives of the Association. The motion 
was adopted. 
The report of the Committee on Oil and Gas Law was adopted. 
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C. Russell Mattson, chairman of the Committee on Hearings, 
reported that the committee had met to consider the resolution 
offered earlier by Mr. Votava in the following language: 
RESOLVED that the House of Delegates of the Nebraska 
State Bar Association approve the amendment of Section 4 of 
Article 8 of the Nebraska state constitution which will be sub-
mitted to the people in 19.5 6 at the general election under the 
recently enacted LB 307; which measure will permit the legis-
lature to absolve real estate taxes and assessments delinquent 
ten years or more. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the lawyers of Nebraska 
are urged to take the initiative in explaining the measure to the 
voters to the end that the electorate can make an intelligent 
decision on the matter on November 8, 1956. 
The Committee on Hearings reported as follows: 
"Your Committee on Hearings met to consider matters to 
be referred to it. 
"The only matter to be considered by the Committee was a 
resolution offered to the House of Delegates by Hon. Joseph 
Votava. This relates to the association approving a proposed 
amendment to Sec. 4 Article 8 of the constitution of Nebraska 
which would permit legislative action to absolve real estate taxes 
and assessments delinquent ten years or more. The resolution 
also relates to the lawyers being urged to explain the measure to 
the voters before November 8, 1956. 
"Upon consideration your committee reports that it recom-
mends opposition to adoption of the resolution, feeling it contains 
a subject matter which should have neither the approval nor 
disapproYal of this Association." 
It was thereupon moved that the report of the Committee 
on Hearings be adopted. The motion carried. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: We will now have a report of the Ju-
dicial Council by Honorable Edward F. Carter, chairman of the 
council. 
Report of the Judicial Council 
The Judicial Council has held three one-day meetings since 
the last annual meeting of this Association. It has considered 
many matters pertaining to court procedure during that period. 
The council, with the approval of the Supreme Court, submitted 
ten proposed procedural changes to the legislature, all of which 
have been enacted into law. Briefly described, these statutes pro-
vide: 
L. B. 170: An act providing for the removal of garnishment 
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proceedings to the district court when the amount or value in 
controversy is in excess of the maximum jurisdiction of the in-
ferior court. 
L. B. 171: An act providing for the transfer of the personal 
property of a deceased person without judicial proceedings where 
the value of the estate, less liens and encumbrances, does not 
exceed seven hundred dollars. 
L. B. 172: An act providing the time and manner of taking 
an appeal to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the district 
court on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
granting or denying a new trial. The effect of this statute is 
to fix the time for such appeal from the rendition rather than the 
entry of the final order. 
L. B. 173 : An act p1·oviding that the clerk of the district 
court may settle and sign a bill of exceptions whenever for any 
cause the judge before whom the case was tried has ceased to hold 
that office. 
L. B. 17 4 : An act providing in a proceeding to obtain a li-
cense to sell real estate for the payment of debts in a decedent's 
estate matter that homestead rights shall be there determined. 
L. B. 175: An act restating the qualifications of jurors, for 
the drawing of additional key numbers in counties of three thou-
sand population or less, and for striking women from key-number 
lists in counties where women may not be called as jurors. 
L. B. 176: An act limiting the exemption of voluntary fire-
men and those engaged in militia duty in time of peace. 
L. B. 177: An act providing for the appointment of a guar-
dian of the estate of a mentally ill or incompetent person who is 
a non-resident of the state and is possessed of property in a county 
of this state. 
L. B. 178 : An act providing that investment or reinvest-
ment of the proceeds of sale of real estate of a ward shall be made 
by the guardian in accordance with existing laws, subject to the 
approval of the county court having jurisdiction of the guardian-
ship. 
L. B. 179: An act providing one method of procedure for the 
recovery of taxes, or any part thereof, that are for any reason 
invalid. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Judicial Council revised the 
disciplinary procedure provided for in Article XI of Chapter IV 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court at the instance of a committee 
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of this Association. The revision was submitted to the Supreme 
Court and was adopted on June 24, 1955, and became effective as 
of that date. The purpose of the revision was to eliminate the 
weaknesses of the procedure and expedite the handling of the 
investigation and disposition of charges. 
Many suggestions are before the council for future consider-
ation. It will serve no useful purpose to recite them here because 
of the very indefinite status they presently occupy. 
Once again I would like to voice the feeling of the council 
that members of the bar are too indifferent to this most import-
ant work. The fault may be ours in that a proper procedure 
has not been found to get the work of the council before the bar 
generally. We must rely, in part at least, upon the lawyers and 
judges to call to our attention procedural defects that ought 
to be remedied. New situations requiring new procedures or the 
revision of antiquated procedures are more likely to be discovered 
by those engaged in the practice. We desire that such instances 
be called to our attention in order that corrective measures may 
be brought about. 
Until the creation of judicial councils, there was no system-
atic effort to evaluate the operation of the courts and no organ-
ized effort to consider improvement. In the code states, of which 
Nebraska is one, the tendency toward archaicness was augmented 
by reason of the divided authority between the legislature and 
the courts. The legislature was charged with the regulation of 
judicial procedure while the courts decided only the merits of 
controversies. This has magnified procedure to the dignity of 
legislative acts and, as members of the legislature are not usually 
conversant with court procedure and the innumberable decisions 
and interpretations which their laws evoked, procedures other 
than judicial sprang up to the detriment of lawyers and the dis-
satisfaction of litigants. To alleviate this situation the judicial 
council was created to provide an official and continuous agency 
constantly engaged in providing information about the courts, 
in weighing the possibilities of more effective administration, 
and, where found, offering concrete proposals for improvements 
in the administration of justice. Confidence in the courts re-
quires that the people securely feel that the administration of 
justice is accomplished with efficiency and integrity. 
Legislative action with reference to judicial procedure in this 
state had its beginnings largely in the imitation of legislation 
from other states without adequate study of its basis or the con-
ditions it was designed to meet, and the tinkering with details 
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without an overall plan of improvement. We need to know that 
which is universal and that which is local, a distinction that has 
been given too little consideration. 
The procedural law for the administration of justice in this 
state is basically sound. It is not the purpose of the Judicial 
Council to embark upon a crusade for its re:f orm. Any such pro-
gram must originate elsewhere. But the needs of a changing 
social, economic and industrial order must be met if lack of con-
fidence in the courts is to be avoided. No one person can do it 
alone the Judicial Council cannot do it alone. The collective in-
telligence of all members of the bar is needed. It is for this 
reason that we urge you to lend your aid to the work of the Coun-
cil. Efficiency and economy in the administration of justice will 
tend to eliminate the growth of competitive agencies and thereby 
result in keeping law business in the hands of lawyers where it 
belongs. Greater confidence in the efficiency and integrity of 
courts will likewise tend to eliminate commissions and agencies 
as a substitute for judicial processes. We must be able to accept 
the responsibilities to the satisfaction of the public if we are to 
merit the confidence of those who entrust us with adjustment 
of disputes and controversies. 
Edward F. Carter 
Chairman, Judicial Council. 
PRESIDENT 'WILSON: The secretary-treasurer will now re-
port the result of the election of officers for the ensuing year. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. President and members. Follow-
ing the directions of the constitution, the Executive Council made 
nominations for the office of president, chairman of the House 
of Delegates, and member at large of the Executive Council three 
months ahead of this annual meeting and caused notices to be 
sent to all members. No opposing candidates having been nom-
inated, nominees of the council of course are elected automatically. 
They are Wilber S. Aten, president; Hale McCown, Beatrice, 
chairman of the House of Delegates; and Clarence E. Haley, Hart-
ington, member at large. They will be installed tomorrm11. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: At this point in the program we will 
receive the report of the Committee on Memorials by C. L. Clark, 
chairman of the committee. 
Report of Committee on Memorials 
Your committee regrets the necessity of reporting that since 
our last annual meeting twenty-eight (28) members of the Bar 
of Nebraska have received their final summons to answer for their 
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accomplishments and activities while sojourning among us. All 
of them proved faithful in the discharge of their duties to both 
the courts and their clients. They made lasting contributions 
to the fair and impartial administration of justice. They were 
devoted to the ideals of our free institutions of government. They 
left their influence upon the ever-developing field of the law. 
We cherish in our memory the personal qualities of these col-
leagues who will not again be our associates or adversaries. Their 
success in their chosen profession is not to be measured by their 
individual material gains, but rather by the fact that they have 
advanced and raised to a higher plane the just and equitable ad-
ministration of the laws of this state and nation, all of which 
benefits our citizenry as a whole. 
It is our knowledge of their loyalty and their integrity, and 
in recognition of their personal responsibility to their clients and 
to the communities in which they labored, that prompts this brief 
report. 
The twenty-eight departed brothers of whom I speak with 
deepest reverence are: 
R. E. BANNISTER, Cozad 
HARVEY A. BRUBAKER, Nelson, 
ARCHER M. BUNTING, Lincoln, 
ALLEN G. BURKE, Bancroft, 
FRANKLIN J. CALLAHAN, Kansas City, Missouri, 
D. 0. DWYER, Weeping Water, 
WILLIAM M. ELY, Ainsworth, 
MILTON R. FROHM, Omaha, 
SIDNEY T. FRUM, South Sioux City, 
EDWARD R. HARVEY, Portland, Oregon, 
WILLIAM c. HEELAN, Valentine, 
w ALTER M. HERBERT, Lincoln, 
LADD J. HUBKA, Beatrice, 
EDWARD F. LEARY, Omaha, 
PALMER MCGREW, Lincoln, 
BERNARD A. MARTIN, Omaha, 
BAYARD H. PAINE, Grand Island, 
HAROLD. A. PALMER, Omaha, 
SIDNEY c. POSKA, Lincoln, 
PENROSE E. ROMIG, Alliance, 
THOMAS P. SHANAHAN, Talmage, 
CHARLES 1\1. SKILES, Lincoln, 
WILLIAM SUHR, Grand Island, 
CHARLES A. SWEET, Palmyra, 
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GEORGE M. TUNISON, Omaha, 
L. L. TURPIN, Omaha 
.ARTHUR R. WELLS, Omaha 
PERRY M. WHEELER, Omaha, 
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Your committee believes it to be fitting and proper that we 
bonor these deceased members by pausing in this session and 
arising and standing silent for a moment in their memory. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Clark. We will now 
recess until the next meeting of the assembly tomorrow afternoon. 
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SOME ASPECTS OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
By 
William E. Knepper 
When Mr. Justice Murphy said that "The pre-trial deposition-
discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the 
most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure," he made one of the understatements of the last decade. 
That comment appears early in the opinion in Hickman vs. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 395, 67 Supp.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, in which the Su-
preme Court was confronted with the delicate problem of trying 
to balance the competing interests of those who sought to pry 
into the privacy of their adversaries' files on the one hand, and 
the fundamental proposition that public policy supports reason-
able and necessary inquiries on the other. 
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, 
an entirely new and different concept of the trial of a lawsuit 
has thundered its way into our jurisprudence. Under the former 
federal practice, the pleadings were used to give notice to the 
adverse party of the claims of his opponent, to formulate the is-
sues in the case, and to make such revelation as was possible of 
the facts to be tried. As we all know, the pleadings were most 
inadequate to perform such a function. Under the new rules, 
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however, the pleadings are restricted to the task of general notice-
giving, and the deposition-discovery process is invested with a 
new and vital role in the preparation for trial. Commenting on 
this new procedure, Mr. Justice Murphy says, "Thus, civil trials 
in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. 
The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for 
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues 
and facts before trial." 
The four rules which are of particular importance in any 
consideration of discovery are Rule 26, relating to the taking of 
depositions, Rule 33, having to do with interrogatories to parties, 
Rule 34, dealing with the production of documents and things 
for inspection, copying or photographing, and Rule 35, providing 
for physical and mental examinations of persons. 
Rule 26 is particularly significant because it prescribes the 
scope of the examination and says that the deponent may be ex-
amined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant 
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, de-
scription, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. That rule ex-
pressly states that it is not ground for objection that the testi-
mony will be inadmissable at the trial if the testimony sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admiss-
ible evidence. 
Any party may take the testimony of any person, including 
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or by deposition 
on written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery, or for 
use in evidence in the action, or for both purposes. The deposi-
tion may be taken without leave of court, unless the notice of the 
taking is served hy the plaintiff within twenty days after com-
mencement of the action. The defendant may take depositions 
without leave of court as soon as the action is commenced. The 
theory behind the twenty-day period is to provide an opportunity 
for the defendant to become conversant with the action and to 
obtain counsel to represent him. The time from which the twenty-
day period begins to run is the date of the filing of the complaint 
with the clerk of the court, and not the date of service. 
Under Rule 26, a party is not deemed to have made a per-
son his own 'vitness for any purpose by taking his deposition. Of 
course the introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part 
230 NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
thereof for any purpose other than that of contradicting or im-
peaching the deponent makes the deponent the witness of the 
party introducing the deposition. But even that provision is sub-
ject to a qualification, namely, that the introduction in evidence 
of the deposition of a party, or anyone who at the time of the 
taking of the deposition was an officer, director or managing 
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership or associa-
tion which is a party will not make the deponent the witness of 
the party introducing the deposition. 
At this point it would be well to observe that if the deposi-
tion is to be used for any purpose during the trial it should be 
filed with the clerk. A practice obtains in some states of taking 
the deposition of an adverse party to be used for discovery or for 
impeachment, and then the lawyer taking the deposition merely 
retains it in his own file until he is ready to use it at the time of 
trial. That is not a safe practice under the Federal Rules be-
cause some courts will ref use to permit the use of the deposition, 
even for impeachment, if it has not been filed with the clerk. 
The rules permit a very wide scope of examination in pre-
trial depositions. The Advisory Committee has said that the broad 
scope of examination may cover not only evidence for use at the 
trial, but also inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as 
evidence but which will lead to the discovery of such evidence. 
The committee says, "The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad 
search for facts, the names of witness, or any other matters which 
may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case." 
The Supreme Court carried this same concept into the de-
cision in Hickman vs. Taylor, wherein Mr. Justice Murphy said, 
"Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both 
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party 
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his 
possession." Thus is demonstrated this new concept of trial 
practice, whereby the trial in the federal courts now becomes 
more of a "search for truth" and less of a "battle of wits." 
The general rule is that all parties over whom the court has 
acquired jurisdiction may be required to be present within the 
jurisdiction for the taking of their depositions by an adverse 
party. A non-resident plaintiff is generally required to be present 
in the district in which suit is brought, for the taking of his 
deposition without pre-payment by the defendant of his travel 
expenses. However, the trial court has the power to make any 
order necessary for the protection of the parties, and will or-
dinarily consider the hardships which might result and condition 
the orders for the taking of the depositions accordingly. 
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Under proper circumstances, upon motion of an adverse 
party, prepayment of travel expenses and fees of the adverse 
parties' counsel may be made a condition of the taking of a de-
position outside of the district of the forum. A number of the 
district courts make specific provision for this in their local rules. 
If a party serving a notice to take depositions fails to attend, 
then any other party or his attorney who is present at the time 
and place specified in the notice is entitled to reimbursement for 
travel expenses and counsel fees. It has also been held that a 
similar expense award may be made if the party giving notice 
fails to subpoena a witness, and as a result of the absence of the 
witness no deposition is taken. 
Rule 33 prescribes a method by which a party may obtain 
information from his opponents so as to prepare for trial, reduce 
the possibility of surprise at trial and narrow the factual issues 
so as to determine what evidence he will need at the trial. This 
method is by written interrogatories to parties. It should also 
be kept in mind that under Rule 26 depositions of parties or wit-
nesses may be taken on written interrogatories. 
The scope of the interrogatories available under Rule 33 is 
the same as the scope of the examination by deposition under Rule 
26. Interrogatories may be served after the commencement of 
the action, and without leave of court, except that if service is 
made by the plaintiff within ten days after his complaint is filed, 
leave of court must first be obtained, but this may be obtained 
with or without notice. 
The rule requires that interrogatories must be answered sep-
arately and fully in writing under oath, and that the answers 
must be signed by the person making them. The party upon 
whom the interrogatories have been served is required to serve 
a copy of his answers on the party submitting the interrogatories 
within fifteen days after the service of the interrogatories un-
less the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, en-
larges or shortens the time. If the party upon whom the inter-
rogatories are served desires to make any objection to them, or 
desires to try to avoid answering them, he must serve written 
objections thereto, together with a notice of hearing the objec-
tions at the earliest practicable time, and those written objec-
tions must be filed within ten days after the service of the inter-
rogatories. The serving of such objections as to some of the 
interrogatories will not relieve the party from being required to 
answer the other interrogatories as to which no objection has 
been made. That he must do, and within time. 
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A party is not required to choose between interrogatories or 
depositions. He may have both, and in either order. However 
the rule does say that the court may make such protective order 
as justice may require and may limit the number of interroga-
tories or of sets of interrogatories to protect a party from annoy-
ance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. 
While it is to be presumed that a party upon whom inter-
rogatories are served will consult with his counsel in the prep-
aration of the answers to those interrogatories, and that for this 
reason, among others, interrogatories may not be quite as eff ec-
tive in obtaining information as would an oral examination upon 
deposition, nevertheless interrogatories do have a real and sub-
stantial value in obtaining discovery. Many times at the taking 
of an oral deposition a party will not recall matters as to his 
past history, or the amounts of his expenses resulting from the 
injury involved in the case at bar, and similar matters. Inter-
rogatories can obtain this information just as effectively, and 
with far less time and expense. Also, interrogatories may be 
effectively used to obtain the names and addresses of witnesses 
known to the adverse party, the names and addresses of persons 
who have taken photographs at the scene of an accident, the 
amounts of repair bills, medical bills, hospital bills and the like. 
Interrogatories may be utilized to obtain the personal background 
and history of a party, as well as his medical history and whether 
or not he has ever been involved in other accidents or other liti-
gation. 
When interrogatories are addressed to a party and he does 
not answer fully, he may be required to do so on motion. It has 
also been held that a party who declines to answer interrogatories 
may be precluded from offering proof at the trial and may be 
similarly punished where he engages in dilatory and contumacious 
tactics. Likewise there is authority that when a party is asked 
to disclose the names of persons who have knowledge of the facts 
out of which the litigation grows, he must disclose all of the names 
at the peril of being refused the privilege of offering as witnesses 
any whose names are not so disclosed. 
It is clearly established,however, that a party cannot be 
compelled to state the names of all witnesses who he will off er 
at the trial and thus commit himself in advance as to the presen-
tation of his case. There is a difference between an interrogatory 
seeking that information and one asking for the names and ad-
dresses of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. 
A party being interrogated under Rule 33 is required to give 
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only matters within his knowledge and which are matters of fact. 
He is not required to express opinions or state his contentions as 
to matters of law or conclusions. He is not required to make re-
search or to compile information which is not readily available 
to him. 
Whereas, under the former practice, it was customary to 
use a motion to make definite and certain to procure additional 
information as to the case of the adverse party, the courts now 
generally hold that such information is to be procured by means 
of discovery so that the pleadings will not be encumbered with a 
great mass of evidentiary material. 
Under Rule 34 a party may procure the inspection and right 
to copy or photograph designated documents, papers, books, ac-
counts, letters, photography, objects or tangible things, not priv-
ileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of 
the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by 
Rule 26 and which are in his possession, custody or control. 
Under that rule, also, a party may obtain the right to enter upon 
designated land or other property in the possession or control 
of an adverse party for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, 
surveying or photographing it, within the scope of the examin-
ation permitted by Rule 26. However such rights are obtainable 
only upon motion and a showing of good cause therefor, and no-
tice of the motion must be given to all other parties. The court 
making such an order is required to specify the time, place and 
manner of making the inspection and taking the photographs and 
copies, and the court may prescribe such terms and conditions 
therefor as are just. 
Under this rule the court has discretion whether to grant the 
order and the court has an opportunity not only to know what 
it is requiring the adverse party to produce, but also whether 
there is in fact good cause for producing it. 
On a motion for discovery and inspection, the items sought 
must be designated, and a blanket request is not permitted. A 
motion for an order permitting a defendant to inspect the records 
of the plaintiff's treatment in a specified hospital and in any 
other hospitals where the plaintiff was treated does not suffic-
iently designate the records. There are four conditions to the 
relief authorized by Rule 34, and a court would not be justified 
in directing the production of documents or papers unless these 
conditions were complied with. The four conditions are: (1) 
"showing good cause" by the party seeking to compel the pro-
duction of (2) "designated" documents, etc., (3) "which con-
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stitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved" (4) 
and are in the possession, custody or control" of the person against 
whom the order is sought. Ma1·zo vs. Moore-McCormack Lines, 
Inc., 7 F.R.D. 378, 380. 
Somewhat related to Rule 34 and yet apparently designed 
more for the purpose of procuring evidence than for discovery is 
Rule 36, which has to do with the admission of facts and of the 
genuineness of documents. The rule says that after the com-
mencement of an action a party may served upon any other party 
a written request for the admission by the other party of the 
genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited 
with the request, or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact 
set forth in the request. Here again if the plaintiff desires to 
serve the request within ten days after the filing of his com-
plaint, leave of court must be obtained. Each of the matters of 
which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted, un-
less, within a period designated in the request and not less than 
ten days after the service thereof or within such shorter or longer 
time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to 
whom the request is directed does one of two things. Such party 
may serve upon the party requesting the admission either a sworn 
statement denying specifically the matters of which an admis-
sion is requested, or setting forth in detail the reasons why he 
cannot truthfully admit or deny these matters; or such party 
may serve written objections on the ground that some or all of 
the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the 
request is otherwise improper, in whole or in part, together with 
a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time. 
As in the case of interrogatories, if written objections are made 
to a part of the request the remainder of the request must be 
answered within the period designated in the request. It is 
most important to bear in mind that affirmative action by the re-
sponsive party is necessary if he wishes to avoid an admission im-
plied by his silence. The failure to respond constitutes an ad-
mission, even though the genuineness of documents had previous-
ly been denied under oath in the pleadings. Also, the answer 
when made must be a sworn statement of the responding party. 
The last of the rules to be considered here is Rule 35, dealing 
with physical and mental examinations of persons. Under this 
rule a party to an action whose mental or physical condition is 
in controversy may be examined, provided good cause is shown. 
The rule provides that the order may be made only on motion and 
upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties, 
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope 
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of examination and the person or persons by whom it is made. 
It is within the discretion of the court whether to order repeated 
examinations. Good cause therefor could be that the physical 
or mental condition of the party had changed since the day of a 
previous examination. Procedure under this rule requires the 
exchanging of medical reports. If the person examined so re-
quests, the party causing the examination must deliver to him 
a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician 
setting out his findings and conclusions. Thereafter the party 
causing the examination is entitled upon request to receive from 
the party examined a like report of any examination, previously 
or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical condition. 
The failure to comply with this rule can result in the exclusion 
of the testimony of the examining or attending physician. Also, 
if the party examined requests and obtains a report of the ex-
amination or takes the deposition of the examiner, he thereby 
waives any privilege he may have had in that action or any other 
involving the same controversy as to the testimony of every other 
person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in re-
spect to the same mental or physical condition. For a discussion 
of this rule, see Sibbach vs. Wil.son & Co. 312 U.S. 1, 61 Sup.Ct. 
422, 85 L.Ed. 479. 
Looking generally at the discovery provisions, we find that 
many of the writers and many of the courts have said that they 
were intended to eliminate surprise from lawsuits. There is 
ground for debate as to whether that is good. In his interesting 
address, "What's So Wrong About Surprise?," 39 American Bar 
Association Journal 1075, Kenneth B. Hawkins, of the Chicago 
Bar, says, "Surprise is as essential to a lawsuit as anaesthesia is 
to surgery. Each helps to find the truth." And we may also 
note the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opin-
ion in Hickman vs. Taylor wherein he says, "But a common law 
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery 
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform 
its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the 
adversary." 
Those pungent statements of today cause us to look back to 
the comment of Sir James Wigram, in his Law of Discovery, 
written a century and a quarter ago, wherein he said that the 
courts of justice in England acted upon the principle "that the 
possible mischiefs of surprise at the trial are more than counter-
balanced by the danger of perjury, which must inevitably be in-
curred, when either party is permitted, before a trial, to kn°'"~ 
the precise evidence against which he has to contend, and ac-
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cordingly by the settled rules of courts of justice in this country 
(approved as well as acknowledged), each party has thrown upon 
him the onus of supporting his own case, and meeting that of 
his adversary without knowing beforehand by what evidence the 
case of his advernary is to be established, or his own exposed." 
It is that conflict between the desirability of eliminating sur-
prise on the one hand and the danger of perjury on the other 
which has been such a serious problem in connection with our 
modern theories of discovery. Professor Sunderland's answer 
has been that "the true safeguard against perjury is not to re-
fuse to permit any inquiry at all, for that will eliminate the true 
as well as the false, but to so conduct the inquiry as to separate 
and distinguish the one from the other where both may be present." 
The Supreme Court, in adopting the rules, took cognizance 
of the danger of abuse of the discovery procedures when it pro-
mulgated Rule 30, and in subparagraphs (b) and ( d) thereof 
made provision for orders for the protection of parties and de-
ponents, and for a motion to terminate or limit the examination. 
Those protective provisions apply not only to all depositions under 
Rule 26 but to others of the discovery procedures. In comment-
ing on those sections, District Judge Johnson, of Pennsylvania, 
(Madison i1s. Cobb, 29 F.Supp. 881, 882) has said, "In these pro-
visions adequate safeguards are erected to prevent unjust use 
of plaintiff's right to take the defendant's deposition, and de-
fendant should resort to these provisions if necessary to protect 
himself, rather than by arbitrarily refusing in the first instance 
to attend the examination." 
Whether that is a complete answer may be doubted~ but the 
fact remains that discovery is here to stay, not only in the federal 
courts but more and more in the courts of the several states. Sur-
prise, as we have known it in past years, is a much less valuable 
courtroom tool than it used to be. Literally thousands of pages 
of the decisions of the courts have been devoted to the construc-
tion and analysis of these discovery rules. In this field, as in 
many others, the problems in each particular case must be de-
termined on the basis of the circumstances existing in that case. 
The lawyer who uses the discovery procedures to their full-
est extent is bound to benefit the cause of his client, whether he 
be representing the plaintiff or the defendant. Therefore all of 
us have much to gain by thoroughly familiarizing ourselves with 
these rules and keeping abreast of the decisions of the courts 
which interpret them and apply them to particular fact patterns. 
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THE TRIAL OF LAWSUITS AND THE PERI.LS 
OF OVER-TRIAL 
by 
Lester P. Dodd 
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The business of trying lawsuits is a baffling business. Be-
cause it is self-proclaimed, experts on trial techniques have been 
finding a ready market for their wares since advocacy began. 
Doubtless many of you have read Robert Graves' book, 
Claudius the God.1 In that delightfully amusing chapter in which 
the Emperor Claudius recounts his experiences as a Roman Mag-
istrate, he tells of passing each day, as he came into the Market 
Place from the Palace, a stuccoed building across the face of 
which was tarred in enormous letters : 
FORENSIC AND LEGAL INSTITUTE-Founded and Directed by 
the most Learned and Eloquent Orator and Jurist Telegonius 
Macarius of This City and of the City of Athens. 
Underneath this on a huge square tablet appeared the fol-
lowing advertisement: 
Telegonius gives instruction and advice to all who have become 
involved in financial or personal difficulties necessitating their 
appearance in Civil or Criminal courts; and has a positively en-
cyclopaedic knowledge of all Roman edicts, statutes, decrees, 
proclamations, judicial decisions, et cetera, past and present, opera-
tive, dormant, or inoperative. At half an hour's notice the most 
learned and eloquent Telegonius can supply his clients with pre-
cise and legally incontrovertible opinions on any judicial matter 
under the sun that they care to present to him and his staff 
of highly trained clerks. Not only Roman Law, but Greek Law, 
Egyptian Law, Jewish Law, Armenian, Moroccan or Parthian Lawl 
Telegonius has it all at his fingers' ends. The incomparable 
Telegonius, not content with dispensing the raw material of Law. 
dispenses also the finished product; namely; beautifully contrived 
forensic presentations of the same complete with appropriate 
tones and gestures. Personal appeals to the jury a specialty. 
Handbook of brilliant rhetorical figures and tropes, suitable for 
any case, to be had on request. No client of Telegonius has ever 
been known to suffer an adverse verdict in any court-unless 
his opponent has by chance also drunk from the same fountain 
or oratorical wisdom and eloquence. A few vacancies for pupils. 
Insofar as I have been able to discover, Telegonius was not 
only the first advocate of record to boast that he never lost a 
lawsuit but was the first of the self-proclaimed experts to broad-
1 Claudius the God, by Robert Graves. Copyright, 1953, by Smith & 
Haas. 
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cast his ability to teach his brethren at the bar how to accomplish 
that same desirable end. 
Seriously, of course, we all recognize that successful trial 
techiques cannot be acquired from books or lectures. What is 
one man's meat is another man's poison. Techniques and pro-
cedures that are highly successful for one lawyer may be ruinous 
if another attempts to use them. 
In short, there are no infallible standard trial techniques. 
Efficient trial procedures are almost as individual as fingerprints. 
They are, in the last analysis, nothing more nor less than the 
end-product of a sound basic knowledge of the rules of evidence 
and procedure, an instinctive knowledge of practical human psy-
chology, and a modicum of native intelligence. I say a modicum, 
because if any trial lawyer had real good sense, he wouldn't be a 
trial lawyer. 
And so, having established that no one, least of all I, can 
better your trial techniques, I shall, like a true expert, attempt 
that very thing. 
I have long believed that few lawsuits are won but that many 
lawsuits are lost. By that I mean simply that the cases in which 
a lawyer's mistakes have caused him to lose a lawsuit far out-
number those in which his brilliant affirmative acts and tech-
niques have resulted in winning it. 
In plain everyday terms of results : We will best improve 
our trial tactics by avoiding those mistakes which lose lawsuits. 
Now what are the most common and most serious mistakes 
in the trial of lawsuits? I believe they fall into a group which 
collectively can be said to constitute Over-Trial. The over-trial of 
a lawsuit means simply that a lawyer has tried too hard. He 
has committed the cardinal sin of the duff er on the golf course--
he has pressed. He has talked too much. He has offered too 
many witnesses. He has over-examined. He has over-cross-ex-
amined. He has over-objected. He has over-argued. He has 
over-acted. In short, he has given himself, his witnesses, the 
judge and the jury, too many chances to err. 
It is utterly trite but uttery true that to err is human. We 
all make mistakes. After many years of trial experience I can 
say truthfully that I have never encountered a superman or a 
genius on the opposite side of the table in the trial of a law suit. 
Any man who talks long enough will eventually say the wrong 
thing. Any lawyer who tries to cover every possible contingency 
that may arise in a lawsuit will find that he has undertaken an 
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impossible task and one that must spread him so thin as to make 
serious mistakes a likelihood if not a certainty. 
Let us minimize our mistakes by minimizing our chances to 
make mistakes. And let us realize that one of our best methods 
of minimizing our chances to make mistakes is by talking less 
and thinking more. 
An anecdote is told of the late Senator James Watson con-
cerning one of his early trial experiences in his native Hoosier 
State. It seems that on one occasion he represented one of the 
local citizens in a rural area in what was for that time and place 
an important lawsuit. The trial began with Jim alone on his 
side of the table but with two lawyers on the other side. Before 
the trial had progressed very far Jim's client came to him to 
inquire why their side did not also have two lawyers. Jim ex-
plained that he thought it unnecessary, but his client still did not 
seem to be completely satisfied. Finally, noting his client's con-
tinuing dissatisfaction, Jim asked him why he was so impressed 
with the fact that the other side had two la\vyers. "Well," his 
client observed, "I've been watching how them fellows do it. One 
of them seems to be doing the talking, and the other the thinking. 
What's bothering me is-who the hell is doing the thinking on 
our side?" 
I do not suggest that two lawyers can think better or talk 
less than one. I do suggest, however, that most of us can, with 
profit, develop a better ratio between the two activities. 
And now let me try to illustrate briefly some of the perils of 
over-trial in relation to some of the actual steps in the trial of a 
lawsuit. 
Recognizing, of course, that the trial of a lawsuit begins in 
a broad but very real sense long before you reach the courtroom, 
and that thorough preparation, both upon the facts and upon the 
law, is of primary importance, nevertheless I am confining my 
observations to actual courtroom procedures and am assuming 
that at this point you have carefully prepared your case and have 
a thorough knowledge of it. 
You begin, assuming that you are trying a jury case, with 
the selection of the jury. Procedures vary, of course, in the selec-
tion of jurors. In some jurisdictions you draw your juries. 
In others you strike from lists. In some you examine prospective 
jurors yourself. In others you examine through the court. The 
applicable principles, however, remain the same. In some man-
ner you are attempting to ascertain the background, the pre-
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judices, the acquaintanceships or connections that may exist be-
tween the prospective jurors on the one hand and the parties, 
the lawyers and the witnesses on the other. You do this, of 
course, for two reasons : To establish the basis for possible chal-
lenges for cause and to establish a sound basis for exercising your 
right to pre-emptory challenges. Reasonable precautions are only 
good sense but over-examination or over-inquiry may be highly 
dangerous. Don't pry. Jurors are apt to resent it. Don't put 
the suggestion of racial or religious or political or economic pre-
judice into their minds by letting it become too apparent that it 
is in yolll's. A void those general, frequently provocative and usu-
ally useless questions such as: "Would you entertain any pre-
judice against my client because of his being of a different race!" 
In the overwhelming majority of all such instances the automatic 
answer to such a question will be "no." Men do not often admit 
and frequently do not consciously recognize that they possess such 
prejudices. If they do they will usually deny them. By asking 
such questions, therefore, and obtaining the almost certain answer, 
you have accomplished nothing except possibly to have stirred a 
dormant prejudice into an active one or to have left the prospec-
tive juror with a resentfully guilty feeling because you have 
forced him to lie. 
In fact in the rare circumstance in which you might get an 
affirmative admission of prejudice in answer to such a question, 
you probably would do well to permit the juror to serve on the 
theory that if a man is honest and conscientious enough to recog-
nize and admit his prejudice he is quite likely to be of the type 
who will lean over backward to avoid an unjust result because 
of them. 
Avoid exhaustive examination of prospective jurors. If you 
are for the plaintiff don't let the jurors get the impression, as all 
too many lawyers permit them to do, that you are so concerned 
about getting a favorable jury that you must have a weak case. 
If you are for the defense, don't build up the importance of 
the case by exhaustive examination ; you may find you have suc-
ceeded only in multiplying the damages. 
I find that the longer I practice law the niore frequently in-
clined I am to indicate my approval of the first twelve jurors that 
take their seats with a bare minimum of examination and fre-
quently none at all. I may be, in fact obviously am, taking certain 
chances is so doing. But just bear in mind that if I am opposed 
by a lawyer who adopts the same strategy, we are taking equal 
chances; we are at least starting even. But if, and usually this 
PROCEEDINGS, 19.55 241 
is the case, I am opposed by a lawyer who does not follow that 
procedure but who examines exhaustively, I wind up both with 
the benefit of his exhaustive examination and the psychological 
advantage of having exhibited perfect confidence in my case, of 
having asked no wrong questions, of having stirred up no pre-
judice, of having)Ilade no enemies on the jury. In short, I ha-v-e 
given my opponent all the opportunities to make mistakes by the 
simple expedient of keeping my mouth shut. 
Be exceedingly sparing in the use of your pre-emptory chal-
lenges. Unless you are a better psychologist than most of us or 
are possessed of phenomenal luck, or both, you will frequently find 
that in exercising a challenge on a hunch you have succeeded only 
in out-smarting yourself. The sour-visaged old gentleman whom 
you were so certain would be for the defendant turns out to be 
the benevolent, warm-hearted, openhanded type that is the dream 
of every plaintiff's lawyer. The prim-looking spinster that you 
were so sure would vote to hang your client because he had had 
the customary two beers before the accident is herself a potential 
candidate for Alcoholics Anonymous. 
Don't permit guesswork or hunches to multiply your chances 
to make mistakes. In pre-emptorily challenging a juror you 
give yourself one chance to help your case but you give yourself 
several chances to harm it. To me that is not a sound or winning 
percentage. If you are wrong in your appraisal of the prospec-
tive juror you have eliminated a favorable rather than an un-
favorable juror. Even if you are right in your appraisal you may 
have eliminated an unfavorable prospect only to see him succeeded 
by a far more unfavorable prospect. Or you may have eliminated 
a poor juror at the cost of making other jurors resentful of your, 
to them, arbitrary exercise of your power to excuse. And fin-
ally you may find, as I so frequently have, that if you will just 
keep your shirt on your opponent will eventually dismiss the very 
fell ow that you were most afraid of. 
Having drawn your jury, your next step is the Opening 
Statement. Here you are offered a really golden opportunity to 
talk too much. 
I assume that under the practice in your jurisdiction, as under 
that to which I am accustomed, counsel for each side is obliged 
to make an opening statement. There is thereby placed in the 
hands of counsel that which can be a very valuable weapon but 
that which can also be a very dangerous weapon. 
Our Michigan Court Rule on the subject says in part: 
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On the trial of a cause it shall be the duty of the plaintiff's 
counsel, before offering evidence to support the issue on his part, 
to make a full and fair statement of his case and of the facts he 
expects to prove. 
Note the language "a full and fair statement of his case and 
of the facts which he expects to prove," but don't take that or 
similar language in your own rule or statute too literally. In 
interpreting or commenting on that rule, our courts have recog-
nized that "the opening statement should be brief," "should re-
late to salient facts which form the basis of the claim or defense," 
"should contain ultimate facts rather than details of the testimony 
to be adduced," and finally, and of prime significance, "any facts 
stated in the opening statement can be taken as an admission by 
the other party and thereupon need not be proved by such other 
party." 
Thus it is apparent that caution and economy of speech are 
doubly important in connection with an opening statement. Not 
only do you run the risk of prejudicing court and jury by over-
stating your case, by promising more than you can prove, by 
making unnecessary promises of proof, etc., but you risk making 
legally binding admissions which can ultimately prove to be your 
undoing. 
I have never known a lawyer to lose a lawsuit by saying too 
little in an opening statement. I have seen many lost because 
he has said too much. I can recall at least three cases in each of 
which I have had a motion to direct a verdict granted on my 
opponent's opening statement. I have on many more occasions 
had the court give binding instructions on some important and 
sometimes vital phase of the case simply because my opponent 
has made an ill-advised, unnecessary statement in his opening 
that later developed to be an important admission against interest. 
No matter how carefully you have prepared your case, no 
matter how sure you are that your key witness has been properly 
ho1·se-shedded and will testify to exactly what he has told you, he 
is quite likely, as we all have good reason to know, to take the 
stand and pour out a version of the facts which makes you glance 
nervously at your papers to make sure that you brought the right 
file with you. In many cases the version given from the witness 
stand, even though different than that given to you in your of-
fice, is still fundamentally truthful and sufficiently consistent with 
your pleadings and with your general theory of the case that your 
cause is not irretrievably lost. In such fortunate cases, assuming 
you have not previously opened your big mouth and told the jury 
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exactly what the witness was going to say, you have suffered 
nothing more serious that that acute sinking feeling in the pit of 
your stomach which, after all, is only a symptom of normalcy to 
the experienced trial lawyer. But if you have made the mistake 
of promising the jury earlier that the witness was going to testify 
to a particular detailed story, you are in for it. You have made 
yourself and your witness objects of suspicion to court and jury 
and have lost ground that can never be regained. 
If you have succeeded in getting a jury sworn and an open-
ing statement made without having talked yourself out of busi-
ness, don't despair. You still have many chances. You have 
witnesses to examine and-God save us-some to cross-examine. 
If it is your studied practice to think before you ask, to 
ask in such manner as to elicit only the evidence that you are 
trying to -develop, to ask it so that it is understandable both to 
the witness and to the jury, to ask it in simple language, to ask 
it in such manner as to avoid offense, and finally to ask only 
necessa1·y questions of necessary witnesses, you are already a 
better trial lawyer than I and I can be of no help to you on the 
subject of examination. 
But, if you are in love with the sound of your own voice, if 
it is your chief purpose to convince all within earshot of your 
own brilliance rather than the soundness of your client's case, if 
you are willing to take your chances on asking a question which 
the witness may interpret and answer in any one of six ways, 
and, most vital of all, if you are willing to risk the dire conse-
quences that so often result from putting on that unnecessary 
witness or asking of a necessary witness that unnecessary ques-
tion, I off er a suggestion. 
All of you will recall that during the war when it was so 
important to conserve transportation facilities for war-time needs, 
we were constantly confronted with the question, "Is this trip 
necessary?" I suggest to the earnest consideration of every trial 
lawyer the desirability of hanging a mental sign in his own con-
sciousness: "Is this witness necessary?" "Is this question neces-
sary?" 
Volumes have been written and countless papers have been 
read by experts on the subject of cross-examination: "How to ac-
quire the art of cross-examination," "How to be a successful 
cross-examiner," "The secret of successful cross-examination," 
etc. To my mind such titles are as suggestively misleading as 
"How to reduce weight without eating less," "How to learn to 
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play the piano in six easy lessons," "How any woman can be-
come beautiful by using our soap." 
In my view, the lawyer who sets out to acquire the "art" of 
cross-examination is asking for trouble. When a young lawyer 
embarks upon his first cross-examination he takes a risk com-
parable to that involved in smoking his first marijuana cigarette. 
The "habit" of cross-examination is much like the dope habit and 
about as easily acquired. If the young practitioner is fortunate 
enough to conduct his early cross-examinations with some degree 
of success, he finds it exhilarating and exciting. But he quickly 
finds it impossible to refrain from practicing his art upon every 
available subject, \vith the inevitable result that he has soon be-
come an incurable addict. 
And so I propose to direct my few remaining remarks on 
this subject not to the "how" of cross-examination but to its 
"when"-or, perhaps better yet, to its "if." 
Obviously there can be no cut and dried formula for identi-
fying the situations in which cross-examination is desirable, but 
I think we will find that the most common fall into three general 
categories. 
The first is what, for want of a better term, I call the des-
peration cross-examination. While its use is not in the exclusive 
domain of the defense lawyer, he probably has more frequent 
occasion to employ it than his brother across the table. The wit-
ness has testified to a set of facts which, if unchallenged, will 
surely sink you without trace. You have no evidence at your 
command to off set it. Your one and only chance, therefore, is 
too try to weaken or destroy the effect of the testimony through 
cross-examination. This is probably the only situation in which 
you are ever justified in cross-examining on the basis of hope 
rather than expectation. 
Here you may roam. Here you may hunt and fish. Here 
you may dig and pry. Here you may try your hand at cajolery, 
persuasion, suggestion or, on rare occasions, even threat. You 
will of course have to fit your precise methods to your own per-
sonality and to the type of witness with which you are con-
fronted. No one can furnish you a blueprint or formula by 
which to proceed. Two basic points, however, are common to 
all. First, you must correctly identify the situation that appears 
to justify this type of cross-examination. In short, you must be 
very sure that you are confronted with an otherwise hopeless 
situation before you resort to desperation measures. Second, and 
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equally important, you must be able to judge or sense when to 
stop. 
It will return you little profit to turn up something favor-
able to your case if, by the time you have done so, judge and jury, 
to say nothing of you and the witness, are exhausted. By the same 
token it will do you little good to discredit the witness or uncover 
weakness or defects in his testimony if you allow him to wriggle 
off the hook or to repair the damage through your failure to stop 
short of trying to extract the last drop of juice from the carcass. 
Just remember that anything favorable to your case you can get 
in such circumstances is so much velvet. Don't crowd your luck. 
The second in the categories of situations in which cross-
examination is often justifiable is that in which you are in pos-
session of definite contradictory material. To set the stage for 
the introduction of impeaching evidence it is often necessary to 
lay the groundwork through cross-examination. You may have 
a signed statement, a letter, a telegram, a transcript of testi-
mony given in another proceeding or other documents contain-
ing admissions or statements contrary to the witness' testimony. 
To the habitual cross-examiner, the possession of such material 
is a mandate to cross-examine. But to my mind, therein lies one 
of the most common fallacies encountered in the trial of lawsuits. 
Do not allow yourself, even in such circumstances, to be ensnared 
by the habit of cross-examination. Do not let yourself fall victim 
to the assumption that there is any situation where cross-exami-
nation is automatic. Before entering upon this type of cross-
examination, ask yourself these questions: Is it necessary for 
me to lay a foundation for the subsequent use of impeaching ma-
terial or testimony by cross-examining this witness? Is there 
any other method by which I may more safely use my material 
than by confronting the witness with it? Is there substantial 
danger that my attempted use of impeaching material or admis-
sions against interest may backfire or off end? 
In the earlier days of my practice I could no more have passed 
up the opportunity to confront a witness with a signed contra-
dictory statement than I could have taken jet passage to the moon. 
But after several years and an all too painfully acquired know-
ledge of how many ways there are in which a wily and well-
coached witness, suffering excruciating pain and under opiates 
at the time of giving the statement, can not only explain away 
such a trifling document but can in the process convict its user 
of forgery, larceny and, malpractice, I more often than not allow 
such a decument to gather mildew in the files. 
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Such cross-examinations invariably have elements of poten-
tial danger. An attempted impeachment that does not quite come 
off puts the cross-examiner in an extremely bad light. Often-
times a technically successful impeachment makes a martyr of or 
creates sympathy for the witness and stirs up resentment against 
the examiner. 
Approach such cross-examinations therefore with extreme 
caution. Be very sure of the validity of your impeaching ma-
terial. Be especially wary of imputing intoxication, immorality, 
lack of chastity, dishonesty or criminal record. Remember that 
once you have embarked upon such a course there is no turning 
back. Remember also that once you have opened up such a sub-
ject you must appear, even if successful, to take no pleasure from 
it and must give the witness every opportunity to explain, justify 
or evade, which he frequently does to your discomfiture. 
In short, if you feel that you must cross-examine in this 
range, do it-not apologetically, but without vindictiveness. Be 
ultra-fair. Be very sure of your ground and treat success then 
and in subsequent argument not as a victory over what may ap-
pear to the jury as a defenseless victim but as an unpleasant duty 
performed as humanely as possible. 
The third type of situation in which cross-examination is fre-
quently justified is that in which the witness has demonstrated by 
his attitude and demeanor on the stand that he is of the type 
which will hurt or destroy himself if given sufficient opportunity. 
Here as always your first problem is to determine whether the 
witness has substantia1ly helped his own side or hurt yours on. 
direct examination. Unless he has, leave him alone. Never try 
to gild the lily. If it is very obvious to you that the witness is 
of the type who will make a bad impression, the chances are that 
he has already done so. 
If, however, it is your considered judgment that he has made 
a sufficiently favorable impression to require some attempt on 
your part to change that impression, the reasoning which impels 
you to that conclusion will dictate the precise methods to be em-
ployed. This general class includes the braggart who, if kept 
talking, will eventually disgust court and jury and destroy any 
confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. An-
other in this general category is the "over-coached" witness. He 
has memorized the answer to key questions. If he is given re-
peated opportunities to tell the same story in the same words, he 
may effectively destroy any originally favorable impression. An-. 
other in this group is the obstinate witness. He is the one who 
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will never agree with you even if he has to reverse his position 
in order to disagree. Still another is the ultra-agreeable witness. 
This one can't say "no." By permitting him to agree to absurdi-
ties, you permit him to destroy his effectiveness. These and many 
others need only to be kept talking to talk themselves into trouble. 
Witnesses in this category can usually be cross-examined with a 
minimum of risk and with a reasonable prospect of profit. But 
do not try these tactics on the obviously honest and intelligent 
witness. You can have just as much fun trying to stop a buzz-
saw with your bare hands. Cross-examining in this field is prob-
ably the simplest and safest type of cross-examination in which to 
indulge. Do not, however, make the mistake of talking too much 
yourself. Merely furnish the witness the leads. Do not center 
attention on yourself or attempt to appear clever or brilliant. Let 
the witness occupy the stage. Your job is to conduct, not to play 
the music. 
I have attempted to break down the more common occasions 
for legitimate cross-examination into three general classes. Un-
doubtedly there are others. But whether there be three or thirty, 
it will pay you to recognize every proposed cross-examination for 
what it is-a potentially dangerous experiment. Not only are 
you risking your own neck but your are frequently giving affirma-
tive aid and comfort to the enemy. I believe there are many ad-
vantages, somewhat vague, perhaps, but nevertheless very real, 
in waiving cross-examination even where it might be of slight or 
moderate advantage to your case to cross-examine. 
One such is the disruption of the timing of your opponent. 
The simple fact is that most lawyers do have the habit of cross-
examination. Most lawyers arise to cross-examine as a matter 
of course at the close of every direct examination. Most lawyers 
habitually over-cross-examine. Those who are afflicted with the 
habit themselves tend to assume, naturally, that all others are 
so afflicted. When you waive cross-examination against such an 
opponent he must be prepared to proceed immediately with his 
next witness. It is surprising how often he is not quite fully 
prepared to do so. By crowding him, by keeping him under pres-
sure, you disrupt his timing and his morale and hence his eff ec-
tiveness. 
How often have you observed the lawyer who has prepared to 
have two or three witnesses available for the day, assuming that 
because of expected lengthy cross-examination they will carry him 
through? When cross-examination is waived or severely re-
stricted and he runs out of witnesses, he must either make lame 
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excuses, throw himself on the mercy of the court, or, what is 
u~ually worse, stall so obviously as to create a bad impression on 
court and jury. Of course I do not advocate waiving a necessary 
or desirable cross-examination for so nebulous a possibility of 
gain, but such a situation has often been, with me and to my 
profit, the deciding factor when the question of whether or not to 
cross-examine has seemed a very close one. 
Again, have you observed how frequently a witness who has 
done his side no particular good on direct examination has really 
gone to town on re-direct? Even if your intervening cross-ex-
amination has done no harm in itself or has, perchance, shown a 
slight profit, you have given your opponent time to pull himself 
together, to think of the important questions he should have asked 
on direct or to cover points that had been left uncovered or con-
fused. 
At the risk of boring you with a personal anecdote, may I 
recall an early but still vivid experience which may serve to illus-
trate not only the perils of unnecessary cross-examination but also 
the manner in which it sometimes relieves the direct examiner of 
the consequences of his own shortcomings. Candor compels me 
to admit that out of this one neither my opponent nor I emerged 
with a laurel wreath on his brow. 
I represented a seven-year-old plaintiff who had suffered a 
skull fracture and a crushing injury to his leg, resulting in ampu-
tation just above the knee. It was necessary to put in my medical 
proofs by deposition, and opposing counsel and I traveled several 
hundred miles to take the testimony of the attending physician. 
As a result of inexperience plus a woefully inadequate prepara-
tion on my part, the testimony on direct examination consisted 
of little more than a bare statement by the doctor that the boy 
had suffered a skull fracture from which he had made an un-
eventful recovery and a brief description of the amputation, from 
which, very obviously, there could be no recovery. 
Instead of leaving well enough alone and letting me suffer 
the consequences of my own inadequacies, my generous adversary, 
who had traveled many miles at substantial expense, felt it neces-
sary to do some cross-examining. He began by asking the doctor 
to assure us again that recovery from the skull fracture had 
been uneventful and complete. This time the doctor was not 
quite so taciturn. As a matter of fact I am sure he knew more 
about trying a lawsuit than I did. He proceeded, at length and 
in detail, to explain that, although the fracture had healed com-
pletely and without apparent untoward incident, such a healed 
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fracture left a ridge of scar tissue on the under side of the skull, 
constituting a potential source of irritation to the lining of the 
brain, which not uncommonly resulted in a meningitis, etc. Realiz-
ing by this time that he would have been much better advised to 
have used that eloquent two-word cross-examination, "No ques-
tions," my flustered opponent, thinking to salvage as much as 
possible, broke in with what was intended to be a terminal ques-
tion. This time he thought surely he was asking a safe one. It 
went something like this : 
"Well, at least, Doctor, insofar as the leg is concerned, it is 
gone, and the worst that can happen has happened." 
I can still see the old doctor lean back in his chair and smile 
and hear him drawl, "Oh, I wouldn't say that." 
He then went on there and at much greater length and de-
tail on re-direct examination to bring out what any lawyer should 
have had the good sense to know and to develop on direct exami-
nation. He explained how youthful bones continue to grow, and 
in growing can push through the skin flap, requiring further 
bone amputations and a long period of time with all the attendant 
danger and pain and expense before a permanent artificial leg 
could be fitted. 
How much the damages may have been increased by that 
testimony no one can know. Certainly they were increased and, 
even more certainly, through no skill or virtue on my part. Al-
though admittedly my story •has no hero, it certainly has a moral. 
The blindest hog will surely pick up plenty of acorns if you in-
sist upon pushing a full platter under his nose. 
There are many other affirmative benefits, tangible and psy-
chological, to be gained from the judicious waiver or severe re-
striction of cross-examination. I shall take time to mention only 
one more. It has no novelty but it frequently pays dividends. I 
ref er to the psychological advantage of a display of confidence. 
Confidence begets confidence. I have known many fine lawyers 
who, by their very quietly confident manner of declining cross-
examination, have done more to convince a jury of the utter lack 
of merit in the witness' testimony than could have been accom-
plished by hours of cross-examination. When in doubt, try it. 
Whatever happens you will have the comfort of knowing that 
at least you did not ask the wrong question. 
And now, gentlemen, the hour grows late. I have already 
trespassed too extensively upon your time and your hospitality. 
I have afforded you a living example of the man who talks too 
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much. I hope that you will profit from that example and thereby 
avoid the perils of over-trial. 
I have been able to offer you no ne\Y nor novel nor startling 
ideas. I am convinced there are none in the realm of trial tech-
niques. As long as the fundamental purpose of a lawsuit is to 
ascertain the facts, apply the law of the land and thereby do 
justice between men and among men's causes, the basic and ele-
mentary rules of right and acceptable human conduct and de-
portment-plus a little horse sense-will be the trial lawyer's 
best guide to successful courtroom behavior and methods. Be 
yourself. Arm yourself with a thorough knowledge of the facts 
and the law. A void the perils of over-trial. You may not win 
more lawsuits, but you surely will not lose as many. 
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JUST COMPENSATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 
By 
Henry B. Curtis 
The law of eminent domain presents an interesting contrast 
between the apparent clarity of the principles involved and the 
uncertainty in the practical application of the law. 
Any law school senior can accurately expound the theory of 
the law, but its application raises questions which experienced 
lawyers and learned judges find difficult of solution. 
Like every other branch of the law, textbooks have been 
written on the subject. In addition to Nichol's on eminent domain, 
the standard authority on the subject, there are two excellent 
books dealing with valuation. One of these is by Mr. Alfred D. 
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Jahr of the New York bar entitled Eniinent Doniain 1'aluation 
and Procedure and the other is Argel's 1'alua.tion Under Eminent 
Domain. 
In theory the law is simple. All property is held subject to 
the implied condition that it must be surrendered whenever the 
public interest requires it. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry 'VS. 
Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486, 34A.L.R. 1517 
In Campbell vs. United States 266 U. S. 368,45 S. Ct. 115, it 
'vas said: 
"The taking was under the sovereign power of eminent domain ... 
and from the taking there arose an implied promise by the United 
States to compensate him for his loss. 
Thereupon he became entitled to haye tl1e just compensation 
safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; that 
is the value of the land taken and the damage inflicted by the 
taking . . . such a sum as would have put him in as good a 
position pecuniarily as he would haYe been if his property had 
not been taken. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. vs. United States 261 
U. S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. Ed. 664. But he was not entitled 
to have more than that. 
This power of taking private property for public use is one 
of three essential attributes of sovereignty without which a state 
cannot exist. The other essentials are the police power and the 
power of taxation. 
None of these fundamental powers is unlimited. The police 
power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or un-
reasonable manner; taxation cannot be confiscatory, and the 
power of eminent domain carries with it, either expressed or by 
implication, the requirement that when private property is taken 
for public use there must be just compensation. 
The requirement for just compensation is found in the fifth 
and by inference in the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
It is found in all or practically all of the state constitutions. 
Even in those states which do not have an express constitutional 
requirement for just compensation, the courts have held that the 
owners of private property taken for public use are protected by 
the "due process" clause, and by the principles of natural justice 
and equity. McCoy vs. Union El R.Co. 247 U. S. 354,38 S. Ct. 
504,62 L. Ed. 1156. 
The Federal Constitution and some of the state constitutions 
speak only of a taking of private property. Other constitutions 
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provide for compensation when private property is damaged or 
destroyed. 
The result is there is considerable divergence in the decisions 
as to when compensation is or is not due in cases where there has 
been no actual taking. 
In those cases where the constitutional protection covers dam-
ages to property, a good statement of the rule was laid down by 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Snyder vs. Platte Valley Public 
Power & Ir1"igation Dist. 144 Neb. 308,160 A.L.R. 1154,13 N.W. 
2d 160 where the court said: 
As to land, where land is not taken, the measure is the dif-
ference in value before and after the construction of the structure 
causing the damage, taking into consideration the uses to which 
the land was put and for which it was reasonably adopted. 
In United States i~s. Campbell, supra, the court allowed dam-
ages (a) for the value of the land taken and (b) for the damage 
caused to the remainder of the tract by the taking, but disallowed 
damage caused or to be caused by the use of lands acquired from 
others. Said the court: 
The land taken from the plaintiff was not shown to be indis-
pensable to tlle construction of the nitrate plant, or to the pro-
posed use of the other lands acquired by the United States. The 
damages to the remainder from the taking of a part were separ-
able from those caused by the use to be made of the lands ac-
quired from others. The proposed use of the lands taken from 
others did not constitute a taking of his property. 
JUST COMPENSATION 
The courts have many times attempted to define "just com-
pensation." Some of the decisions have held that just compensa-
tion is the equivalent of "fair market value." But an objection 
to this definition is that there are cases where property has no 
real market value because there is no market for that particular 
type of property. 
There is no absolutely satisfactory definition, but perhaps it 
could be said that "just compensation" is the equivalent of "true 
value." 
In Minn - St. Paul Sanita1·y District vs. Fitzpatrick 201 Minn 
442, 277 N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897 it was said: 
The just compensation to which the owuer of property taken 
for public purposes is constitutionally entitled is the market 
value thereof at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid 
in money. The sum so to be paid is arrived at upon just con-
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sideration of all the uses for which it is suitable. and the highest 
and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and 
needed or likely to be needed, in the reasonably near future is 
to be considered to the extent that the prospects of demand for 
such use affect the market value while the property is privately 
held. 
The market value of the property taken in condemnation is not 
measured by the benefits to, or needs of the condemnor. The 
question is ·what has the owner lost? Not what has the taker 
gained? 
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The first principle in the determination of proof of fair 
market value is that any evidence which can reasonably be ex-
pected to throw light on the real value of the property is relevant. 
The discretion of the trial court in admitting such evidence will 
generally be sustained. If anything, it would appear to be safer 
to admit rather than reject evidence of doubtful relevancy. 
Evidence is relevant which is descriptive of the prope1·ty and 
its location, physical characteristics, advantages and surroundings. 
Maxell vs. Iowa State Highway Commission 271 N.W. 883, 118 
A.L.R. 862; St. Louis J.M. & S. R. Co. vs. Ma.cfielcl Co. 94 Ark. 
135,126 S.W. 83, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1111. 
PROOF OF VALUE 
In the determination of value there are various kinds of evi-
dence or methods of proof which are generally accepted by the 
courts as relevant. These are: 
1. . Prior sales of the same property. 
2. Sales of similar property in the vicinity. 
3. Reproduction cost of building or improvements. 
4. Revenue produced by property. 
5. Opinion evidence as to its value. 
Each of these methods of proof has advantages and dis-
advantages. Some may be relevant in one situation and not so 
under other circumstances. 
Proof of sales of the same property 
Under certain circumstances a prior sale of the same prop-
erty would be very good evidence as to its true value. It is not, 
however, conclusive and in some cases may be almost irrelevant. 
For example, the sale must have been made within a reasonable 
time before the commencement of the condemnation suit. A sale 
or purchase made many years before would have very little evi-
dentiary value in determining the present value. It must be 
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shown or at least presumed that the sale was made by a person 
willing to sell but not obligated to do so, and that the property 
was bought by a person who was willing to purchase but not 
compelled by ulterior motives to acquire same. That is what is 
meant by the willing seller and willing buyer rule. Baucum vs. 
Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Ark 1929) 15 S. W. 2d 399, Lebanon 
& N. Turnp Co. vs. Creveling 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S. W. 2d 22, 65 
A.L.R. 440. 
Even in those cases where it appears that the property had 
been purchased by the defendant owner but a short time, say 
six months or less, before, it would not follow that the price paid 
was necessarily the true value of the property. The defendant 
owner might have purchased the property at much less than its 
real value or he may have made a poor bargain. While it has 
been said that "sales at arm's length of similar property are the 
best evidence of market value," it is also true that the state may 
not confiscate the owner's bargain, nor be required to assume his 
loss. Kinter vs. United States 156 Fed (2d) 5. 
Again, where property has been acquired by the defendant 
owner just a few months before the condemnation suit another 
factor enters the picture. 
If the defendant owner receives exactly what he paid for 
the property and nothing more, he will undoubtedly suffer a cer-
tain loss. The legal fees and other expenses which he paid in ac-
quiring the property are not ordinarily a part of the purchase 
price. Therefore, if he is allowed just exactly the purchase price 
the owner is going to suffer a loss. Now technically he cannot 
recover for such fees or expenses, but the court or jury may very 
·well find a slight increase in the value of the property, which will 
thus serve to give full and complete compensation. 
This problem does not exist if the owner has been able to 
hold the property long enough to receive some return on his in-
vestment. Even in the case of vacant or non-revenue producing 
property, at least the owner has had the opportunity of a possible 
enhancement in value. 
SALES OF SIMILAR PROPERTY IN THE VICINITY 
This method is perhaps a fairer and more accurate method 
of determining true value, because if there are enough sales of 
similar property in the vicinity and these sales have taken place 
within a reasonably short time before the condemnation suit, we 
have a pattern which should portray a fairly accurate picture of 
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the market value of the property. The disadvantage of this 
method is that only in exceptional cases are two pieces of prop-
erty exactly alike. The location with respect to cross-streets, the 
condition of the buildings immediately adjacent to the property, 
the flow of traffic and many other factors all affect the value of 
property. 
This method may give under appropriate circumstances an 
accurate picture of the value of the land, but it is obvious that 
one building, even though adjacent to another building, may be 
of entirely different value because of its construction, age or con-
dition. Perhaps the only information which can be derived from 
method No. 2 is the value of the land less the building. 
REPRODUCTION COST OF BUILDING OR IMPROVEMENTS 
The cost of reproducing a building which is to be condemned 
may be very relevant, and in some cases, it may be essential in 
determining just compensation. There are cases where a build-
ing has little or no market value, in the sense that it is impossible 
to find a person or corporation which would purchase the prop-
erty except for the land upon which the building is situated. In 
such cases the prospective purchaser would plan on demolishing 
the building and erecting one suitable for its O\Vner's use. The 
best example of a building which has little or no market value is 
a church. It is seldom, though it sometimes happens, that one 
congregation will purchase the church of another congregation. 
These instances are so few and far between that we can perhaps 
say that a church as such has no market value. Other buildings 
constructed and designed for a particular use are in the same 
category. In such cases, after determining the value of the land 
upon which the building is situated, it would be necessary to de-
termine the cost of rebuilding it somewhere else if we are to 
award the congregation just compensation. On the other hand, 
depreciation or obsolescence should be taken into consideration, 
as it is obvious that a building which is so old or obsolete as to 
have little or no value could not be considered in the same category 
or as having the same value as a new and modern building. While 
under certain circumstances value of property might be sho'\"\'11 
by the amount of insurance which the owner carried upon it, 
the general rule is that such evidence is immaterial. The theory 
and practice of insurers and insured is to make the limit of in-
surance much less than the value of the property, while 0\1mers 
are permitted to procure insurance in amounts far below this 
limit. The result is that the amount of insurance has no fixed 
or uniform relation to the value of the property it covers, and 
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hence does not directly tend to disclose its value. Union Pac. R. 
Co. vs. Lucas, 146 Fed. 374. Mere age is not necessarily a sign 
of depreciation in value, because if the building has been kept 
well it has been of necessity repaired from time to time so that 
it has to some extent preserved its reproduction value. 
In estimating the fair market value of land upon which a 
flour mill is situated for the purpose of awarding damages in 
eminent domain proceedings to appropriate the land, the court 
may consider not only the cost of production but all the cost neces-
sarily or reasonably expended in bringing the mill into effective 
working condition, all to be weighed with other evidence of value. 
Banner Mill Co. vs. State, 41 A.L.R. 1019, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 
668. But this does not include good will. · 
The cost of the erection of a new building on a different 
piece of land in which a business conducted on land taken in 
condemnation proceedings is to be continued cannot be included 
in the compensation or damages awarded. Nor in the absence of 
disclosures of like or closely similar constructions and conditiqns 
in all respects can it be proved as tending to show its value of the 
old building. Gauley & E. R. Co. vs. Conley, 7 A.L.R. 157 84 W. 
Va. 489, 100 S. E. 290. 
REVENUE PRODUCED BY PROPERTY 
This type of evidence can be very helpful in the determina-
tion of value. There are several things to be considered in con-
nection with the admissibility of such evidence. They include 
the following: 
(1) The valuation of the property should be based upon its most 
profitable legal use. Any reasonable future use to which the 
land might be adapted or applied may be considered in arriving 
at present market value. Denver vs. Quick 108 Colo. 111,113 P 
(2d) 999, 134 A.L.R. 1120. Johnstone vs. Detroit G.H. & M. R. Co. 
245, Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 325, 67 A.L.R. 373. 
(2) If the property is a zoned neighborhood, evidence as to the 
revenue which it would produce if it were unzoned is too specula-
tive. Long Beach City High School Dist. vs. Stewart 173 A.L.R. 
249, 30 Cal (2d) 763, 185 P (2d) 585. 
(3) The revenue produced by the property, i.e., its rental, must 
generally be in accord with rental produced by other similar prop-
erty in the neighborhood. If property is rented at an exorbitant 
figure, obviously that does not represent its true value any more 
than rental far below what the property should bring. In either 
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case there would probably be special circumstances which would 
explain the situation. If evidence of such rentals is received it 
is always competent to rebut by showing that the property is 
worth more or less than its rental figure would indicate. 
Assuming that the revenue produced by a piece of property 
is a fair indication of its value, the court or jury may use the 
capitalization of income as a means of determining value. 
This method involves the assumption of a fair rate of return 
on invested capital and then dividing the net annual return by 
this figure. Thus if we assume that 5 % net is a normal return 
on money invested in real estate, and the property brings in a net 
of $5,000.00 per annum, the actual value determined by this 
method would be $5,000.00 divided by .05, which would be $100,-
000.00. This method, however, is not nearly as simple as it 
seems. The money market, and hence the expected rate of re-
turn, may change; the property may depreciate; it will certainly 
in the course of time become more or less obsolete; and other 
factors will play a part. All of which means that the revenue 
produced by property is not necessarily a true or accurate picture 
of its value. 
OPINION EVIDENCE 
This type of evidence, like the opinions of witnesses in other 
cases, should be received with great caution. It is an attempt to 
substitute the opinion of the witness for the judgment of the 
court or jury. In some cases, such as medical testimony or matters 
involving highly specialized subjects, such evidence is relevant. 
On the other hand, a realtor testifying as a so-called real estate 
expert is not like a doctor, an electronics engineer or some highly 
trained specialist. In such cases the medical or other eA"}Jert wit-
ness can be required to prove his qualifications. A real estate 
man, on the other hand, while he might be qualified to testify as 
an expert on the technical features of the real estate business, 
may not be competent to pass on real estate values. Even less 
is such a witness qualified to say how much a piece of property 
is or will be damaged by the construction of some public improve-
ment in front or on the side of the property, or on a part thereof, 
when only a portion of the property is being e}.."}Jropriated. 
In connection with the admissibility of opinion evidence, it is 
interesting to read a decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
rendered in 1881 in the case of F1'emont etc. RR vs. Whalen 11 
Neb. 585, 10 N.W. 491 where the court said: 
The practice indulged in on the trial of this and other cases of 
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taking the opinion of witnesses as to the value of the land, sub-
ject to the location of the road over it, ought not to be permitted. 
A strong objection to it lies in the fact that indirectly the dam-
ages are assessed by the witnesses instead of the jury, whose 
duty it is, and most likely on an improper basis. It is doubtless 
a proper course to take the opinion of experts as to the value 
before it is affected by the location of the road. Thus done, the 
testimony on the question of damages should be confined to those 
matters affecting the value proper to be considered, leaving the 
jury to draw their own inferences therefrom unaffected by the 
judgment of others. 
This decision was overruled a year later in Republican Valley 
R. Co. vs. Arnold 13 Neb. 488, 14 N.W. 478 where the court said: 
The proper mode of assessing damages is by calling experts, men 
acquainted with the land and its value, and who are capable of 
estimating the injury sustained. 
The evidence as to the valuation put upon property for tax 
assessment purposes is not generally admissible. These valua-
tions are usually far below the actual value of the property and 
have generally not been considered in eminent domain proceedings. 
Minn. St. Paul Sanitary Dist. vs. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 
N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897. 
In Louisiana there is also an apparent exception to this rule. 
It is found in the Constitution of Louisiana of 1921, Art. XVI, 
Section 6, which provides that lands or improvements actually 
used or destroyed for levee purposes shall be paid for at a price 
not to exceed the assessed value for the preceding year. 
This is based upon the old theory that the owner of land 
fronting on a navigable stream or body of water owed a servitude 
or easement to the public to permit the building of a levee on the 
bank of such river, stream or other water which would protect 
not only the owner but also other properties in the vicinity. People 
bought and acquired riparian property subject to such an ease-
ment in favor of the public. Wolfe vs. Hurley, 46 F. (2d) 515. 
Also, in Louisiana there is a decision which is somewhat at 
variance with the general jurisprudence. In City of New Orleans 
'VS. Larroux, et al, 203 La. 990, 14 So. (2d) 812, the court held that 
evidence as to the assessed value of the property, though not con-
trolling, should be considered as a factor in determining the value 
of the land. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize briefly all of the decisions on the subject of 
valuation in eminent domain proceedings, it can be said that it is 
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and should be the object of the court to put the owner of the 
property taken in the same financial position he would be in if 
he sold the property at a time when he was willing to sell to a 
purchaser who was willing to buy but did not have to have the 
property. Actually this really should not be a difficult question 
to answer. A person who wishes to know what the real value 
of his property is can probably get a fair picture by offering it 
for sale at a price which he is willing to take. He should not be 
required to take less than the real value of the property, nor 
should he be entitled to enrich himself at the expense of the state 
or municipality. Everyone who purchases property does so with 
the implied knowledge that whenever the property is actually 
needed for public purposes it can be taken, provided he receives 
the true value thereof. 
But human nature being what it is, the usual result is that 
the defendant owner will introduce or attempt to introduce every 
bit of evidence which he or his counsel considers favorable to 
their side, and the taker will, on its side, endeavor to minimize 
the value of the property and the resultant loss to the owner. 
PROCEDURE UNDER THE NEW EMINENT DOMAIN ACT 
OF 1951 
By 
Herbert M. Fitle 
The eminent domain procedure set forth in the Uniform Act 
of 1951 amended some 20 chapters of Nebraska statutes. It is, 
as named, a uniform procedure, applying to all condemnations 
with the exception noted in Section 76-703-that is, where it is 
sought to condemn property used or useful of a public utility 
engaged in the rendition of existing services. 
With respect to the city of Omaha, a city of the metropolitan 
class, the procedure set forth in the Uniform Act has taken the 
administrative power from the city council and given it to the 
county court. Under the old "law" the city appointed its own 
appraisers and approved or disapproved their awards. The prop-
erty owner appealed directly to district court. Under the new 
Act the condemner must negotiate, which means negotiators have 
to be appointed, and if negotiations fail a petition must be filed 
in county court, where the county judge appoints three appraisers 
and hearings are held. Then where the Federal Government par-
ticipates, there is often the requirement that a preliminary ap-
praisal without contacting property owners be made before nego-
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tiations take place. This extends the procedure even further. But 
all in all the new act does benefit the property owner who is in-
voluntarily surrendering his property. 
For purposes of discussion I have divided the subject matter 
into three parts; one, negotiation, two, county court procedure; 
and three, appellate procedure. Under the Act, the condemner 
must negotiate with the condemnee before filing a petition to con-
demn the property in the county court of the county where the 
property is situated. 
Section 76-704 is clear in this respect, stating: 
If an condemnee shall fail to agree with the condemner with 
respect to the acquisition of property sought by the condemner. 
a petition to condemn the property may be filed by the condemner 
in the county court of the couny where the property or some 
part thereof is situated. 
If you represent the governmental agency condemning prop-
erty, you must satisfy this requirement of the statutes. Our Su-
preme Court has said in effect that the condemner must in good 
faith negotiate with the condemnee, and that it is not sufficient 
that the condemner is unable to contact the condemnee personally 
or is unable to agree on the amount of the damages requested by 
the condemnee. This question has been discussed in the case of 
Higgins vs. Loup River Public Power Dist'rict, ·which was appealed 
to the Supreme Court on two occasions, the first case being cited 
at 157 Neb. 653, 61 N.W.2d 213 and the second appeal being cited 
at 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170. Incidentally, the condemnation 
proceeding in the Higgins cases was instituted before the eff ec-
tive date of our Uniform Act. However the court in its opinion 
pointed out this fact and stated that the requirement is the same 
as far as the Uniform Act is concerned. In the first case, 157 
Neb. 653, page 659 of the opinion, the court cites corpus juris on 
eminent domain, paragraph 318, page 895, which reads as follows: 
In order to satisfy the statutory requirement there must be a 
bona fide attempt to agree. Thel'e m11st be an of fer made, honest 
and in good faith and a reasonable effort by the owner to ar:cept 
it. 
In the Higgins cases the condemner pleaded, among other 
things, that it was unable to contact the condemnee. However, 
the court stated that there were ways of satisfying the require-
ment of attempting to agree before condemnation was available 
other than personal contact and verbal conversation of the parties. 
To summarize the matter of negotiation, if you represent the 
condemner you had better advise your negotiators not only to 
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enter into negotiations with the condemnee but to make an off er 
with a reasonable time for acceptance, and for the record you 
should retain some evidence of the fact that negotiations are 
carried on and an off er is made. 
Throughout the period for negotiations there is no duty or 
burden on the condemnee or the property owner to take any ac-
tion. The condemnee is placed in a rather favorable position in 
that the condemner must approach him and must make an off er. 
However if the negotiations have failed, the condemner or his 
representative, upon proper identification and after informing the 
condemnee of the contemplated action, is authorized to enter upon 
the land of the condemnee for purposes of examination and sur-
vey under Section 76-702 of the Act. 
Now as to the practical aspects of conducting negotiations-
these questionable bits of homespun advice are not guaranteed, 
so you take the same at your own risk. 
If I represented the condemner I would attempt to get all of 
the information that I could get through negotiations. Get the 
property owner to give you his written appraisals, and of course 
if possible get him to sign a purchase agreement or option. But 
the idea is to arm yourself with all of the evidence you can get 
in the event that you are unable to purchase the property, because 
when you appear before the appraisers in county court you should 
be ready to present your facts and figures and off set his case 
if possible. 
If you represent the property owner, the best thing for you 
to do during negotiations is nothing and a lot of it. The con-
demner has to approach you. He has to make an offer. You 
get another opportunity in county court before the appraisers if 
you don't like the off er. 
Incidentally, the condemner almost has to present his case 
to the appraisers. He can't let the property owner run wild, and 
there are not many occasions where the appraisers aren't going 
to hike that off er somewhat to try to have the matter settled, so 
the property owner has the best deal during negotiations. I 
think he should keep his ears clean and his mouth shut. 
So much for the negotiations. Now the procedure in county 
court. The condemner must proceed with a petition filed in the 
county court. We have always included the following elements in 
our petitions: 1) A statement of the authority to proceed. 2) A 
description of the property. 3) ,Names of interested parties. 4) 
262 NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
Attach a copy of an acquisition or necessity ordinance. 5) Allege 
that the condemnee failed to agree with the condemner and at-
tach a copy of the resolution accepting the report of the negotia-
tors and authorizing the law department to proceed. 
The Uniform Act under Section 76-705 also provides the 
right of the condemnee to file a petition in the county court in the 
event that any condemner has taken or damaged property for 
public use without instituting condemnation proceedings. It is 
of interest to note that the language set forth in Section 76-705 
is the same language found in our state constitution, Article I, 
Section 21, which provision has been given a very liberal inter-
pretation by our Supreme Court in the case of Qu~st vs. East 
Omaha Drainage District, 155 Neb. 538, 52 N.W.2d 417 (March 
21, 1952). The drainage district purchased a piece of property 
near the property owned by the plaintiff. The defendant drainage 
district excavated its property, leaving a cliff 40 feet in height. 
Among other things, cliff swallows nested in the cliff, and these 
swallows created noise and filth in the yard and on the person 
and property of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages and 
recovered, and this is what the court said on page 544 of the 
opinion: 
The purchase of property by a public corporation, where it could 
have been acquired by the power of eminent domain, carries with 
it all the incidents of taking or damaging by eminent domain in-
sofar as the question of damages by reason of the taking or 
damaging is concerned. 
One of the incidents of taking property by eminent domain is 
that not only is the condemnor liable to compensate for the 
taking, but also is liable, by virtue of Article I, Section 21, of 
the constitution of Nebraska, for consequential damage to other 
property in excess of the damage sustained by the public at large. 
The words 'or damaged' in Article I, Section 21 of the Constitu-
tion of Nebraska, include all actual damages resulting from the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain which diminish the 
market value of private property. 
The point is that under the new Uniform Act the plaintiff 
could come in under Section 76-705 and file his petition in county 
court and have the damages determined by three appraisers. 
The condemnee is not required to file any pleading in county 
court. The condemner files his petition. Now the question has 
arisen as to whether the condemnee can attach the petition by 
direct attack in county court. The cases seem to indicate the 
county court proceeding is merely an administrative one. Our 
Supreme Court discussed this question in the case of Scheer vs. 
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Kansas-Nebraska Natuml Gas Company, 158 Neb. 668, 64 N.W.2d 
333. And here is what the court said at page 675 of the opinion. 
The securing of an appraisal of damages by appraisers appointed 
by the county judge is an administrative act as distinguished 
from a judicial proceeding. The method of appeal is procedural 
only and contemplates a complete new trial upon plea~ings to 
be filed as in the case of an appeal from the county court. There 
can be no variance in the issues because no pleading, except the 
petition of the condemner, is contemplated in the administrative 
proceeding. The present appeal statute contemplates the filing 
of pleadings and the framing of issues for the first time in the 
judicial proceeding in the district court. The issue is not limited 
to the question of damages only unless the pleadings limit the 
trial to that issue. 
In that case it was stipulated on appeal that no new plead-
ings need be filed and the case would be tried on appeal in the 
same issue as in the court below. The Supreme Court said that 
under those circumstances the issues on appeal would be limited 
to damages only. 
This question was also discussed in the case of Jensen vs. 
Omaha Public Powe1· Disfrict 159 Neb. 277, 69 N.W. 2d, 591. 
In the Scheer case there was a question of proper description 
of the property in the petition. The court said the petition was 
sufficient as against a collateral attack-that is, the particular 
petition in that case. But in the Scheer case the court also talks 
about the decision in F1·emont vs. Mattheis, 39 Neb. 98 57 N.W. 
987, where the court said: 
We think the petition filed with the county judge was sufficient 
as against a collateral attack. In Fremont, E. & M. V.RR.C. vs. 
Mattheis, 39 Neb. 98, 57 N.W. 987, this point was discussed 
in the following language: Assuming the above description to 
be less specific than contemplated by law, objection on that 
ground comes too late when made for the first time after the 
damage has been assessed and the road constructed. It cannot 
be said there is not available to the land-owner in such cases an 
adequate remedy by direct proceeding. Without doubt the county 
judge is authorized to exercise the same control over the warrant 
or commission to the appraisers as over any other process issued 
by him. If the allegations of the petition are indefinite, an 
amendment may be allowed: and if there is no authority for 
the issuing of the writ, it may be quashed and set aside upon the 
motion of one adversely interested. . . 
This would indicate that you can file pleadings in county· 
court. However, I would go along with the language used in 
the Scheer and Jensen cases and say that you don't have a right 
to plead in county court. 
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Is the petition filed in county court by the condemner subject 
to collateral attack? 
In the Scheer case the court said that in the absence of an 
appeal to the district court the condemner is bound by the descrip-
tion set forth in his petition, and if it be indefinite or inaccurate 
in description it is subject to collateral attack. However if the 
condemner appeals he is required to raise any or all issues in the 
district court, and if he does not he is bound by the rule of res 
judicata in a collateral attack. 
After the condemner has filed his petition, Section 76-706 
provides that the county judge shall within 3 days by order en-
tered of record appoint 3 disinterested freeholders not interested 
in a like question to serve as appraisers. The county judge directs 
the sheriff to summon the appraisers to convene at his office to 
qualify and proceed with the appraisal. The county judge ad-
ministers the oath to the appraisers as required by Section 76-
708. 
Notice of the time and place of hearing with respect to dam-
ages by the appraisers must be served on the condemnee at least 
10 days prior to the hearing. Although the statute does not 
indicate who should sign this notice, we have had the appraisers 
sign the notice. Section 76-706) 
The Uniform Act under Section 76-709 provides as follows: 
It shall be the duty of the appraisers to carefully inspect and 
view the property taken or sought to be taken, and also any other 
property of the condemnee damaged thereby. The appraisers 
shall hear any party interested therein in reference to the amount 
of damages when they are so inspecting and viewing the property. 
We have interpreted Sections 76-709 and 76-706 to mean 
that the condemnee is entitled to two hearings 1) on the situs of 
the property and 2) at a time and place determined by the ap-
praiser. Therefore our form of notice has contained 1) the time 
of the inspection of the property by the appraisers and 2) the 
time and place of the hearing on damages by the appraisers. 
The hearings by the appraisers are conducted in a very in-
formal manner. The judge is not present and no record is made 
of the testimony and both the condemner and condemnee present 
their ideas of what the damages are to the board of appraisers. 
Here is where I think the property owner should "shoot the 
works." He knows what the condemner's idea of value is. Now 
is the time for him to bring in his expert witness and present his 
case to the appraisers. 
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The property owner ought to meet these appraisers at the 
situs of the property also--it's another chance to him to develop 
his case. 
If you represent the condemner you want to be prepared to 
offer what you have. We have had cases where the prope~· 
owner came in with a new and higher appraisal. Of course it 
didn't help him much when we produced a copy of his lower value 
ideas obtained during negotiations. 
After the appraisers have arrived at the amount of the 
awards they are required to file a report under Section 76-710 
of the Uniform Act. The appraiser's report does not have to be 
approved by the county judge. However, the county judge does 
fix the amount of the appraiser's fee and the same are taxed as 
costs to the condemnee. 
Under Section 76-711 the condemner does not acquire any 
interest in the property until he deposits the award with the 
county judge. If no appeal is taken by the condemner he will be 
deemed to have accepted the award unless he files an intention 
to abandon the procedure within 60 days of the filing of the ap-
praisers report. If the procedure is abandoned it may not be 
instituted again for a period of two years. 
Here's one for you to figure out. The last sentence under 
Section 76-711 of the Uniform Act provides as follows: 
Upon deposit of the condemnation award with the county judge 
the condemner shall be entitled to a writ of assistance to place 
him in possession of the property condemned." 
Section 76-714 of the Uniform Act provides as follows: 
The interest in the property acquired by the condemner shall be 
such title, easement, right-of-way or use as is expressly specified 
in or necessarily contemplated by the law granting to the con-
demner the right to exercise the power of eminent domain. The 
condemner shall not dispossess the condemnee until the condemner 
is ready to devote the property to public use, and such title or 
interest as the condemner seeks to acquire shall not be complete 
until the property is put to the public use for which taken. 
Let's take the case of a residence being condemned. Suppose 
the condemner pays the award into county court under Section 
76-711. The condemner is entitled to a writ of assistance to place 
him in possession of the property condemned. Under Section 
76-714 the condemner is not entitled to possession until he is 
ready to devote the property to public use. Can the property 
owner retain possession after he has accepted the award? Does 
he have to pay rent? Who pays the taxes? 
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Under Section 76-714, the property o·wner seems to get a 
"free ride" until the condemner is ready to devote to public use. 
l\faybe this is unjust enrichment. 
Upon deposit of the condemnation award the county judge 
shall prepare and certify under his seal of office a true copy 
thereof and shall transmit the same to the register of deeds of 
the county where the property is condemned. 
With regard to the procedure in appealing to the district 
court after the report of the appraisers has been filed, the Act 
provides that either the condemnee or the condemner may appeal. 
The notice of appeal and the bond must be filed within 30 days 
after filing of the appraiser's report. This is actually the first 
occasion on which the condemnee files any type of filing in the 
county court. 
The bond must be approved by the county judge. It requires 
one good and sufficient surety and it must contain the following 
conditions : 1) that the appellant will prosecute such appeal to 
effect without any unnecessary delays and 2) that if judgment 
be rendered against the appellant in the appeal, the appellant 
will satisfy any judgment rendered against him. 
30 days after the filing of notice of appeal the county judge 
must prepare and transmit to the clerk of the district court a 
duly certified transcript of all proceedings upon payment of the 
fee for the same. The proceeding is docketed in district court 
showing the party first appealing as plaintiff and the other party 
as def end ant, issues to be tried in the same manner as in the 
appeal from the county judge to district court. 
The question has arisen as to who must file the petition in 
district court. In the case of City of Seward vs. Gruntorad, 158 
Neb. 143, 62 N.W. 2d 537, the attorneys for the condemnee were 
under the mistaken impression that the condemner had to file a 
petition on appeal. The court in that case set forth the rule that 
the failure of the appellant to timely file a petition in the district 
court does not affect or defeat jurisdiction. However good cause 
must be shown for failing to file a petition in district court with-
in 50 days from the date of filing your notice of appeal, and for 
the most part what is good cause is left to the discretion of the 
district court. 
This question was discussed in the above mentioned case on 
page 149 of the opinion, which reads as follows: 
"We construed this statute in in re Estate of Lindekugel, 
supm, we applied it in in 1·e Estate of Myers, supra, and held: A 
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discretionary duty is imposed upon a district court to determine 
whether or not good cause has been shown for the failure of a 
party to plead within the time required, and after the court has 
heard the reasons of the pa1·ty in default for his failure to timely 
plead, and in the exercise of a legal discretion has decided that 
no sufficient cause has been shown, this court will not -0rainarily 
disturb the decision of the district court." 
"The question then is : Was good cause shown?" 
Even though the only issue you want to try on appeal is the 
question of damages, you still have to file your petition within 50 
days after filing the notice of appeal. This question arose in the 
case of Jensen vs. Omaha Public Powm· District, 159 Neb. 277, 
66 N.W. 2d 591, quoting from page 284 of the opinion. 
Apparently the condemnee's counsel became aware of this court's 
opinion in the case of City of Seward v. Grmitorad, Supl'a., and 
sought to follow the procedure set forth therein applying to 
eminent domain. The condemnee's counsel takes the position 
that where damages constitute the only issue in a condemnation 
proceeding no petition need be filed in the district court. Cases 
are cited to sustain the condemnee's position in such respect. 
However, the cited cases are prior to our decision in city of 
Seward 11'. Gruntorad, supra, and the condemnee's position is in 
direct conflict with what this court said in City of Seward v. 
Gruntoi·ad, supra, on procedure in eminent domain cases. 
We had ~ case in Douglas County where the condemnee filed 
his notice of appeal but failed to file his petition in the district 
court within 50 days thereafter. The condemnee at an ex parte 
hearing obtained an extension of time in which to file his peti-
tion in the district court. However we moved to dismiss the case 
on grounds that there wasn't any good cause shown, and the 
court sustained our motion. The cause in that case was just about 
the same as the cause shown in the City of Seward case--that is, 
that counsel was confused as to the procedure to take. 
You can stipulate to try the case on the same issues in dis-
trict court, which means in effect that you are trying the issue 
of damages only on appeal. However in the absence of such a 
stipulation a petition must be filed. 
Now if you represent the property owner you have several 
practical things to think about with reference to appeals. If you 
appeal you don't get your money, which is usually a big item. 
And of course you don't stop the condemner from proceeding after 
he has deposited his award. 
Under the Uniform Act the condemner can appeal, and here 
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is where I think he should make his move if he thinks he is pay-
ing too much for the property. The same old story-a lot of 
people don't want to go through a jury trial. Sometimes they 
\Yill take less money. When the condemner appeals he ties up the 
money. Section 76-719. 
Either condemner or condemnee may appeal from the judgment 
of the district court to the supreme court in the manner provided 
by law for taking an appeal in a civil action. In case an appeal 
is taken either to the district court or the Supreme Court, any 
money deposited by the condemner shall remain in the hands of 
the county judge until a final judgment is :r;endered. 
This is the condemner's "break in the ball game." If you 
get kicked around, exercise your right of appeal. 
Summarizing, the steps in taking your appeal from county 
court to district court are as follows: 1) A notice of appeal must 
be filed within 30 days after date of the filing of the appraiser's 
report together with the proper bond. 2) The transcript must be 
ordered and the fee for the same tendered and 3) You must file 
your petition in the district court within 50 days from the date 
of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
This completes a brief statement of procedure under the 
new Act. I have with me today one set of forms which we use, 
including the petition, an oath given the appraisers, the notice 
to the property owners and the appraiser's report which any of 
you may peruse after the meeting. 
ASSOCIATION DINNER FOR MEMBERS 
AND THEIR LADIES ................................................ 6:30 P.M. 
Presiding .............................................................. John J. Wilson, Esq. 
President of the Nebraska State Bar Association 
INTRODUCTION OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS 
"1956-Peace, War and Politics" .............................. Bob Considine 
New York, N. Y. 
Noted Author; INS Correspondent; King 
Features Columnist; Star of Radio-TV 
"On the Line with Considine." 
1956 PEACE, WAR AND POLITICS 
By 
Bob Considine 
I think we are in for an extended period of peace. Our atomic 
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stockpile and our ability to deliver the atomic goods to any point 
of the earth within hours after an act of provocation has made 
war unthinkable. From what I've seen and heard in the master 
control room at SAC headquarters here at Offut, I can't con-
ceive of Russia's lasting a full week in any all-out war with us. 
(China wouldn't last a day. It has no capability of waging a 
modern war.) The Soviet Union is rimmed by our air bases. 
Every major target in the U.S.S.R. and among the satellites has 
been identified, and reasonable facsimiles in this country may be 
under a mock bombing raid right now. One of the last times I 
was in Omaha I had Gen. LeMay on my Mutual of Omaha sho\Y 
and he remarked, in a casual way, that one of his planes was even 
then practice-bombing a section of this city. Not a soul in 
Omaha knew the plane was up there in the shrouds of night, too 
high to be seen, too high to be heard. Yet Omaha lay naked on 
the radar screen of that plane, and that portion of the city which 
was marked for destruction was theoretically destroyed. On the 
radar screen, that section resembled an important railroad junc-
tion far behind the Iron Curtain. 
The men in the Kremlin may be cruel, conniving and con-
temptuous of a lot of the things we hold dear. But they're not 
fools, and you have only to see them eat and drink to recognize 
that they want to go on living and hold on to what power their 
predecessors amassed for them. 
The great, final communist world revolution can wait, so far 
as these fellows are concerned. Sure, they'll keep their operatives 
fanned out through the world, looking for soft spots in the armor 
of the West, looking for political vacuums to fill. But the big 
pay-off doesn't have to be tomorrow. Karl Marx put no time 
limit on it. Neither did Lenin. Neither did the man who made 
these present rulers--Stalin. If there is to be a Pax Americana 
or Pax Atomica for twenty, thirty, even fifty yea1·s--so what? 
One day, they feel, the world revolution will succeed. One day, 
they feel, we'll go bust or be sucker enough to let down our guard, 
and then they can move. The present crop in the Kremlin may 
have died off, but the system will dredge up new leaders and 
bring them to the top. 
At Geneva I asked Chip Bohlen, our ambassador to Moscow, 
to tell me something about the current Russian leaders. He said 
that he had given them a good study and was convinced that 
there is no one boss, as Stalin was boss. Bulganin, Khrushchev 
and Molotov sat at Stalin's feet like schoolboys, afraid to open 
their mouths. He chose no heir among them. He could send 
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12,000 Polish officers to their death in the Katyn Forest without 
batting an eyebrow, or starve and shoot millions of kulaks to 
death, or condemn millions-maybe as many as 15,000,000-to 
the slow·er death and degradation of slave labor camps. 
These fellows who form the committee that succeeded Stalin 
look like tame people only by comparison to Stalin, one of his-
tory's most brutal despots. They are dangerous products of a 
system that lives on deceit. But they can be reached. They can 
be talked to, where Stalin could not be. With German tanks in 
the suburbs of Moscow early in the war and the Russian govern-
ment fleeing to Kuibyshev, Stalin entertained the Polish premier 
at dinner in the Kremlin and said, in effect, "Now, after the war, 
we will annex much of the eastern section of Poland .... " 
I don't know if "appeal to" is too strong a term, but I'll 
chance it: Bulganin and Khruschev, who appear to be of about 
equal rank, can be appealed to-if the right man is entering the 
appeal. So can Marshal Zhukov. Molotov and Gromyko abide by 
the Book-Lenin's Book-·which emphatically says it is not pos-
sible for a communist state to co-exist with a capitalistic state. 
But Molotov and Gromyko are not running the show. Bul-
ganin and Khrushev and, to a lesser degree, Zhukov are the de-
cision-makers. And they just don't seem to be the sadistic type. 
Bulganin looks a bit like a Russian Foxy Grandpa. Khrushchev 
likes to get drunk. At Geneva, Zhukov looked like a man trying 
to get Eisenhower's autograph, or an old chorus boy from the last 
road company of "The Student Prince." 
They're not going to sniile us into relaxing our vigilance, 
of course. We're not dumb enough to fall for anything as simple 
as that. What our side did at Geneva was to sound out these 
fellows like a doctor applying a stethoscope, or an, attorney in a 
pre-trial interrogation. And they stood still for the examination. 
Which brings me to the man who did the principal sounding, 
the man who tonight lies in his hospital bed on the eighth floor 
of Fitzsimmons Army Hospital. 
Your political leanings are none of my business. I don't 
want to talk now about Eisenhower the politician at this point, 
anyway. I want to talk now about Eisenhower, the Man of Peace. 
His performance at Geneva was the most thrilling, inspiring, won-
derful job I've seen turned in by a statesman in twenty-five years 
of reporting. He transcended party affiliations and all other 
considerations and performed as an American. They called it 
the "Meeting at the Summit." But only one man truly made it 
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all the way to the peak, and he was our President. It makes you 
proud to be an American. 
Ike talked to those Russians not in the high-falutin' language 
of diplomacy. He looked them in the eye and talked to them man 
to man. And in basic English-Basic Kansas English. 
This happened: 
One day over a drink at the buff et which followed formal 
meetings, Eisenhower and Bulganin got into a discussion about 
the horrifying effects of the H-bomb. 
Suddenly Ike looked at him and said, "You know, don't you, 
that the prevailing winds of the earth blow from west to east. . ." 
Bulganin answered, after a bit, "You mean that we would 
get your radioactive dust?" 
"Yes," Ike said, looking at him steadily. 
Bulganin nodded and said, "Yes, but you'll also recall that 
the winds continue to blow from west to east and in time blow 
from our land to yours. You would get our dust, too." 
"Right!" Ike agreed. "But these winds flow mainly over 
the upper portions of the world, where our two countries lie. We 
could destroy you; you could destroy us, perhaps. But if you did, 
don't you see that you'd be gone, but many free places like South 
America and Africa and Australia and New Zealand would still 
exist. . .and free?" 
Bulganin was plainly moved by what he heard. He mumbled 
something in Russian, several times over. 
It meant: We must do something ... We must do something. 
The Russians were thoroughly unprepared for Eisenhower's 
proposal that we exchange military blueprints and let observers 
fly over each other's country. They couldn't comprehend such 
open-handedness. Their furtive, scheming lives had not condi-
tioned them to understand goodness of heart. Ike couldn't have 
stunned them more if he had rapped them on the noggin with a 
baseball bat. 
That evening, more than before, the four of them rubbed 
shoulders as they left the Palais des Nations, as if for mutual 
support. They had nobody to call home to for advice. Ike knocked 
them completely off balance. 
It is one of the curious contradictions of our time that Eisen-
hower would emerge as the temporal symbol of peace on earth. 
For years and years his business was mass destruction. At West 
272 NEBRASKA. STA.TE BAR ASSOCIATION 
Point he studied Clausewitz, Napoleon, Grant, Lee, Lundendorf. 
At Leavenworth he graduated Number One in his advanced post-
graduate studies on how to conquer and defend. In World War 
II he had under his command the greatest armed force in history, 
more than 5,000,0.00 men on land, sea and in the air. His forces 
laid waste to cities, armies and to some extent populations from 
North Africa to the Baltic. 
And then, almost like Saul on the road to Damascus, he 
traded in his s-\vord for an olive branch. But he retained some-
thing not always associated with a peace-maker. He retained 
that fighting jaw. He began to fight for peace. 
In the course of those battles Eisenhower has achieved a 
miracle. He has made peace exciting. He has become to peace 
what Churchill was to war. The bugle he sounds calls men to 
peace, not to arms. 
I flew to Korea with him, after he made that campaign 
promise to go there and try to bring that exhausting war to a 
close. It was a memorable experience. . . the bitter cold. . .the 
disgust of the m~n with the war ... the suffocating smell of Korea 
... the slim little "token" forces that other United Nations sent 
to fight UN's first war ... and tender moments such as when Ike 
took leave finally of his son John, then serving with a forward 
element. He told his boy that he could somehow bear it if John 
was killed in the service of his country but he wondered if he 
could carry on as president if John was captured. "For God's 
sake," he said, "don't let them capture you." 
Each day, Eisenhower flew from Seoul to a different portion 
of the front in a tiny single-engined plane. In that terrain an 
engine failure would almost automatically mean death. A Mig, 
such as those which came over Seoul the night we left, apparently 
looking for his transport plane, a MiG could have shot down the 
little plane with:a single burst of fire. A Chinese anti-aircraft 
gunner could have done the same wit4 hardly much more trouble. 
But Eisenhm~rer was spared for the great jobs that lay ahead. 
He has the gift of da.ring a hesitant world to take a more trust-
ful attitude. That speech before the UN after the Bermuda con-
ference, for instance. That's where he proposed that the nations 
of the world pool their peaceful atomic knowledge, that all join 
in, contributing what they could, for the benefit of all. 
Russia said. "Ridiculous!" at the time, and even some of our 
friends ,;;.ere 'v~ry .. 
, ' . 
But at Geneva this summer, thirty-some nations, including 
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Russia, met in the atoms-for-peace conference, met in the most 
cordial and cooperative manner. Russia showed her 100-kilo-
watt atomic power plant and spread out her plans for a 100,000 
kilowatt job. An Indian outlined the breath-taking potentialities 
of hydrogen power, power from the H-bomb. A man from West-
inghouse sold the Fiat Co. of Italy an atomic reactor. Tne nations 
of the world gathered around an operating reactor built by us 
and owned by the Swiss, and around the walls of the building 
were exhibits whose captions were written in English, French, 
Spanish and Russian. 
Ike's imaginative dream of December 8, 1953, the date of his 
speech before UN, had come true in eighteen months. 
But where will he be, eighteen months after Geneva? That 
would bring him up to election time in '56. 
I don't think he'll run. I have no inside information, and 
the signs may be deceptive. But right now I'd say he'll slowly, 
surely regain his health to a point where he can assume much 
(but not all) of his past responsibility and activity, concentrate 
on convincing Russia and the rest of the world that the people 
of the U.S. feel exactly as he does about peace-and when he's 
decided that he has made his point, he'll say, "That's it boys. 
Come up to Gettysburg and see me sometime." 
When he says that, I wouldn't advise any of you to stand in 
the doorway of either the Republican national convention or the 
Democratic national convention. You might be trampled to death 
by would-be candidates, favorite sons and the like. 
It's going to be a scramble when Ike bows out, as I think 
he will. (In further support of the brief that Ike won't run, 
the Vice President told me in an interview a week before Ike's 
heart attack that the President considered his health one of three 
major factors involved in whether he'd seek re-election. The other 
two concerned the international situation and the continued do-
mestic prosperity. As for health, the President then was pic-
tured as being a man who knew he had to come to peak physical 
and mental fitness time after time after time. The President 
estimated that he averaged one fateful decision per hour, each 
of which made tremendous demands on him. He'd have to see 
whether he felt he could keep that up for four more years. He'd 
have to see. In the meantime, you'll recall, he said on several 
occasions that there were plently of good Republicans in the woods 
and that there ·was no such animal as the "indispensable man.") 
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To repeat, don't stand in any open doorways. 
The woods may indeed be filled with good Republican can-
didates, but it seems to me the GOP needs more than a good can-
didate. It needs a good dramatic Republican. It's the minority 
party in this country and has been for longer than we might 
suppose. Gallup Poll indicates that if all Americans of voting age 
were required to register today there would be 54.3 Dem. : 34.3 
GOP. It had to go outside of its party ranks to come up with the 
last two presidents it elected-Herbert Hoover and Eisenhower. 
Neither had ever run for public office before. Both earned their 
fame in non-political fields. Both had toyed with the notion of 
running as Democrats. It seems a bit hard to believe now, but 
Hoover was asked to head the Democratic ticket and run against 
Coolidge. He declined (just as Ike declined to run with Truman's 
support in 1948). 
No vice president in our history was ever given a truer power 
of attorney than Dick Nixon. The young Californian has been 
an assistant president from the start. He has conducted the 
weekly meetings of the cabinet, the National Security Council 
and the legislative leaders, in addition to presiding over the 
Senate. He has visited 35 countries as Ike's personal represen-
tative and has the President's complete confidence. 
But Eisenhower admires him more wholeheartedly than do 
some of the factions and splinter groups within the GOP hier-
archy. It is plain by now that Governor Knight, rather than the 
second highest office-holder in the land, will control the powerful 
California delegation to the convention in San Francisco next 
August. Governor Knight would like the nomination himself, as 
perhaps would Senator Knowland. 
Which brings us to a fourth Californian, who now says he 
wants no part of it-Chief Justice Earl Warren. He's Ike's age 
and plainly would pref er to stay on the high bench. But there 
is precedent for leaving it-Charles Evans Hughes did-and 
there's no doubt that if Eisenhower feels he can't cauy on, tre-
mendous (and very possibly successful) pressure will be put on 
Warren to pick up the torch. With Eisenhower's endorsement 
I think he'd be tough to beat. 
Now the Democrats. Stevenson, it seems to me, faces two 
problems: 1) He has been a man without a platform for nearly 
three years of prosperity and wide employment and 2) he's got 
that 1952 loss going against him. On the other side of the ledger, 
some Democratic leaders will figure that the voters considered 
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him the second best man in the country three years ago, and 
now if the best man isn't playing ball any more, they'll take the 
next best. They gave him a tremendous number of votes the last 
time. 
Averell Harriman has the most important platform in the 
country as governor of New York. He says he's for Stevenson. 
But Carmine Di Sapio, the Tammany leader who handles Harri-
man's political business, say he's for Harriman-not Stevenson. 
Harriman is 64. 
I saw Estes Kefauver's picture in the World-Herald today, 
wearing an Indian turban and a garland of flowers. He should 
carry the Calcutta vote hands down, but he can't get the leaders 
of the Democratic party to go for him. As for the most respect-
ed Democrat on Capitol Hill, Dick Russell of Georgia, he'll be 
passed up, I suspect, because the Democrats must depend to some 
extent on the Negro vote in the North. 
There will be a sprinkling of other names-John Foster Dul-
les, Harold Stassen, Christian Herter, even Tom Dewey-for the 
Republicans, Soapy \Villiams and Gov. Lausche for the Democrats. 
It'll be a scramble all right. Had a card yesterday from Bernarr 
McFadden. He's thrown his parachute in the ring. And Tommy 
Manville. 
And everybody expected that it would be one of the quietest 
of them all, with Ike running and winning without trouble. 
The people will know what to do. They'll know because they 
are the best-informed people in the world today-with free courts, 
newspapers, radio and TV. 
This, incidentally is National Newspaper Week. The slogan 
this time is "The People's Right to Know." There is certainly 
nothing to complain about the coverage of the Eisenhower illness. 
Probably never before in history has the exact condition of a 
chief of state been so completely communicated to the people. 
This is infinitely better than leaving us in the dark-where the 
American people were left in the matter of the condition of Pres-
ident Cleveland, Wilson and F.D.R. 
Cleveland was operated on for cancer of the upper right jaw 
on July 1, 1893. But the only people who knew about it were a 
handful of doctors, a few personal friends and perhaps the crew 
of the private yacht "Oneida," on which the operation was per-
formed. The story was broken several months later by a Phila-
delphia newspaper but vigorously denied by a White House 
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spokesman. The public considered it a hoax. The full account 
was not published and believed until 1931, years after Cleveland's 
death. 
Woodrow Wilson, by an astonishing coincidence, was taken 
ill in Denver within a few hours of the very hour Eisenhower 
was stricken thirty-six years later. He insisted on going on by 
train to Wichita where he suffered what several of his biographers 
agree was the first of two strokes. The public never knew. Just 
who ran the country until the end of his term is still a matter of 
debate-though some say it was Admiral Grayson and Mrs. Wilson. 
Roosevelt's . physical condition was extremely bad before he 
went to Yalta and worse when he returned. But the public wasn't 
told. 
Churchill suffered a slight stroke in 1949, while out of office. 
It briefly affected his speech, but he recovered sufficiently to 
campaign in 1950 and return to office. On June 24 at 10 Down-
ing Street, at the end of a statedinner, Churchill suffered a sec-
ond stroke which deprived him of his speech for twelve hours. 
His meeting with Ike at Bermuda was postponed indefinitely. 
Yet to the amazement of his doctors he recovered and carried on 
until this April, at which time he first told the world that nearly 
two years before he had had what he called "a very serious ill-
ness which paralyzed me completely physically." 
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"SOME REAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF AVIGATION" 
By 
Perry W. Morton 
Assistant Attorney General of the United States 
It is always good to meet with fell ow lawye1·s, but I am especi-
ally grateful for the invitation which has brought me back home 
to Nebraska today to be with old friends of the Nebraska Bar 
and particularly to participate again in a program sponsored by 
the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Section, in the work of 
which I have been vitally interested ever since its organization 
in 1936. 
Before reaching the announced subject, you may be interested 
in a few more general words about the operations of the Lands 
Division in the Department of Justice. Before going to Wash-
ington, I would never have supposed that the work of the Lands 
Division could possibly off er such a variety of experience and in-
volve such a diversification of problems. For example, it was be-
yond my most fantastic imagination that I should be engaged in -
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the defense of the Government against the assertions of the claims 
of tribal Indians involving potential liabilities in the estimated 
aggregate of as much as ten billion dollars. Little did I anticipate 
that I would be trying to help figure out the responsibility of 
the United States to pay, if at all, for the northerly half of an 
international bridge across the Rio Grande now collapsed under 
the waters of the reservoir behind Falcon Dam.1 I could not 
conceive that I would be working upon a case involving an old 
dispute between secretaries of two of the executive departments of 
the same Federal Government at the suit of a county in Oregon, 
involving the administration of 1/2 million acres of valuable 
timber land.2 I could not have guessed that a real-estate lawyer 
would have much to do with the question whether the Government 
is liable for the killing of Indian ponies and allegedly driving 
certain individual Indians from some desert grazing lands in a 
well-nigh undiscovered portion of the State of Utah.3 Little did 
I know that I would be involved in a vast program of slum clear-
ance in the District of Columbia and in testing the constitution-
ality of the Act under which it is being done.4 
But these are just a few samples of the problems within the 
scope of the work and responsibility of the Lands Division. 
I consider it a privilege almost without parallel to be in 
charge of the title work and real estate litigation of the biggest 
landowner, the biggest land buyer, the biggest landlord, the big-
gest land seller, and at the same time the biggest land tenant in 
America. A recent survey by the General Services Administra-
tion shows that the Federal Government now owns 21 % of all the 
land in the United States.0 
The staff of the Lands Division is divided among eight sec-
tions, each with a particular field of responsibility. I would not 
impose on your time to describe the function or work load of each 
of these sections. One may suffice for illustration. In the Land 
Acquisition Section alone we have cases now pending for the con-
demnation of more than 30,000 separate tracts of land. Under 
the Declaration of Taking Act, permitting the advance deposit of 
estimated just compensation, we have on deposit in -the Court 
1 United States vs. 85237 Acres in Zapata County, Civil 529, Laredo 
Division, Southern District of Texas. Pending. 
2 Clackamas County, Ore. vs. :McKay, 219 F.2d 479, vacated as moot, 
:.J49 U.S. 909. 
a Bill Hatahley vs. United States. 220 F.2d 666. 
4 Berman vs. Parker, 348 U.S. 26. 
u Inventory Repo;·t on Federal Real Property, Senate Document No. 32, 
84th Cong., 1st Session, p. 9. 
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Registries a fairly constant balance of somewhere around $40,000,-
000, with the monthly new deposits and withdrawals averaging 
roughly $3,000,000. Aside from condemnations, this section also 
handles the title work on so-called "direct purchase" matters 
where the acquiring agencies have successfully negotiated volun-
tary purchases, and there is an average volume of around 4,300 
of such transactions pending in the office most of the time. In 
the 26 months I have been in office more than 23,000 title opin-
ions of the attorney general have been prepared in this one sec-
tion, and in many cases a single opinion will cover several tracts. 
Out of all the mass of interesting questions which are con-
stantly confronting the Lands Division it has been rather dif-
ficult to decide on one for this discussion. The subject which has 
been announced has at least the virtue of being ultra-modern. 
It has to do with some of the consequences of the collision between 
the flight of modern aircraft and some very durable old common 
law concepts about the ownership of air-space. The rapid ad-
vances in aviation, particularly the recent developments of jet 
planes for the military services, have brought into sharp focus 
many questions regarding the nature and extent of the rights of 
landowners whose property is in the immediate vicinity of an 
airfield. There is such a widespread misunderstanding of some 
aspects of the problems created that a discussion of them here 
may be both timely and helpful. 
Sir Edward Coke, who died in 1634, in his Institutes of the 
Law of England, expressed the ancient common-law rule in a way 
which at least had the advantage of simplicity :6 
And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not 
only of water, as hath been said, but of ayre and all things even 
up to heaven; for cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum., as 
is holden in 14 H. 8. fo. 12. 22 Hen. 6. 59. 10 E. 4. 14. 
Blackstone7 and Kent,8 in their Commentaries, restate the rule 
given by Coke. Blackstone can be forgiven since he died in the 
year 1780 and the balloon was not invented until 1783. But 
Kent, who lived until 1847, does not have this excuse. As early 
as 1815, Lord Ellenborough considered a case in trespass for 
cutting a tree, the brances of which overspread the defendant's 
land. He is reported to have said :9 
6 First American Ed., 1853, Ch. 1, § 1 ( 4a). The three cases relied 
on by Coke in support of the maxim all had to do with the ownership of 
young birds in their nests in trees. 
7 Lewis ed., 1902, p. 18. 
s Gould ed., 1896, p. 621. 
9 Pickering vs. Rudd, .June 20, 1815, 1 Stark. 56, 58. 
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I recollect a case where I held that firing a gun loaded with shot 
into a field was a breaking of the close. ·would trespass lie 
for passing through the air in a balloon over the land of another? 
Lord Ellenborough did not answer his own question, prob-
ably because of the fine English sensibility about not disposing 
of questions which are unnecessary to a decision. 
The prophetic question of Lord Ellenborough was one of the 
earliest expressions of doubt about the inflexibility of the com-
mon-law maxim that the ownership of land extends from the 
center of the earth to the periphery of the universe. But even 
so, the courts have struggled with the philosophy of airspace 
problems from very early times, while trying generally, none-
theless, to keep their decisions within the framework of the 
common-law maxim. The reported cases dealing with so-called 
ownership of airspace are so numerous that their collection here 
would be impractical. These include actions of various kinds re-
lating to the overhanging of natural growths, 10 such as the 
branches of trees; the protrusion of man-made structures such as 
cornices,11 eaves,12 crossarms,13 elevated railways,14 power and 
telephone lines ;1G and the firing of projectiles across land without 
touching the surface.16 The variety of the cases is almost un-
limited. One curious case in 1874 arose because the defendant's 
horse had kicked and bitten the plaintiff's mare which was stand-
ing on the other side of the boundary fence. No part of the horse 
touched plaintiff's ground. This vrns held to be actionable tres-
pass because the horse's nose and leg protruded in the airspace 
over plaintiff's land.17 
I cannot resist the temptation to include passing reference to 
another unusual airspace case. The trespass consisted of the de-
fendant reaching her arm across the boundary fence during a 
bitter quarrel between neighboring landowners. The Iowa court 
amusingly observed that ownership extends not only downward, 
but upward. to the heavens, "although it is, perhaps, doubtful 
H• E.g., Lemmon vs. Webb, 1894, 3 Ch.D. 1; same, 1895, .A.C. 1. 
11 E.g., Fay vs. Prentice, 1 C.B. 828 (1845); Harrington vs. McCarthy. 
169 Mass. 492, 48 N.E. Z78. 
12 E.g., Smith vs. Smith, 110 Mass. 302. 
13 E.g., discussion in Harris vs. Central Power Co., 109 Neb. 500, 191 
N.W. 711. 
H E.g .. "i\Ietropolitan "\Yest Side Elevated Ry. Co. vs. Springer, 171 Ill. 
170. 49 N.E. 416. 
1G E.g., Butler vs. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716. 
10 Infra, notes 33 and 34. 
li Ellis vs. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 1874, 10 C.P. 19. 
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whether owners as quarrelsome as the parties in this case will 
ever enjoy the usufruct of their property in the latter direction."1' 
Until the arrival on the judicial scene of some of the special 
problems created by avigation, there could be detected in the re-
ported cases some disagreement in basic theory. Some courts in-
clined to the view that the airspace is not capable of ownership 
and that invasions of it are only actionable when they are breaches 
of duties otherwise owed to the subjacent landowner. Generally 
speaking, the argument has been much hotter among theoretical 
commentators than it has ever been deducible from reported de-
cisions. By far the greater number of cases adhered to the com-
mon-law concept that the superjacent airspace belongs to the 
owner of the surface. When confusing language is sometimes 
found in the courts' opinions, it is often quite obviously due to the 
opinion writers' attempt to justify a particular result on the 
merits either by means of or in spite of some very rigid distinc-
tions made at the common law between particular forms of ac-
tion, as, for example, the differences between ejectment, trespass 
quare clausum fregit, and trespass on the case-differences which 
have in various degrees disappeared with the progress of modern 
concepts of pleading and remedy. If the maxim is limited to the 
e:i..'"tent to which it has been applied in adjudicated cases, practic-
ally all of which have dealt with trees or buildings or other man-
made structures having ground support somewhere, there should 
be nothing amazing about refusing to apply it to aviation, or 
modifying it to suit the practical requirements of the new problem. 
In this perspective, the 1946 decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby19 is fairly understand-
able. In that case the majority opinion, after referring to the 
common-law doctrine, sweeps it away by saying: 
But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air 
is a public highway, as Congress has declared. '\Vere that not 
true. every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to 
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To 
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these 
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development 
in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that 
to which only the public has a just claim. 
In an effort to confine this discussion as much as possible to 
aspects of real estate law, any extended reference to regulatory 
powers and functions of federal, state or local authorities will be 
18 Hannibalson vs. Sessions, 116 Ia. 457, 90 N.W. 93. 
19 328 u.s. 256. 
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purposely avoided. It is, however, helpful to note at this point 
that Congress, by the Air Commerce Act of 192620 and the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938,21 exercising its power under the com-
merce clause, has recognized "a public right of freedom of inter-
state and foreign air navigation"22 through the navigable airspace 
of the United States, and has defined navigable airspace as mean-
ing "airspace above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed 
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority."23 The regulations adopted24 
pursuant to these Acts prescribe the minimum safe altitudes of 
flight as 1,000 feet over congested areas and 500 feet elsewhere, 
except for take-offs and landings which are required to conform 
to a given flight pattern and "path of glide." Military aircraft 
are subject to the rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the 
absence of military regulations to the contrary.25 Exercising 
their police powers, several of the states have enacted laws deal-
ing with sovereignty in the airspace, lawfulness of flight within 
certain limits, and ownership of airspace by the subjacent land-
owners subject to the right of flight. 
However, the effect upon the "ownership" aspects of aviga-
tion of a federal or state "commerce power," comparable to that 
exercised by Congress over rivers and harbors, has never been 
decided with regard to the landing and take-off areas near air-
ports,26 and hence is a completely virgin territory which I shall 
not explore today. 
While seeming to repudiate what it calls the "ancient doc-
trine" as to the ownership of airspace, the Causby case goes on to 
hold the Government liable for frequent, low-level flights by mili-
tary planes over private land. It may be said more accurately, 
therefore, that what the Causby case really does is to trim the 
doctrine down to the size required by modern life in the air age. 
The Causby case was brought in the Court of Claims to re-
cover for the alleged taking of an interest in Causby's home and 
20 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171, et seq. 
::n 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C. 401, et seq. 
22 49 u.s.c. 180. 
23 49 u.s.c. 180, 401 (24). 
2414 Code of Federal Reg., Sec. 60.17 (1952). To the effect that these 
regulations supersede local ordinances, see Allegheny Airlines vs. Village 
of Cedarhurst, 132 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. N.Y. 1955). 
2li Cameron vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 140 F.2d 482. 
26 In the Causby <:ase, supra, the court found it unnecessary to decide 
"the question of the validity of the regulation" since the "path of glide" 
for landing and taking off was not within the regulation's definition of 
"navigable air space." 
PROCEEDINGS, 1955 283 
chicken farm located about 2,200 feet from the end of the main 
runway of an airport leased by the Government. Frequent and 
regular flights of Army planes, in taking off and landing, passed 
over Causby's land at about 83 feet, which was only 18 feet above 
the highest trees. It was claimed that there was great noise, 
vibration and glare of light which deprived respondents of sleep, 
made them nervous and frightened, and killed so many of their 
chickens that they were driven out of business. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the Court of Claims2 i in this respect that the 
actions of the Government in the particular case constituted a 
taking of an easement of flight over the Causbys' land for which 
they were entitled to receive just compensation as provided by 
the fifth amendment. 
Neither the Causby case nor any other provides any precise 
yardstick for judging whether in any other given state of facts 
there is or is not a taking of an easement for which compensa-
tion must be paid. The result must invariably depend upon the 
facts of each case. Yet there can be summarized from the deci-
sions several general rules against which any particular facts 
must be measured.28 
It is firmly established that a landowner has no such exclu-
sive proprietary right to the superjacent airspace as would per-
mit any recovery for occasional flights of aircraft over his land 
on a theory of trespass or taking. In that respect the "ad coelurn" 
part of the common-law maxim is as dead as Lord Coke. The 
airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the fact 
that it may sometimes cause certain inconveniences or annoy-
ances must be accepted. On the other hand, frequent low-level 
flights of Government aircraft over private land, resulting in 
direct interference with the use and enjoyment of the land sub-
stantially diminishing its value, may constitute the imposition of 
an easement upon the land requiring payment of just compensa-
tion. Thus the landowner clearly has some rather definite rights 
in the airspace immediately above his land. And those rights are 
real property rights. The word "taking" and the word "ease-
2; Opinion of Court of Claims: 60 F. Supp. 751. 
2s A few illustrative cases are: Causby, supra; Hinman vs. Pacific Air 
Transport, 84 F.2d 755, cert. den. 300 U.S. 654; Smith vs. New England 
Aircraft Co., Inc., 270 i\Iass. 511, 170 N.E. 385; Northwest Airlines vs. 
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (3rd paragraph of concurring opinion by Jackson); 
Hyde vs. Sommerset Air Service, 61 A.2d 645; Antonik vs. Chamberlain, 
78 N.E.2d 752; Swetland vs. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201; Van-
derslice vs. Shawn, 27 A.2d 87; Thrasher vs. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 
S.E. 817, 99 A.L.R. 158, and note, 173. 
284 NEBRASKA ST.4TE BAR ASSOCIATION 
ment" are very much at home in the field of real-estate law, as 
distinguished from tort law. It may be noted parenthetically that 
the Causby case was decided May 27, 1946, whereas the Federal 
Tort Claims Act was not passed until August 2, 1946. In the 
Government's brief in the Causby case there was a short argu-
ment that the claim, if actionable at all against a private opera-
tor, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims because 
it sounded in tort as for nuisance. There has been some spe8Ula-
tion whether the Causby decision, applying the taking-of-an-ease-
ment theory, may have been influenced by the then-existing sov-
ereign immunity from tort claims. But that is a little like argu-
ing which came first, the chicken or the egg. The fact is that 
the Causby opinion is in the record, and that is that. 
While the surface owner has some rights in the superin-
cumbent airspace, these rights are definitely limited. He has 
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the atmosphere only 
to the extent necessary for his full enjoyment of his property 
and his exploitation and development of it according to its pres-
ent or immediately foreseeable highest and best use. His pro-
tection e}.."i;ends at least as far as the airspace is, or economically 
can be, physically occupied or used in the conventional sense. But 
that is just a part of it. It also means that the intrusions in the 
airspace must not, without compensation, be so low and so fre-
quent as to cause substantial impairment in the use of the sur-
face. It is the character of the invasion as related to the char-
acter of the property-not the amount of damage, so long as sub-
stantial-which determines whether there is a taking.29 Any 
diminution in the value of property not directly invaded or pecul-
iarly affected, but sharing in the common burden of incidental 
damages arising from lawful governmental activities, is not a 
taking of property.30 Only damages not experienced by the pub-
lic at large may be the basis for recovery of compensation.31 In 
other words, the liability of the Government for payment of just 
compensation arises only when the damages differ in kind and 
not merely in degree from those suffered by the public at large.32 
Another factor in considering whether there has been a 
taking and if so the extent of it, is the probability of the inten-
tion of the Government to continue the particular operation. This 
:!!•United States vs. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328. 
30 Richards vs. ·washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 554. 
31 Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. vs. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 
317, 332. 
32 Thompson vs. Kimball, 165 F.2d 677, 681; United States vs. 357.25 
Acres of Land, etc., 55 F.Supp. 461 (W.D. La.). 
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element is well illustrated by the history of two airspace cases 
which did not involve airplans but did involve the firing of a 
coastal artillery battery. In the first case, decided in 1913, the 
Supreme Court held that the mere erection of a coastal battery 
with a field of fire extending over the plaintiff's land and the 
subsequent discharge of only th1·ee shells did not evidence a.n in-
tention on the part of the Government to impose a servitude on 
the land.33 Yet nine years later when the same parties plaintiff 
again brought suit alleging repetitions of acts of this nature by 
the Government, the court said, "While a single act may not be 
enough, a continuance of them in sufficient number and over a 
sufficient time may prove it. Every successive trespass adds to 
the force of the evidence."34 Thus we see that there is no single 
factor which may be the basis of judgment, and great importance 
is attached to the cumulative result of several factors. 
It should be noted that the fifth amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, as distinguished from its counterpart in many state 
constitutions, including Nebraska's,:ii; provides just compensation 
only for takings of, not damages to, private property. The 
borderline between takings and damages may sometimes be a 
little fuzzy, but it is nonetheless very important. If the impair-
ment of property caused by an authorized federal activity is suf-
ficiently substantial, it may be a taking of an interest in that 
property, even though the interest taken is in the nature of an 
easement or use, either permanent or temporary, requiring the 
payment of just compensation for that particular interest less 
than the fee. But the Federal Government, under the fifth amend-
ment, is not required to pay for consequential damages.36 
Although it is implicit in what I have already said, it may 
be well to observe specifically that there are at least three prin-
cipal ways in which the United States may acquire real property 
or some interest in it. First, of course, the Government may 
purchase the property or interest in an ordinary free negotiation. 
Secondly, it may acquire by condemnation proceedings which it 
institutes in exercise of its power of eminent domain. The third 
33 Peabody vs. United States. 231 U.S. 530. 
34 Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. vs. United States, 260 U.S. 
327. 
After remand, the claimants were unable to prove a case, the petition 
was dismissed, 64 C.Cls. 572, and certiorari was denied, 277 U.S. 603. 
35 Article I, Sec. 21: "The property of no person shall be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.'' 
36 United States vs. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-8; l\litchell vs. 
United States, 267 U.S. 341, 344; United States ex rel. T.V.A. vs. Powelson, 
319 U.S. 266, 281. 
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method of acquisition, which is not familiar to the laws of some 
states, is called inverse condemnation. This is likewise an exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain, but it is done without af-
firmative legal proceedings. It is outside the scope of this paper 
to examine the ramifications of that form of acquisition in de-
tail. It happens to be exactly the kind of acquisition which was 
involved in the Causby case. Inverse condemnation occurs when 
the Government intentionally and physically appropriates private 
property to its own use for an authorized federal purpose. This 
appropriation is a taking in the constitutional sense just as much 
as the taking which results from a condemnation proceeding. The 
time of the taking by inverse condemnation, generally, is the time 
of the first substantial invasion of the private property.37 The 
remedy of the landowner is by an action for compensation under 
the Tucker Act.38 In a negotiated transaction the interest which 
the Government acquires is, of course, the precise interest de-
scribed in the contract of the parties. In a condemnation proceed-
ing the just compensation must be limited to the exact estate 
condemned, for the Government acquires and must pay only for 
what is expressly taken.39 The same concept is also present in 
the cases of inverse condemnation.40 This is illustrated by the 
fact that in the Causby case the Supreme Court considered the 
findings of fact of the Court of Claims insufficient as to the ac-
curate description of the easement taken by the Government and 
remanded the case to the Court of Claims to make such necessary 
findings. 
Another essential point to remember is that a suit against 
the Government under the Tucker Act may be commenced only 
within six years after the cause of action accrues.41 If someone 
has purchased land after the easement has already been imposed 
by the process of inverse condemnation, the title which the pur-
chaser acquires is, of course, just as much subject to the ease-
ment-12 as it would be subject to any prescriptive easement, the 
extent of which could be ascertained by reasonable examination 
37 United States vs. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748. 
3828 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1346(a)(2), as to United States District Courts; 
and Sec. 1491. as to Court of Claims. 
39 Karlson vs. United States, 82 F.2d 330, 335-6 (C.A. 8, 1936) (affirmed 
on other points, Olsen vs. United States, 292 U.S. 246); United States 
vs. 2,648.31 Ac. of Land, etc., 218 F.2d 518 (C.A. 4, 1955). 
40 United States vs. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328-9. 
n 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2501. Cause of action accrues when "situation be-
comes stabilized," United States vs. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 7 45, 7 49. 
42 Cf. Smithdeal vs. American Air Lines, 80 F.Supp. 233 (N.D. Tex .. 
1948). 
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of the premises at the time of the purchase even though there may 
be no evidence. of ft in the abstract or the record. 
Finally, we should give some consideration to the basis for 
and elements of evaluation of the easement, which is now com-
monly known as an avigation easement. The general rule is exact-
ly the same as applies to the valuation of any kind of easement. 
The measure of just compensation is the amount by which the 
fair market value of the property is diminished as a direct result 
of the imposition of the easement.43 It is simply an application 
of the familiar "before and after" principle. An extreme case 
could be imagined in which the value of land might be totally 
destroyed, and in such case the value of the easement would be 
the same as the fee.44 At the other e:ll..-treme it is easily possible 
that the value of the easement may be little more than nominal. 
In cases of inverse condemnation the same facts which would re-
sult in a conclusion that there was only nominal value to a so-
called easement would probably require the conclusion that there 
had, in fact, been no taking at all. While it is important to keep 
separate the legal principles of taking on the one hand and the 
rules for valuation on the other hand, it is nevertheless true that 
both determinations will be governed by the cumulative result of 
most of the same factors. 
There are well documented studies45 showing that generally 
the establishment of an airport enhances rather than decreases 
the land value in its vicinity, even in the approach zones. The 
pattern for the development of areas in the vicinity of numerous 
airports has been historically similar. Airport sites are generally 
selected in relatively undeveloped areas where land is rather 
cheap, at least until people know that Uncle Sam wants it, and 
there are few obstructions to the natural approaches to the run-
ways. Access roads and other public utilities are made available 
primarily for the airport. The airport and its activities attract 
people-the general public and the workers who require homes 
close to their jobs. Land developers see an opportunity to develop 
at a profit the surrounding land where utilities are already avail-
able. All of this generally results in an enhancement of land 
values in the airport vicinity. The historical pattern indicates 
43 United States vs. Causby, supra; United States vs. 2648.31 Acres etc., 
supra; United States vs. 26.07 Ac. of Land, etc., 126 F.Supp. 374 (E.D. 
N.Y., 1954). 
44 The Causby opinion proceeds from exactly this premise. 
45 Walther, "The Impact of l\Iunicipal Airports on the l\Iarket Value of 
Real Estate in the Adjacent Areas," XXII The Appraisal Journal, 15 fo 
25 (January 1954). 
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that people adjust very readily to the seeming nuisances of air-
plane operations. Mere proximity of property to an airport, with-
out more, does not justify a conclusion that there has been a 
taking, since damage due solely to proximity is common to the 
public at large and any difference in the amount of damage is 
one of degree only.46 In valuing the easement, if it is determined 
that one has been taken, there must be excluded from considera-
tion all matters which are conjectural, speculative, remote, fanci-
ful or imaginary. 
The highest and best use to which the land and superjacent 
airspace may be adapted may be considered, but only when the 
prospective use is reasonably probable, as distinguished from being 
merely possible.47 This will depend primarily upon the character 
and location of the land, the existing development of the neigh-
borhood, the market for comparable land, the existence of zoning 
regulations or building restrictions limiting the use of the land 
or the height of structures on it. From data readily available to 
appraisers, the elevation of the path of glide over each property 
should be definitely ascertained. The glide-angle plane does not 
represent the actual line of flight but is the minimum elevation 
of the approach zones including the allowance of a safety factor. 
Generally, in military operations this minimum glide-angle plane 
commences at ground zero at least 1000 feet from the end of the 
runway and rises one foot vertically to every fifty feet horizon-
tally. 
The easements, no matter how acquired or imposed, include 
the right to clear physical obstacles and to prohibit the erection 
of structures which would extend above the glide-angle plane at 
any given point. When it is necessary to remove or reduce the 
height of an obstruction as, for example, a smokestack, the neces-
sary cost of the alteration may be the measure of compensation to 
the extent that the alteration will diminish the amount of dam-
ages.48 
Some journal writers have asserted,49 incorrectly, I think, 
4G Richards vs. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554; Thompson 
vs. Kimball, 16.S F.2d 677, 681; United States vs. 357.25 Ac. etc., 55 
F.Supp. 461 (W.D. La.). 
'17 Olson vs. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255-6 (1934). 
48 Cf. Porrata vs. United States, 158 F.2d 788 (C.A. 1, 1947), that will-
ing buyer would consider availability of substitute loading station. And 
see, Gohman vs. City of St. Bernard, 146 N.E. 291, 299 (Ohio, 1924); 
Hartshorn vs. County of Worcester, 113 Mass. 111, 114; Baltimore Steam 
Packet Co. vs. United States, 81 F.Supp. 707, 710. 
4!1 E.g., Howard, "Valuation of an Avigation Easement," XXII The Ap-
p1·aisal Journal, 336 (July 1954). 
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that avigation easements have nothing to do with noise, vibra-
tion or glare of light. How such an assertion could be reconciled 
with the precise facts of the Causby case, I am at a loss to under-
stand. I think it is unquestionably clear that these factors do, in 
appropriate cases, enter into the valuation problem in precisely 
the same way that they are factors in determining whether there 
has been a taking, no more and no less. It is essential to repeat, 
however, that in the modern age a landowner has no vested right 
to freedom from annoyance, inconvenience, or even discomfort. 
For such factors to be considered in valuation, their effect must 
be such as would be harmful or dangerous to the health and com-
fort of reasonable people of ordinary sensibilities who can usually 
adjust themselves to the conditions of the locality.50 
Such intangible factors as fear of danger or interference 
with television are, I think, beyond the limits of reasonable con-
sideration. Statistically, aerial navigation is demonstrably safe, 
and danger to persons on the ground is so remote that an asser-
tion of fear is fanciful.51 Even bicycles kill more innocent by-
standers than do airplanes. 
These, then, are a few of the real property aspects of aviga-
tion. The entire subject is new enough that its rapid develop-
ment is certain to command the increasing attention of both the 
bar and the bench as the line between the rights of landowners 
and the rights of airspace navigation becomes more clearly de-
fined. None of such cases may be on your desk today; but do 
not be too sure that you may not have to grapple with one of 
them tomorrow. Many of the general principles which we have 
examined today are already sufficiently clear that there is little 
excuse for some of the professional misunderstanding about them. 
But even if the books already contained a thousand decisions on 
the subject the individual case would necessarily depend on its 
own facts. I am reminded of a recent news item to the effect 
that the General Services Administration had granted the at-
torney general authority to buy a bull for one of the federal prison 
farms without asking for competitive bids. An official of the 
Prison Bureau explained that "it is awfully hard to write up 
specifications for a bull." 
oOSmith vs. New England Aircraft Co., 270 l\Iass. 511, 170 N.E. 385; 
Hyde vs. Somerset Air Service, 61 Atl.2d 645 (N.J.); Antonik vs. Chamber-
lain, 78 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio); Thrasher vs. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 
817, 99 A.L.R. 158, 162. 
;;1 "The Airport and Its Neighbors," Report of the President's Airport 
Commission, 1952; "Accident Facts,'' National Safety Council, 1954. 
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THE PROPOSED MODEL PROBATE CODE 
By 
Barton H. Kuhns 
The Model Probate Code had its origin in a series of articles 
published .in 1939 and 1940 by Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, 
who then taught wills at the University of Missouri. The final 
article by Professor Atkinson, ·which was published in the Febru-
ary, 1940, issue of the Journal of the American Judicature Society, 
was entitled "Wanted-A Model Probate Code." This sugges-
tion was taken up by the Probate Division of the section on Real 
Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion, the chairman of which division, incidentally, at that time, 
was our fellow lawyer, Fred Hanson, of McCook. 
Professor Atkinson wrote his article in a background of a 
movement for reform of our probate law. During the 1930's a 
number of jurisdictions had adopted new probate codes, among 
them being Minnesota in 1935 and Michigan in 1939. Other jur-
isdictions were studying reforms in their probate laws, and it 
is fair to say that in quite a number of states there was general 
dissatisfaction with much of the statutory law pertaining to pro-
bate matters. 
A special committee of the Probate Law Division of the Real 
Property section of the American Bar Association was appointed 
at the 1940 annual meeting of the Association for the purpose of 
making further study of the suggestion for a model probate code. 
Considerable progress was made by the committee between 
the 1940 and 1941 annual meetings of the American Bar Associa-
tion, and at the 1941 annual meeting held in Indianapolis the de-
sirability and the feasibility of a model probate code had become 
apparent. The general topics to be covered by such a code and 
the general plan or arrangement of the code had been developed. 
Many of the section titles of the Model Probate Code in its final 
form came directly from topics suggested by that committee. 
It had also become apparent by 1941 that the task of actu-
ally drafting such a model probate code was one which was too 
tremendous for a committee of a section of the American Bar 
Association composed of busy lawyers serving on a voluntary 
basis. Fortunately about that time the University of Michigan 
Law School came to the rescue, and in 1942 the actual drafting 
of the code became a research project of the Research Department 
of the University of Michigan Law School. 
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The preparation of the code was in charge of Professor Lewis 
1\:1. Symes, who was relieved of part of his teaching duties for 
this purpose and who was ably assisted by Professor Atkinson, 
who has since become a professor of wills at the New York Uni-
versity Law School, and Mr. Paul Bayse, then a research assist-
ant and now of San Francisco. Their work not only included the 
drafting of the proposed model probate code, but the actual draft-
ing work was preceded by extensive research into the many prob-
lems suggested by the variety of statutory provisions in the pro-
bate laws of the different states. Not only the statutory la-w 
but the case law and the practical workings of the probate law 
in the various jurisdictions were included in the research project. 
It required approximately five years to complete the work on 
the Model Probate Code, and the result is a code in five parts 
which are divided into these subject matters: 
I. General Provisions. 
II. Intestate Succession and Wills. 
III. Administration of Decedents' Estates. 
IV. Guardianship. 
V. Ancillary Administration. 
The suggestion of a model probate code was not just an 
academic idea. There has been a continuing movement for pro-
bate reform in many of our states. Some jurisdictions have 
adopted entirely new probate codes. Others have been making 
piecemeal changes in their probate laws. The last session of the 
Texas legislature adopted an entirely new probate code. Even in 
Nebraska, where I suspect that many lawyers are of the impres-
sion that we have not substantially changed our probate law for 
many decades, there have been since 1943 more than twenty 
amendments made to sections of our Chapter 30 dealing with dece-
dents' estates up to the time of our 1955 legislative session. And 
this figure, of course, does not take into account the many bills 
introduced but not enacted by our legislature. The e:x'"tent of the 
movement varies in different states, but I believe it is safe to say 
that there are only a limited number of states where it can be 
said that there is complete satisfaction by the profession with all 
the provisions of the existing probate la\v. 
I want to emphasize that the Model Probate Code is what it 
is described to be; namely, a model act as distinguished from a 
uniform act. This distinction is of considerable importance, in 
that in using the code as a guide it should be clearly understood 
that it was never intended that all states should adopt it without 
change. It is strictly a model and was so intended. Uniform 
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acts are promulgated on subject matters where it is felt that uni-
formity of the law is necessary or desirable. Uniform laws fail 
in their complete accomplishment of purpose to the extent to 
which an entire uniform act is not adopted in any given state. 
A model act, being more in the nature of a guide, may tend in 
some degree to promote uniformity of legislation, but the prin-
cipal purpose of a model act is to set forth an example of a poten-
tial code or act without the necessary thought that uniformity of 
its adoption is essential or desirable. It is rather the thought 
that a model act in whole or in part may serve as a useful sug-
gestive guide to the enactment of legislation on the subject matter. 
Contrary to a general impression, the Model Probate Code as 
such is not a product of the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws; however, there is embodied in the code a 
number of uniform acts, some very short and some very more 
lengthy. These include uniform acts on the subject matter of 
Execution of Wills, Secured Creditors' Dividends in Liquidation 
Proceedings, and also ·the Uniform Veteran's Guardianship Act. 
In addition, the part of the code dealing with ancillary administra-
tion is composed primarily of uniform acts in this field, including 
the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act and the Uni-
form Ancillary Administration of Estates Act. 
These uniform acts, of course, should be adopted without 
change, and, as a matter of fact, they can be lifted out of the 
Model Probate Code and enacted in any jurisdiction as a separate 
item of legislation on the particular subject matter involved. 
I think it is rather important to understand that to take ad-
vantage of the Model Probate Code it is not necessary that all of 
the probate laws of the state should be repealed and supplanted 
by the Model Probate Code. It is one of the objectives of the 
code that the more desirable provisions may be removed from it 
and enacted in states which wish to adopt those provisions, with-
out necessarily abandoning all existing law on the subject matter 
where that law has proved satisfactory. In only a very few 
states, of which Arkansas is an example, has the legislature seen 
fit to supplant all existing probate law with the Model Probate 
Code. I think it is likely, for example, that in Nebraska there 
would be a reluctance to change the established and accepted plan 
of intestate succession as far as concerns closely related heirs. 
To illustrate, under the Model Probate Code the surviving spouse 
is entitled to one-half of the estate regardless of the number of 
issue. It seems· to me that it would be a very substantial, and 
perhaps unwarranted, change in. our probate law to attempt to 
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alter our accepted plan of intestate succession, so that the surviv-
ing spouse would receive one-half where there is more than one 
child. Likewise, in procedure for the probate of wills and the 
appointment of personal representatives, the practice of the vari-
ous states is well established. In some states the will is offered 
for probate and there is a publication, usually of three or fonr 
weeks, before a hearing is had on the probate of the will, after 
which the executor or administrator is appointed and notice to 
creditors is then given. In other states, and this is the plan of the 
Model Probate Code, the will is proved as the initial step in the 
probate proceedings, and the personal representative then gives 
notice of his appointment combined with a notice to creditors. 
Under this procedure the period of administration can be short-
ened. Of course under this procedure the period within which a 
contest can be made is usually longer than in jurisdictions where 
the objections must be filed prior to a decree admitting the will 
to probate. Unless there is substantial objection to the length of 
time required for the administration of estates in those jurisdic-
tions which follow the plan of giving notice before the probate, 
the probabilities are that the practice is so well established that 
if reasonably acceptable there is no particular point in recom-
mending change. 
Then, too, in some states there are constitutional provisions 
with respect to the establishment of the probate court, the quali-
fications of its judges, and even its jurisdiction, which might 
render unconstitutional some of the provisions of Part I of the 
Model Probate Code under the heading of General Provisions. 
Unless the dissatisfaction with existing probate laws is so 
substantial that the Bar is clamoring for a complete reform of 
the probate laws, the Model Probate Code should be used as a 
reference and a guide whenever reform is felt desirable in any 
particular area of probate law. It would be desirable if there 
could be prepared a section-by-section comparison of our existing 
probate laws and the recommendations of the Model Probate Code. 
The very making of this section-by-section comparison might re-
veal undesirable features of existing law, but whether that should 
be the case or not, the comparison would then be available in the 
event that any suggestions are made to change any particular 
section or sections of our existing statutes. Occasionally some 
isolated section of our probate statutes is amended simply because 
one lawyer or a very small group of lawyers may have encountered 
a particular problem involving that section, and the proposed 
amendment comes before the legislature without a full study of 
all the ramifications which the amendment may involve. A more 
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intelligent appraisal of the desirability of a proposed amendment 
could be made if such a comparison were available. Many sections 
of the Model Probate Code can be isolated from other sections 
and taken over as an improvement of one particular phase of the 
probate laws. Certainly it is not an indictment of the Model 
Probate Code to say that it should not be approached with an at-
titude of take it all or leave it all alone. 
Let me cite some instances where helpful suggestions might 
be obtained from the study of the Model Probate Code. 
As you know, our Statute, Section 30-111, provides that 
"Kindred of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of the 
whole blood, in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to 
the intestate by descent, devise or gift of some one of his ances-
tors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such 
ancestor shall be excluded from such inheritance." Thus the way 
in which the intestate acquires the property makes a difference 
in the manner of its descent. This presents extremely difficult 
problems in cases where there has been commingling of inherited 
and non-inherited property, and involves the necessity of having 
to trace the source of particular property. The Model Probate 
Code simply provides that "Kindred of the half blood shall in-
herit the same share which they would have inherited if they 
had been of the whole blood." 
In Nebraska illegitimate children are not allowed to claim, 
by right of representation of either their father or mother, any 
part of the estate of the father's or mother's kindred unless the 
parents have married and had other children and unless the 
father, after such marriage, shall have acknowledged the child in 
writing before a witness, or adopted the child. See Section 30-109. 
The Model Probate Code simply provides that the illegitimate 
child will be treated as the legitimate child of the mother for 
purposes of inheritance to, through and from such child, and that 
if the parents marry the child is treated as the legitimate child 
of both. 
With reference to questions of inheritance in connection with 
adopted children, our Statute, Section 43-110, provides that "After 
a decree of adoption is entered, the usual relation of parent and 
child and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of 
the natural relation of child and parent shall thereafter exist 
between such adopted child and the person or persons adopting 
such child and his, her, or their kindred." Our statute is silent on 
the effect of the adoption upon the rights of inheritance between 
the adopted child and his natural parents. The Model Probate 
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Code provides that "An adopted child is treated as though he were 
the natural child of his adopting parents for purposes of inherit-
ance to, through and from such child, and for purposes of inte-
state succession, an adopted child ceases to be treated as a child of 
his natural parents." 
The law with respect to advancements illustrates another area 
wherein the Model Probate Code might profitably be studied. Our 
law with respect to advancements seems to be confined to an 
advancement "to any child or other lineal descendant." (See Sec-
tion 30-112.) Under the Model Probate Code an advancement "to 
any person who would be entitled to inherit if the intestate had 
died at the time of making the advancement" is counted toward 
the advancee's intestate share. The code contains a further pro-
vision whereby if the advancee dies before the intestate, the ad-
vancement is taken into account in determining the share of a 
lineal descendant of the advancee, with a carefully phrased pro-
vision as to the proportioning of the advancement if the lineal 
descendant's intestate share is less than that of the deceased ad-
vancee. 
There is an interesting provision in the code whereby a sur-
viving spouse has an alternative election to receive life income. 
In the field of execution of wills, the Model Probate Code 
offers valuable suggestions. It is, I believe, common practice to 
have the testator sign in the presence of attesting witnesses who 
sign in the presence of each other. Our statute (Section 30-204) 
does not specifically provide that the witnesses must sign in the 
presence of each other. The Model Probate Code does specifically 
require that the witnesses and the testator all sign in each other's 
presence. 
Our statute (Section 30-201) makes "full age" one of the 
requirements of testamentary capacity. The question of the age 
at which a testator may be considered as sufficiently mature to 
make a will received extensive study by the draftsmen of the 
Model Probate Code. There is statutory authority in other juris-
dictions for permitting minors to execute wills. Sometimes the 
exception is founded on the minor being a member of the military 
or naval forces of the United States. The possibility of persons 
under twenty-one years of age making an appointment under a 
general power of appointment is recognized in Section 2503 ( c) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in connection with the 
circumstances under which gifts to minors will not be considered 
as gifts of a future interest. The draftsmen of the Model Pro-
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bate Code have provided that any person of sound mind, eighteen 
years of age or over, should be able to make a will. 
On the question of revocation of a will by burning, tearing, 
canceling or obliterating, with the intention of revoking it, our 
statute (Section 30-209) provides that this shall be done by the 
testator or by some person in the presence and by the direction 
of the testator. Our statute does not provide that there must be 
any other witness to the destruction of a will. Some states specif-
ically require that a destruction at the direction of the testator 
must be proved by at least two witnesses, and the Model Probate 
Code likewise provides that there must be two witnesses to the 
destruction. 
In the field of administration of estates, there is a provision 
of the Model Probate Code which specifically allocates those 
powers which can be exercised only by two or more personal 
representatives when there are two or more such personal repre-
sentatives, as distinguished from those powers which can be exer-
cised by any one of two or more personal representatives. The 
powers the exercise of which requires joint action are as follows: 
(1) instituting a suit, (2) employing an attorney, (3) carrying on 
the business of the deceased, (4) voting corporate stock, and (5) 
powers which a will specifically provides shall only be exercised 
by all the personal representatives. Any other powers may, under 
the provisions of the Model Probate Code, be exercised by any 
one of two or more personal representatives. 
There is a provision in the Model Probate Code for the ap-
pointment of a special administrator, without notice, even after 
the appointment of an executor or a regular general administra-
tor, without removing him, under which such a special adminis-
trator may perform duties with respect to specific property, or 
perform other particular acts. 
There are specific provisions in the Model Probate Code to 
meet the situation where a will is discovered after administration 
proceedings have been commenced. The code provides a five-
year statute of limitations on the probate of a will. 
In the area of guardianship law, helpful suggestions may be 
found in provisions of the Model Probate Code for the appoint-
ment of a temporary guardian for an incompetent, pending com-
pletion of the formalities of the appointment of a regular guardian. 
Provision is made for the filing of claims against a guardianship. 
And there are specific provisions governing the procedure for the 
termination of guardianships. 
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The foregoing comments upon the provisions of the Model 
Probate Code could be expanded many fold. Other features which 
I believe would be found especially interesting are those dealing 
with the right of a surviving spouse to elect, the election pro-
cedure, and the provisions for waiver of the right to elect. There 
is, for example, a provision of the code whereby the clerk of the 
Probate Court gives notice to the surviving spouse of the right to 
elect, a feature which does not exist in many states. 
There are interesting provisions pertaining to the bonds of 
fiduciaries. There is, for example, a section which states that 
in the case of a corporate fiduciary a deposit of cash or collateral 
with the state treasurer may be in lieu of any other bond. There 
is also a provision that where one bond is signed and filed by two 
or more personal representatives, no personal representative shall 
be deemed a surety for another personal representative unless the 
bond so provides. 
Other subject matters such as pretermitted heirs, qualifica-
tions of witnesses to wills, the effect of a witness to a will being 
interested, and just what makes an attesting witness interested, 
all present considerations which might well be studied. 
I trust that the foregoing discussion conveys the message 
that there is at hand, completed within the last ten years, a pro-
bate code which in whole or in part can be used as a model for 
purposes of studying probate reform, as well as for studying the 
drafting language with respect to almost any particular detailed 
item of proposed probate legislation. The code was authenti-
cally and carefully prepared with extensive research. Many of its 
provisions have been well seasoned by virtue of adoption in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The code should, I believe, be more widely 
known by lawyers generally than is the case. If my remarks 
will at least tend to prompt consideration of the provisions of the 
Model Probate Code whenever general reform or even minor 
tinkering with our probate statutes is contemplated, they will 
have served some useful purpose. 
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AFFECTING REAL ESTATE, 




The purpose of this review is to challenge the practitioners' 
attention to legislation affecting the branches of law in which the 
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members of this section are interested, which may be novel or 
important. This review will not attempt to cover all of the de-
tails of the legislation affecting such subjects where it is felt 
that such new legislation makes no material change in the exist-
ing law. Neither will this review attempt to cover in minute de-
tail the provisions of each bill discussed, but will only touch upon 
the major provisions of such legislation, leaving it to the individ-
ual practitioner to check carefully all of the details of such legisla-
tion. 
With reference to decedents' estates, L.B. 171, it is of interest 
and represents a further demonstration of the activities of the 
bar in its service to the public in attempting to decrease the ex-
pense in connection with small estates. Many of you may recall 
that in the 1953 legislature L.B. 143 was adopted, which is now 
Sections 60-111.01, .02 and .03 of the 1953 supplement. This 
bill when first proposed was intended to cover all estates where 
the value of .the property of the decedent was less than $700.00; 
however, as passed the bill was limited wholly to the matter of 
the vesting of the title to motor vehicles. L. B. 171 of the 1955 
legislature extends this Act to all of the personal estate of the 
decedent. It provides that the surviving spouse or the distrib-
utees of the estate shall have a defeasible right to the personal 
property thereof without the necessity for the appointment of an 
administrator or the probate of a will, if the value of the entire 
estate of the decedent, less liens and encumbrances, does not ex-
ceed the sum of $700.00. The 1953 Act provided that it was ap-
plicable if the value of the entire estate did not exceed $700.00, 
and therefore it soon became evident that in cases where the 
estate exceeded $700.00 in value in gross but there were liens and 
encumbrances against the same so that the actual equity was less 
than $700.00, the distributees or surviving spouse still could not 
take advantage of the provisions of the Act. The 1955 Act elimi-
nates this difficulty because the value of the estate is now deter-
mined after liens and encumbrances. Any person having posses-
sion of such personal property is required to make delivery there-
of upon presentation of an affidavit setting forth the facts estab-
lishing the defeasible right of a surviving spouse or distributees 
in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the Act. The 
Act purports to relieve any such persons from liability for making 
distribution of personal property in reliance upon such an affi-
davit. 
It will be noted that there are a number of questions remain-
ing unsettled by the provisions of this Act. Thus, the Act states 
that the personal property is to be turned over to the surviving 
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spouse or the distributees; it leaves unanswered the question of 
what is to happen when both the surviving spouse and the distrib-
utees, as defined in the Act, may make adverse demands. Like-
wise, what is to happen when demand is made by one set of dis-
tributees claiming under a will, and by another set of distributees 
who claim that the will is invalid? There is no provision in 
the Act for the person having possession of the personal prop-
erty to relieve himself of liability in case of such duplication or 
uncertainty of claimants. Under the Act he can be sued by any 
claimant, and thus be put to the expense and trouble of def ending 
himself against such suit and perhaps setting up at his own ex-
pense and cost the claims made by the adverse or conflicting 
claimants. In the ordinary case the Act will serve a useful and 
beneficial purpose in permitting prompt distribution of personal 
property of small estates to persons entitled thereto without the 
cost and expense of legal proceedings. However, the holder of 
such property is not protected in the instances which I have men-
tioned, nor is there any protection for creditors where the distrib-
utees obtain possession under an affidavit which eventually is 
demonstrated to be false. 
L. B. 174 provides that in proceedings in the district court 
for the sale of decedent's property to pay debts, etc., that the 
court may determine whether or not the property was a home-
stead. This Act serves a most worthwhile purpose. Undoubtedly 
all Nebraska practitioners are familiar with the fact that the 
homestead cannot be sold by the administrator or executor under 
the statutory provisions for sale for payment of debts and ex-
penses, and matters of that kind. If an administrator's sale were 
held and it was later established that the property constituted the 
homestead of the deceased, the administrator's sale would be 
wholly void. Yet there was no statutory provision for the deter-
mination of the question as to whether or not the property was a 
homestead. L. B. 17 4 will now eliminate all questions and will 
facilitate the examination and approval of titles, in that it pro-
vides that the petition for sale shall assert that the property is 
not a homestead and that the court shall hold a hearing on that 
issue and shall make a determination which will then be binding 
upon everyone. 
L. B. 269 provides procedure for dispensing with the ad-
ministration in the event of the death of a person under guard-
ianship or who has a conservator appointed over him. In such 
cases, where the assets in the hands of the guardian or conserva-
tor do not exceed a sum sufficient for the payment of the ex-
penses of the last illness and burial expenses not in excess of 
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$350.00, and the costs, administration shall be dispensed with; 
and the court, in the order closing the guardianship or conservator 
proceedings, shall make final distribution of the property in the 
hands of the guardian or conservator. This Act is an elaboration 
and amplification of L. B. 12 of the 1951 legislature. 
L. B. 93 repeals Sections 30-228.01 and 30-228.02 of the Re-
vised Statutes, Supplement, 1953, and in effect re-enacts 30-228 
as it existed in the 1943 Revised Statutes. It does provide, how-
ever, that the Act shall apply to devisees or legatees named as a 
member of a class and who may have predeceased the testator, 
leaving issue; and provides that when any devise or legacy shall 
be made to any child or other relation to the testator, either by 
name or by designation of such relationship, singly or as one of a 
class, and the devisee or legatee shall die before the testator, 
having issue who shall survive the testator, such issue shall take 
the estate so given by the will in the same manner as the devisee 
or legatee ·would have done if he had survived the testator, unless 
a different disposition should be made or directed by the will. It 
will be noted that this is almost identical with the language of 
Section 30-228 of the 1943 Statutes, with the addition that it ap-
plies to the designation of a devisee or legatee as a member of 
a class. The history of this Act is interesting. L. B. 331 of the 
1951 legislative session repeals Section 30-228 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1943 and provided in Section 1 that any devise of 
real or personal property which shall be void or lapse shall become 
a part of the residue and shall pass to the residuary devisees, un-
less the will makes a contrary disposition. Section 2 provides 
that unless the will made a contrary disposition, \Vhen any adopted 
child of the testator or blood relative within the fourth degree 
is designated as a devisee and such person dies after the making 
of the testamentary instrument and before the testator, leaving 
issue surviving, or is dead at the time of the execution of the will, 
leaving issue surviving and the fact of the death is unkown to 
the testator, then such issue as represents a deceased devisee shall 
be deemed substituted for him. In the 1955 legislature attention 
was called to the fact that Section 2 of the 1951 Act referred 
only to a devise. It was asserted that since a devise applied only 
to real estate, the Act might not apply to bequests or legacies of 
personal property. This argument was made even though Sec-
tion 1 of the 1951 Act specifically referred to a devise of real or 
personal property. It was suggested to the 1955 legislature that 
Section 1 was already the law of the State of Nebraska, and that 
Section 2 was uncertain and indefinite because of the use of the 
term devise only, and therefore it was felt that the 1943 statutes 
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amended to take care of class gifts would be sufficient. Accord-
ingly, L. B. 93 repealed L. B. 331. It is submitted that the lan-
guage of L. B. 93 is also indefinite and will raise a question as to 
whether it is applicable to cases where the testator may have 
made a devise or bequest to a person who was already dead at 
the tim€ of the execution of the will, hut the death of such person 
was unknown to the testator. A strict grammatical reading of L. 
B. 93 would lead to the interpretation that it does not apply to 
such cases. On the other hand, L. B. 331 of the 1951 legislature 
did provide for such cases. It is submitted that it would have 
been preferable to simply have amended Section 2 of the 1951 
Act to use the word "devise or legacy" if there was any question 
about the meaning of said section. 
In the field of trust law, L. B. 315 specifies the forms and 
kinds of investments lawful for trust funds. The provisions of 
this Act are so detailed and comprehensive that it is impossible 
in a review of this kind to give a full, detailed analysis thereof. 
It suffices to say that every la-wyer who advises trustees, guard-
ians, executors, administrators, and other fiduciaries must 
thoroughly familiarize himself with the provisions of this Act. 
A significant change made in L. B. 315 is the specific provision 
that it shall not apply to any incorporated religious, charitable or 
eelemosynary institution or corporation except to the extent that 
any such institution or corporation may be named as specific 
trustee under a will or other trust instruments. 
By a series of bills dealing with the subject of oil and gas, 
the legislature made provision for the authority and power of 
trustees in such matters. These are L. B. 36, L. B. 61, L. B. 62 
and L. B. 59. I shall not attempt to review all of these bills but 
simply call attention to the fact that they all deal with the power 
and authority of trustees relative to contracts with pipeline com-
panies and the granting of easements therefor, and trustees for 
oil and gas leases and provisions for obtaining the authority to 
enter into such leases. L. B. 62 provides for the appointment of 
trustees to represent and take care of the interests of contingent 
remainder men for the purpose of leasing land or entering into 
oil and gas developments. The bills deal not only with trustees 
but also with similar powers and authorities for administrators, 
executors, guardians and other fidicuiaries. 
In the field of real property law, the 1955 legislature has 
adopted novel and significant changes. Particularly interesting 
in the light of the presentation made at this meeting by the Honor-
able Perry W. Norton relating to air rights and navigation, we 
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find that the 1955 legislature by L. B. 541 made specific provi-
sions limiting the rights of the owner of the soil insofar as the 
rights of aerial navigation are concerned. Section 1 of this Act 
declares that there exists in behalf of the citizens of the United 
States a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through 
the airspace of the State of Nebraska, and that any obstruction 
to air navigation interfering therewith is dangerous to life and 
property, and that the public health, safety and welfare require 
that the erection and maintenance of obstructions to air naviga-
tion be regulated and controlled. By this Act the legislature has 
placed and recognized limits to the old common-law right of the 
owner of the soil to control the airspace above his land. Section 
3 of the Act limits the height of any structure within the State 
of Nebraska to not exceed 400 feet above the surface of the 
ground unless a permit in writing shall have first been obtained 
from the Department of Aeronautics; and no such permit will be 
granted which will constitute a hazard to air navigation or will 
interfere unduly with public right of freedom of transit in com-
merce through the airspace affected thereby. Section 7 also makes 
provision for a requirement for the owner of the soil to mark and 
light all structures which are located outside corporate limits and 
which exceed 150 feet in height and all structures within corpo-
rate limits which exceed a height of 500 feet. Any structure 
erected in violation of the Act is declared to be a nuisance and 
may be removed on 5 days' notice. 
It may be of interest to note that as first proposed the Act 
contained a provision for graduated heights and structures de-
pending upon the distance of the location thereof from the exist-
ing airports. Thus ground immediately adjacent to an airport 
might be prohibited from having any structure thereon whatever. 
While the Act as passed was not this drastic, it is interesting to 
note that now the legislature has recognized that the right of 
ownership of the grounds is subject to the right of air transporta-
tion, and the legislature may from time to time hereafter further 
limit and prescribe the rights of the owner of the fee above 
ground. It will be interesting to observe in the future which will 
be given preference, the right of aerial navigation or the right 
of the owner of the soil to use it as he may desire. Eventually 
some reconciliation is going to have to be made between these 
two interests, since it is quite apparent that they can, and in 
many instances will, conflict. It may very well be that the owner 
of land immediately adjacent to an airport, if he erects any struc-
tures thereon, may create a hazard to air navigation; and yet, on 
the other hand, the owner of such land may have to erect struc-
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tures therein in order to make full use of his investments or his 
ownership. At some point these two interests will clash, and one 
or the other will have to give way. As of 1955, the legislature 
has determined that the rights of the owner of the soil do not 
interfere with freedom of aerial navigation where the structure 
does not exceed 400 feet in height in a mu..'11.icipality or 150 feet 
in height outside of corporate limits. Only the future can fore-
tell what the ultimate resolution will be. 
L. B. 127 grants to foreign corporations, incorporated under 
the laws of the United States or the laws of any state of the 
United States, the right to acquire and own oil and gas leases and 
to acquire and own the fee or to lease for any period such real 
estate as may be necessary for producing gas, oil or other hydro-
carbon substances and of treating, processing, storage and disposal 
thereof. This Act further provides that no corporation doing busi-
ness in the state which owns or holds any real estate shall elect 
aliens as members of its board of directors in a number sufficient 
to constitute a majority of the board or elect aliens as its executive 
officers or managers, or have a majority of its capital stock owned 
by aliens. This Act is an extension of the rights of foreign corpo-
rations to own real estate in the State of Nebraska. 
While not particularly in point so far as real estate law itself 
is concerned, L.B. 230, I am sure, will be of interest to the mem-
bers of this section. This bill provides for the allowances of 
fees in partition proceedings. Heretofore it has been the law 
that only the plaintiff's attorneys could be awarded any fee, and 
then only in cases where the proceedings were amicable. This was 
a highly technical rule laid down by the Supreme Court as to 
when proceedings could be said to be amicable. While the court 
held that where the proceedings were adversary no fee could be 
allowed, yet there were few if any instances where the court ever 
held such proceedings to be adversary. The case of Lor·enz vs. 
Lorenz, 150 Neb. 20, is interesting on that point. In that case, 
even though there was an argument over the respective interests 
of the parties and the liens which existed thereon, the court never-
theless held that the proceedings were not adversary. It is also 
true, on the other hand, that many practitioners have had the 
experience of being required to appear in a partition proceeding 
in behalf of certain parties named as defendants in order to set 
up the defendants' rights and interests where the plaintiff's coun-
sel failed to set forth properly the respective interests of the 
parties. Thus it was in many instances necessary for the defend-
ant in a partition action to procure his own counsel to protect 
his own interests and naturally to pay his own counsel. At the 
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same time such defendant, who was compelled to employ an at-
torney to protect his interests because of the neglect or failure 
of the plaintiff to properly plead the same, still had to pay his 
portion and share of the attorney's fees. L.B. 230 takes care of 
this situation. It provides that in all cases reasonable attorney 
fees shall be taxed as costs, and that if the shares of the parties 
have been properly pleaded and properly set forth such fees shall 
be awarded entirely to plaintiff's counsel. However in the event 
that the plaintiff's pleadings do not properly set forth the shares 
of the parties and expenditures thereon, then the court may 
order such fees to be divided among all of the attorneys of 1·ecord. 
This bill should be of considerable value both to the public and 
the bar and eliminate a troublesome situation in many partition 
cases. 
The title to L. B. 263 states that it is a bill for an act re-
lating to decedents' estates. However, the bill really has nothing 
whatever to do with estates, but attempts to establish a procedure 
to determine title in certain cases. Normally all questions as to 
title to real estate are to be determined by the district courts. 
This Act purports to enable certain of such questions to be deter-
mined by the county court. The Act is intended to take care of 
cases where the title is vested in a certain person subject to a 
limitation over to the children or heirs of another person. Its 
use can be illustrated by the following example : Assume a con-
veyance to A with remainder on the death of A to the children 
or issue of A. A dies leaving no estate to be administered. How 
are the persons who are to take the remainder to be determined? 
L. B. 263 provides that in such case any person having an in-
terest in the property may file a petition in the county court in 
which the property is situated or in the county court of the county 
in which the deceased resided at the time of his death, seeking 
a determination of the time of death, who are the heirs at law, 
devisees, legatees, or surviving issue, and their degree of kinship. 
The statute then prescribes the procedure whereupon the county 
court shall make such determination. Such decree of the county 
court shall then be binding and conclusive upon all persons in-
terested, including heirs at law, devisees, legatees or surviving 
issue. 
This statute must be considered in the light of the famous 
Fisher vs. Sklenar case in 101 Neb. 553 wherein the Supreme 
Court made it evident that the county court can act only in con-
nection with the settlement of estates and said: 
The object of a decree of distribution [in the county court] is 
to determine to whom the estate of the deceased should be de-
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livered. Neither adverse claims nor title to the property can be 
litigated in the proceedings. The title itself may not be drawn 
in question. No title passes by the decree to the persons named 
as heirs. 
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Under the rule of this case, if there is no estate to be adminis-
tered, it is, to say the least, hig:.h.ly questionable whether the c9m1ty 
court can enter any sort of decree which will be of any utility. 
Since the county court is precluded from acting where title to 
real estate may be drawn in question and is only permitted to act 
where a distribution of an estate is to be made, it is difficult to 
see how the county court may be permitted to make a finding of 
heirship where there is no estate to be distributed. 
Also, it must be borne in mind that our Supreme Court has 
said: 
The district court has original jurisdiction to make a finding of 
heirship where the question becomes material in a proceedings 
of which such court has original jurisdiction. 
Dennis vs. Omaha National Bank, 153 Neb. 865. 
Since the district court is the court which has original juris-
diction over the questions of title to real estate, it would seem that 
L. B. 263 is an attempt to deprive the district court of its original 
jurisdiction to make a finding of heirship where the question is 
material in a proceedings where the title to real estate may be 
drawn in question. 
Also, we are confronted with the situation that in many in-
stances the heirs are to be determined not as of the date of the 
death of the decedent but as of a much later date. (See In ?·e 
Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52, and the Dennis case hereinbefore 
cited.) The act does not make it clear as to what date the county 
court may make its determination. Section 1 provides that it is 
to determine the time of death of the decedent and who the heirs 
are. Is this determination to be made as of the date of the death 
of the decedent or is it to be determined as of the date of the fil-
ing of the petition? If as of the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, there is all the more question as to the jurisdiction of the 
county court, since it would be clearly evident that the finding was 
being made in connection with the title to real estate and not for 
any determination as of the date of the death of the testator. 
It must be further remembered that our Supreme Court has said: 
A county court in Nebraska ... has no power to construe wills . 
. . . The construction of the will by the probate court was not in-
cident to distribution of the estate, but solely for the benefit of 
the executor in advance of any distribution. Such a decree bound 
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no one, but could only be for the guidance of the executor .. 
This jurisdiction was long committed to the doctrine that the 
construction of the will in such a case in probate court is for the 
benefit and information of the executor or administrator only .... 
It adjudicates nothing beyond his rights and liabilities in the 
execution of his office; controversies between adverse claimants 
under the devise, or between the executor or administrator and 
persons claiming adversely to the estate will not be affected 
thereby. 
In Jones vs. Shrigley 150 Neb. 137, the Supreme Court said: 
The county court has jurisdiction to construe wills when neces-
sary for the benefit of the executor in carrying out the terms of 
the will, but it has no jurisdiction to construe wills to determine 
rights of devisees or legatees as between themselves and has no 
authority to bind the heirs, devisees or legatees by any construc-
tion. 
Section 1 of L. B. 263 provides that if any person shall die 
testate or intestate without leaving an estate to administer the 
county court is vested with jurisdiction to determine who are the 
heirs, devisees and legatees or issue of the decedent. Section 3 
provides that the court shall make a decree determining who are 
the devisees and legatees of the decedent and such further matters 
as may be necessary for proper determination. Section 4 provides 
that the decree of the county court shall be a final order and shall 
be binding and conclusive upon all persons interested, including 
devisees and legatees. 
It would seem that this act is directly contrary to the hold-
ings of our Supreme Court. Thus, supposing, in a case which 
we have heretofore posed, there is a dispute between parties as 
to who are the legatees or devisees entitled to take. By our con-
stitution and the cases announced by our Supreme Court the 
county court has no jurisdiction to make any determination. As 
a matter of fact the decree of the county court in such case is a 
nullity, and the district court does not apply any jurisdiction in 
case of an appeal from the county court. (See Hahn vs. Verret, 
143 Neb. 826.) Since the county court cannot make any deter-
mination as between adverse claimants, how can it make a deter-
mination under this statute which would settle any problems as 
to the rightful takers under a will? Even in a case where there 
is no dispute, an attorney could not pass a title based upon a de-
cree of the county court because such decree would not be binding 
upon any person who wanted to dispute the finding of the county 
court. 
Furthermore, the proceedings as to notice specified in this 
Act would seem to be questionable. In case proceedings are in-
PROCEEDINGS, 1955 307 
stituted in the district court, service of summons must be had on 
all available persons, and only when summons cannot be person-
ally served can service be had by publication. Even where service 
is permitted by publication, there are certain safeguards which 
protect the rights of the defendant to notice. L. B. 263 simply 
provides for the publication of a notice in the county where the 
petition is filed, which may or may not be the county where the 
interested parties live, or where the property is situated, and 
even though the interested parties may be known to the petitioner, 
the petitioner is under no requirement to serve notice upon them. 
I personally cannot believe that the rights of any persons in-
terested in real estate can be shut off by procedure of this kind. 
It is quite evident that this legislation demonstrates again the 
hazards of piecemeal legislation designed to take care of a parti-
cular problem, but is adopted in haste without considering the 
implication and application of all the other rules of law which may 
be affected. This bill demonstrates the need for study of the 
effect of any particular legislation in the entire field of the law 
before adopting such a bill to meet a particular problem. For 
myself I cannot recognize the validity of any proceedings in-
stituted under this act until such time as the Supreme Court shall 
pass thereon. 
Another departure in the law with which all the members of 
this section should be familiar is L. B. 197. This also purports 
to be, by its title, an act relating to decedents' estates. However, 
it does not affect decedents' estates but affects the law of joint 
tenancy. Simply stated, L. B. 197 provides that upon the death 
of a joint owner of any real or personal property the surviving 
joint owner shall be liable for the debts and obligations of the 
deceased joint owner under the following conditions: (1) a credi-
tor or personal representative of the deceased joint owner shall 
institute an action in a court of competent jurisdiction within three 
months after the death of the deceased joint owner against the 
surviving joint owner, setting forth the claim; (2) the surviving 
joint owner shall be liable to the creditors or personal representa-
tives of the deceased to an amount equal to the value of the amount 
contributed to the jointly owned property by the deceased joint 
owner, for the payment of lawful debts and obligations of the 
deceased, but subject to all homestead and legal exemptions in 
the decedent's jointly owned property. 
Apparently if a deceased joint owner contributed nothing to 
the acquisition of the property, the creditors get nothing; on the 
other hand, if the deceased joint owner contributed half of the 
cost of the jointly owned property by advancing x dollars, the 
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fact that such half\ interest may now be worth 2x dollars is im-
material, and all that the creditors can require is payment of the 
original advancement of x dollars. Even this is subject to exemp-
tions to which the decedent would have been entitled. It must be 
emphasized that the obligation is personal against the survivor, 
and there is no obligation as against the property itself. The 
Act does not create a lien upon the title but imposes a personal 
obligation wholly upon the surviving joint tenant to the extent 
of the amount advanced by the decedent for the acquisition of 
the joint property. 
L. B. 197 further provides that in any action instituted there-
under it shall be necessary for the persons interested to allege 
and prove that there is not sufficient other property standing in 
the name of the deceased joint owner at the time of his death, 
subject to the payment of his debts, provided that if no petition 
to probate the estate of the deceased is filed within thirty days 
from the date of his death, there shall be a presumption of lack of 
such property. 
The genesis of this bill is very interesting. The bill was 
sponsored by parties who felt that joint tenancies were being made 
use of to avoid the payment of debts. While there was no desire 
to eliminate joint tenancies entirely as their legal estate in the 
State of Nebraska, it apparently was felt by the proponents of 
this bill that property in joint tenancy should, upon the death of 
a joint tenant, be liable for the payment of his debts. The bill 
as first introduced provided that: 
all jointly held property ... shall be liable for all the debts and 
obligations of the joint owners, both their joint debts and !lb-
ligations and their separate and individual debts and obligations. 
That on the death of either or any of the joint owners, any and 
all property that was held jointly at the time of his or her death 
shall be liable for all the debts and obligations of the deceased. 
There were a great number of objections to this bill as it 
originally read, not only because of defects in draftsmanship and 
the failure to coordinate with other rules of law also applicable 
to these situations, but because of the fact that this bill would 
tie up the title to joint properties so as to make the same wholly 
unmerchantable. If the bill as originally drawn were adopted, 
it would be manifestly impossible ever to pass title to jointly 
owned property. This was recognized by the proponents, and 
consequently various amendments thereto were proposed, includ-
ing a proposal that only the share of the deceased joint owner 
would be liable for the payment of debts. When it was pointed 
out that upon the death of a joint owner there was no share, the 
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bill was finally amended on the floor of the legislature to read in 
its present form. 
Since this bill does not directly affect the passage of title to 
real estate but only lays down a rule as to personal liability, it 
is not our position as lawyers to question the public policy which 
may lie behind the legislative adoption of this statute. Whether 
public policy requires the imposition of personal liability in such 
case is a matter for the legislature as a solid spokesman for the 
people to decide. 
Certainly this bill requires interpretation by the court before 
the full extent of its meaning and use can be determined. There 
are many problems created by this bill which may possibly ex-
ceed any good to be accomplished thereby. It is, however, a bill 
with which every member of this section should be familiar. 
In conclusion I cannot refrain from making several observa-
tions as the result of my study of the new legislative enactments 
above referred to and the process of their enactment. Apparently 
the Bar Association has been quite active in proposing new legis-
lation deemed to be beneficial and in the public interest. The Bar 
has not, however, been as active in watching proposed legislation 
to see whether such legislation is well thought out and will best 
serve the public interest. It is submitted that in the case of both 
L. B. 263 and L. B. 197, a study by a responsible committee of 
the Bar Association would have been very helpful in enlightening 
the members of the legislature as to what was being considered 
by them. Both of these bills involve technical problems in fields 
of law where the layman is not competent to judge. Yet the 
legislature could receive no assistance in the consideration of 
these bills from any authorized spokesman of the Bar Association 
or of the section of the Bar interested therein. Only individual 
lawYers who were willing to take the time and trouble to appear 
could be heard, but such lawyers had no authority to speak on 
behalf of the Bar. It is submitted that it would be very helpful 
and a great public service in the future if at least this section 
would appoint a legislative committee charged with the duty of 
examining all proposed legislation affecting the fields of law in 
which the members of this section are interested and, speaking on 
behalf of this section, to enlighten the members of the legislature 
and help guide it in these technical fields. The Bar should not 
only inspire legislation, but should also act to endeavor to pre-
vent undesirable legislation. 
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By 
Roman L. Hruska 
United States Senator for Nebraska 
Powers of investigation by Congress are well established since 
early years of the Republic. They include the right of subponea 
to secure presence of witnesses for examination, the right to de-
mand and enforce production of papers and records, and the right 
to punish for contempt. Such powers are extensive. They are 
indispensable to proper discha1·ge of legislative duties. 
But precedents are neither clear nor certain when attempts 
were made to project those powers into the area of the Txecutive 
Department. 
Frequent conflict has arisen when Congress or one of its 
committees insisted upon the Executive Department's duty to dis-
close in order to subserve the legislative function. In resistance 
to such demands, the Executive on occasion has cited its "duty 
to withhold" information because of its confidential nature or be-
cause its disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest 
or jeopardize the safety of the nation. 
The purpose of this paper is to cite some of the instances of 
such conflict and to consider some underlying principles. 
The present administration first asserted its duty to withhold 
testimony papers and records in May, 1954. The sub-committee 
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations had called on 
the Department of Defense to produce certain records of con-
versations and communications and of correspondence pertaining 
to the controversy between Senator McCarthy and the Depart-
ment of Army. President Eisenhower, in a letter dated May 17, 
1954, instructed Secretary of Defense Wilson to instruct depart-
ment employees in all appearances before the sub-committee re-
garding the subject inquiry that "they are not to testify to any 
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such conversation, communications or to produce any such docu-
ments or reproductions. This principle must be maintained re-
gardless of who would be benefited by such disclosure." 
The President's reasons for giving such instructions will be 
set out later in my remarks. 
Immediately upon publication of the President's letter, a loud 
chorus of anguished criticism was loosed. It was quite apparent, 
however, that the controversial and emotional nature of the issue 
at hand had much to do with many of the denunciations made. 
The effort to make partisan political capital was also quite evi-
dent. It was a Congressional election year. Criticism leveled on 
this latter basis was not very pursuasive. President Eisenhower's 
predecessor had invoked "the duty to withhold" in about a dozen 
major instances during his tenor as president. 
Of course there are some who would not consider actions of 
President Eisenhower's predecessor as valuable or even as very 
pertinent precedent. Aside from this, however, as lawyers we 
would do well to explore the historical origin and development of 
this subject. In doing so, we find that it is based on impressive, 
time-honored practice and on sound principle. 
The very first instance dates back to 1792 under President 
George Washington. A House resolution created a committee to 
inquire into the "failure of the late expedition (against Indian up-
rising) under Major General St. Clair; ... and that said Com-
mittee be empowered to call for such persons, papers, and records 
as may be necessary to assist their inquiries." (President and 
Congress, Wilfred E. Binkley (1947) pp. 40, 44; Richardson's 
Messages & Papers of the Presidents, Vol. I, pp. 194-6). 
The House based its right to investigate on the control of 
Congress over public money expenditures. This being the first 
example of a demand on the Executive for papers, President Wash-
ington called his entire cabinet together to consider it. He stated 
his wish that so far as it should become a precedent, this matter 
should be rightly conducted. 
Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, reported the event. 
The unanimous conclusion of Washington and his very notable and 
distinguished cabinet members ·was : 
First that the House was an inquest, and therefore might insti-
tute inquiries. Second that it might call for papers generally. 
Third. that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as 
the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the 
disclosure of which would injure the public; consequently were 
to exercise a discretion. . . . 
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Washington applied the same rule in 1796 regarding certain 
papers regarding treaty negotiations with Great Britian. 
In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson asserted the same denial 
to Congress in its demand for "any information in possession of 
the Executive ... " in regard to the Aaron Burr conspiracy against 
the United States. In that instance for the first time the "raw 
file" nature of information at hand and means of gathering it 
entered the picture. Jefferson's reply to Congress brought up to 
date the news he had received regarding the illegal combination 
of private individuals against the peace and safety of the Union. 
He then pointed out that he had recently received a mass of data, 
most of which had been obtained without the sanction of an oath 
so as to constitute formal and legal evidence. He went on to say: 
It is chiefly in the form of letters, often containing such a mixture 
of rumors, conjectures, and suspicions as renders it difficult to 
sift out the real facts and unadvisable to hazard more than gen-
eral outlines, strengthened by concurrent information or the par-
ticular credibility of the relator. In this state of the evidence, 
delivered sometimes too, under the restriction of private confid-
ence, neither safety nor justice will permit exposing of names, ex-
cept that of the principal actor, whose guilt is placed beyond 
question. 
(Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents Vol. 
Ip. 412.) 
In 1835, President Jackson received a Senate resolution re-
questing him to communicate copies of charges which had been 
made to the President against the official conduct of one Gideon 
Fitz, late surveyor-general, which caused his removal from office. 
The President declined to furnish the information, stating that in 
his judgment the information related to subjects exclusively be-
longing to the Executive Department. The request, therefore, 
encroached on the Constitutional powers of the Executive. In 
his message, President Jackson ref erred to many previous similar 
requests which he deemed unconstitutional demands by the Senate. 
He went on to say: 
Their continued repetition imposes on me, as representative and 
trustee of the American people, the painful but imperious duty of 
resisting to the utmost any further encroachment on the rights 
of the Executive. 
The President noted the fact that the Senate resolution had 
been passed in executive session. From this he presumed that if 
the requested information were communicated, it would be ap-
plied in secret session to the investigation of fraud in sale of 
public lands. Thus, he stated, the citizen whose conduct the Sen-
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ate sought to impeach would lose one of his basic rights, namely, 
that of a public investigation in the presence of his accusers and 
of the witnesses against him. In addition, compliance with the 
resolution would subject the motives of the President, in the case 
of Mr. Fitz, to the review of the Senate when not setting as judges 
on an impeachment; and even if such a consequence did not fol-
low in the present case, the President feared that compliance by 
the Executive might thereafter be quoted as a precedent to similar 
and repeated applications. 
Such a result, if acquiesced in, would ultimately subject the in-
dependent constitutional action of the Executive in a matter of 
great National concernment to the domination and control of the 
Senate .... 
In 1843, President Tyler issued what is considered one of 
the best reasoned precedents of a President's refusal to permit 
the head of a department to disclose confidential information to 
the House of Representatives. The House had demanded reports 
relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians and to the frauds 
which were alleged to have been practiced upon them. 
The Secretary of War informed the House that negotiations 
were then pending with the Indians for settlements of their 
claims ; therefore publication of the report at that time would be 
inconsistent with public interest. It was further reported, how-
ever that Lt. Col. Hitchcock, who had been charged to investigate 
this matter, rendered a report containing information which had 
been obtained by ex parte inquiries of persons whose statements 
were without the sanction of an oath and which the persons im-
plicated had had no opportunity to contradict or to explain. Prom-
ulgation of those statements at that time would be grossly unjust 
to those persons and would defeat the object of inquiry. 
The answer of the Secretary of War was not satisfactory to 
the House committee, which claimed the right to demand from 
the Executive and the heads of departments such information as 
might be in their possession relating to subjects of the deliber-
ations of the House. 
President Tyler in his message to Congress vigorously as-
serted that the House of Representatives could not exercise a right 
to call upon the Executive for information, even though it related 
to a subject of the deliberation of the House, if by so doing it 
attempted to interfere with the discretion of the Executive. 
One of the most famous of Congressional investigations oc-
curred during the Civil War. In 1861, by joint resolution of both 
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Houses, a joint committee was appointed "to inquire into the con-
duct of the present war; that they have power to send for persons 
and papers ... " This was the first instance of a joint Congres-
sional committee. Apparently Congress did not trouble itself 
with the reflection that inasmuch as the president is commander-
in-chief of the Army, such interference constituted a serious in-
fringement of the Executive prerogative. The vote of the Senate 
on the resolution was 33 to 3. In the House there was not even 
debate or division. The committee went about its duties vigilantly 
during the entire course of the war. Its reports comprise four 
large volumes. It has been said that this committee virtully took 
over a partial control of Union operations. Practically no phase 
of the conflict escaped the inquisitorial eye. Battles, disloyal em-
ployees, naval stations, surrenders at sea, military and naval sup-
plies were investigated. War contracts were inspected with great 
zeal. It has been further said that if legislative meddling could 
be shown to have been damaging from a strategic standpoint, at 
least Congress was able to legislate with adequate knowledge and 
to hold officials in Washington and upon the line of battle to 
strict accountability. 
President Theodore Roosevelt, in 1909, was confronted with 
a Senate resolution directing the attorney general to inform it 
whether certain legal proceedings had been instituted against the 
United States Steel Corporation, and if not, the reason for non-
action. The President replied, refusing to honor this request upon 
the grounds that: 
Heads of the Executive Department are subject to the Constitu~ 
tion, and to the laws passed by the Congress in pursuance of the 
Constitution, and to the directions of the President of the United 
States, but to no other direction whateve1·. · 
Thereupon the Senate summoned Herbert K. Smith, the head 
of the Bureau of Corporations, and requested the papers and docu-
ments in question on penalty of imprisonment for contempt. Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt then took personal possession of all 
the papers, informed the Senate Judiciary Committee of what he 
had done, and stated that the only way the Senate could get them 
was through his impeachment. He also explained that some of 
the facts were given to the Government under the seal of secrecy 
and cannot be divulged, "And I will see to it that the word of 
this Government to the individual is kept sacred." 
While the foregoing are some of the outstanding instances 
in this field, almost every President encountered the same prob-
lem. There are well documented instances under Presidents Mon-
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roe, Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan, Grant, Hayes, Cleveland, Coolidge, 
Hoover and :franklin D. Roosevelt, in addition to the presidents 
already mentioned in this paper. 
It has been demonstrated that in every case where a pres-
ident has supported the refusal of a departm~nt head to testify, 
the result w~s that the subject information was not furnishea. 
"Public interest" was invariably given as one of the reasons. 
One of the underlying principles evidencing itself through-
out seems to be this : The president can withhold information 
or direct its withholding whenever he finds that it is confidential 
or that its disclosure would be incompatible with the public in-
terest or endanger the safety of the nation. 
Bases for this principle include the following: That officials 
and employees of the Government must be candid in advising 
with each other on official matters; that channels of information 
sources must be kept open-confidences cannot be breached. Fur-
ther, that the doctrine of separation of powers in our constitution-
al form of government precludes the exercise of arbitrary power 
by any one branch. This is necessary if we are to be saved from 
autocracy, whether it be executive or legislative in character. 
The president is head of the Executive Department. He is given 
certain powers. He may use discretion in exercising those powers. 
His accountability is not to the Congress but to the country in 
his political character, and to his own conscience. 
This does not necessarily mean that the president is all-pow-
erful and that the Congress is impotent. The Congress still has 
power over legislation and over appropriations. Its investiga-
tions around the periphery of any given situation can be so search-
ing and so relentless as to raise suspicions and pressures in pub-
lic opinion which would make silence on the part of the Executive 
Department impossible. 
For over 150 years this basis of conduct has served well in 
the relationship between Legislative and the Executive. It con-
tains the elasticity of give and take. Very often the powerful per-
sonalities on either side may have much to do in determining its 
exact course. The procedures and results under them have been 
such as to withstand all attempts to clarifying legislation or Con-
stitutional amendment. 
What about court action or proceedings? It seems that when-
ever the aid of a court was sought to obtain information or papers 
from a president or the head of departments, it has universally 
been held that the president and his department have an uncon-
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trolled discretion to withhold the sought information and papers 
in the public interest, that the courts will not interfere with the 
exercise of that discretion, and that Congress has not the power 
as one of the three great branches of the Government to subject 
the Executive Branch to its will any more than the Executive 
Branch may impose its unrestrained will upon the Congress. 
SECTION ON TAXATION 
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HALE McCOWN: The first section of our program this after-
noon is on social security provisions with particular reference to 
the one affecting farmers. I have asked Tom Davies if he will 
introduce our speaker. 
THOMAS DAVIES: Our speaker today is district manager of 
the Lincoln office of the Social Security Administration, and we 
had him last year for the Institute of the Lincoln Bar Association 
and he did a swell job for us. 
I want to tell you a little bit about him. He was graduated 
from the University of Minnesota in 1932 and received his degree 
in electrical engineering. He was a Lieutenant Commander, 
USNR, and was in the Pacific for approximately three years on 
the cruiser "Denver." He was a radar technician and an assistant 
gunnery officer. 
I hope that he had a better reception in the Navy than I did. 
When I went aboard my ship, the skipper said, "What are you?" 
And I said, "I am a lawyer." 
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He said, "My God, we need engineers and they send us law-
yers!" 
So I assume that Joe Sewell had a better reception in the 
Navy than I did. He was assistant manager of the social security 
office in Des Moines from 1940 to 1948, except for his Navy duty. 
And it is a pleasure to present Joseph Sewell. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Thank you, Tom. 
Well, gentlemen, what I would like to do is just very briefly 
review the Social Security Act, bringing it up to date, and then 
spend most of my time talking about these new amendments with 
particular reference to coverage of farmers. 
The original Act went into effect on January 1, 1937. At 
that time the only people who were covered were persons working 
as employees in commerce or industry. Self-employed were not 
covered, no sort of agricultural work was covered, no govern-
ment employees or anything, just people working as employees in 
commerce or industry. 
So far as coverage is concerned, that Act remained in effect 
substantially without change until January 1, 1951. As of that 
date the Act was broadened to take in some of the previously ex-
cluded groups. 
At that time the big group that was brought in was the self-
employed businessman in town. The self-employed fam1 operator 
was still excluded. There were certain professional groups, pro-
fessional self-employed groups, still excluded, among them, of 
course, lawyers, doctors, dentists, and so forth. 
In 1951 farm hands, not the farmer, but the farm hand, was 
covered to a limited extent. Coverage was made available then 
to state and local employees, and the State of Nebraska passed 
the necessary enabling legislation bringing all state employees 
under in 1951, and in turn making it optional with each political 
subdivision. 
And in the intervening four years since then, ninety-two out 
of the ninety-three counties in the state have brought their em-
ployees under, and I would estimate that somewhere between eighty 
and ninety percent of the larger municipalities and other polit-
ical subdivisions-well, I shouldn't say "other"-very few town-
ships, but eighty to ninety percent of the larger municipalities 
have brought their employees under. 
Coverage was also made available in 1951 to employees of 
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non-profit organizations such as churches, schools, and so forth 
on a basis that was optional with the employing entity, and at 
least two-thirds of the employees. 
As of January 1, 1955, there was another broadening of 
<:overage. As of that date the self-employed farm operator came 
under social security, and our office and every social security 
office in the country that had anything to do with farmers has 
been swamped with questions about this farm coverage. 
I will just touch on a few of those questions, and perhaps you 
will raise others in the question and answer period afterwards. 
By far the commonest question that we have received is, 
"Is it compulsory? Can I take it or leave it?" It is compulsory 
on exactly the same basis as the program has been compulsory to 
all other covered employees ever since it went into effect. Farm-
ers are treated no differently than anybody else in that respect. 
If the farmer is still operating his farm he is covered by social 
security. If he is not operating a farm or if he is not in any 
other kind of work covered by social security, he is not covered 
even though he might want to be. It is compulsory in both di-
rections. 
Another question of course that most of you know the an-
swer to is, "When do I pay my social security tax? What steps 
do I need to take?" 
Of course the first one is that the farmer should get a social 
security account number if he does not already have one. If he 
already has one he should get a duplicate if he has lost it, as most 
of them probably have. We are very much concerned about the 
farmers getting social security numbers and you can be a help 
to us and to the farmer. 
In the spring of 1952 when the first self-employment tax re-
turns became due, I think on the afternoon of March 14, 1952, 
we got about five thousand letters saying, "Please rush me a 
social security number. I need it tomorrow morning." Of course 
you cannot open that many letters in half a day, let alone issue 
the numbers. So we are very anxious that those people, self-em-
ployed farmers, who are going to need numbers get their num-
bers now and not wait until that last minute. 
For those of you who will be helping farmers prepare re-
turns, be sure that that number gets on the return. We have had 
untold numbers of self-employment tax returns where the fellow 
had a number but they just failed to put the number on the re-
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turn. When a return comes in from John Smith without a social 
security number, we have no way in the world of knowing what 
John Smith that is. The only way we can keep track is by the 
numbers. 
So if you do help anyone prepare a return, be sure that his 
number gets on that return. Another question is, "What type of 
income is covered? What type is not covered?" Well, just rough-
ly, the Act says that operating income, that is, the net profit from 
the operation of the farm, is covered. The big exclusion in the 
farm area is rental income. Rental income is not covered, re-
gardless of whether it is received in the form of cash rental or 
crop shares. By far the largest rental income or most common 
type of rental income here in Nebraska is crop-share rental, not 
very much cash. 
For a long time we had a great deal of difficulty just deter-
mining what income was rental income and what was not. There 
is a twilight zone in there where it is extremely difficult to make 
a determination. 
Regulations were recently approved, and thus they have the 
status of administrative law more clearly defining what consti-
tutes rental income. 
There are four elements that we consider in deciding whether 
or not the income is rental income. 
First, where the landowner and the share farmer, sometimes 
called the tenant and sometimes called a partner, regardless of 
what he is called, the fellow who is doing the work, the land-
owner and the share farmer, agree that the share farmer will 
produce a crop or livestock. 
Second, on the landowner's farm, for which, third, the land-
owner will receive a share of the crop or livestock, or a share of 
the proceeds of the crop or livestock. 
And, fourth, where that share, the amount of the share, de-
pends on the amount of crop or livestock produced. 
If those four elements are all present, then the regulations 
provide that the income is considered to be rental income re-
gardless of what the farmer may choose to call the relationship. 
He can call it a partnership or an employer-employee relation-
ship or whatever he wants. If those four elements are met, the 
share farmer agreeing to produce a crop on land owned by the 
farmer, and they share that crop and the amount of the shares 
depend on the amount of the crop, then it is considered to be 
rental income and will not be covered. 
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And another question that has been asked very often is, 
"Does the farmer have to deduct all his operating expenses? Can 
he, in order to boost up his net profit for social security purposes, 
not consider his operating expenses but simply get credit for his 
total receipts?" 
And there again he must deduct all his operating expenses. 
The Social Security Act defines net income as being the same as 
it is so defined in the Internal Revenue Code, and of course the 
Internal Revenue Code defines net income as total receipts or 
gross income minus operating expenses. The Social Security Act 
has exactly that same definition. 
Another question that has been asked is, "Does the farm wife 
need a social security number? They file joint income tax returns 
as a general rule. Does that mean that she also needs a social 
security number?" No, she does not. The mere fact that a hus-
band and wife file joint returns does not in itself create a part-
nership, and the only situation in which the wife would need a 
social security number is if she is actually a valid legal partner 
in the operation of the farm. And for our purposes we will con-
sider that the farmer himself is the primary operator of the farm. 
The wife will qualify for social security benefits based on his 
wage record without needing a social security number herself. 
Whenever we get a pair of applications in the same envelope 
from the same address and it appears that one of them is from 
the farm wife, we will go ahead and issue the number to the 
farmer and return her application along with a little note that 
she will not need a number. However if she is actually working 
in town or someplace where she needs a number, or if she is in 
fact a legal partner, we just tell her to send it back to us, if she 
will, for a number, but normally the wife will not need one. 
As a matter of fact there has been a lot of misunderstanding 
as to computation of benefits. People have gotten the impression, 
I do not know where, that by splitting the income between the 
two of them and each one qualifying on his own record they can 
get larger social security benefits. Well, that is true only pro-
viding the entire net profit from the farm is somewhere in the 
area of fifty-four hundred dollars a year. And if the income is 
less than that and they split it behveen the husband and the wife, 
each one will qualify for benefits only based on half of the in-
come, and the combined benefits in that situation will not be as 
large as if the farmer had shown the whole income and she quali-
fied on his wage record. So in most cases they are going to in-
jure themselves by splitting the earnings. And I say whether 
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they are going to injure themselves or not, they should not split 
the earnings unless the wife is actually a recognized legal part-
ner in the operation of the farm. 
I am going to pass on here to some of the other changes. 
Back in 1951 farm employees were covered only to a very limited 
extent. For all practical purposes the only farm hands that were 
covered were those working on a full-time, year-around basis for 
one employer. Starting this year, 1955, a farm hand is covered 
if he works long enough so that he is paid cash wages of one 
hundred dollars or more during the year by one employer. So 
that is going to cover a lot more farm employees than were cov-
ered though 1954. If he goes out and maybe helps with the plant-
ing in the spring and earns fifty dollars, goes back and helps 
with the harvesting in the fall from the employer and earns an-
other fifty dollars, then that employer is required to deduct the 
two percent social security tax, match it with two percent of his 
own, and send it in at the end of the year just like the employer 
in town. The only difference is that the employer in town sends 
in the tax quarterly while the farmer only sends it in annually. 
There has been only one large extension o:f coverage, and 
that was the possibility of extension to teachers in the state. Un-
der the 1951 amendments they were barred from coverage be-
cause they had their own existing retirement system. In the 
fall of 1954 the Act was amended to permit them to come under 
social security co-existent with their existing retirement system, 
providing a referendum is held in which the majority of the 
members of the existing system voted for coverage. 
The legislature has passed the necessary enabling legisla-
tion for them to hold that referendum, and it is presently planned 
that the referendum will be held sometime in December. If 
the vote is in favor of social security coverage, the coverage will 
be effective January 1, 1955. 
There were some changes in the computation of benefits, 
but I am going to pass over those very rapidly. Essentially the 
method of computation is the same. It is based on the average 
earnings over the entire period from January 1, 1957, or from 
January 1, 1951, up to the date the computation is made, with one 
change. 
Under the new amendments we drop out the low four or 
five years. We simply drop those out of the picture and base 
it on the remaining high years. The primary reason for drop-
ping or putting in that four or five year drop-out was simply for 
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the benefit of those new groups who are coming under now for 
the first time who have not had any coverage during the years 
'51, '52, '53 and '54. Those drop-outs will permit them to get 
rid of those zero years in there and thus their average will not 
be hurt. 
So for all practical purposes for these new groups who are 
coming in now, 1955, for the first time, their benefit will be based 
on their average earnings from January 1, 1955, up to the date 
the computation is being made. 
Benefits are substantially the same as they were before-
benefits to the survivors of a qualified wage-earner who dies, 
that is, mostly the widow, children under eighteen, or to the widow 
past sixty-five, or in the case of a single wage-earner benefits 
to his dependent parents. 
The retirement benefits, that is, the benefits to the living 
retired wage-earner past age sixty-five, benefits to the wage-earner 
himself, or to herself as the case may be, and to his wife, to his 
children under eighteen. I did not mention in the survivors' side 
of it a minute ago that in addition to the monthly survivors bene-
fit there is also a lump sum benefit payment made in every case, 
either to the surviving spouse or, in the case of a single wage-
earner, to the person who has paid his burial expenses. 
The retirement test has been changed. I mentioned a moment 
ago that the benefits were paid to the living and retired wage-
earner past sh .. 'ty-five. The newer benefits define retirement as 
being earnings of twelve hundred dollars a year or less, or, put-
ting it a little differently, a person can earn up to and including 
twelve hundred dollars a year and still get the full amount of 
his social security benefit for all twelve months of the year. If 
he earns more than twelve hundred dollars, then he is considered 
only partially retired and his benefits are suspended for some of 
the months of the year, depending on how much more than twelve 
hundred dollars he earns. 
Well, I might as well get a little technical here, I guess. For 
each additional eighty dollars of earnings above twelve hundred 
dollars, he loses one month's benefit, because up to twelve hundred 
dollars there's no benefits lost; he receives twelve payments. Up 
to twelve hundred and eighty dollars he'd lose one month's bene-
fit and receive eleven. Up to thirteen sixty he'd lose two and 
receive ten, and so forth, until he gets up to two thousand eighty 
dollars a year, and by that time all twelve payments have been 
suspended. 
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After age seventy-two there is no retirement test. A person 
age seventy-two or over can draw the full amount of his bene-
fits for all twelve months of the year, regardless of the amount 
of his earnings. The only type of earnings that applies to that 
twelve hundred dollars income or retirement test is earned in-
come. There again, rental income, investment income, income 
from another retirement system, life insurance proceeds, and so 
forth have no application to that twelve-hundred;.dollar test. It 
is only if the pei;son keeps on working and earning twelve hun-
dred dollars or more a year that the retirement test is applied . 
. I might also mention the disability freeze. That's something 
that was new in 1955. The disability freeze does not provide for 
the payment of any disability benefits to the person who is under 
sixty-five. It does provide that if a person is totally and per-
manently disabled that he can freeze his status as of the date 
his disability commenced. So that when he does reach sixty-five 
at some date in the future he will get just as much benefits as 
though he kept on working, as though he had not become dis-
abled and kept on working at the same average earnings rate 
that he had up to the time of his disability. It simply protects 
his status at age sixty-five, but does not provide for any imme-
diate cash benefits. 
Now you folks are probably, in connection with that disability 
freeze, in a position to be of great service to disabled persons, 
particularly to persons who may have become disabled at some 
time in the past. We have no way of knowing about them unless 
somebody contacts and calls them to our attention. Many of them 
are not aware of this disability freeze. They are not si:id;y-five 
yet so they haven't made any application for benefits, or if they 
did make inquiry at the time they became disabled we simply 
had to tell them that there was no provision whatever for disabil-
ity in the Act. That was true probably at the time we talked to 
them, maybe three or four or five years ago. We had no way of 
anticipating this change in the law. 
Anyhow, they may not know about it and may have failed 
to file an application for disability freeze. Those applications are 
fully retroactive from the time they became disabled, providing 
they get their application on file before July 1, 1957. If they 
file their application after July 1, 1957, then it is retroactive 
for not more than one year. So any person you know of who 
has worked under social security for at least five years, and that 
is a requirement, worked under social security for at least five 
years and has become disabled sometime in the past, that person 
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should be encouraged to contact his nearest social security office 
to find out whether or not he might be eligible for a disability 
freeze, and before July 1, 1957. 
Most of you are probably aware of the fact that the veterans 
of World War II or the post-World War II period received social 
security credit for the period of their military service. The Act 
just recently extended that: I think that under the old Act that 
credit expires as of July 1, 1955. It has been extended to April 
1, 1956. Why they selected that particular date, I will guess 
with you. But anyhow, up until April 1, 1956, as the Act is now 
in effect, veterans still receive credit for social security pur-
poses from the military service. 
Well, that's been a pretty fast go-over of what is actually 
a pretty technical and complicated piece of legislation, and no 
one knows it better than we do in those social security offices. 
Now if you have a few question, I will be glad to answer them 
as long as time will permit. 
VOICE: With a farmer, that man owning the land, the ten-
ant's feeding stock for him, both the landowner and the tenant 
own the stock, is that an income or is that rent? 
JOSEPH SEWELL: I will repeat the question for the benefit 
of those of you who may not have heard it so you will know what 
question I am answering here. 
Landlord-tenant relationship in which the landlord and ten-
ant own stock jointly, equal share. The tenant is feeding the 
stock. What is the landlord's income, rental income or profit? 
Going back to that regulation that I read a while ago, if the 
tenant performs substantially all of the services in connection 
with feeding and caring for that stock and the landlord performs 
substantially none of the services as we interpret it, that would 
constitute rental income. 
Now if the landlord himself, owning fifty percent of the 
stock, has fifty percent of the investment, he has fifty percent 
of the risk of loss. If he actually performs a reasonable amount 
of services, it would not have to be fifty percent of the services, 
but if he actually performs a reasonable amount of physical ser-
vices and participates in the management aspect of it, that is, 
the determination of when to buy the stock, when to sell it, and 
who to sell it to and so forth, the kind of stock to buy, I would 
interpret him as being self-employed, and he would be covered 
with respect to his share of the net profits from feeding the 
stock, not from the rest of the farm, just the stock-feeding. 
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VOICE: Are you able to tell me why it is that the Social 
Security Administration seems reluctant to deal with lawyers? 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Well, I did not know they were reluctant 
to deal with lawyers. 
VOICE: I have had several eases, and invariably I would 
begin by writing the Social Security Administration, asking them 
for blanks for a client of mine, usually a widow, whose husband's 
estate I am probating. They will send the blanks directly to the 
widow. The widow would then have to come down to my office 
to have them made out. She does not know how to make them 
out. 
I will make them out and send them to your office with a 
letter from my office, and if something is needed they will turn 
around again and write the widow directly. They will never 
correspond with me. 
On one occasion that I can remember I sent a widow down 
to the Grand Island office and told her to make application for 
social security benefits. She went down there, and for some 
reason, though I was thoroughly convinced in my own mind that 
she had some benefits coming, they questioned her down there 
and told her, "No, you do not have any benefits down there be-
cause your husband ·was not covered." I knew at the time that 
her husband failed to file a tax report because he was convinced 
that he did not make enough money. I checked into her income and 
was in the process of sending in an amended return to Lincoln, 
but they told the lady that because her husband was not covered 
there was no sense in her signing an application. 
Now I did not kno\Y that until approximately a year later 
when I went down there, and then the question came up as to 
when her benefits would start; were they to start the day I sent 
her down there to sign the application or the date she actually 
signed the application, a year later? 
Now if the social security office had seen fit to talk to me, 
we could have alleviated a lot of that. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Of course in the territory served by the 
Lincoln office, and I think in most service offices, we have no 
reluctance whatever to deal with attorneys. 
Of course we are in a rather difficult position there. For in-
stance, if some widow comes in and she does not say she has been 
sent in by an attorney, we will question her: "Did your hus-
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band work in the kind of employment covered by social security, 
or the kind of self-employment?" 
"Yes, but he never earned enough to file a tax return. His 
income was always less than four hundred dollars a year, and he 
never filed any tax returns." And we will probably do the same 
thing as the Grand Island office, and 'Ye will say if he was not 
covered, there is no sense in filing an application. And unless 
she tells us her whole story, that she has already gone to her at-
torney and he is in the process of preparing that return, and if 
she does not tell us that, we would have no way of knowing that. 
And as I say, it depends on the information that is given 
to the field office at the time the application is made. We are not 
in the business of making meaningless claims. If the person 
comes in and says, "My husband never worked under social se-
curity," why, it seems futile to make application for benefits that 
are not going to be paid. 
And if she makes an application and says he worked under 
social security benefits, we would certainly try to get the addi-
tional information. 
Now when you write a letter to the social security office and 
they answer directly to the claimant without going back through 
your office, I will say I do not think it should be done. In my 
own office, I hope it is never done that way. Any time we get 
an inquiry from any attorney, we will answer the claimant through 
the attorney. 
VOICE: Well, it is very habitual at the Grand Island office. 
VOICE: Omaha office too. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: I say, if we are doing it, it is something 
that we should straighten out. 
VOICE: Well, I received the impression that the social se-
curity office thinks that lawyers are preying on these widows and 
charging them huge amounts to get social security benefits. Ac-
tually I do not think I have ever charged a client of mine, and 
I do a lot of work for them in obtaining social security reports. 
If I could get a little cooperation out of them, I could get it done 
a lot quicker and a lot sooner. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Where are you from? 
VOICE: I am from Burwell, in the Grand Island area. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Sometime when you are down there in the 
Grand Island area, why don't you stop in and visit with the mana-
ger in the Grand Island office about that problem. 
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VOICE: It does not make any difference. 
JOSEPH SEWELL: Of course I have no control. We serve 
our territory and they serve theirs. We should all be doing it 
on the same basis, but apparently we are not, and, I say, we should 
be, and I hope we are not doing that in our territory. At least 
we will do something about it if it is eaHed ta my attention. 
Thank you. 
HALE MCCOWN: I am sorry to shut off your questions here 
so rapidly, but we are forced by the schedule this afternoon to 
vacate for the Hoase of Delegates later on. 
There will be a five-minute recess right now, and I would like 
to have you all back promptly after five minutes so that we can 
go ahead. 
Mr. Sewell, I'm sure, will be glad to answer any individual 
questions that you may have during this five minutes. 
(Short recess at 2 :15 o'clock p. m.) 
HALE MCCOWN: Gentlemen, if you will come to order we 
will go ahead with the program for the afternoon, and which is 
as you note from your program notes the panel discussion of 
developments under the 1954 Revenue Code. 
First, may I call your attention to the fact that the regular 
13th annual Tax Institute \Yill be held again in December com-
mencing the week of December 12th, starting Monday of that 
week. It will be held as previously in two-day sessions, com-
mencing at Scottsbluff the first two days, Kearney the second 
two, and Omaha the last two. Laurens Williams and Bob Moodie 
will both be with us again on that clinic. I am sure that all of 
you will want to be here again for the regular December clinic. 
The panel today, as I think probably most of you know from 
the program, Mr. Mason on my left, Bob Denney to my right, 
Jack North, the next gentleman over, and on the far right, Leo 
Eisenstatt. 
Now we have simply selected certain individual things and 
individual topics which we thought might be of interest to all 
of you. We are not going to attempt to follow any set routine 
or any proposal or any specific set of subjects. It will be moving 
from one to the other of the fellows on this panel. 
At the close there will be time for questions. However if 
something is not clear as we go along, please feel perfectly free 
to ask for a clarification at that time. We have to be out b)· 
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not later than 4 :15, if possible, and we will try and leave possibJy 
fifteen or twenty minutes at the close for a question and answer 
period. 
First, I think that there has been considerable discussion 
about provisions with respect to dependents on the new '54 code. 
There have been some additional matters come out on that. 
Bob Denney, would you comment on the specific provisions 
with respect to dependents under the '54 code? 
ROBERT DENNEY: yes, I will, Hale. I want to say this, that 
there have been very few regulations issued with reference to 
dependency, and this paper will primarily be concerned with a 
review of the changes in the law with reference to dependents 
from the '54 code and the '39 code. I would like to call to your 
attention that effective for tax yea1·s begining after 1953 and 
after, and ending after August 16, 1954, the internal revenue 
code of 1954 created several special classes of dependents for 
whom under certain conditions a taxpayer was entitled to a six 
hundred dollar dependency deduction. 
These included children, stepchildren and adopted children 
under nineteen year of age or attending school. That seemed to 
be one of the most import.ant. 
And then, secondly, other individuals, including non-relatives 
whose principal place of abode was the taxpayer's home. And, 
third, mentally or physically disabled cousins receiving institu-
tional care. 
Now with reference to that first class of dependents, children 
under nineteen and students, the income test, that is, the depen-
dent's income must be less than six hundred dollars, is no longer 
a prerequisite to qualifying for a dependent in these two situa-
tions, where the child is under nineteen or is attending school five 
months or more according to the taxpayer's calendar year, is a 
full-time student at a regular school or college, or is pursuing 
full-time or on-the-farm training under the supervision of an 
educational institution or state agency. 
But we must keep in mind that the taxpayer must have con-
tributed over one-half of the child's support. An example of this: 
The total cost of supporting a son who is under nineteen years 
of age or is attending school is twenty-four hundred dollars. The 
son earns eleven hundred dollars by his own efforts, which he ap-
plies to his own support. The father contributes thirteen hundred 
dollars, and of course the father's entitled to the exemption. 
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And in determining with reference to the child in school, if 
he earns a scholarship of five or six hundred dollars, Section 
152 ( d) of the new code provides that a scholarship does not 
count in figuring whether a parent contributed more than half the 
child's support. A warning that some writers have given on 
these tax matters : Attendance at night school while holding a 
job is not considered full-time attendance., 
Another observation. Enrollment for part of a month con-
stitutes enrollment for the full month. February through part of 
June will qualify. 
Now take the second one, other individuals including non-
relatives. You must assume the support and earnings tests are 
niet and that the taxpayer is entitled to exemption for any in-
dividual making the taxpayer's home his principal place of abode 
for the entire taxable year. 
Temporary absence due to special circumstances will not dis-
qualify, such as attendance at a boarding school or college or 
hospitalization. This removes the inequities of the prior law, be-
cause now you can claim the dependency of a foster child or a 
child awaiting adoption. And of course the cousins. That would 
not happen often, but, assuming that the support and earnings 
tests are met, a cousin of taxpayer can qualify as a dependent if 
he receives institutional care by reason of mental or physical dis-
ability, and before receiving such care he or she was a member 
of taxpayer's household. 
Another important point under this dependency which I kno\\~ 
comes to all of you is the multiple support of dependents, some-
times called the multiple-support problem. 
It often happens that two or more taxpayers contribute joint-
ly to the support of a close relative or other person who could be 
a dependent of any one of them. Who can claim the exemption? 
If one contributes more than half the support, he and he alone 
can claim the exemption. If no one contributes more than half 
the support and they can all cooperate and agree, then one of 
them can claim the exemption if he has contributed more than 
ten percent of the dependent's support, and each other person who 
has contributed to that support more than ten percent files a 
written declaration as prescribed by the commissioner that he 
will not claim the support. 
For example, two sons contribute to their mother's support, 
each son five hundred dollars. The mother spends seven hundred 
dollars of her capital. Her income is less than sb~ hundred dol-
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lars. Either son may claim, provided the other son files a written 
waiver. Or A, B, C and D contribute thirty, twenty, twenty-nine 
and twenty-one percent respectively to support of their mother. 
Each contributes over ten percent. Any one could claim de-
pendency if all others execute a Form 2120 or a comparable in-
strument. But it would not be enough, for example, for either 
A or D to claim the credit and the other execute the waiver, even 
though between them they contribute over fifty percent of their 
mother's support. 
Now about the only other regulation that I'm aware of right 
now with reference to individuals is this rounding-off regulation 
with reference to the figuring of the tax. After you have added 
up the gross income and subtracted your deductions, it's my un-
derstanding that under the new regulation you can take the near-
est dollar-if it's below fifty cents drop down to the next dollar, 
if above fifty cents to the higher dollar-and when you actually 
arrive at the tax you can drop the cents off the tax itself, and of 
course when the government pays a refund they can ignore the 
cents when they make the refund. 
HALE MCCOWN : As I recall too that election is made by put-
ting on your return. You should probably check that regulation. 
I would like to have Jack North, if he will, cover the changes 
of the '54 code as made in the taxation of corporate acquisition 
and disposition of property. 
JOHN NORTH: Well, Hale, the general problem in connection 
with corporations, with corporation sale or corporate acquisitions 
of property, is simply this: A corporation may hold some prop-
erty that it wants to sell, and the shareholders want to know 
whether or not the corporation will recognize income upon sale 
and whether that income when it is distributed to them will be 
taxable to them. 
Under the 1939 code the best way to make savings was to 
have the corporation distribute the assets in liquidation and then 
let the shareholders sell. That way they would incur a tax only 
at the shareholder level and not a double tax, which would occur 
when the corporation would sell, since we have a tax on the corpo-
rate income and then when a distribution is made to the share-
holder he pays a second tax. 
Naturally corporate shareholders decided that when they 
would sell property they would use the first method, and this 
presented a problem which was decided in Court Holding, and 
that is, where a corporation solicits the sale and then prior to 
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consummation of the sale distributes the corporate assets to the 
shareholders, that the commissioner will be allowed to look through 
the transaction and treat is as if the corporation made the sale, 
tax the corporation on the income from the sale, and turn around 
and tax the shareholders when the distribution is made. 
So the shareholders then decided that the smart thing to do 
would be to have the acquiring corporation just purchase their 
stock, and in that way they would only recognize a capital gain 
upon the sale of their stock and they'd get the same percentage of 
the selling price that they would have had by reason of the dis-
tribution and liquidation. 
Now this presents the problem on the other side of the table; 
that is, whether or not the corporation that is going to acquire the 
property wants to purchase personally all of the shares of stock 
of the owning corporation, or whether that corporation wants to 
purchase merely the asset. 
Now a simple illustration would be a corporation that owns 
an apartment building and wants to acquire another apartment 
building. Should they buy all the stock of another corporation 
owning the building, or should they buy outright from that corpo-
ration the apartment building? 
If the corporation apartment building is worth seventy-five 
thousand dollars, that will be the purchase price whether they 
buy the building outright or whether they buy the stock. Now 
the transfer of the corporation that owns the apartment building 
may have a base of fifty thousand dollars, so the acquiring corpo-
ration will have this problem: If they invest seventy-five thou-
sand dollars in the stock they acquire the apartment building, but 
they'll acquire the apartment building at the basis that it has in 
the hands of the transfer or corporation, that is, at the lower 
basis of fifty thousand dollars. 
Now the commissioner, when the basis would be stepped up, 
the commissioner would assert you should look through the trans-
action and treat the acquiring corporation as merely purchasing 
the building, just actually reverse of the situation in Commission 
vs. Court Holding. 
And in the Kimball-Diamond case, the Supreme Court, the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, went along with the commissioner, that 
is, said that you could look through the step transaction and where 
the acquiring corporation pays fifty thousand dollars for the 
asset and seventy-five thousand dollars for the stock, you could 
look through the transaction and say that that's the purchasing 
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price of the asset rather than the purchasing price of the stock, 
and they'll take that as a basis of the asset. 
Now the 1954 code makes some rather significant changes in 
application of Commission vs. Court Holding and the Kimball-
Diamond case. The effects of the Court Holding case are elimi-
nated; that is, if a corporation decides to sell property and makes 
that sale as a part of liquidation, it doesn't make any difference 
whether the corporation itself or the shareholders consume the 
sale. There will only be a tax levy at the corporate level. 
Now it is important to remember that, because when you're 
on one side of the transaction or the other you can remember 
that the buyer should be the one to determine the mode of the 
transfer because the buyer is the only one that will be adversely 
affected. tax-wise by the manner which the sale is made, because 
under the 1954 Act, whether the shareholders make the sale or 
the corporation makes the sale, the tax consequences will be the 
same-that is, if it is consummated within the year period. 
Now as to the Kimball-Diamond case, the 1954 code presents 
this legislative clarification. If at least fifty percent of the ac-
quired corporation's stock is purchased within a twelve-month 
period and if the corporation is liquidated within two years there-
after, the basis of the assets received should not be the trans-
feror's basis but the price paid for the stock. In other words, 
saying that the purchasing corporation ·will take as its basis the 
amount that it pays for the stock and not the basis that the 
transfer or had. 
Now many of you may have this problem in mind. Why is 
it that the transferee corporation just could not liquidate the trans-
feror corporation and then take the increased basis upon the recog-
nition of its being in liquidation? 
The reason for this is that when a corporation liquidated a 
subsidiary that under the old Act and under the new with slight 
modifications, the1·e was no gain or loss, and the corporation that 
did the liquidating merely took the transferor's basis, that is, the 
first corporation's basis. 
The enactment as this automatic Kimball-Diamond rule posed 
this problem. The Kimball-Diamond decision was favorable to 
the government; that is, the taxpayer's basis, the acquiring corpo-
ration's basis was stepped down because he had paid less for the 
stock than the transferor's basis. The commissioner after the 
Kimball-Diamond rule tried to assert that it only applied where 
the taxpayer's basis was stepped down; that it, where he paid 
less for the stock than an amount equal to the transferor's basis. 
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But the problem that arises under the 1954 Act is whether 
that is exclusive; that is, supposing the taxpayer decides not to 
comply with the provision, that is, not to complete the liquidation 
within a two-year period as required. Then naturally if the 
amount paid for the stock is less than the transferor's basis, the 
acquiring corp-0raticn would not want to require liquidation, and 
the questions is, can the commissioner come back then and say 
that he will look at it as a stepped-down transaction and treat it 
as a legal transaction? 
Now I have covered that hurriedly, but I have given you 
some idea of both aspects under the elimination of the Court Hold-
ing rule and the legislative adoption of the Kimball-Diamond rule. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thank you, Jack. 
There have been a number of changes, of course, in the state 
gift-tax field. So far the regulations are not yet out. 
John, would you cover briefly what we ought to be looking 
for in those regulations when they come out. 
JOHN C. MASON: There are a few areas in the gift and 
estate tax sections of the new code in which there may be some 
room for difference of interpretation of the Act. I will attempt 
to go through just a few of those situations to call your attention 
to what the Act might say and so that we may, when the regula-
tions are issued, examine them and see just what position the 
Treasury Department has taken. 
The most important change in the estate tax law under the 
1954 code was the elimination of the premium payment test in 
determining whether proceeds of a life insurance policy are tax-
able to the estate of the insured at his death. 
Section 204.2 provides specifically that the value of the gross 
estate shall include the value of all the property to the extent of 
the amount receivable by the executor-for example, as insurance 
under policies on the life of the decedent-and also to the e:i..-tent 
of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance 
under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which 
the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidence of o·wner-
ship, exercised alone or in conjunction with any other person. 
The Section then goes on to define incident of ownership, 
and including a reversionary interest, whether arising by the ex-
press terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of 
the law. Only if the value of the reversionary interest, however, 
exceeded five percent of the value of the policy immediately before 
the death of the decedent. 
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Now the term "reversionary interest" is further specifically 
defined to include the possibility that the policy or its proceeds 
may return to the decedent or estate or may be subject to a power 
of disposition by him. 
The situation which usually comes to mind is the method of 
taking advantage of this section of the code, is to have the in-
sured make gifts of his insurance policies to his wife or children 
or to have new policies taken out on the life of the insured by 
the wife or children. By reason of the elimination of this prem-
ium payment test, the fact alone that the insured paid the prem-
iums would not seem to make the policies taxable in his estate if 
he did not possess any of the incidence of ownership of the policy 
at the time of his death. 
However, court questions arise at the interpretation of this 
section with respect to what is an incident of ownership, and 
that is the area in which you will be interested in seeing the 
position which may be adopted by the Treasury Department. For 
example, if a reversionary interest includes the possibility that 
the policy or its proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate 
or be subject to a power of disposition by him, does the possibility 
that the insured may inherit from his wife who has been made 
the owner of the policy, amount to a reversionary interest? 
Tax lawyers generally, I have found by reading articles on 
the subject, are quite interested in seeing what the regulations 
may provide in connection with that particular problem. 
There is also a question, a very incidental question perhaps, 
as to whether it is possible that insurance policy in which a frac-
tional interest may be owned by the decedent at his death would 
be taxable entirely to his estate or only fractionally to the extent 
that he had the fractional interest which might occur in some 
situations. 
There has been a change in the gift tax part of the law with 
respect to gifts to minors. As you Jiecall, if a gift is not a future 
interest, then the gift is subject to the annual three thousand 
dollar exclusion in the donor's determination of gift taxes for 
the year. 
However there was a question under the old law as to whether 
gifts in trust, for example, were future interests or not future 
interests when the gifts were for children or the beneficiaries 
were children. 
Specific provisions have been made in the new code defining 
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what interests will qualify and what interests will not qualify for, 
as future interests, in that respect; and generally, if the gift 
gives a present interest so that the principal and income can be 
used by the child before the child becomes twenty-one, and if the 
child should die before reaching twenty-one, if the proceeds would 
be available to the child's estate or subject to a power of appoint-
ment by the child, then (I'm speaking generally now) the policy 
would qualify for the annual exclusion-I don't mean the policy-
the gift would qualify and it would not be a future interest. 
In interpreting this the statute says that the child must be 
entitled to have the property go to his estate if he should die be-
fore twenty-one, or the property should be subject to a power of 
appointment. Now there is the question in some people's minds 
as to whether that's used in the disjunctive sense, that "or" that 
I mentioned, so that a power of appointment alone would qualify 
it or giving the property to the child's estate alone would qualify 
it without the power of appointment, and we'll see what the 
Treasury rules when the regulations are issued. 
In the use of marital deduction under state tax law, there 
have been a couple of changes. For example, primarily, I under-
stand, for the benefit of this section of the country, or at least 
agricultural areas of the country, it is now possible to qualify a 
gift of a life estate for the marital deduction so that a husband 
can leave a life interest in a property to his widow if he also 
leaves her the requisite power of appointment to appoint the 
property. 
Formerly, under the old 1948 amendments life estate did not 
qualify for the marital deduction. If you are contemplating using 
a life estate in this manner you may be interested in a caution 
which might be in order, and that is to be sure that you do not 
restrict her use of the income. 
For example, if she, by reason of the language you use, will 
be required to use some of the income in a way which would be 
interpreted as an investment in the principal-for example, some 
type of a replacement of a portion of the property, or something 
of that sort-it may be a restriction on income which would dis-
qualify the gift for the marital deduction because in order to 
qualify it, it has to give her the entire right to the income from 
the property. 
And likewise if you want to give her a power of appointment, 
be sure that the power of appointment is not too restrictive. For 
example, a power for her to use the property or sell the property 
if she was in need during her life would not be sufficient to 
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qualify the gift for the marital deduction. One other point that 
I might mention is that under the marital deduction provisions 
now it is possible theoretically to create a trust in which a por-
tion of the interest is granted to the wife, a portion of the income, 
and the power of appointment over a portion of the principal of 
the property, with the other portion of the trust being for the 
benefit of other people, and the portion which is for the benefit 
of the wife, if it beats the terms of the statute, will qualify for 
the marital deduction. 
In this connection there is some difference of opinion which 
may or may not be resolved by the regulations, as to whether the 
portion of the income in which she is given an interest has to be 
the same portion as the portion of the principal over which she 
has the power of appointment. And to take a conservative ap-
proach to it you would want to make those portions the same. 
There is also a question whether in a trust of that type it is 
necessary to have a portion of the trust segregated or set aside 
in the administration of the trust for the benefit of the wife, or 
whether undivided interests are adequate, and again to play it 
safe until it may be further clarified by the regulations, it prob-
ably would be well to frame such a marital deduction trust in 
such a way that it would really constitute two separate trusts 
although all under the terms of one instrument. 
Those are a few of the things that we might look out for in 
the regulations when issued. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, John. 
There have been a number of changes with respect to partner-
ships. Leo, would you cover the ones with particular reference 
to the basis of contributed property to the partnership. 
LEO EISENSTATT: Yes, Hale. 
I think I ought to preface my remarks by an admonition to 
all lawyers that the field of partnership tax law is in my opinion 
not so simple, and the new code did a lot to clarify conflicting 
provisions. But the field itself is not too simple and requires a 
moderate amount of study. The one basic fact that you should 
keep in mind with respect to whatever remarks I make is that 
the new code considers the partnership as an entity, that is, some-
thing separate and distinct from the partners, and that thread 
or idea will run through almost all of my remarks. 
Now to get to the subject of contributed property. I think 
it can be best summarized by the statute itself that says that 
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property contributed by a partnership to the partnership in ex-
change for an interest in the partnership takes the same basis as 
it has in hand. For example, if A and B form a partnership and 
A contributes one thousand dollars for fifty percent interest and 
B contributes a piece of property which has a fair market value 
of one thousand dollars for a partnership interest, the cash, of 
course, on the books of the partnership takes the basis of one 
thousand dollars. 
The property, machinery or real estate or whatever it might 
be remains the same so far as the basis is concerned on the books 
of the partnership. Supposing in this case that the partnership 
had a basis of two hundred dollars. The partnership would pick 
up that property at a basis of two hundred dollars, and the depre-
ciation, capital gains treatment and so forth would follow from 
that fact. And that might lead to some inequitable results be-
tween the two partners. 
For example, suppose that soon after this partnership was 
formed the partners sold that asset for one thousand dollars or its 
fair market value. The partnership would have a capital gain. 
Assume it is a capital asset of eight hundred dollars. If the 
partnership agreement is silent on the matter, the division of in-
come and losses in the partnership agreement would control in 
its division of this particular gain. So partner A would have to 
pick up in his own individual return four hundred dollars of 
capital gain and partner B also. And that is in most cases to A 
in equity, because partner A has contributed a thousand dollars 
in something that he thought he was getting a fifty percent in-
terest in, and theoretically within fifteen minutes after the part-
nership is formed, he has a fifty percent interest and a four hun-
dred dollar capital gain that he has to pay tax on. 
A similar thing is true, you might say, that in putting in this 
thousand dollars into the partnership, the partner A bought a 
fifty percent interest in an asset that lie thought was worth a 
thousand dollars, and it ends up that from the tax standpoint he 
bought one that was only worth two hundred dollars, and so 
when it comes to depreciation, instead of his being able to de-
preciate the asset on the basis of a thousand, it has to be cut 
down to a fourth of that or a fifth of that, twenty percent. 
Now this result can be varied by the partners by specific 
provision in the partnership agreement. In order to protect the 
interests of the partner who contributed the thousand dollars and 
to prevent an inequity to him, the partnership agreement could 
provide that in the event of the sale of that particular asset the 
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capital gain attributable thereto would be taxed solely to him, 
and you can word that so as to try to take into account future 
developments, because the partnership, fair market value, can 
change after the partnership is formed, and you could preserve 
it by language to the effect that the differences between the fair 
market value and the basis at the time it was contributed, just 
that portion would be charged to that partner. 
Now to some extent you can, with respect to depreciation, 
protect partner A who is losing, in a sense, some of the deprecia-
tion that he ordinarily would have been entitled to if the partner-
ship had gone out and bought that piece of equipment for a thou-
sand dollars. The partnership agreement can provide that all 
dep1·eciation with respect to the contributed property can be taken 
on the return of the non-contributing partner, so that if there is 
a full year life remaining, a partner A who contributed a thou-
sand dollars could pick up fifty dollars depreciation, and partner 
B nothing. 
Now the code specifically provides for this effect. When 
you are attempting to take into account the difference between 
the basis and the fair market value, that is specifically covered 
in the statute by specific wording and also in the regulations, and 
if you have these provisions in a partnership agreement which 
attempt to perform other acts than to pick up the difference be-
tween the base of the fair market value, you have got to be care-
ful that the commissioner or bureau will not describe the pur-
pose of evading or avoiding tax. If the only purpose is to evade 
or avoid tax according to the proposed regulation, of course the 
attempted redistribution will be eliminated and the tax incidence 
of, say, depreciation or gain, will be affixed according to the 
partnership gains and losses. 
I might conclude this particular subject by saying that my 
discourse has been rather sketchy in that it has only attempted 
to hit the high points of this particular problem, and it is some-
thing that should be kept in mind when you are drafting new 
agreements or in renewing existing agreements that your clients 
may presently have because you can make amendments to take 
advantage of the benefits that the new code allows. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, Leo. 
There has been a lot of discussion about the new depreciation 
provisions of the code. I thought it appropriate to repeat those 
again briefly. Bob, will you cover the depreciation provisions? 
ROBERT DENNEY: I suppose many of you ladies and gentle-
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men have had the same problem that we have down in my section 
of the country. The farmer has read in his farm periodicals 
about new methods of depreciation, and he comes in to talk to 
you about why have you not done something to take advantage 
of this tax saving. 
That is why we decided to briefly review the new methods 
set forth in the '54 code. Of course, the '54 code re-enacts the 
straight line method of depreciation, and then it adds what is 
known as the declining balance method, the sum of the year's 
digit method, and any other consistent followed methods which 
do not during the first full two-thirds of the useful life ac-
cumulate a depreciation reserve greater than would be accumu-
lated on the declining balance method at such time. 
We can see from those methods that are set forth that the 
useful life of a certain article has not been changed at all by the 
'54 code, but the manner in which such apportionment shall be 
made has been very substantially affected by the new code, and 
in looking at the declining balance method we can see that there 
are certain characteristics which I think are interesting and 
which can be used to describe to the client how it differs from 
the straight line. 
It uses a fifty percent rate of depreciation, not exceeding two 
hundred percent of the straight line method. It exceeds the 
straight line rate but it is applied each year to the remaining bal-
ance of cost rather than the original capital sum. 
The annual allowances decline each year. There will always 
be some depreciation left if you stick to that method, concentra-
tion of cost recovery in early years of the life of the asset; it may 
be used in group accounting as well as item accounting, and you 
may change back to the straight line method without the com-
missioner's approval. 
It was interesting to me to compare that with the sum of 
the year's digit method. It resembles the straight line method in 
that the rate is applied each year to the original cost. The rate 
changes each year and produces a lot of depreciation in the earJy 
years. 
Now just for example I took an item of a life for five years 
having a cost of one hundred fifty dollars and no estimated salv-
age value. Under the declining balance method of course your 
rate of depreciation for the. first year would be sixty dollars, 
straight line thirty, and the sum of the year's digit's method 
which would be, your enumerator is the remaining life, your de-
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nominator of course is the addition of the life of the article, such 
as fifteen, if you have a five year life. You would have fifty 
dollars the first year. You go on down; when you get through 
with the declining balance method, you have $11.66 left over; onto 
the year's of the digit, of course you depreciate it out, you simply 
take the straight line method, you depreciate it out completely. 
Any other consistent method provides the use of miscellan-
eous other reducing changed methods, most of which are varia-
tions of the declining balance method. The new methods referred 
to are not available to intangible property, property having a 
useful life of less than three years, property acquired before Jan-
uary 1, 1954, used property, new or reconstruction completed 
prior to January 1, 1954. 
Section 167 (d) of the new code provides that the taxpayer 
and the government may make a written agreement specifically 
dealing with the useful life and rate of depreciation of any prop-
erty. And also it should be kept in mind the taxpayer can use a 
different method at the same time for different assets or a group 
of assets. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, Bob. 
I think that we might also keep in mind that under the de-
clining balance method you do not have to use any salvage value 
in making your computation. 
Now also a long time ago they finally plugged this one, be-
tween husband and wife. A man owned a piece of property and 
it depreciated in value, so he sold it to his wife and reported a 
capital gain and his wife started to depreciate it on a new basis. 
In the new code there are provisions with respect to distribu-
tion of depreciated property so far as corporations are concerned. 
Jack, will you cover those, please? 
JOHN NORTH: Yes, Hale. 
I think that everyone understands that there was no basic 
change in the taxation of corporate distributions other than the 
annual exclusion of fifty dollars and four percent credit; that is, 
corporate distributions are taxed to the extent that the corpora-
tion has earnings of profits, just as we have a corporation using 
a cash dividend, that cash dividend would be a tax to the extent 
that there are any profits. 
But you have a peculiar problem when the corporation dis-
tributes depreciated property, because on the one hand we have 
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a code provision which states that property distribution will be 
treated as a dividend to the extent of the fair market value. 
Suppose we have a corporation which has depreciated prop-
erty that is worth one hundred fifty dollars, which could be an 
air-conditioner or anything else. Supposing that the corporation's 
basis for that property was a hundred dollars. If the corporation 
sold the property it would recognize the fifty dollar gain. Sup-
pose that the corporation has earnings and profits of one hundred 
and twenty dollars. The corporation, instead of selling the as-
sets and distributing the fifty dollar profit or the one hundred 
fifty dollars, distributes the asset. 
Now on the one hand the commissioner will contend that the 
taxpayer has a dividend to the e};.i;ent of one hundred and fifty 
dollars, the fair market value of the property distributed. The 
taxpayer on the other hand will contend, "No, I have a dividend 
only to the e};.i;ent of one hundred and t\venty dollars, the corpo-
rate accumulated earnings and profits." 
The Tax Court under the 1939 code agreed with the tax-
payer. The Tax Court agreed that only one hundred t\venty 
dollars would be taxable, and that was the Godley case. The 
House report indicates that the language of the section relating 
to this particular problem in 1939 code need not be changed be-
cause they adequately expressed existing law, and the House was 
of the opinion that existing law should be continued; that is, 
when there is a distribution of depreciated property the corpo-
rate earnings should not be increased by the amount of deprecia-
tion and thereby increasing the dividend, but the dividend should 
be limited to the corporate earnings and profits at the time of 
the distribution. 
And using the precise example that I have stated, the House 
report stated that it would be taxable only to the extent of one 
hundred and t\venty dollars. 
Now after the House bill had been passed and sent to the 
Senate, the Godley case was appealed and the Circuit Court of 
Appeals said, "No, when you distribute depreciated property the 
taxpayer has a dividend to the extent of the fair market value of 
the property just as long as there are earnings sufficient to cover 
the basis." 
Now the reasoning is simple, that when they distributed that 
property having a fair market value of a hundred dollars, they 
actually have a gain of fifty dollars, and that fifty dollars should 
be added to their corporate earnings, thereby making the corpo-
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rate earnings one hundred and seventy dollars and determining 
the total amount of the tax to be the one hundred fifty dollars 
worth of property would be taxable in full. 
Now the Godley case in the Third Circuit was followed by 
the Hirshon case in the Second Circuit. Both of these cases de-
cided that the taxpayer should be taxed on the distribution as a 
taxable dividend to the full extent of one hundred fifty dollars 
even though the corporation has only one hundred twenty dollars 
earnings prior to the distribution. 
Now there is a rather interesting point in connection with 
this problem because the House, or the Senate, rather, did not 
change the provisions. The Senate Finance Committee made a 
comment on the House's comment to this effect. The House re-
port-and this is what it contained in the Senate Finance Com-
mittee report-the House report indicated that this rule clarified 
existing law. Subsequent to the date of the House report two 
court decisions have taken a position to the contrary, and the Fin-
ance Committee cited the Hirshon and Godley cases. 
"In view of this decision your committee does not intend any 
implication from the enactment of such 312 (a) with respect to 
the effects of a distribution of property on earnings and profits 
and on shareholders under the 1939 Code." 
Now it is interesting that the Senate Finance Committee 
made a comment in connection with the effect to be given in the 
1939 code in passing the 1954 code, because this query immedi-
ately comes up : Do they intend any implication in connection 
with the 1954 code? Do they intend that the House's construc-
tion of the bill as indicated in the House committee's comments 
then to control, or do the Hirshon and Godley cases as determined 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals control? 
The commissioner in his proposed regulations has taken the 
position that was taken by the Second and Third Circuits; that 
is, that the entire amount of the one hundred and fifty dollars 
fair market value in property is taxable even though prior to 
the distribution there was only one hundred twenty dollars in 
corporate earnings in profit. 
Now just last week a rather interesting development occurred. 
The same situation arose in the Tax Court of the United States, 
and the Tax Court openly refused to follow the Hirshon and 
Godley cases. After Godley had been reversed by the Third Cir-
cuit and the theory of reversal followed by the Second Circuit, 
the Tax Court turns right around now and follows the same rule 
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that is originally followed; that is, that the distribution of de-
preciated property would be taxable only to the e::1..1;ent of earn-
ings and profits at the time of the distribution. 
So here we are left with this rather interesting problem con-
trolling decision. Now this decision of the Tax Court was an 
interpretation of the 1939 Act, but we have this problem: In in-
terpreting the 1954 Act, should we follow the comment of the 
House committee and the theory that's adopted by the Tax Court, 
or should we follow the commissioner's regulation and the position 
taken by the Second and Third Circuits? I think there will prob-
ably be clarifying litigation. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, Jack. 
A number of us have had the decision from time to time, 
where is it best to take the deduction for attorney's fees, and so 
forth, in an estate? One of the factors to keep in mind in decid-
ing is whether to take them on the income tax return of the estate 
or to take them on the estate tax return. 
John, would you cover that, please? 
JOHN C. MASON: I think that it would be well just to point 
out the tax deductions which are available, either for estate tax 
or income tax or both, in the administration of an estate, and 
then point out for you briefly what some of the factors are that 
are to be taken into consideration. 
T:here are three general sections or groups of sections of the 
code which pertain to this problem, and of course we have the 
estate tax sections which impose an estate tax and grant certain 
deductions in computing the estate tax. 
These deductions, as you are all familiar, administration ex-
penses, claims, funeral expenses, mortgages against property which 
is included at full value in the gross estate. There are two other 
sections then in the income tax parts of the code which pertain 
to income taxation and deductions in computing income tax in 
connection with estates. 
Section 641 and the sections immediately following generally 
provide that executors are to be, and estates are to be taxed in 
the same manner as individuals are taxed, except where specifi-
cally changed by the sections that are grouped there. 
One of the limitations imposed by Section 642 is that the in-
come tax deductions cannot be taken if they are being taken as 
a state tax deduction. Therefore in computing the income and 
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deductions of an estate for income that is accumulated or accrued 
or paid during the course of administration, you have your choice 
of taking either an income tax deduction or an estate tax deduc-
tion, but not both. 
Then Section 691 and the sections following it deal with in-
come in respect of a decedent. Now that, generally speaking, 
means income items which if paid prior to the decedent's death 
would have been ;taxable to him. They have the character of in-
come, and when they are paid during the course of administration 
they are still treated as income. 
And by the same token deductions which have that general 
character are also deductible. 
Now there is no provision in this part of the code that deduc-
tions cannot be taken both for income and estate tax purposes. 
So when you are dealing in income with respect to decedent, and 
if it also qualifies as an estate tax deduction, you can have the 
double deduction. 
Just a brief check list to illustrate the point. Items which 
are deductible for estate tax only, which would include, for ex-
ample, funeral expenses, of course would not be deductible for 
any income tax purposes. Payment of unpaid mortgages and 
other indebtedness, payment of claims which represent personal 
obligations of the decedent and would not be in the nature of 
business sense obligations, such as claims for expenses and so 
forth. 
In the field of deductions available only for income tax, there 
would of course be any normal income tax deductible item which 
did not qualify as an estate tax deduction. In the field, for ex-
ample, of administration expenses, if you hold an estate open for 
an unduly long time· so that apparently the purpose of holding it 
open is to manage and conserve the property and produce income 
rather than merely to accomplish the usual purpose of turning 
the property over to the heirs, then you may get into a situation 
where it is not a normal administration expense and would not 
be deductible for estate tax purposes. 
I am referring to such things, for example, as executor's and 
attorney's fees, b.ut it "\YOuld be deductible in computing the estate's 
income taxes. 
Items which would be deductible for both income and estate 
taxes would include such things as interest accrued at date of 
death but unpaid until after death, property taxes which were 
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accrued up to the date of death or prior to the date of death but 
not paid until during the administration of the estate, and ex-
penses which would have been deductible as trade and business 
expenses, non-trade or non-business expenses which were accrued 
up to the date of death. 
The general principles which are involved here, and this 
relates to income in respect of a decedent, are limited in this fash-
ion. It must be a situation where the decedent was liable for the 
item at the time of his death, the liability having been founded on 
a promise or agreement which was supported by full and adequate 
consideration. It must be an item which was not properly allow-
able after deductions in the final income tax return of the dece-
dent or in any prior year of the decedent, and it must be an 
item which is actually paid during the course of administration. 
Now in the area of deductions which are allowable on an 
alternative basis either as income tax or as estate tax deductions, 
we include basically administation expenses which would include 
such items as the following: court costs, filing fees, certification 
and notarial fees, appraiser's fees, proper traveling expenses, exe-
cutor's expenses, attorney's fees, accountant's fees, storage and 
maintenance expense and selling expense, preparing of income and 
state inheritance tax returns, tax litigation, cost of operating and 
maintaining real estate, and the litigation respecting the proper-
ties or the tax on the properties. 
In addition to these items which would be deductible in the 
alternative either as income or estate tax deductions, any casualty 
losses incurred during the course of administration to the extent 
not compensated by insurance "\Vould be deductible, one or the 
other. 
It is interesting to note that the minimum income tax rate on 
taxable income of the estate is twenty percent. This percentage 
rate is not in the estate tax brackets until the taxable estate is 
forty thousand dollars after allowing all deductions, including the 
marital deduction and specific exemption. 
Thus in any estate where there would be no estate tax or 
where the taxable estate is not over forty thousand dollars for 
estate tax purposes, it vrnuld seem that income tax deductions 
should be taken at least to the extent that there was taxable in-
come. The estate tax bracket does not exceed thirty-seven per-
cent until the taxable estate reaches one million dollars, which 
for practical purposes probably limits our discussion here. 
Yet the income tax bracket reaches thirty-eight percent when 
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the taxable income reaches ten thousand dollars, an amount which 
would not be unusual in many of the estates which are probated 
in other states. 
It is therefore probably indicated that the attorneys should 
check carefully into the possibility of income tax deductions in 
either foreign field. 
One other point which was satisfactorily answered by Treas-
ury rulings under the '39 code and which will no doubt be the 
same under the '54 code is that administration expenses, for ex-
ample, may be split between estate tax and income tax, from a 
deductibility standpoint, so that part of an item may be claimed 
for income tax deduction and part for estate tax deduction, and 
some items may be claimed for income tax deduction while others 
may be claimed for estate tax deduction. This gives the executor 
greater flexibility in minimizing taxes. 
There's one other way in which the executor has a certain 
amount of flexibility, and that is, that it was possible, or was 
possible under the old code and apparently is still, for you to claim 
it both ways. You can file an estate tax return and claim the 
deduction or file an income tax return and claim the deduction, and 
until one or the other of the returns is audited, you may continue 
reinspecting the situation, so that when the first return is audited 
you may at that time make your choice. You have no limitation 
on your right to take the estate tax deduction, but your right to 
take the income tax deduction is limited in this way: If you 
have been allowed the estate tax deduction or have claimed it, if 
you have been allowed the estate tax deduction, then you could 
not take the income tax deduction, so until the estate tax deduc-
tion is actually allowed, you apparently would have the right to 
avoid making up your mind, which may give a little opportunity 
for hindsight in some situations. 
HARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, do you not have to file 
an election along with your income tax return that you are not 
taking it on your estate taxes? 
JOHN C. MASON: The answer to that, I believe, is that under 
the Section 642, which allows the income tax deduction, but with 
the limitation, it is provided that the deductions which are allow-
able under the estate tax, under 2053 and 2054, in computing the 
taxes of the estate shall not be allowed a deduction in computing 
the taxable income of the estate unless there is filed within the 
time and in the manner and form prescribed by Secretary of the 
Treasury a statement that the amounts haYe not been allowed 
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as deductions under those sections, and a waiver of the right to 
have such amounts allowed as tax deductions under those sections. 
Now the filing of that waiver does not have to be made at 
the same time that the income tax i·eturn is filed, but it can be 
filed, at least prior to the 1954 code sections and rulings it could 
be filed, at the time the income tax return is being audited, for 
example, which gives you an opportunity to delay making the de-
cision. 
It is possible that regulations could be issued which would 
require the filing of that at the time the income tax return is 
filed, but at no later time. If such was the nature of the regula-
tions when they are to be issued then you would not be able to 
avoid making up your mind, but the same situation existed be-
fore, and the Treasury Department did not require the making 
of the election at the time the income tax return was filed. 
Therefore if they follow the same procedure as they did be-
fore, I think it will still be possible to avoid making the decision 
until a later time. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks, John. 
With respect to the old provisions of partnership agreements, 
and so forth, where one partner had a guaranteed salary and also 
ther~ was income, there was no deduction for the salary except 
as a part of the partnership income. 
Leo, would you take the proposition of the treatment of a 
guaranteed salary to a partner? 
LEO EISENSTATT: yes, Hale. 
This particular subject is based upon Section 707 (c) of the 
'54 code, which says that to the extent determined without regard 
to the inco~e of the partnership, payments to a partner for 
services or for the use of capital shall be considered as made to 
one who is not a partner, and it says though that it can only be 
used for the purpose of Section 61 (a), and that is included as 
gross income of the partner, and Section 162 (a) would be con-
tributed to the expense of the partnership. I paraphrased the 
provisions of the code. 
Now suppose you have a partnership agreement which pro-
vides that partner A who is a one-third partner shall receive ten 
thousand dollars by way of salary. The partnership return will 
show that as "any other salary." It will be an expense, and in 
computing the profit or the loss of the partnership will be shown 
as "any other salary." 
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Now the partner must pick that up in his return as "other 
ordinary income," as "other salary." Now the proposed regula-
tions answered one point with respect to that. 
The question \Vas raised, "Would such a salary be subject 
to withholding and social security?" The regulations very speci-
fically provided that that income so far as the partner is con-
cerned has no application to any other section of the code. In 
other words you do not eat up social security payments with res-
pect to those guaranteed salaries. 
Now keep in mind that a salary, to qualify for this type of 
treatment, must be payable irrespective of the income situation 
of the partnership. If it is keyed to profit, then this does not 
apply. The old treatment, it would be considered just merely as 
a distribution of the partnership. In other words, the agreement 
that there is ten thousand to be paid if there is profits would 
not qualify for this section. Now the same treatment is afforded 
for those cases where you have an interest payment to a partner 
for the use of his capital, which is sometimes common. That is 
treated as any other interest and expense and picked up by the 
receiving partner as an interest expense. 
Now let us take a few more examples to illustrate the proposi-
tion. Suppose a partnership has made exactly ten thousand dol-
lars profit over-maybe it's easier to figure. I am not too good 
with my arithmetic-nine thousand dollars in addition to the ten 
thousand dollar salary to Mr. A. Now on his return for that 
year he will show ten thousand salary from the partnership, and 
then his distributed share of the ordinary income of three thou-
sand dollars, or a gross of thirteen thousand dollars income. 
Let us take the converse of the situation. Suppose as a 
result of the payment of this ten thousand dollar salary the part-
nership suffers a nine thousand dollar loss. Now he would be 
required on his individual partnership return to show the ten 
thousand dollars income and then, to the extent there is such 
sums credited to his account as the basis of his partnership, he 
can show a three thousand dollar loss as his share of the partner-
ship loss for that particular year. 
The partnership return as filed for the partners would show 
a nine thousand dollar loss. Each partner would pick up his 
third on his own return. This partner then would net a seven 
thousand dollar gain as a result of that transaction. 
There is one other situation that is mentioned in the pro-
posed regulations, and it deals with a partner who is entitled to 
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a salary up to, say, ten thousand dollars if there is pa1tnership 
income to cover it. 
In devising a partnership provision when you are forming a 
partnership, you want to take into account this pa1ticular pro-
vision of Section 707 ( c) , because you may have a situation where 
a partnership is consistently losing money and the partners' in-
terest in that partnership is continually decreasing because of 
such losses, and then at the same time he may have to pick up 
ordinary income by way of the salary provisions. 
Another section of the code limits the amount of loss that 
a partner can take to the amount of his basis in the partnership, 
and it could very easily happen that after a year or two of bad 
business he would be having to report income without being able 
to offset it with corresponding deductions for a partnership loss. 
CHARLES PHILLIPS : Now that limitation of loss to their 
partnership, was that just under the '54 code? 
LEO EISENSTATT: That is just with respect to the code. 
HALE MCCOWN : I would like to have Bob, if you will, cover 
soil and water conservation, which I know is of inte1·est to a 
great many of you. 
ROBERT DENNEY: Section 175 of the code provides that the 
taxpayer engaged in farming shall elect to treat expenditures for 
soil and water conservation in respect to land used for farming 
or for prevention of erosion as currently deductible. It defines 
"land used in farming" as land used by a taxpayer or his tenant 
for production of fruit, crops or other agricultural products or 
for grazing. 
Deduction is limited to twenty-five percent of gross income 
from farming, and not from all sources, and not from just one 
farm should be recognized. Any excess is carried forward and 
deducted on succeeding years. 
For example, Farmer Jones's gross income is twenty thou-
sand dollars from all sources, nineteen thousand from farming. 
He spent five thousand dollars for conservation work. Deduc-
tion is limited to twenty-five percent of nineteen thousand or four 
thousand seven hundred fifty dollars; the remaining two hundred 
and fifty dollars is carried over the next year. 
The '54 code specifically lists types of expenditures included 
within this concept of soil and water conservation and prevention 
of erosion of land, such as fertilization, leveling, grading, terrac-
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ing and contour furrowing, construction, control and protection of 
diversion channels, drainage ditches, earthen dams, watercourses, 
outlets and ponds, eradication of brush and planting of wind-
breaks. 
The farmer can elect to deduct currently those expenditures 
in the first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1953, and 
ending after August 16, 1954, without permission of the Internal 
Revenue Service. Once election is made it is binding on him for 
subsequent years unless permission to make a change is requested 
and granted from the district director where the return is filed. 
The election is made by attaching a statement to the returu 
specifying the amount and type of each expenditure. 
There is one warning that should be recognized. The ex-
penditures unused due to the twenty-five percent limitation which 
normally would be carried over and used to reduce income the 
following year cannot be used in an addition to basis in the event 
the farm land is sold before the deduction is used. 
VOICE: Bob, what is the situation on metal tube? 
ROBERT DENNEY: Well, of course if it was construction and 
control-well, for one thing, you cannot take any deduction on 
depreciable items, and I believe that that would be a depreciable 
item. 
HALE MCCOWN: Yes, normally your tube would be a depre-
ciable one. 
It used to be you could have a pref erred stock issue and then 
later on after a necessary period you would have the corporation 
redeem it and get capital gain treatment, and thus get some money 
out of the corporation. 
There are some new provisions with respect to those pre-
f erred stock bailouts. 
Jack, would you tell us about those. 
JOHN NORTH: Yes, Hale. 
I think that it should be mentioned that under the 1939 code 
whenever a corporation made a distribution in its own stock that 
no taxable dividend resulted in the relative interest of the stock-
holders in the corporation after the dividend was substantially 
the same as before. 
Now this gave rise to a neat device for a tax saving; that is, 
ordinary income could be distributed and treated as a capital gain 
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in this manner. A corporation with earnings and profits, instead 
of distributing those by way of an ordinary cash dividend, if it 
had only common stock outstanding, would declare a dividend in 
preferred stock. 
The stockholder could then allocate the basis of his old com-
mon stock between the new preferred and the old common. He 
could turn around and sell the preferred stock with this allocated 
basis and recognize instead of ordinary income a capital gain, 
report it as a capital gain. 
Now oftentimes in closely held corporations there would be 
an arrangement with an insurance company whereby the insur-
ance company would agree to buy the pref erred stock from the 
shareholders and the pref erred stock might have redemption pro-
visions providing for a sinking fund so that the insurance com-
pany would be entirely protected. 
Now after the insurance company had acquired all of the 
pref erred stock and the stockholders had recognized the earnings 
and profits of the capital gains raised by a sale, the corporation 
would actually take the earnings and profit and redeem the pre-
f erred stock and cancel it and start the whole process all over 
again, and in that way the ordinary income of a corporation will 
be distributed to its shareholders at capital gains rates. 
Now the 1954 code attempted to frustrate this device by es-
tablishing what we call Section 306 stock. Now Section 306 stock 
is defined rather simply. It's defined as any stock other than 
common stock received by way of a non-taxable stock dividend. 
Any stock other than common stock. 
Now I might say that in talking about the distribution of 
property, many of you may have wondered whether or not a 
distribution by a corporation of its own stock would be property 
and taxed in the same way as the air-conditioner that I mentioned. 
Well, the answer is no, because stock of the distributing cor-
poration is not considered property within the definition unless 
the stock is issued in discharge of an obligation under pref erred 
stock, for example, to pay to pref erred dividend or unless the 
stockholder has an option to take cash instead of the stock divi-
dend. 
Well, the second aspect of the definition is any stock other 
than common stock which is received in a corporate reorganiza-
tion or separation, to the e:ll..'ient that the effect of such receipt 
was substantially the same as the receipt of a non-taxable stock 
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dividend, or the stock was received in exchange for Section 306 
stock. 
Now you can see if you received 306 stock, you might be 
able to transfer, if you didn't come under that specific provision. 
You might also, if you have received some Section 306 stock, give 
it to your son, and your son could sell it, and then you wouldn't 
have any Section 306 stock on hand. But the legislature provided 
for that by saying, "Any other stock, the basis of which is deter-
mined by reference to the basis of Section 306 stock." 
Well now, if the corporation does not have any earnings or 
profits at the time the preferred stock dividend is declared, we 
have no problem, because it cannot possibly come within the defi-
nition of the Section 306 stock. 
Now once it is determined that it is 306 stock, and that is 
a typical illustration that I have given, common outstanding, and 
the distribution of the pref erred; then these are the rules that 
are applied. If the stock is redeemed from the shareholder by 
the corporation, the amount realized by the shareholder is taxed 
as a dividend to the extent that they are corporate earnings and 
profits at the time of the redemption. 
So that there are two things you have to remember: If the 
shareholder sells back to the corporation, the redemption situa-
tion, it is taxed as ordinary income, and that is determined by the 
earnings and profits at the time of redemption, not at the time 
that the stock is issued. 
If disposition of the stock by the shareholder is made by a 
sale, then the amount realized by the shareholder on the sale is 
treated as a gain upon the sale of property which is not a chattel 
asset, that is ordinary income to the extent that the amount rea-
lized would have been a dividend if the corporation had distributed 
cash instead of stock. 
So that means that if at the time the stock is distributed the 
corporation has earnings and profits, and if the stockholder waits 
three years to sell this Section 306 stock, he is going to recognize 
a non-capital gain upon sale to the extent that the corporation 
has earnings and profits at the time of distribution. 
It would seem that this effectively frustrates the pref erred 
stock bailout, but there is one possibility for some tax savings. 
I do not know; I might say that the possibility is really imprac-
tical in a sense, but it is this : Supposing that a corporation has 
earnings and profits, and it is ready to distribute those earnings 
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and profits and would distribute them in the ordinary way and 
wants to know whether it should also make stock dividends. Well, 
the advice would be, first, to distribute the earnings and profits, 
thereby reducing the earnings and profits that would be con-
sidered upon a later distribution of stock. Now after you have 
reduced the earnings and profits, then pref erred stock dividend 
must be advanced. 
The stockholder may hold that preferred stock; that is, it 
may have no substantial economic value at the time it is distrib-
uted, but he may hold that stock while that corporation is earn-
ing money. Then after two or three years go by he may sell the 
stock, and he will recognize a gain only to an extent to the earn-
ings and p1·ofit that the corporation had at the time that the stock 
was distributed, since they distributed all they could at that time. 
But the difficulty with the process is that it cannot be con-
tinued; that is, you cannot then buy it back and reissue another 
stock dividend because the difficulty is clear that they have earn-
ings and profits at such time, and the subsequent stock dividends 
will be taxed. 
But the rule of thumb, at least the first time, would be to 
declare a stock dividend on 306 stock after you have reduced 
earnings and profits as much as practicable. 
HALE MCCOWN: For a number of years we have heard 
many comments about joint tenancies. The '54 code made a num-
ber of changes which had some effect on the validity and the ad-
visability of joint tenancies. 
John, will you cover briefly the joint tenancy problem? 
JOHN C. MASON: Well, our panel members and speakers at 
various meetings of our Bar Association have often criticized this, 
and this criticism has been based largely on certain inadvertent 
pitfalls which may many times unnecessarily trap the layman. 
It seems to me that generally speaking the Bar Association 
has given the impression that joint tenancies are not desirable. 
It is certainly common knowledge among Nebraska lawyers, 
however, that joint tenancies are widely used. Many of the pit-
falls resulting from earlier tax laws have been removed under the 
1954 tax code, and it is my own thought that in the future joint 
tenancies can be an even more valuable estate planning tool than 
ever before. 
The danger in respect to the joint tenancies prior to the 1954 
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code may be summarized in part at least under the following head-
ings: First, under a joint tenancy the property did not pass by 
the decedent's will, and does not. And therefore the decedent 
does not have the power to prescribe by his will who shall benefi,t 
from his property, and thus he may inadvertently make it imposs-
ible for his children, for example, to take an interest in his real 
estate if he has previously placed it in joint tenancy with his wife. 
Secondly, the basis of the property for income tax purposes 
under the former law continued the same as at the original crea-
tion of the joint tenancy, and the surviving joint tenant (I am 
assuming a gift without consideration at the creation of the joint 
tenancy) the surviving joint tenant did not receive a stepped up 
basis commensurate with the value of the property at the time of 
the husband's death, in a typical situation. 
When the wife went out to sell the property at some later 
time after her husband's death, she found a considerable capital 
gain problem. 
Thirdly, gift tax liability was often incurred at the incep-
tion of the joint tenancy without the realization of the joint tenant 
and without their reporting the gift and without their paying the 
tax, which created a certain problem in the question of trying 
to clear up that problem at a later date, perhaps after the death 
of the original joint tenant who made the gift but did not realize 
that he \Vas making the gift. 
Another problem was that there was no avoidance of a state 
tax which would have been the case if the husband had trans-
ferred the property as a tenancy in common, for example, in which 
case he probably vvould have avoided at least half of the property 
being taxed in his estate, or if he makes it an outright gift, of 
course he would theoretically get it all out of his estate. 
Another point is that if almost all of the property of the 
decedent was owned in joint tenancy there may not be enough 
property left subject to claim to result in a deduction for funeral 
expenses, claims and administration expenses under the old code. 
Now the 1954 code has eliminated many of these objections, 
and I will enumerate some of the changes which help make joint 
tenancies a more useful tool in estate planning. 
First, with reference to the basis of the property. Under 
Section 1014 (b) 9 of the '54 code a new cost basis attaches the 
joint tenancy property to the extent that the property is included 
in the decedent joint tenant's gross estate, the estate of the first 
of the joint tenants to die. And in these illustrations we are as-
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suming that the first to die is the husband and the husband has 
made the gift without consideration; that is a rather typical situa-
tion. 
The new basis in that situation under the new code is the 
fair market value of the property on the day of death, or on the 
6ptiona1 estate tax date, and it is applicable beginning with the 
date of death. Apparently it is not required that any estate tax 
be found due on a decedent's estate but only that the property be 
includable in the definition of the gross estate. 
The basis is reduced by any amounts which were allowable 
as deductions prior to the date of death, such as depreciation, de-
pletion, amortization and other similar type of deductions. The 
stepped up basis applies only to that portion of the property which 
is taxable in the estate. 
If the husband had furnished all of the consideration for the 
purchase of the property, then it would be entirely includable in 
his estate, and the stepped up basis would apply to the entire prop-
erty. 
If he had furnished less than all of it, then there would be a 
proportionate share rather than a full stepped up basis. 
In another field, with reference to deductions for debts and 
administration expenses, Section 2053 (a) of the estate tax sec-
tion allows deductions for funeral expenses, administration ex-
penses, claims and mortgages in the amounts allowable by the 
jurisdiction where the administration of the estate occurs. Sub-
sections (b) and ( c) provide now that the e:x.-penses of adminis-
tration of property not subject to claims are also allowable as 
deductions in computing estate taxes to the same extent they 
would have been allowable if the property was subject to claims 
if the payments of the claims are made within the period allowed 
for filing an estate tax return. 
So you would now be able to get estate tax deductions for 
the normal claim, payment of claims, and administration expenses, 
even though the property is not subject to probate. Therefore 
that situation has been corrected. 
With reference to gift taxes, this is the field in which the 
most important change has occurred. Now in the creation of a 
joint tenancy where one tenant furnishes more than his propor-
tionate share of the consideration, the creation of the joint ten-
ancy which previously was considered a gift to the donee joint 
tenant no longer need be considered a gift for gift tax purposes. 
It is still possible to treat the transaction as a gift if the donor 
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chooses to file a gift tax return and so declare ff. If no such 
declaration is made then it is treated as though no gift was made 
at the time the joint tenancy was created. 
In this case when the joint tenancy is terminated a gift is 
deemed to be made to the extent that the donee receives no more 
than his proportional share of his property proportioned in ac-
cordance with the original contribution as consideration in the ac-
quisition of the property. For example, if he had furnished all 
of the consideration in the acquisition of the property, and at the 
termination of the joint tenancy if he receives back all of the 
consideration, then there need be no gift deemed to have occurred 
at either time. 
If, however, his wife receives half of the proceeds when the 
property is sold or when the joint tenancy is terminated, then it 
would be deemed that a gift were made to the wife of one-half of 
the value of the property at the time the joint tenancy was termi-
nated. 
VOICE: Is that limited to joint tenancy by the entire issue? 
JOHN C. MASON: I am not sure. I think it applies to ten-
ancies by the entities, but I was not really conscious of studying 
that part of it. 
VOICE: Could it not apply to father and his sons? 
HALE MCCOWN: I was checking that. At the moment my 
recollection is that it is limited to husband and wife and to real 
estate. It does not apply to joint tenancies between other than 
spouses, if my recollection is right, and it only applies with respect 
to real estate. 
JOHN C. MASON: I am sure that's right, and I am sorry I 
did not make that clear when I was preparing this thing. 
Now here are same factors than which should be considered 
in connection with this joint tenancy between husband and wife, 
real estate between husband and wife, to be precise. 
If the property is held until death there will never be any 
gift tax if no gift tax is declared at the inception of the joint 
tenancy. Therefore it is possible to avoid it altogether. 
If the property is transferred or the joint tenancy is termi-
nated and the property has increased in value, then treating the 
transfer as a gift in time of termination will result in a greater 
gift than if it had been declared a gift at its inception. 
Thus if it is likely that the property will depreciate in value 
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and the joint tenancy will be determined prior to the death of 
either joint tenant, it may be advisable to declare it a gift at the 
time of the inception of the joint tenancy. 
On the contrary, if it is a home, for example, which is likely 
to depreciate in value, then it may be better to wait until the 
termination of the joint tenancy before having any gift declared. 
If the property is treated as a gift when the joint tenancy is 
created and then if upon the sale of the property the donor hus-
band takes back all the proceeds, it will be treated as a second 
gift from the wife to the husband at the termination of the joint 
tenancy because she in effect is giving to him half of the pro-
ceeds, which otherwise would have been treated as belonging to 
her. Thus in that situation there would be a double gift tax. 
One type of problem will doubtless arise. Possibly its solu-
tion will be indicated by the regulations when issued. I ref er to 
a situation where a joint tenancy is created in a resident property 
and no gift is declared at the time of the creation of the joint 
tenancy. Then if the property is sold later and a new home 
purchased, the proceeds of the old home being applied as partial 
payment on the new home, there may be a question as to whether 
the wife received any share of the proceeds of the old home. 
Probably to avoid there being a gift at the time of the second 
transaction it would be well to have the proceeds of the old home 
paid to the husband so that they can be clearly traced and then 
paid by the husband in the purchase of the new home, so that the 
wife does not have any interest in those proceeds. 
In such case I believe that no gift would have been deemed 
to have taken place at any time. Unless the lawyer is closely in 
touch with such a transaction, it is certainly possible that the 
matter could be innocently handled in such a way that the gift 
was deemed to have taken place at the time of the second trans-
action. 
It is hoped that the foregoing analysis will help the Nebraska 
lawyers in guiding their clients in the use properly and effectively 
in joint tenancies. 
LLOYD POSPISHIL: A question. What happens to the mari-
tal deduction in a joint tenancy when a joint will is executed? I 
am thinking of the Autry case; what is the status of that rule now? 
HALE MCCOWN: I am not sure. Unless I am mistaken, so 
far your two circuits are in opposite directions. At the moment 
they are still taking the position at least that a joint will will 
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destroy the marital deduction. Now what the effectiveness of 
it is going to be, I do not know. I think it depends on whether 
there is a contest. I think Dan Stubbs can probably tell you more 
about that than I can. 
What is the present status of the decisions on it? I have 
not checked it for a while. 
DANIEL STUBBS: We are about to get a mandate from the 
Tax Court so far as Nebraska is concerned in line with the Autry 
case. I do not have it yet. They have agreed to it so I don't like 
to get to the-
HALE MCCOWN: We are getting close to closing time. I 
have one or two other topics that I wanted to cover. 
Leo, would you cover the question of transactions between a 
partner and the partnership? 
LEO EISENSTATT: Yes, Hale. 
Going back to the opening remarks, the first topic I covered, 
the code in specific words says that the partnership is a separate 
entity to be considered in the same light as any stranger, and the 
transactions between the partners with the partnership are to be 
treated as if they were disinterested persons, except in a few 
cases. 
Now in this regard you must keep separate the distinction 
between transactions with the partnership and contributions to a 
partnership. If the partner contributes a thousand dollars to a 
partnership for a ten percent interest, that is not a taxable trans-
action. However, if he were to sell an automobile to the partner-
ship for five hundred dollars and receive money for it, that is not 
a contribution but a taxable transaction, and in treating that on 
his return he would consider it just as if he had sold it to any 
stranger. 
Now the1·e are exceptions to when this type of treatment will 
be permitted, and that exception deals with controlled partner-
ships. If a partner owns fifty percent or more of a partnership's 
capital or profits, then he will not be permitted to take any loss on 
that transaction. 
Now the same rule applies to a partnership having trans-
actions with another partnership; if there is a fifty percent owner-
ship factor in both partnerships and then the losses will not be 
recognized or allowed. 
And there is one other situation where the entity rule so far 
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as transactions between partner and partnerships are not recog-
nized, and I suppose that the best example to apply to it would be 
in the case of depreciable business property or a non-capital asset. 
Any gain recognized in a transaction with a partnership in which 
the grantor owns eighty percent of the interest in the capital 
p-r0fits of th€ partnership, why, they tax him as the gain on sueh 
a transaction as ordinary income. And there is the specific pro-
vision in the code and proposed regulations are declaratory of it 
and the examples given in the proposed regulations make that 
clear. 
So keep in mind that partners may, by observing the provi-
sions of this controlled partnership, have their own businesses. 
They can still retain the controlled section and jurisdiction of 
property so, long as they do not involve themselves in the con-
trolled partnership feature, and they can get losses. In other 
words, you have under your control the ability to, in a sense, 
hold onto that asset and at the same time take the partnership 
loss. You can pick it off in a year when your father has a con-
siderable income, for example, take some transaction in which a 
loss would ordinarily be recognized, he does not really want to 
get rid of. The exception to the entity rule then applies strictly 
to recognizing losses in controlled partnerships where the person 
involved owns fifty percent or more of the capital profits. 
HALE MCCOWN: Thanks very much. We are now open for 
questions from the floor. 
VOICE: On the question of joint tenancies, assume that a 
husband buys a piece of real estate for three thousand dollars and 
puts it in his name and his wife's name, and he dies, and upon 
the date of death it is worth ten thousand dollars, and that is all 
of the estate he had; he had no estate; that is all of the property 
he had. 
Does it take the new stepped up basis? 
JOHN C. MASON: Assuming that he bought it after the '54 
code went into effect. That is assuming that the date of death 
was after December 31, '53. 
VOICE: The point of it is, he does not have to have a sh .. ·ty 
thousand dollar estate. 
VOICE: I have a question. I would like to question the panel 
concerning the state tax and income tax deductions. 
If you take the attorney's fees, for example, on the income 
tax deduction, do you have a greater adjusted gross estate in 
figuring the marital deduction? 
360 NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
HALE MCCOWN: John, do you want to answer that one? 
VOICE: Do you follow me? Instead of taking the deduction 
off the estate which you are permitted to do, you take it off the 
income tax. 
JOHN C. MASON: It is a question of whether you have to 
take the deduction in the state tax for the attorney's fees to ad-
just the fees for the purpose of computing marital tax deductions. 
VOICE: I don't know. 
JOHN C. MASON: I would think not. I would think that you 
would only be entitled to take the deductions which you are claim-
ing for estate tax purposes in order to determine the adjustable 
gross estate in order to compute the marital deduction, but it is 
just a guess. I do not know. 
VOICE: Then you can hurt the children. You give the wife 
more-I do not know if that is the law or not, but I will put it 
up to you. 
HALE MCCOWN: I should think as an offhand comment that 
that probably is the situation. You do not use it or claim it; then 
your net and your marital deduction ·would be figured on the 
estate as computed, and it would therefore increase your marital 
deduction. 
VOICE: And injure the people taking the residue. 
JOHN C. MASON: I think that you raised a very interesting 
point which was not really involved in these papers, but it is col-
lateral to what you are talking about when you say it would 
injure the children, for example. I think that there is an area 
which could well be examined by all of us and could well be the 
subject of papers or studies on the duties of an executor or an 
attorney in administering an estate where there can be that sort 
of situation. 
You have conflicting interests between the widow and the 
children. We are concerned with it presently in connection with 
a situation where a formula clause has been used, and you norm-
ally would go into an inheritance tax appraisal, for example, and 
try to get as low a valuation as possible, and in setting up the 
estate tax return you would try to get as low a valuation as possi-
ble on all the property.; but when you have conflicting interests, 
with some- properties going into the marital deduction part of 
the estate and others going into the residuary part of the estate, 
you can not do that because it would hurt somebody, as you say, 
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and what the duties of the various people connected in a fiduciary 
capacity with the administration of the estate are taxed under 
the situation, I am not entirely sure, but it is an interesting prob-
lem to think about and one to be aware of. 
VOICE: If I could comment on that, I think something that 
we can all watch in drafting is to give the executor absolutely dis-
cretionary power to determine whether to take those deductions 
one way or the other, thus avoiding that problem of whether you 
can or cannot do it. 
HALE McCowN: You also get into the problem of income. 
Supposing you have one beneficiary who is entitled to the income, 
and you take the deductions on the income tax return. The effect 
then is a great deal more benefit to that income beneficiary than 
to the residual ones in the estate, no matter who they might be, 
so I do think that those suggestions are good. 
VOICE: It is not conclusive that an asset is worth what it 
brings at public sale under the present law-is that right? 
HALE MCCOWN: Excuse me, I did not get that. 
VOICE: If an asset in an estate is sold at public sale, that 
is not conclusive of its value, is it? 
HALE MCCOWN: Well I would say normally it has been 
treated so. At least the department normally has treated it so. 
You have the provision that if you have a sale within a year that 
value is the value, and of course it would depend on your optional 
valuation date there. Of course that might make a difference, for 
example. 
VOICE: Well I am thinking of unproductive leases, for in-
stance. They get rooked on the appraisement. Now what I 
thought was that the Bar Association ought to get behind the 
proposition and have the Treasury either make a regulation or 
amend the law, if necessary, that if you have an asset in an 
estate which has a potential value, I mean, it has a present value 
if you sell it on the open market, but when you go to appraise it, 
they appraise it on its potential capacity, and a lot of times your 
productive stuff wouldn't be sufficient to pay the inheritance tax 
on an unproductive asset. 
Now why would it not be a good rule and why should we not 
contend for the proposition that if that asset is sold that the 
heirs or beneficiaries could buy it at public sale and that would 
establish the value in order to protect it for the heirs? For in-
stances, on all leases. Now would that make sense? 
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HALE McCowN: Well, I do not know. Again it is a question 
of valuation. There's a factual question, and whenever you have 
a valuation problem you are likely to have some trouble with the 
department. Normally, however, if it has been a public sale I 
do not think they are going to raise too much of a question; if 
you have it limited to the family or something of that sort you 
may have some trouble. 
VOICE: The only time they question it is when part of the 
family buys it at public sale, and they say, "Well, of course, then 
the sale is rigged." If we could get avmy from that thing, I 
vrnuld be happy and satisfied. That is when the department comes 
in and says, "He got what he had in it. He paid a small price 
for it, and we are going to soak him." 
Now why would it not be a good idea for the department to 
make the rules on public sale, make it possible so that you are 
not paying on an unproductive asset, which you would pay the 
present market on it now, but you want the family to have that 
potential? 
HARRY B. COHEN: You would still get away from it if you 
have your public sale and have your family member be the highest 
bidder. 
HALE MCCOWN: I was going to say if I had that situation 
and I had a public sale and somebody bought it at a public sale, 
I would go right ahead with it. 
HARRY B. COHEN: That might be, but you have a lot of 
litigation there. 
VOICE: Why would it not be a good idea to make the recom-
mendation that if an asset is sold at a public sale it establishes 
conclusively its value, which it does not do today. It is the best 
evidence, but it is not conclusive. That is the point I am trying 
to bring out. 
(Thereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the meeting was adjourned.) 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN STANDARD AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 
COVERAGE 
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F. 0. Terbell 
The policy which is the subject matter of this paper is of-
ficially known as "Standard Provisions for Automobile Liability 
Policies." It is the "Fifth Revision" and became effective April 
1, 1955. In promulgating this revision to its membership, the 
Bureaus' interpretive bulletin requires the members for all policies 
written on the older form on or before April 1st and outstanding 
as of that date to interpret such older edition policies with respect 
to accidents occurring on and after April 1st so as to afford any 
broader grants of protection as to the same coverages. The com-
panies rely upon this bulletin because there was not simultaneously 
prepared an amendatory endorsement to be used with the old 
policy until the companies' supplies of those printings were ex-
hausted. On and after July 6, 1955, the Bureau membership are 
required to use the Fifth Revision. 
To fully comprehend the significance of the standard provi-
sions program, a brief look into its historical origin seems worth 
while. In the early '30's and with the rapid growth of automobile 
insurance, all companies were faced with filing problems neces-
sary to meet a multiplicity of state regulations. Even at that 
date approval of policy forms for writing automobile insurance 
was required in a number of states. Almost simultaneously two 
voluntary industry associations, the American Mutual Alliance-
later replaced by the Mutual Casualty Insurance Rating Bureau-
and the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, began explor-
ing a program of policy uniformity for their respective members. 
About the same time the Insurance Section of the American Bar 
Association became interested in related legal problems. Among 
other things, this section set about compiling an annotation of 
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prov1s10ns commonly found in automobile policies. Eventually 
these activities became a united effort from which evolved the 
first standard automobile policy. As the work of developing the 
auto policy progressed, the Bureau committees sought and re-
ceived valuable assistance and advice from representatives of the 
Insurance Section of the American Bar Association as well as 
other interested groups. These various endeavors culminated in 
the first standard provisions automobile policy which became ef-
fective January 1, 1936. 
Viewed in the light of twenty years' experience, the manner 
in which this program has developed, the breadth of its accept-
ance, and the way it functions, particularly in the way of state 
filings, is worthy of some comment. While the standard provi-
sions policy is not a statutory policy such as the standard fire 
policy, at the same time many state insurance laws establish 
standards for writing automobile insurance. It is not uncommon 
for such insurance laws to lay down requirements for prior ap-
proval of policies before they are used by any company.1 The 
more modern insurance rating laws which give recognition to 
rating bureaus acting on behalf of their member companies also 
recite requirements as to policy filings and approval.2 It, there-
fore, is to be observed before standard language is ever used in 
a policy form by any company. It is first filed by the two Bureaus 
with the insurance supervisory authority which in turn approves 
the standard provisions as appropriate policy terminology. Once 
so approved, the Bureaus' instructions to the member companies 
state : "This policy is expressed in standard language which may 
not be amended and no part of which may be altered except .... " 
(The exceptions are noted later.) Therefore under the Standard 
Program, a member company must strictly adhere to the language 
in the several parts of the policy. 
The mandatory aspect of the program has now been sanc-
tioned by state regulations in thirty-odd states. In the areas 
where the standard policies are used, the legal rule for interpret-
ing an insurance police-being the language of the company, is to 
be strictly construed against it-is not in complete harmony with 
l Section 44-34A, Nebraska Insurance Code: "No insurance policy or 
certificate of any kind shall be issued or delivered in this state unless and 
until a copy of the form thereof has been filed with the Department of 
Insurance and approved by it." 
:i Section 44-1412, Nebraska Rating Law 1947: "Beginning ninety days 
after September 7, 1947, no insurer shall make or issue a contract or 
policy except in accordance with filings which are in effect for said in-
surer as provided in Section 44-1401 to 44-1442." 
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the current practice of policy preparation. Rather it approaches 
a legal fiction, for Insurance Department approval is not always 
a simple ministerial function. At numerous points policy langu-
age reflects Departmental rulings. This rule of construction was 
first evolved long before the first standard automobile policy or 
before there was any such orderly process regulating policy termi-
nology. It is not my thought that this rule of construction is to 
be disregarded simply because of increased state regulation of 
insurance generally and policy forms in particular. Is it, never-
theless, not plausible to suggest the very breadth of the acceptance 
of "standard language," coupled with the stamp of approval placed 
thereon by insurance directors, is sufficient to bring this rule of 
strict construction into question? After all, a basic function of 
insurance directors is protecting the public interest. No longer 
is it axiomatic that a Bureau insurance company is solely responsi-
ble for the words in its policy. Gradually and with increasing pre-
valence, courts seem to take judicial notice of the standard char-
acter of the policy before them.3 While most such comments 
have been by way of dicta, at least in a few instances the fact 
that the policy was "standa1·d" appears to have been partially 
persuasive as to the result. 
The modern rating laws, such as Nebraska's, spell out in 
considerable detail the director's responsibility for approving un-
derwriting rules and i·ates applicable to the grants of coverage as 
reflected in the underwriting manuals prepared by the National 
Bureau. Under these rating laws, coupled with Bureau member-
ship, the companies, broadly speaking, are obligated to adhere 
not only to the approved rates but to provide the protection ex-
pressed by those manual rules. In essence, standard provisions 
are the expression of such underwriting bases. In one state at 
least, a court has allowed the introduction of a manual rule by 
way of explanatory proof of the sense of the words used in the 
policy.4 
3 I. L. Logging Co. vs. Manufacturers and ''\'holesalers Indemnity Ex-
change, (Ore. 1954) 275 P. 2d 226. 229; Farm Bureau l\Iutual Auto In-
surance Company vs. :\Iarr (USDC-N.J.-1955) 128 F. Supp, 67, 68; Con-
tinental Casualty Co. Ys. Padgett (USCA-4th Cir.-SC-1955) 219 F. 2d 133, 
137; Seavey vs. Erickson (l\Iinn., 1955) 69 N. W. 2d 889, 891; Koehn vs. 
Union Fire Insurance Co. (1950) 152 Neb. 254; 40 N. W. 2d 874, 878; 
Bazar Ys. Great American Indemnity Co. (N. Y. Ct. App.-1954) 119 N. E. 
2d 346, 4 AC 2d 791. 
4 Kennedy vs. (Amer.) Lumbermens 1\Iutual Casualty Co., 85 NYS 2d 
428. "We conclude the defendant (insurer) by adopting the rule (Under-
writing Manual) followed by annexing the amendatory endorsement . . . 
extending the policy . . . fully intended to make that rule applicable to 
Insuring Agreement V of the policy." 
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It may be well to emphasize this is a program of "standard 
provisions" rather than "standard policies." Under the previously 
noted exception in the general instructions, companies are given 
options for including or omitting any major insuring agreement 
and all policy provisions relating solely to that class of insurance. 
Moreover, the companies are allowed certain latitudes as to the 
arrangement of the several parts of the policy. In a few in-
stances they have the option of combining provisions. For ex-
ample, the limits of liability may be stated either as a policy con-
dition or as an integral part of an insuring agreement. 
Turning directly to the changes brought about in the Fifth 
Revision, one of the most significant innovations is in the defini-
tion of "insured." If the named insured is an individual, his 
resident spouse is given approximately an equal status. The resi-
dent spouse no longer need prove the actual use of the automobile 
was with the named insured's permission, express or implied. 
Furthermore, the resident spouse can now extend permission to 
another so that such permissive user becomes an "insured." This 
extension of coverage to the spouse is further reflected in a com-
parable provision in the basic medical payments. The same intent 
is reflected in modifications made in the "temporary substitute," 
the "newly acquired" and the "use of other automobiles" provi-
sions. 
The definition of "insured" makes the policy applicable to 
many persons or interests other than the named insured. The 
inclusion of such multiple interests in the term "the insured" has 
created interpretive problems. Questions such as: Are the omni-
bus insured's rights the equivalent of the named insured's? Con-
versely, does the inclusion of these additional insureds curtail the 
rights of the named insured? Does a breach of the policy by one 
insured affect the coverage afforded another? Does the policy 
afford coverage to an omnibus insured for a claim made by the 
named insured? Heretofore a determination of these questions 
turned on whether the policy was so drawn as to treat all in-
sureds as a class or as individual interests; whether "the insured" 
should be interpreted severally or joint and several.5 On this 
u For an able discussion of the principle of severability, see "Who is 
the Insured in the Automobile Policy?" by Norman E. Risjord, General 
Counsel, Employers Insurance Corp., and June i\I. Austin. 5 Fed. of In-
surance Counsel 52, 61, 1954. Cited with approval in Employers Mutual 
Ys. Byers. 114 A. 2d 888. 
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point there has been a difference of judicial opinion.6 
For the Standard Provisions policies, such questions have 
been resolved by the insertion of a new condition, Severability of 
Interest. This condition negates the class construction by specific-
ally saying, "The term 'the insured' is used severally and not 
collectively .... " This means all policy provisions applicable to 
liability coverage are to be construed according to the particular 
insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought. The 
change which has been effected by this new condition can be best 
illustrated by the much discussed case, Standard SU1·ety vs. Mary-
land Casualty, 119 NYS 2d 795. Here the holder of a general 
liability policy and the owner of a steam-shovel sought protection 
as an omnibus insured under an automobile policy because of an 
injury to the truck driver, an employee of the named insured in 
an automobile policy. The truck driver's injury occurred in the 
process of unloading the steam shovel. The automobile insurer 
argued the omnibus clause did not apply because, by virtue of 
the employee exclusion, the named insured would be denied cover-
age if the same claim were being made against him. In uphold-
ing the denial, the court said, "The purpose of the exclusion is 
to exclude certain risks or probabilities of injury which the in-
surer considered too great to cover. . . . The risk was not that 
an injured employee of an insured would sue or otherwise claim 
against his own employer, but that the employee of any user of the 
'insured' vehicle would be injured. The exclusion ... should be 
interpreted in terms of injuries to be excluded, not in terms of 
the persons who are to be indemnified." Subsequent to this deci-
sion and before the new automobile policy was promulgated, the 
two Bureaus issued an interpretive bulletin expressing the under-
writing intent on which the severability condition is predicated by 
stating the exclusion in question is to be interpreted severally so 
that it will apply only to the interest against whom the claim is 
made or suit is brought. This bulletin, issued in face of the afore-
mentioned contrary judicial expression, as an implement of the 
standard provisions program, has legal significance. It makes 
clear the severability condition is to be considered as replacing 
the judicial interpretation found in Standard Surety and other 
6 Pullen vs. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. (La. App.), 72 So. 
2d 353; Associated Indemnity Corp. vs. Wachsmith (Wash.) 99 P. 2d 
420, 127 ALR 531; Standard Surety and Casualty Co. vs. Maryland Casual-
ty Co., 100 NYS 2d 79; Continental Casualty Co. vs. Pierce (Miss.) 154 
So. 279; Purcell vs. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of N. Y. (Texas) 
260 S. W. 2d 134; Kaifer vs. Georgia Casualty Co., 67 F. 2d 309; Shanahan 
vs. Midland Coach Lines (Wisc.) 67 N. W. 2d 297; Employers' Mutual 
Liability Insurance Co. vs. Byers (N. H.) 114 A. 2d 888. 
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similar cases. In fact after the Standard Surety case the Bureaus 
participated amicus curiae in another New York case involving an 
analogous point arising from a suit by a named insured against 
an omnibus insured. This decision supported the severability 
principle. 7 
The proposition that the insurer's duty to defend is only co-
extensive with its obligation to pay on behalf of the insured, with 
a few minor exceptions, has been generally recognized.8 A test 
most commonly applied by the courts in deciding whether the 
insurer correctly refuses to def end a suit is to look at the allega-
tions in the complaint. If those allegations state a cause of ac-
tion within the coverage, the insurer is bound to def end even 
though the facts of its investigation point to an ultimate possi-
bility of no coverage. As a corollary, it was also believed an 
insurer was not required to def end additional actions if its policy 
limit had been exhausted.9 In fact some companies held to the 
view that, after exhausting the limits in payment of judgments 
or settlements of claims, they were entitled to return pending 
lawsuits to the policyholder if in doing so, his rights were not 
prejudiced. 
In American Employers vs. Gobel, 131 NYS 2d 393, the court 
took exception to these general principles. After characterizing 
as frivolous and captious arguments that the duty to defend was 
no broader than the duty to pay, it concluded that, even though 
the total ad damnum on eleven suits already filed far exceeded 
the policy limit and more suits were anticipated, the insurer was 
nevertheless obliged to def end at least the pending actions. This 
decision, among other cases, cites Michigan Poultry vs. Hawkeye 
Casualty, 298 N. W. 114. The court in this suit strongly relied 
upon the introductory wording of an older defense agreement: 
"It is further agreed that as respects insurance afforded by this 
policy ... the company shall ... " The justice in the Gobel case 
did not take into account this introductory statement had been 
changed to "as respects such insurance as is afforded by other 
7 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. vs. General Casualty of America, N. Y. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. (l\Iay 10, 1955) 23 L. W. 2613, 140 NYS 2d 670. In 
considering the coverage agreement with the definition of insured, the 
court concluded, "They express an undertaking on the part of the com-
pany to indemnify an authorized user . . . regardless of who makes the 
claim against him. The coverage afforded is full and complete. . . . " 
s "Insurer's Duty to Defend," J. P. Faude, Assistant General Counsel, 
Aetna Casualty Company, Jnsumnce C01msel Jow"?W..l, Vol. XV, Oct. 1948, 
p, 331. 
9 Lumbermens l\Iutual Casualty Company vs. :McCarthy, SA 2d 750. 
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terms of this policy ... the company shall ... " This change made 
in 1946, with the expectation of overcoming the Michigan Poultry 
decision, was an attempt to state more clearly the defense agree-
ment and the undertaking to pay damages are not several and 
independent. In American Casualty vs. Howa,,rd (USCA 4th Cir.) 
187 Fed. 2d 322, after the peliey limit had been exhausted, the 
court did not agree that the insurer was relieved under its agree-
ment " ... to defend any suit," etc., and e:ll..-pressed belief in the 
proposition that the defense agreement was independent of other 
related coverage provisions in the policy. 
Largely as a result of the Howard and Gobel decisions, an-
other editorial refinement has been made in the introductory 
statement of the defense agreement. In addition, the subsections 
have been re-arranged. The subsections relating to the def ending 
of litigation have been separated from the provision for supple-
mentary payment such as bond premiums, court costs, interest, 
immediate medical and other expenses. The concluding provision 
which refers to applicable limits of liability now modifies only 
the supplementary payments subsection. By implication, the de-
fense agreement in subsection (a) is, therefore, subject to the 
applicable limit of liability. 
The definition of "automobile" is a vital insuring agreement 
of this policy. This edition accomplishes a number of editorial 
refinements. Only three points of significance will be mentioned. 
All previous policies required the automobile covered be described 
by motor or serial number in the declarations. The companies 
now have the option of preparing a policy either on a described-
car basis as in the past or, if they so desire, incorporating addi-
tional language in the described auto definition: ". . . or, if none 
is so described, any private passenger automobile owned on the 
effective date of this policy by the named insured or by his spouse 
if a resident of the same household." For the no-description 
policy, there are two additional provisions. First, a declaration 
by the insured of the total number of owned private passenger 
automobiles on the effective date of the policy. Second, a defini-
tion of "private passenger automobile." 
The definition of "automobile" has further been expanded 
with regard to trailers. This definition has been broadened to in-
clude any non-described trailer which is designed for use with 
a private passenger automobile if it (1) is being used w~th either 
a private passenger automobile for either business or non-business 
purposes or (2) is being used with a commercial or truck-type 
automobile for non-business purposes only. These qualifications 
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are stated negatively so the coverage continues while a trailer is 
not attached to a commercial automobile. The effect of this 
change is to provide liability insurance without additional prem-
ium charge not only for the utility trailer but also for the home 
trailer which was formerly excepted from this definition. 
The newly acquired automobile definition has been changed. 
"Acquired" still implies ownership must arise subsequent to the 
effective date of the policy. It still distinguishes between a new 
automobile replacing the described automobile and the one which 
is an additional automobile. For the replacement automobile the 
coverage is fully automatic without any time requirement of no-
tice. For the replacement automobile there is no requirement 
the company insure all owned automobiles. If it is an additional 
automobile, automatic insurance will be afforded provided (1) 
all automobiles owned by both the named insured and spouse on 
the date of the delivery of the new automobile are covered by the 
company and (2) thirty days' notice of acquisition is given. 
The language of this revised agreement should be distin-
guished from that in older policies which were the basis of two 
decisions in your jurisdiction. In Home Mutual vs. Rose, 150 Fed. 
2d 201, the court concluded the reference to insuring all owned 
automobiles signified that portion of the agreement was to apply 
only if the contract had been prepared as a "blanket policy." In 
an insurance man's vernacular, the term "blanket policy" is unfor-
tunate because it is used to characterize a policy embracing a 
hazard by a class description and without identifying the units 
falling within such class. Excepting the no-description option for 
individually owned private-passenger automobiles, this policy 
never functions as a blanket policy in that it requires a specific 
description of all vehicles insured. Fundamentally, the court was 
right in the Rose case, but its language may lead to confusion 
because at least one standard reference work has adopted the 
Rose opinion without any editorial comment.10 
In Koehn vs. Union Fire, 40 N. W. 2d 874, an insured, under 
a policy describing a pleasure car, acquired an additional com-
mercial automobile. The opinion stresses the policy provision 
which said coverage applies only " ... to the extent applicable to 
all such previously owned automobiles. . . ." Since the purpose 
of use for the described car was pleasure and business and since 
the policy draws a distinction between such use and commercial 
use, the court concludes coverage was not to be extended to the 
10 See annotation 34 A.L.R. 2d 936. The text also quotes the First 
Edition provision which has long since been replaced. 
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additional commercial vehicle. This agreement is no longer limited 
to the extent coverage was initially provided for owned automo-
biles; therefore we no longer expect to get the result of the 
Koehn case. 
From its inception the automobile liability coverage agree-
ments read '' ... because of injury ... caused by accident." Vari-
ous aspects of the meaning of "accident" have been before the 
courts on innumerable occasions. Time permits consideration of 
only one aspect which until comparatively recently had seemed to 
be relatively free from dou}?t. The auto policy, like the other 
liability policies, state limits of liability for the bodily injury 
coverage in terms of "each person" and "each accident" and for 
property damage liability in the terms of "each accident" only. 
In the middle .'20's a California court was presented with a 
question11 of applying the property damage limit to a multiple-
claimant case. In this litigation the insured's automobile struck 
another vehicle, damaging its steering mechanism and causing a 
collision with a third. The question was, was this one accident 
or two? The majority answered "one accident," reasoning the 
term referred to the cause and not the resulting damage or injury. 
Stressing the cause rather than the resulting injury is entirely in 
harmony with the use of" ... because of injury ... caused by 
accident" in the standard liability agreements. This phraseology 
has been purposely used to overcome decisions under the older 
insuring agreements which read "accidentally sustained" or "acci-
dentally suffered" and which had been interpreted from the 
viewpoint of the person injured. 
Anticipating St. Paul vs. Rutland, ................ Fed. 2d ............... . 
(August 24, 1955), the California court observed, "It would no 
more be correct to say of such a case that there were two acci-
dents than it would be to predicate two or more accidents on a 
general freight train wreck merely because two or more cars in 
the train might have been demolished in the same catastrophe." 
The case of Anchor Ca.sualty vs. McCaleb, 178 Fed. 2d 322, 
arose under a general liability policy covering oil-well drilling 
operations. The policy had both an "each accident" and an "aggre-
gate" property damage liability limit. There is some dispute on 
the facts, but it seems that as the result of a blowout the well 
spewed sand, mud, oil, etc., on the adjoining property. The well 
was out of control some fifty hours, during which time the wind 
shifted, thus bringing about claims by the owners and the ten-
11 See Hyer vs. Inter-Insurance Exchange 246 P1055. 
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ants of several pieces of property. The following is the signific-
ant statement on the limits question : "The blowing out of the 
well was not a single accident but a series of events, a catastrophe. 
Numerous accidents were the product of this motivating force 
and the wind as a supervening force. The eruptions continued 
intermittently for over two days; and during this period the wind 
changed from time to time blowing mud and sand on different 
properties. The wording 'each accident' as used in the policy, 
must be construed from the point of view of the person whose 
property was injured." One of the statements relied upon is 
from Couch.12 
Now in the Rutland case the insured motorist collided with 
a freight train, causing a wreck. As a result of that wreck, cars 
owned by sixteen different carriers were damaged and, in addi-
tion, there was damage to the operating railroad's right of way. 
The automobile policy had an "each accident" property damage 
limit of $5,000. The court was called upon to determine whether 
the insurer was liable for only $5,000 or whether the limit was 
to be applied repeatedly to the claim of each owner. In its ori-
ginal opinion of December 15, 1954, one panel of judges in the 
fifth circuit, relying on the same statement from Couch and a 
:::iimilar statement from Corpus Juris, concluded the policy was 
"strongly indicative of an intention to provide coverage for sP.veral 
or any number of accidents which may happen in a single wreck 
or other occurrence." The court cites McCaleb with approval. 
Upon granting of a petition for rehearing, the original opin-
ion was withdrawn. The case was heard by another panel, and 
a second opinion reversing the earlier holding was filed August 
24, 1955. In the second opinion the court observed, " ... when 
ordinary people speak of an 'accident' in the usual sense, they 
are ref erring to a single, sudden, unintentional occurrence. They 
normally use the word 'accident' to describe the event no matter 
how many persons or things are involved." Judge Dawkins goes 
on to observe that, in the absence of cited cases, the court would 
be obliged to conclude it was the intention of the parties to this 
policy that the word "accident" be given that meaning; that the 
policy in question had three different coverages, one a bodily in-
jury liability coverage which was on an occurrence basis, an-
other being automobile property damage liability which was on 
12 Cyclopedia- of Insurance Law, Volume 5, page 4136. "If one cause 
operates upon several at one time, it cannot be regarded as a single inci-
dent, but injury to each individual is a separate accident." Couch cites 
only an old English case: South Staffordshire Tramways Co., Ltd., vs. 
The Sickness and Accident Assurance Association, Ltd., (1891) 1 Q. B. 402. 
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an each-accident basis, and the third being a property damage 
other than automobile subject to both an each-accident and to an 
aggregate limit. The difference in the treatment of the limits 
in the various insuring agreements was commented upon as mani-
festing an intended difference. Finally, he concluded that the word 
"accident" as used in the declarations is intended to be interpreted 
from the standpoint of cause rather than effect. 
In disposing of the McCaleb case, the court points out the 
factual difference by observing the damage resulted from a series 
of events rather than a single collision. Stress is placed upon 
the "catastrophe" aspect of the oil-well blowout. This is the rule 
which is expected to prevail under the new limits condition which 
states the declared limit comprehends "all dama.ges arising out 
of the injury to or destruction of all property of one or more 
persons or organizations, including the loss of use thereof, as the 
result of any one accident." 
While the Rutland case was pending on rehearing, two other 
cases arose. One is Truckers InsU?·ance Exchange vs. Rohde, Su-
perior Court, Yakima County, Washington. Rohde, while driving 
down the highway, met three motorcycles. The first two motor-
cycles each had a passenger in addition to the operator. The first 
motorcycle collided with Rohde's vehicle, caromed into the second 
motorcycle and collided with the third. Two of the cyclists were 
killed. At the time of this accident the policy was on an occurr-
ence basis, but subsequently it was amended by endorsement to 
"each person," "each accident." In his opinion the trial justice 
discusses the multiple-accident question from the standpoint of 
the people injured, reaching the conclusion there was an accident 
or occurrence on each impact. Reference is made to both McCaleb 
and Rutland.13 This litigation is still pending. 
There is also pending in a Federal District Court in Pennsyl-
vania the case of Tri-State Roofing Company vs. New Amsterdam. 
which was held on the docket for decision on the rehearing in 
the Rutland case and from last 1·eport is still pending. 
To summarize, it seems fair to observe that this new limits 
condition, by its very difference in treatment of multiple claim-
ants, in contrast with the similar condition for bodily injury, 
creates a clearly discernible distinction. For the bodily injury 
liability, the limits condition first treats the individual claim-
ant's situation and then makes the proviso for each accident sub-
13 The Court also considered: Bruener vs. Twin City Fire, 222 P. 2d 
833; Perkins vs. Fireman's Fund, 112 P. 2d 670. 
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ject to the each-person qualification. The property damage limit 
says the each-accident limit shall always be applicable irrespec-
tive of the number of persons whose property is damaged in a 
single happening or accident. 
In speaking of the financial responsibility (F. R.) condition 
of the policy, it is necessary to distinguish between the "security" 
provisions and the "proof" provisions of these statutes. Some of 
the confused thinking concerning this condition may be attribut-
able to court decisions which are not crystal clear as to which 
section of the law is being applied. In fact, some cases seem to 
treat decisions under motor vehicle carrier laws as authority in 
passing upon the effect of the financial responsibility condition. 
Such a construction is contrary to the policy drafters' intent. In 
examining judicial interpretation of this condition, it is necessary 
to distinguish between the older type F. R. laws and the more 
modern safety responsibility laws. Most of the older statutes 
contain only proof provisions applicable to future accidents. By 
far the greater number of decisions construing the automobile 
policy arose under the older type law.14 
The "security" provision of an F. R. law comes into play 
when an accident occurs by calling for evidence of existing in-
surance. Evidence of such insurance counteracts the penalty 
feature in the proof section. Many of these F. R. laws specify a 
standard provisions automobile liability policy with stated limits 
as adequate evidence of security. Such evidence of insurance 
under this section is usually designated as an "SR-21." An SR-21 
simply means the motorist voluntarily carries automobile liability 
insurance. The security provisions of an F. R. law do not inter-
fere with the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. 
The policy exclusions and conditions are controlling as to the 
insured, the insurer and the injured third person. They are not 
affected by either the F. R. condition or F. R. statutes. 
H Specific authorities have not been cited, rather the reader is referred 
to "Analysis of Policy Defenses under F. R. Laws," Allan P. Gowan, In-
surance Counsel Journal, Vol. XXI, July, 1954, page 295. 
Later decisions: New Zealand Insurance Co. vs. Holloway (La.) 123 
F. Supp. 642; held unless policy was actually a required policy, the F. R. 
law was inapplicable. 
Tri-State Insurance Co. vs. Ford, 120 F. Supp. 118; held the Texas 
F. R. law did not abrogate a defense of misrepresentation of prior can-
cellation as against injured third persons. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange vs. Ledesma, 214 F. 2d 495; the court 
concluded insurer by policy terms had assumed an absolute liability even 
though the F. R. law did not apply to the first accident but cites no au-
thorities supporting the decision. 
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The "proof" provisions of the F. R. law pertain to future 
accidents. They either apply after an accident in which the 
motorist was uninsured or in some states apply because of a con-
viction of a motor vehicle violation. To satisfy the proof pro-
visions, most statutes characterize the policy as a "motor vehicle 
liability pa!iey." Certification of the policy t0 some state authori-
ty is usually required. Such a certificate is commonly known as 
an "SR-22." In keeping with the concept these statutes are 
designed for, the protection of the accident victim, such a certi-
fied policy in a sense becomes a statutory policy because now the 
insurer's liability is controlled by the terms of the statute relat-
ing to motor vehicle liability policies rather than the terms of 
the policy.rn The terms of the statute will often result in the 
abrogation of one or more limitations in the policy. Usually it 
is expected that at least some, if not all, of the policy def ens es are 
not available to the company in an action brought by the injured 
person or judgment creditor. When the policy is actually certi-
fied to the state authority and only as to accidents occurring 
thereafter does the financial responsibility condition operate to 
vary other terms of the policy. To clarify this intention, the 
Fifth Revision modifies the opening statement in this condition 
by saying, "When this policy is certified as proof of financial 
responsibility for the future . . .. " To distinguish from the se-
curity situation, the word "proof" is used because that is the 
term employed by most F. R. laws. For the certified policy, the 
condition in effect reads the proof section of the statute into 
the policy without the attachment of an endorsement amending 
it to conform to the wording of the statute. 
These remarks, lengthy though they may seem, by no means 
cover all the Fifth Revision changes or the reasoning behind 
them. In the allotted time I have sought to highlight those changes 
believed to have the greatest over-all significance. In selecting 
the changes discussed, I have tried to demonstrate that some are 
aimed to clarify the policy on points that have been troublesome 
in litigation. Others represent the evolutionary process by which 
the companies try to meet the public's desire for more complete 
protection. 
Any member of the Joint Forms Committee, the drafters of 
the standard provisions, I am sure, would readily concede that 
the Fifth Revision is not a complete answer even to all the cur-
15 For a more comprehensiYe study, see "The l\Iotor Vehicle Liability 
Policy under Financial Responsibility Laws" by Edward F. Earle, In-
surance Law Journal, 1953, 678-684. 
376 NEBRASKA ST ATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
rent problems. The standard provisions policy is not a static 
contract. The work of the committee is a continuous process 
carried on by correspondence and by periodical meetings in which 
members pool their experience to meet insurance needs. Believe it 
or not, theirs is not a narrow company point of view. If some 
changes appear to make the policy language more complex, con-
sider that no small part of this complexity is attributable to 
broader coverage. 
intention of the parties is a basic element of contracts. Just 
as it must be translated clearly and concisely into the covenants 
of a lease by an attorney anticipating legal and practical prob-
lems unforeseen by the parties thereto, in a like manner the Forms 
Committee seeks to weave the same elements and safeguards in-
to an insurance policy. The difference is only one of degree, for 
in no other private legal document is the expression of intent 
subject to such precise and technical scrutiny. All or many parts 
of standard provisions annually find their way into literally mil-
lions of contracts and, as a consequence, unanticipated factual 
situations are bound to arise. When such situations arise, you 
gentlemen aid in arriving at the answers. So it is with a degree 
of pride and perhaps relief that the legal profession, the insurance 
industry and our committee take note that only a minute per-
centage of these policies are ever presented to a court of last 
reso1·t for interpretation. 
THE TAXATlON OF LIFE INSURANCE-
WHERE DO WE STAND NOW? 
By 
Irving V. Brunstrom 
Within the past fifteen years the subject of taxation has 
become one of ever-increasing importance to both lawyers and 
laymen. Almost no business deal of any consequence is executed 
without some consideration of the taxes which may accrue as a 
result of the transaction. A flood of literature on taxation has 
been one outgrowth of this change in the American scene. Books, 
articles and pamphlets pour from the presses, discussing one or 
another of the technical phases of taxation, and the literature on 
the taxation of life insurance has been no exception. The im-
portance of life insurance and annuities as the foundation for 
even the most modest estate is almost universally recognized to-
day, and the impact of taxes on life insurance necessarily is the 
subject of closer scrutiny than was the case thirty, or even twenty, 
years ago. Loose-leaf services, books and papers without num-
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her have been published on the subject of making the best use of 
life insurance and annuities, and the attendant tax consequences. 
This being true, what contribution can be made by another 
paper traversing such a well travelled road? One answer oc-
curred; instead of placing under the microscope some technical 
minutiae of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or discussing the 
uses of business insurance, for example, it might be worth while 
to discard the laboratory equipment. Instead of examining the 
needles on one branch of a pine tree, let us climb a hill and look 
at the forest for a moment. To vary the metaphor, some of us 
may have become like some doctors, specialists on the left nostril 
only. It is difficult to retain a sense of perspective looking at 
the left nostril, so let us back away and look at the whole animal. 
A life insurance company has two sources of funds: prem-
iums, and return on invested moneys. Any tax on a life insurance 
company or on the funds paid to policyholders and beneficiaries 
therefore must be imposed on one or both of these sources. There 
are no other accumulations against which to levy a tax. These 
facts may seem so patently obvious that they need not be said, 
but once stated clearly, it also becomes obvious that a legislative 
body must decide which of the two sources is to be taxed. Also 
a tax of a certain type might be constitutional if levied against 
premiums, for example, and unconstitutional if levied against in-
come. A lack of understanding of these fundamentals may, and 
in the past has, led to confusion and uncertainty. 
For example, the United States levies an income tax on life 
insurance companies. The Congress has struggled with this prob-
lem for forty-six years, and at the present time is re-examining 
the whole theory of a proper basis for the tax. In this instance 
the difficulty is basic: What is the income of a life insurance 
company? Assuming, as Congress does, that it is proper to im-
pose an income tax on life insurance companies, then Congress 
has the power, under the sixteenth amendment, to impose a tax 
only upon income, and not upon capital. All that need be deter-
mined is the net income of the company. How has Congress an-
swered the question? 
The Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 imposed a tax up-
on "every corporation, joint stock company or association, organ-
ized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares, 
and every insurance company .... "1 The basis of the tax for 
insurance companies as well as for other corporations was the 
" ... entire net income ... from all sources." Under the revenue 
l Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, Sec. 38. 
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acts of 1913, 1916, 1917 and 1918 this continued to be the basis.2 
How did the two sources of funds, premiums and investment re-
turn, fare under these laws? For the eleven years 1909-1920 the 
gross income of life insurance companies was considered to be 
their total revenue from the operation of the business and of their 
income from all other sources within the taxable year. Premiums 
were included in gross income, with claims paid on policies being 
allowed as a deduction. Immediately a controversy arose over 
the question whether that portion of the premium income returned 
to policyholders as dividends was to be excluded from gross in-
come. The insurance companies, of course, contended that such 
dividends were merely the result of a deliberate overcharge and 
hence were not taxable as income to the company. In 1911 the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared that these dividends 
were not merely the return of an overcharge, but were distri-
butions of surplus derived not only from overcharges but from 
all sources of company income.3 However this theory was aban-
doned in the succeeding law. The government conceded that there 
should be full deduction of dividends. 
Another phase of the same problem came up in connection 
with dividends applied to pay renewal premiums, to shorten the 
premium-paying or endowment period, or to purchase paid-up 
additions. Here the insurance companies argued that such divi-
dends did not constitute income in the year they were so applied 
by the company, and should not be included in determining tax-
able income for the year in which they were so applied. The 
commissioner ruled adversely to the companies4 on the ground 
that dividends transferred back to the company at the direction 
of the policyholder constituted new taxable income received in the 
year of application, even though the possession of the dividends 
had been received by the company in a previous year and had re-
mained in the company during the year they were applied to pay 
renewal premiums, shorten the premium-paying or endowment 
period, or purchase paid-up additions. The courts, however, did 
not sustain the commissioner.0 
2 Tariff Act of 1913, Sec. IIB (1); Rev. Act of 1916, Sec. 10; Rev. 
Act of 1917. Sec. 1206 (1); Rev. Act of 1918, Secs. 213 and 233 (a) (1). 
3 T.D. 1743, Treas. Dec. under Int. Rev. Law of the U.S., v. 14 (1911), 
p. 134, at 136, 137. 
4 Supm, note 3. 
:; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. vs. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (D.C.N.J. 1912), 
aff. 201 Fed. 918, cert. den. 231 U.S. 755; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
vs. Eaton, 218 Fed. 188 (D.C. Conn. 1914); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. 
Eaton, 218 Fed. 206 (D.C. Conn. 1914); Fink vs. Northwestern Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 267 Fed. 968 (1920). 
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A second problem which arose under the 1909-1920 type of 
income tax on insurance companies was the deduction allowed for 
net additions to reserves required by law. The questions were 
what was meant by the word "reserve" and what reserves were 
"required by law." The argument raged for years, and resulted 
in a. series of administrative rulings and court decisions not neces-
sary to detail here. 6 Mention is made of these two problems only 
to point up the fact that by 1921 it was considered advisable to 
abandon the philosophy of taxing life insurance companies under 
the general corporate tax law. The general corporate approach 
was criticized at that time on practical grounds: 
(1) There were constant disagreements between the Treasury 
Department and life insurance companies. 
(2) In a desire to avoid litigation the companies submitted 
to many demands which they deemed unfair. 
(3) When principles involving large amounts of tax were 
involved, litigation was undertaken at great expense to 
policyholders. 
( 4) After eleven years of experience during which com-
panies were taxed on supposed net income, there were 
still many matters in dispute. 
There were also theoretical grounds for criticism: 
(1) There was doubt about the constitutionality of the law. 
Under the sbd;eenth amendment, Congress is not free to 
declare that to be income which is not income. Serious 
question existed about the right of the government to 
tax premiums to a life insurance company as income, 
particularly in the case of a mutual company. 
(2) The tax did not bear equally upon different companies. 
(3) It did not provide any certainty of income to the govern-
ment. 
(4) The amount of tax was not easily determinable, and 
when determined was not a tax on net income. 
( 5) The tax was collectible only after heavy e::qlense by both 
companies and government. 
61\fut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. vs. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (1912); Reg. 33. 
Art. 147(d); Reg. 33 (revised), Art. 240; Reg. 45, Art. 569; Maryland 
Cas. Co. vs. U.S., 251 U.S. 342, 40 S. Ct. 155, 64 L. ed. 297 (1920); O.D. 
427, C.B. 2, p. 216 (1920) and L.O. 1032, C.B. 2, p. 216 (1920); Fink 
vs. Northwestern l\Iut. Life Ins. Co., 267 Fed. 968 (1920); U.S. vs. Boston 
Ins. Co., 269 U.S. 197, 46 S. Ct. 91, 70 L. ed. 232 (1925); l\Iinn. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. vs. U.S., 66 Ct. Cl. 481, cert. den. 279 U.S. 856, 49 S. Ct. 
352, 73 L. ed. 998 (1929). 
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Therefore in 1920 three suggestions were made for a sub-
stitue for the general corporate approach. The first was a direct 
tax on premiums. The second was a tax upon the amount of in-
surance issued. The third was a tax on so-called free interest 
income. The only virtue of the first two approaches was sim-
plicity. Speaking of a federal tax on premiums, this comment 
was made: 
A very serious objection is that the burden would be very unevenly 
distributed, and it would fall with greatest weight upon the 
younger and smaller companies whose interest income is small 
compared with their premium income. The older companies with 
many policies carrying high reserves naturally have a much larger 
proportionate interest income than the young companies. Further-
more the older companies have upon their books a great many 
paid-up policies from which a large interest income is derived, 
but no premium income. The young companies have very few 
such policies. A premium tax would also bear heavily upon in-
dustrial insurance.7 
With reference to the second proposal, a tax on the amount 
of insurance issued, objection was made that the entire burden 
would be placed on new policyholders, and the greatest burden 
would fall upon those insured under the cheaper plans. The 
younger and smaller companies would be at a disadvantage com-
pared with older and larger companies, as would companies issu-
ing nonparticipating insurance as against those doing a business 
on the participating plan. Further, the cost of industrial insur-
ance would be greatly increased. 
Both of these proposed taxes would have departed from the 
income type of tax, and would have been excise or franchise taxes. 
The third suggestion, for taxing so-called free investment in-
come, had been made in 1918 by the Senate Finance Committee. 
The recommendation was adopted by the Senate but was rejected 
by the Conference Committee. In 1921 the reasoning underlying 
the free investment income approach was given in the Senate Fin-
ance Committee hearing by Dr. T. S. Adams, tax adviser of the 
Treasury Department. Investment income, by definition, included 
only interest, dividends and rents, while capital gains and any 
other type of income generally regarded as investment income 
were excluded. Deductions included investment expenses and 
amounts representing investment income needed for policy and 
'Proc. Assn. Life Ins. Pres. 1920, p. 142. See this paper also for 
general discussion of 1909-1920 period. See also Preliminary Report on 
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance C01npanies to the Joint Connnittee on 
Internal Revenue, 71st Cong. (1929). 
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other obligations.8 In essence this was the theory adopted in 
1921. However, since state laws fixed minimum standards for 
reserves, and many companies, in the interest of conservatism, 
set up higher reserves with consequent lower interest require-
ments, it was deemed fair to grant the same reserve interest de-
duction to all companies. This was done to avoid abvious dis-
crimination and the penalizing of conservatism. As Dr. Adams 
said: 
It has been suggested-and I think it is obviously sound-that 
the only true basis of income of a life insurance company is its 
investment income-interest, dividends and rents it receives. The 
premium payments it gets are a good deal like a bank deposit. 
When it takes them over it creates an obligation such as the 
obligation of a bank to return a deposit when it is called for.9 
This about-face in the philosophy of life insurance company 
taxation illustrates strikingly what may occur if sight is lost of 
the two sources of funds with which this discussion began. As 
Dr. Adams admitted in 1921, the inclusion of premium receipts in 
the gross taxable income of life insurance companies was "one 
of the faultiest parts of the income tax act."10 The Supreme 
Court of the United States some years later recognized this when 
it said: 
It had long been pointed out to Congre:;s that these receipts, ex-
cept as to a very minor proportion of each premium, were not true 
income but were analogous to permanent capital investment.11 
Since 1921, therefore, "life insurance companies" and "in-
surance companies other than life or mutual" have been taxed 
under provisions of revenue acts and the Internal Revenue Codes 
of 1939 and 1954 which are applicable specifically to such com-
panies. 
Some little space has been devoted to this history for pur-
poses of illustration, as the whole concept of life insurance com-
pany taxation is again under examination.12 There is some rea-
son to believe that governmental representatives are inclined to 
s Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance ( 67th Cong., 1st 
sess.) on H.R. 8245 (1921), p. 83. 
9 Ibid., p. 83. 
10 Supra, note 9. 
11 Helvering vs. Oregon l\Iut. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 267, at 269, 61 S. 
Ct. 207, at 208, 85 L. ed. 180 (1940). 
12 See "A Preliminary Statement of the Facts and Issues With Respect 
to the Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies," Nov. 1954, pre-
pared by the staff of the Subcommittee on the Taxation of Life Insurance 
Companies, House ·ways and Means Committee. 
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favor taxing "life insurance companies upon their total income 
from all sources in the same manner as other corporations. Tax-
able income, in general, would consist of premiums and investment 
income less (1) expenses and other deductions as provided in the 
Internal Revenue Code for corporations generally; (2) total 
amounts paid to policyholders by reason of death, maturity, or 
otherwise, including policy dividends; and (3) net increases in 
policy reserves excluding increases in contingent surplus reserves. 
An approach similar in principle but different in application gov-
ened the taxation of life insurance companies from 1913 through 
1920."13 (Emphasis supplied.) If this proposal should be adopted, 
we shall then have come the full circle, from a tax conceived in 
ignorance and buried in collapse, through one radically different 
in theory, back to the original concept refined as to details but 
similar in principle. The outcome will be of interest to every 
life insurance policyholder. 
Is this discussion of interest to the practicing lawyer? Per-
haps only insofar as he is interested in the theory and philosophy 
of taxation. This paper assumed such an interest at the outset. 
But perhaps there are more applications of historical surveys of 
tax theory than may appear at first. 
For example, historically the pre-eminent state tax on life 
insurance has been a tax on premiums. The tax is paid annually 
by the company. Then why should this tax be of interest to any-
one but the company? For many years it was not. Let us look 
at a little more history. In 1908 a committee of the National 
Convention of Insurance Commissioners made a report to the 
commissioners on life company taxation.14 One recommendation 
was that such taxes should be reduced, and that "upon the insur-
ance companies and their policyholders devolve the great burden 
of responsibility for procuring these desirable changes. It is the 
duty of the managers representing their policyholders to protect 
in this legitimate manner their property from depletion by unjust 
taxation." 
What is the character of this tax on premiums and who actu-
ally pays it? The answers are obvious: it is a tax upon a capital 
contribution, and the policyholder pays it. Looking back again 
at our two sources of funds, we see this to be a direct tax upon 
one source. It is a tax whose only justification is a desire for 
revenue. It is imposed only upon the thrifty, upon those trying 
13 Supra, note 12, at p. 25. 
H Proc. Nat. Conv. Ins. Commrs. 1908, pp. 59-61. 
PROCEEDINGS, 1955 383 
to make provision for the future of themselves and their fami-
lies, provision which will prevent a future burden upon the state. 
The objections to a tax on premiums have been noted earlier, 
from the company standpoint. What are the advantages which 
cause legislatures to overlook these objections? There appear to 
be four such merits: 
(1) The tax is reletively simple to compute. 
(2) It is easy to collect. 
(3) A state with no domestic life insurance companies 
collects taxes in proportion to the premiums paid 
by its residents. 
( 4) The tax increases automatically as insurance in force 
increases. 
The inequities inherent in the tax are outweighed by these 
facts. 
What have been the results of the tax, apart from the raising 
of premium rates made necessary by this excise? One result 
has been the abandonment of the idea which originally underlay 
the tax, that the companies should pay for the support of the 
state departments which supervise them. Less than five percent 
of the taxes collected are now used for that purpose. In addi-
tion, fees and examination expenses must be paid by the com-
panies. Over ninety-five percent of the revenue now goes either 
into state general funds or is earmarked for schools or some 
other special purpose. 
Another result has been one which came into being by acci-
dent, without design. Prior to World War II the word "annuity" 
was one known principally to life insurance companies and to 
wealthy individuals. But the passage of the Social Security Act, 
the wage stabilization regulations during World War II, and the 
increasing power of labor unions combined to bring the fringe 
benefit to the fore. One such benefit, fostered and encouraged 
by the 1942 Revenue Act, was the employee-pension plan. The 
tax benefits given qualified pension plans were an invitation to 
the establishment of such plans, especially during the period of 
operation of excess profits taxes. Many such plans were under-
written by life insurance companies. Many were not. There are 
several reasons which may influence an employer establishing an 
employee-benefit program which will lead to the use of a non-
insured as against an insured plan. Flexibility of operation is 
one. Some employers have used a non-insured plan because they 
believed lower costs would result. 
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Non-insured plans are feasible for the large employer. For 
most smaller employers they are not. And one of the major in-
fluences militating toward the use of non-insured plans has been 
the taxes which are imposed on insured, but not on non-insured 
plans. For years efforts have been to secure lower state premium 
taxes on annuities, and the allowance of a deduction for returned 
annuity considerations, in an effort to place insured pension plans 
on an equal plane with non-insured plans taxwise. In Nebraska, 
for example, the Supreme Court held15 on May 27, 1955, that 
annuity considerations received for annuity contracts are tax-
able under the premium tax statute.16 These efforts to date 
have met with only a modicum of success. And it is not only in 
the field of state premium taxes that this discrimination exists. 
The federal income tax on life insurance companies has amounted 
to a tax on annuity considerations from which non-insured trus-
teed plans are exempt. This was recognized in "A Preliminary 
Statement of the Facts and Issues with respect to the Federal 
Taxation of Life Insurance Companies" ref erred to previously: 
This report is immediately concerned only with the taxation of 
life insurance companies. However. possible actions in the non-
insurance field that may have a bearing on this problem are dis-
cussed below. 
One po:>sibility would be to impose a tax on noninsured plans cor-
responding to the insurance-company tax, for example, a tax of 
6~{i percent of net investment income. A difficulty raised in im-
posing such a tax on employee trusts is that it would require re-
calculation of the amounts necessary to provide employee benefits 
where they are determined by contract. The employer would have 
set up such a plan on the assumption that certain contributions on 
his part would be adequate to meet the pension that he agreed to 
pay. Imposing a tax corresponding to insurance-company tax 
would require that he increase his contributions.11 
Here we have a lesson in fundamental economics, already fa-
miliar to members of the bar, but which is only now seeping down 
to those not so conversant with taxes, that a tax differential can 
alter basic decisions and influence investments and the entire 
course of a business. This lesson is being graphically illustrated 
on television every Tuesday night, in the difficulty experienced 
by contestants who have to decide whether to take $32,000 or try 
for $64,000. The lesson is brought home forcibly to millions of 
watchers that if the contestant is a single person with no other 
taxable income he can keep about $18,000. The government takes 
1:; Bankers Life of Iowa vs. Laughlin, 70 N.W. 2d 474 (19551. 
16 Secs. 77-907, 77-908, Neb. R.S. Supp. 1951. 
17 Supm, note 8, at p. 40. 
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the other $14,000 in income taxes. If he tries for the $64,000, 
he can keep about $26,500, the government taking the remaining 
$37,500. This is a purely incidental, but certainly a wholesome 
bit of public education. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the taxes on annuities 
paid by life insurance companies at the state and federal levels 
have had the result of inducing many employers, particularly the 
larger ones, to decide upon non-insured pension plans. This has 
been recognized in the life insurance company income tax bills 
introduced at the last session of Congress,18 in the provisions which 
would permit the deduction from net investment income of 100% 
of the investment income allocable to group annuities and pension 
trust contracts relating to qualified retirement plans. One of 
these two identical bills passed the House of Representatives July 
18, 1955, but action on the bill was deferred in the Senate for 
consideration at the next session of Congress. Final approval of 
any tax legislation is always problematical, so that while such 
theoretical reco'gnition of this situation is pleasing, it has had no 
practical results as yet. The urgent need of the states for reve-
nue yields a no more pleasing picture, as exemplified by the action 
of the Minnesota legislature this year in imposing a 2% tax on 
annuity considerations where no tax had been levied before. HI 
There are good reasons for encouraging life insurance companies 
to underwrite pension plans (the safety of their operations and 
the actuarial soundness of their rates being among them) instead 
of discouraging them by discriminatory taxation. 
There is another part of the forest we might look at with a 
critical eye to see whether it is composed mostly of evergreens or 
of deciduous trees which will shortly shed their leaves. For ex-
ample, what about the elimination of the premium payment test 
for including life insurance proceeds in a decedent's estate? Is 
this provision likely to remain in the code, and if not, why not? 
And what use should be made of the provision? It may be as-
sumed that all tax practitioners are familiar with this provision 
and its history. For those who are not, it may be noted that from 
1942 to 1954 the Federal Estate Tax Law20 provided that life in-
surance covering the life of a decedent must be included in his 
gross estate if (1) the proceeds were payable to his estate, or 
(2) the insured possessed any incidents of ownership at the time 
of his death, or (3) the insured paid the premiums on the in-
surance, directly or indirectly. 
is H.R. 7201, H.R. 7202, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955). 
19 Ch. 2, Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. 1955. 
20 Sec. 811 (g), I.R.C. 1939, as amended by Sec. 404, Rev. Act 1942. 
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Under the 1954 code21 the third test was eliminated, but a 
new provision was inserted, to the effect that life insurance must 
be included in the decedent's gross estate if the decedent had a 
reversionary interest in a policy on his life which exceeded 5 % 
of the value of the policy immediately before his death. 
There was ample reason for deleting the payment of prem-
iums test, the principal one being that the test made life insurance 
the only form of property which could not, for estate tax pur-
poses, be given away by the insured while he was alive. 
The Senate Finance Committee report on the 1954 code said, 
"To discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not j usti-
fied."22 For Congress to permit an insured to give away a life 
insurance policy on his own life, as he could do with any other 
form of property, is a distinct gain, of course. But almost im-
mediately after the 1954 code was approved, two fears were ex-
pressed. First, that the provision would be amended to reinstate 
the premium payment test. One comment stated: 
Some Treasury officials are annoyed with the life insurance in-
dustry because it has been strenuously "selling" the new provi-
sion, telling clients that only through life insurance can they al-
most completely escape estate tax liability. Such tactics are sure 
to increase the Government's revenue loss, officials claim.23 
On other words, if the purported idea of some officials should 
be followed, life insurance was placed on an equal plane with 
other forms of property, but it is improper to make use of this 
equality. 
The second fear was that, intentionally or unintentionally, 
Congress had not placed life insurance on an equal basis with 
other property in Sec. 2042, I.R.C. 1954, in that if there should 
be a possibility that the insured might inherit the property pre-
viously given away, and the possibilities of such inheritance were 
more than one out of twenty, the proceeds would be taxable in 
his estate.21 Inheritance results from the "operation of law." If 
21 Sec. 2042, I.R.C. 1954. 
22 Sen. Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong. 2d sess. (1954); H. Rep. No. 1337, 
83d Cong. 2d sess. 91 (1954). 
:?3 Wall Street Joumal, Nov. 17, 1954, p. 1. 
:H The pertinent portion of Sec. 2042 reads: " ... the term 'incident of 
ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the ex-
press terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law) 
only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the 
value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent. As 
used in this paragraph, the term 'reversionary interest' includes a possi-
bility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the 
decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him." 
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a decedent gave away all his right, title and interest in a life in-
surance policy to his wife, who then left the policy to the husband 
in her will, would he have a "reversionary interest" in the policy? 
If so, a policy purchased by the wife originally, and never owned 
by the husband, would seem to lead to a similar conclusion. It may 
then be asked, upon what constitutional ground could such a tax 
be based, to include in the decedent's estate property which he did 
not purchase, never owned, and in which he had no interest? 
To date there are no guideposts on this question. No regu-
lations have been issued, and no rulings have been forthcoming 
from the Internal Revenue Service, in spite of requests for such 
a ruling made almost a year ago. This may be the result of a 
decision that the answer is so clear no regulation or ruling on 
the subject is necessary. However, estate planners could breathe 
more easily if the answer were definitely known. 
Another problem similar to the one just outlined was de-
scribed in a rather recent law review article2;; by Professor Joseph 
Murphy of Syracuse University Law School. In this article Pro-
fessor Murphy suggests that Sec. 2039, I.R.C. 1954, may attempt 
to impose taxes which are unconstitutional. This section deals 
with the estate tax treatment of survivorship benefits under an-
nuity contracts. It defines the amount of the value of the survi-
vorship benefits includible in. the gross estate, in the case of non-
qualified plans, to be that part of the value proportionate to that 
part of the purchase price contributed by the decedent. It then 
provides that any contribution by the decedent's employer or 
former employer to the purchase price of the contract or agree-
ment shall be considered to be contributed by the decedent if made 
by reason of employment. 
A proviso then exempts from inclusion in the estate, not 
only under Sec. 2039, but under "any provision of law," survivor-
ship benefits received by a beneficiary other than the decedent's 
estate, under a pension, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan, or 
under an annuity contract purchased pursuant to such a plan, if 
the plan is qualified under Sec. 401 of the code. 
If the qualified plan was contributory, however, the value of 
the survivorship benefits is includible in the decedent's estate in 
an amount proportionate to the contributions made by the dece-
dent. Here, though, the contributions of the employer are not 
considered contributions by the decedent. Thus there is a dis-
tinct advantage in having survivorship benefits provided under a 
2;; 1 Howard Law Jollrnal 1-39, January, 1955. 
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qualified plan. This is not feasible, of course, in many instances. 
One method suggested of avoiding difficulty would be for 
the decedent to enter into two contracts, one providing a life an-
nuity for himself, the other providing a survivorship annuity for 
his wife. He would immediately assign the second contract to 
his wife. Under these circumstances it is quite probable that 
the survivorship benefits would not be included in the husband's 
estate, either under the retained life estate theory of Sec. 2036, 
or under Sec. 2039. This would seem to follow under the decision 
in Bohnen vs. Harrison,26 where the United States Supreme Court 
held that an assignment of the life insurance portion of a life 
insurance-annuity combination made the contracts separable, and 
prevented the application of the retained life estate theory now 
found in Sec. 2036 of the 1954 code. 
To return to the thread of the argument, however, the estate 
tax is designed to tax the privilege of transmitting property at 
death, the basic section being Sec. 2033 of the code. The code 
then continues with a group of provisions designed to cover trans-
fers which were between living persons in form, but which were 
testamentary in substance. The idea underlying these sections is 
to tax some property which had been the subject of a transfer by 
the decedent, as in the examples of the usual survivorship bene-
fits under qualified and non-qualified annuity plans. 
It appears, however, that Sec. 2039, as interpreted in the 
House and Senate Committee reports,27 apparently does not re-
quire that, in order to be taxed, the decedent need ever have owned 
certain property or have made a transfer of it. He need merely 
be employed by an employer who had a contract, not necessarily 
with the employee, which provided benefits for him when employ-
ment ceased, and benefits for others after his death. 
The conclusion drawn from this study of the network of 
estate tax provisions is this: To tax this type of survivorship 
benefit in the decedent's estate, where the decedent contributed 
nothing, and where there was no contract between the employer 
and the employee, but rather, for example, between the employer 
and an insurance company, may be unconstitutional, because the 
decedent had no property interest in the benefits and he made no 
transfer of them.· 
2G Bohnen vs. Harrison, 345 U.S. 946. 73 S. Ct. 863, 97 L. ed. 1371 
(1953). 
27 H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. A 316 (1954); Sen. Rep. No. 
1662, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 472 (1954). 
PROCEEDINGS, 1955 389 
CONCLUSION 
The statements made thus far may seem to have only a tenu-
ous connecting link. To the writer it seemed worth while to make 
at least these two points: Let us not become specialized to the 
degree that we lose our perspective, and, as members of the bar, 
let us net forget our duty to protect our clients from injustice. 
With reference to perspective, this paper has tried to make 
clear the fact that taxes which seem far removed from the in-
terests of most clients may actually be determinative of business 
decisions. It is therefore suggested that you should be interested 
in the form these taxes assume. 
With reference to the second point, it is suggested that the 
word "unconstitutional" may not belong to a dead language. Mere-
ly because laymen in general may regard take-home pay as their 
total remuneration, let us, as guardians of the idea of a govern-
ment of limited powers, not also become so calloused that we dis-
regard the possibility of unjust impositions, of attempts to tax 
which lie beyond the enumerated powers of government. 
JURY TRIAL OF AUTO INJURY CLAIMS THREATENED 
By 
George L. DeLacy 
Your chairman asked me to present a paper to this section. 
I was, of course, flattered, but I've been before this section so 
many times that I rather hesitated to appear again. 
Having in mind that whatever I say is to be presented to 
you in the daytime, and not after an extended cocktail hour and 
heavy dinner, I have taken the liberty of reducing my thoughts 
to writing. It is much easier on me to do so, and I hope it will 
not bore you. 
In the past on many occasions I have made the statement 
that man in the English-speaking countries has reached his high-
est attainment in the administration of justice. While I still be-
lieve this, I am quite conscious of the fact that there is much 
room for improvement. I am conscious of the fact that there is 
much uncertainty and inefficiency in the trial of controversies in 
our courts, especially where juries are involved. Men hesitate to 
submit their controversies to a court and jury. Payments are 
made to avoid court procedures and men do not turn to the courts 
with the complete assurance that justice will be administered and 
that the right will prevail. 
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It has been said that the very bulwark of the American 
system of life is based upon trials by juries and judges, but if the 
system that we have is not going to seek the truth in an expediti-
ous manner, then litigants of all types, whether they be injured 
pedestrians seeking damages against the driver of an automobile 
or businessmen seeking a solution of differences with other busi-
nessmen, will force the legislatures of this country to furnish 
some type of bureau to adjudicate their differences. 
Some of you will remember that prior to 1913 the trial doc-
ket, especially of Douglas County, was crowded with master and 
servant cases. There were always pending hundreds of these 
cases against the various packing houses and other employers. 
Negligence was charged in failing to furnish a reasonably 
safe place to work and failing to furnish proper tools, etc. The 
defenses were assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and the 
plea of contributory negligence. One man recovered nothing; 
another man got much more than he was entitled to. 
As you know, steps were tak~n in England and later on in 
this country to soften these common-law defenses by passing em-
ployer's liability acts. These acts either limited or abolished the 
defense of assumption of risk or made it a question for the jury. 
These acts generally abolished the fellow-servant defense. They 
also made contributory negligence a question for the jury, provid-
ing that contributory negligence should not be an absolute bar, 
but that the recovery should be diminished because of contribu-
tory negligence. 
The main effort in the trial of these cases was to get to the 
jury. This effort resulted in an increased amount of false swear-
ing. It was also necessary for the injured workman, who wished 
to sue his employer, to employ an attorney. These cases were 
generally handled on a percentage basis. Such litigation was cost-
ly and long drawn out and again there was much uncertainty and 
many instances of injustice. 
The great complexity of relationships in modern life brings 
with it the necessity of coping in a comprehensive and systematic 
way with problems whfoh owe their existence to that very com-
plexity. In the matter we are discussing, public opinion came to 
regard the care and rehabilitation of injured workers as a just 
charge upon the industry in which the accident occurred, and 
through that industry upon society. 
The common-law courts throughout the country had made 
such a mess out of this class of litigation that the legislatures of 
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the various states passed workmen's compensation laws. These 
laws had previously been developed in Germany and in England. 
In Nebraska the Workmen's Compensation Law was adopted in 
1913. Its passage accomplished a change and it was, therefore, 
opposed at the time. The law was submitted to a referendum of 
the people, but was adopted. 
This Compensation Law eliminated jury trials and provided 
first for a Compensation Commissioner and later for a Compensa-
tion Court. At this time the adjudication of claims of servants 
against their masters, growing out of accidental injury, arising 
out of, and in the scope of, their employment is handled in an 
expeditious manner. The judges become skilled in handling claims 
under the compensation law; in most cases of accidental injury 
or death there is no contest and the functioning under the Act is 
expeditious and is much less expensive than the handling of the 
same claims by a regular common-law court and jury would be. 
No one would suggest that we go back to the old system. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the tax courts, estab-
lished by federal statute to determine the rights of the govern-
ment and of the taxpayers under the Revenue Codes of the United 
States, function expeditiously and in an entirely satisfactory 
manner. In these courts a trial v;rith a jury is not involved. 
At this time courts and attorneys are presented with the prob-
lem of administering justice growing out of the automobile traffic. 
We are confronted with the problem of properly handling claims 
resulting from personal injuries growing out of that traffic. 
How long will the public tolerate the continual upward spiral 
of jury verdicts in personal injury cases? You are familiar with 
the reports in the press of tremendous verdicts growing out of the 
operation of railroads and growing out of the automobile traffic. 
Think of a verdict, tax free, of $400,000 to a 44-year-old waiter 
for brain injuries and injuries to his legs; of $250,000 for a brain 
injury sustained by a 48-year-old freight agent; of $100,000 for 
an eye; of $240,000 for the loss of a leg. These enormous figures 
have acted as a stimulus for many spurious claims, and a tremen-
dous amount of litigation that has little or no merit has been 
instituted. Statistics show that between 1941 and 1951 the cost 
of living index had increased 73% while jury verdicts had in-
creased 149 % and are still increasing. 
It is true that the citizen of today has become accustomed to 
thinking in larger amounts. The high cost of everything, taxes, 
etc., develops this; but it must be apparent that there is some 
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other reason for these tremendous verdicts in the metropolitan 
cities. 
The average jury, at least in a metropolitan city, is usually 
made up of men and women of average education. They are not 
familiar with court procedures and with their duties as jurymen, 
but are suddenly called in to act as finders of the fact in a trial. 
The plaintiff's counsel is, of course, aware of the natural advan-
tages in his favor where he is representing an injured party, es-
pecially if that injured party is one who has to make his livelihood 
with his hands. The association of plaintiffs' attorneys, called 
N.A.C.C.A., organized in 1946, advises and teaches the use of 
demonstrative evidence. The surgical instruments used are pro-
duced. Colored photographs are presented showing the wounds, 
blood, etc. Not long ago I tried a case in which the surgeon had 
taken colored pictures of the injuries, which \Vere the basis of the 
suit. The pictures were certainly realistic. This doctor took 
pictures on innumerable occasions, i.e., every time he dressed the 
wounds; and all of them were exhibited to the jury. This N.A.-
C.C.A. organization advises the plaintiff's counsel not to rely on 
the doctor who .actually treated the claimant, but suggests that 
special doctors be employed; that an attempt be made to develop 
the possibilities which might result from the accident. 
In the modern jury trial the injuries are built up by putting 
on a number of physicians, by exhibiting x-rays which have been 
blown up, by showing photographs of the blood, the wounds and 
the dressings, and by exhibiting the braces and casts, etc., used. 
Simple injuries are magnified. The natural sympathy which all 
jurymen have is inflamed, and as a result throughout the country 
unconscionable and excessive verdicts are prevalent. 
If in addition to the use of demonstrative evidence the court 
permits a prejudicial and inflammatory closing argument by plain-
tiff's counsel and 'if the court permits the use of charts whereby 
plaintiff's counsel not only writes out the various amounts claimed 
for pain and suffering and loss of wages, etc., but is allowed to 
leave these charts after the argument is closed, in the presence 
of the jury, it is apparent that no proper trial of the controversy 
is had. The trial is controlled by passion and prejudice rather 
than objective deliberation. 
If this trend continues, insurance rates must necessarily be 
increased and an excessive burden must be borne by those operat-
ing railroads, motor vehicles, etc. 
It has been said: 
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"No one has any objection to proper evidence that truly assists 
a court or jury in determining a controversial question. But when 
evidence ceases to truly assist and begins to create 'impulsive 
verdicts' it ceases to be a part of an orderly trial. The question 
of exhibition of injuries, introduction of surgical instruments, the 
use of blackboards in closing argument and similar schemes to 
increase awards are all things that a trial judge may regulate in 
his discretion. During the last twenty years it has seldom been 
considered discreet to restrict these practices. Verdicts continue 
to soar. There is considerable alarm from coast to coast about 
the trend. There is a contest among plaintiff's lawyers to some-
how get a larger verdict than has been before returned. The 
trial courts are quite conscious of this, yet there seems to be no 
restriction on new schemes designed to stir the emotions of the 
jury." In 1925 the Illinois Appellate Court had this to say: 
The doctors treating plaintiff for her injuries were permitted to 
go into considerable detail, describing the instruments and sur-
gical appliances used in the treatment. There was introduced in 
evidence a surgical clamp which had been applied to plaintiff's 
broken leg. We strongly disapprove of unnecessary descriptions 
of such appliances and their exhibition to the jury. Such exhibi-
tions usually serve no purpose except to excite sympathy. To 
permit this in personal injury cases would open a wide door 
tending to arouse emotions not conducive to a fair and impartial 
consideration of the proper issues presented. 
It seems apparent to me that if the courts continue to allow 
such procedures and if the courts continue to allow excessive and 
unconscionable verdicts to stand, that legislatures will soon be 
called upon to provide for the handling of such claims in the same 
manner as compensation claims are handled, and this will be by a 
bureau or special court and will not be by the ordinary trial court 
and jury. This is what happened when the ordinary common-law 
courts did not handle efficiently the claims arising out of the re-
lationship of master and servant. It appears to be the rule in 
this country that we swing from one extreme to the other. There 
was a time when the plaintiff could not recover damages even 
though the def end ant was negligent if the plaintiff was guilty of 
any negligence. There was a time when the plaintiff employee 
could not recover for the negligence of a fell ow servant. There 
was a time when the doctrine of assumption of risk precluded 
recovery by a plaintiff employee. Gradually all of these defenses 
were modified. The pendulum has swung back; the adjudication 
of the rights of an injured claimant is turned into a dramatic 
sketch, false testimony is common, and trivial injuries are played 
up and magnified so that unconscionable sums are in many in-
stances allowed to the claimant. 
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It should not be forgotten that during the trial there sits upon 
the bench a judge; learned in the law, and placed in that position 
to see that justice is done between the parties so far as humanly 
possible. It is apparent that a fearless and experienced judge can 
see to it .that the trial of a jury case is not turned into a theatri-
cal performance, and can see to it that there is no improper use 
of demonstrative evidence and charts, etc. I will speak of this 
later on in this paper. 
The Bar has made great progress in improving trial proce-
dure. I refer to the Federal Court Rules and the discovery stat-
utes in force in,the State of Nebraska. We have all become con-
vinced that the administration of justice requires a full disclosure 
of the pertinent facts. If an accident has happened, all parties 
should know the names of the witnesses. If the plaintiff has 
sustained an injury and is claiming money damages to compensate 
him for it, the defendant should know what his doctors report, 
he should know what the hospital records show and should like-
wise have the benefit of an examination by his own doctor or at 
least by a doctor appointed by the court. This has been accom-
plished. You all know that depositions may be taken of either 
party. At the taking of these depositions all pertinent facts may 
be inquired into. If it is not desired to go to the expense of hav-
ing a deposition taken, interrogatories may be served, which the 
other party is required to answer. By the use of these interrog-
atories the names of all of the \vitnesses can be obtained and all 
other pertinent facts may be inquired into. Under the statutes, 
parties may obtain leave to inspect the premises, take pictures of 
the premises, make maps of the premises, force the other party 
to produce pictures taken at the time of the accident which are 
not otherwise available and, in fact, procedures have now been 
adopted which, if energetically availed of, results in a full dis-
closure of the facts. In addition to this in both federal and state 
courts we have the pre-trial procedure, wherein the case may be 
reviewed before the trial judge. This pre-trial procedure is of 
great help to both parties if it is really used and if it is held by a 
judge who will really make an effort to conduct a pre-trial as it 
should be conducted. If the court's attitude is simply to get 
through a task, then nothing will be accomplished by it; if prop-
erly used, proper settlements in many cases may result. 
All our procedures are now evolved to eliminate surprise and 
to do away with the old sporting theory of conducting a trial 
(based on surprise) . 
We believe that our courts should sense that we are living 
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in an age of distorted values and that the developments in trial 
techniques unless judicially controlled will unduly magnify these 
distorted values. 
In a Wisconsin case, Markowitz vs. Miller Electric Railway and 
Light Co., 284 N.W. 31, decided in 1939, the court in commenting 
on an improper argument said: 
Proper administration of justice requires that the court promptly 
check such improprieties on its own motion. A verdict returned 
upon a record free from such improprieties or after effective judi-
cial control by prompt and positive rulings checking or counter-
acting them is not as apt to be impaired by reason of prejudice or 
passion on the part of the jury. . . . 
In the case of Warren Petroleum Corporation vs. Sterling 
Pyeatt, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, reported in 275 S.W. 
2d 216, there was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff allowing 
him damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 
The defendant appealed and the case was reversed. In this case, 
the defendant complained of the action of the trial court in per-
mitting plaintiff's attorney over defendant's timely objection to 
place three charts upon a blackboard in full view of the jury 
immediately prior to commencement of closing argument. In 
the opinion the charts are set out. In the opinion, the court 
says: 
Defendants objected to the placing of said charts upon the black-
board and to their use in the closing argument for many reasons, 
the chief objection being that "the use of the charts were highly 
prejudicial and effectively injected new and unsworn testimony 
for the jury's consideration." With this contention we agree. 
We do not believe the use of such charts would be permissible in 
any case over timely objection. Most of the statements in the 
first two charts are plain positive factual unsworn statements and 
were not put there during the argument on each point and not 
as a reasonable deduction from the evidence. The statements and 
figures in the third chart were not put there during the argument 
and as a reasonable deduction from the evidence. Oral argument, 
with proper references to the testimony and evidence that would 
reveal such factual statements as contained in the charts to be 
true might have been permissible. But such bold factual state-
ments made orally in argument without any reference to or in-
ference from the evidence is error. An attorney cannot testify 
orally in his argument, and what he cannot do orally he certainly 
cannot do in writing. Wichita Transit Co. v. Sanders, Tex. Civ. 
App., 214 S.W. 2d 810; Employers' Ins. Ass'n. 'II". Rowell, Tex. 
Civ. App., 104 S.W. 2d 613; Huey & Philp Hardware Co. v. 
McNeil, Tex. Civ. App., 111 S.W. 2d 1205; Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Hardy, Tex. Civ. App., 91 S.W. 2d 1075, re-
versed, 131 Tex. 573, 117 s:w. 2d 418 .... The charts were not 
put in evidence prior to the time plaintiff and defendants rested 
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their case. They were effectively put in evidence in the closing 
argument. 
The bar has for many years sanctioned the practice of allow-
ing attorneys to handle personal injury cases on a contingent 
basis. Thi~ is the only practical way to handle these cases. In 
the larger metropolitan cities (not in Nebraska), runners are at-
tached to some law offices whose duty it is to bring in personal 
injury cases which are, of course, handled on a percentage basis. 
Where this practice exists it is apparent that the temptation to 
introduce false testimony is great and a racket is apt to develop. 
It is asserted that these firms have associated with them doctors 
who are amenable to suggestions and testify for them in court, 
building up and exaggerating the injuries claimed. There is now 
added to all this the use of colored pictures, charts, etc., i.e., demon-
strative evidence. 
I am of the opinion that nearly every member of the Bar will 
admit that the handling of personal injury cases, where a jury 
trial is involved, is uncertain, is , not efficient; I believe all will 
agree that many injustices result. I believe all will agree that 
litigants involved in personal injury cases are apprehensive, are 
fearful of the results and that many defendants prefer to pay 
more than they should to avoid such an ordeal. This is the year 
1955 ; men in other walks of life, I think, wonder at the inefficient 
handling of such litigation by our profession and wonder why we 
do not improve upon our procedures. 
The description of the modern jury trial of a personal in-
jury case, especially in the great metropolitan centers, does not 
paint an agreeable picture of our adversary system of adminis-
tering justice. Mr. Harry LaBrum, Philadelphia lawyer, in an 
address given in Milwaukee in August, 1954, said, and we take 
the liberty of quoting from his address: 
Some time ago in Philadelphia the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit handed down a decision which made the front page and 
shocked alm,ost everyone-lawyers and laymen alike. 
It was not a political decision; it was not another example of hard 
cases making bad la'w; it was an ordinary case under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. 
A railroad employee fell from a bridge and was injured. Aside 
from the question of coverage under the Act-which all the Judges 
decided in favor of the plaintiff-the only issue in the case was 
whether or not the railroad was negligent. 
Now what could there possibly be in such a case to justify an 
opinion by the Court of Appeals which immediately became a 
"best seller." Could it be the amount of the verdict? Certainly 
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not-the court upset the verdict, and in any event a $37,000 
verdict shocks no one today, except of course the particular de-
fendant and his insurer! 
The great public interest and discussion about this case stemmed 
from the reasons the Court of Appeals gave for upsetting the jury 
verdict in the case. Here is what the court said, in reversing 
the judgme.nt: 
" ... Because of the bickering and brawling of both counsel, the 
jury could not possibly have decided the real issues on their merits, 
but was sidetracked into passing judgment on the .character of 
the attorneys." 
And-"The conduct of both counsel was of such nature as to 
vitiate the entire trial.'' 
And finally-"The jury did not have an opportunity fairly to 
pass upon the real issues, because of the conduct of the at-
torneys.'' 
'Now I do not mean to cause any reflection on either of the lawyers 
involved. As the Court of Appeals said, they were able and ex-
perienced men and they are well known at the Philadelphia Bar. 
Their conduct in this case was probably different only in degree 
from that which takes place at many trials almost daily. 
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Professor Joiner of the University of Michigan in the Michi-
gan Law Review, November, 1954, calls attention to a review of 
a textbook on trial technique written in 1936. The review ap-
peared in the Harvard Law Review, 1949, page 1389. The re-
viewer of the book was Mr. E. M. Morgan. Here is what he said 
about a book written for lawyers on trial technique: 
Intended as a lawyer's book, it will in all probability be read only 
by laWYers and those who would be lawyers. And fervent prayers 
that the book be read by no others should be raised by those who 
want to believe, and want others to believe, that a law suit is 
a proceeding for the discovery of truth by rational processes. 
If only some lawyer could rise up and honestly denounce l\Ir. 
Goldstein as a defamer of his profession! If only l\Ir. Goldstein 
himself had written his book as an exposition of the evils inherent 
in our adversary system of litigation! If only a reviewer could 
assert that this book is a guide not to the palaces of justice but 
to the red-light districts of the law! But a decent respect for 
the truth compels the admission that l\Ir. Goldstein has told his 
story truly. He has told it calmly, without pretense of shame, 
and (God save use!) without the slightest suspicion of its shame-
fulness. He has shown by his own unperturbed frankness with 
what complaisance the profession, which would smile the superior 
smile of derision at the suggestion of a return of trial by battle 
of bodies, accepts trial by battle of wits. In all innocence, he 
has produced a document which is a devastating commentary 
upon an important aspect of our administration of justice. 
Personal injury litigation in recent years has become big 
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business on both sides, and it should be handled with businesslike 
efficiency across a desk with the opposing counsel seeking a solu-
tion and not in the trial courts unless trial is absolutely unavoid-
able. 
There is danger that if the trial courts and trial lawYers do 
nothing to improve the situation, disaster will result. As said 
by Mr. LaBrum in the same address mentioned above, "The public 
will stand just so much, and while I am not one to cry wolf, I can 
without fear of contradiction, predict that unless the present situa-
tion is corrected and soon, we will lose the bulk of personal in-
jury litigation to either arbitration, or some form of compensa-
tion." 
Again, Mr. LaBrum said: 
This is not idle talk. You know that both arbitration and com-
pensation are-right now-receiving serious study in responsible 
circles; and the only thing that can head them off is a drastic 
change in the outlook for disposal of personal injury cases in law 
offices and in courts. 
If we do not take this problem seriously, the parties will not only 
take the cases away from the courts--but from the lawyers too; 
and the rule of law and the role of lawyers will be weakened 
that much more. 
I have noticed advertisements inserted in national periodicals 
by casualty insurance companies relating to the subject of exces-
sive jury verdicts. They suggest that such verdicts increase in-
surance rates. That these verdicts must be paid out of premiums 
belonging to thousands of policyholders. When premiums col-
lected do not cover claims, everybody's insurance rates have to go 
up. 
Such advertisement occurred in the Saturday Evening Post 
and Life. 
One of the ads exhorted jurymen "to be fair with the public's 
-and your money." None of the ads called upon the public to 
be other than fair and reasonable when on a jury. After such ads 
appeared we find lawsuits brought to enjoin such publications 
and even to oust the insurance companies from a certain state for 
contempt of court, etc. 
I ran across the case of People vs. Ame1'ican Automobile In-
surance Company, (California) 282 P. 2d 559 (decided April 18, 
1955). In this case a quo warranto petition was filed against an 
insurance company based on the advertisements to which I have 
been ref erring. A demurrer was filed to the petition and the 
demurrer was sustained. 
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It has never been my idea that attorneys had a vested in-
terest in court procedures which illy serve the public as a whole. 
The spectre of the enlargement or extension of workman's 
compensation benefits to the field of all accidents is ever present. 
Its accomplishment would be a catastrophe to lawyers whether on 
the plantiff's or defendant's side of the problem. 
This compensation plan which I have been talking about has 
not been adoped in any of the states in this country. Such a plan 
was· adopted in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. It has 
been suggested that the imposition of liability, regardless of fault 
(a necessary corollary of such a compensation plan) would lead to 
individual irresponsibility and fraudulent abuses. Workmen's 
compensation is thought to be a feasible system only because of 
the existence of the employment relationship which aids investi-
gation of claims and prevention of fraud, collusion or malinger-
ing. Under such a relationship there is a fairly uniform class of 
beneficiaries. 
Employers as a class can pass on the cost of compensation 
to the general public and can aid in preventing accidents through 
the installment of safety devices, whereas those factors are absent 
with the largely unoff ending class of motorists. Likewise the 
plan would place a heavy burden on the unoffending motorist and 
would at the same time provide a scale of benefits so low as to be 
inadequate for any injured person, not a wage-earner, leaving 
many flagrant wrongs unredressed. 
It likewise can be urged that the plan is socialistic and con-
trary to our system of free enterprise. 
This has been a rather rambling disertation. 
During my rather extensive experience I have noted the trends 
and have come to certain conclusions, which I throw upon the 
table for discussion. 
I am sure that as practicing lawyers we are vitally concerned 
in µiaking our legal and judicial processes both adequate and ef-
fective. We should therefore do more than all others to make 
them so. 
We . must make the courts of law more efficient and attrac-
tive to the public for the determining of all kinds of disputes. 
The public must believe that justice is really meted out in our 
trial courts in an expeditious manner and that it is being done 
without too much cost. 
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Improvements in the administration of justice have been 
largely left to the Bar and the various Bar Associations. This 
is as it should be. 
Let us not allow the impression to exist among the people 
that a jury trial is simply a contest of wits between counsel, 
that everything goes; that it is an outdated and ineffective pro-
cedure for the determination of the truth and for the doing of 
justice between aisputants. 
We will all agree, I am sure, that motion picture or tele-
vision reproductions of a trial are usually a travesty and create a 
most unfavorable impression. 
The proper conduct of the trial of such cases lies with the 
district judge. The district judge should not simply preside at 
a battle between plaintiff's and defendant's lawyers; he should 
not simply keep order in court; he should see to it that the officers 
of the court try each case in a proper manner. Each case should 
be a challenge to the judge to see to it that justice Tesults from 
the trial before him. Each trial should be a special event, not 
one to be hurried through and disposed of simply for the pur-
pose of clearing up the docket. If we have time for nothing else, 
we all should take time to see that justice is properly administered 
in our courts and in a dignified manner, otherwise the balance of 
the community may move in and take charge in a way which will 
injure our professions and espe,cially those engaged in trial work. 
It follows from what has been said that the obtaining of 
high class men upon the trial bench is a goal to be sought. The 
Bar has done much to accomplish this. The salaries of judges 
have been increased. A pension plan has been evolved, this in 
the hope that the bench will attract able attorneys to make it a 
life's work. 
I am of the opinion that we could have accomplished much 
along these lines if we had adopted the Missouri Plan for the 
selection of judges at least in Douglas and Lancaster Counties. 
It may be in the agricultural districts that the candidates are 
known to the voters and that the voters are capable of selecting 
proper judge. However that may be, it might be advisable to 
give such districts the right to elect as to whether they would 
come under the provisions of the statute or not. 
I believe we should again vigorously proceed to initiate pro-
cedures to have what is know as the Missouri Plan adopted. This 
should be our task for the forthcoming year. 
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As has been said before, personal injury litigation has be-
come big business-about 85 percent of our trials involve personal 
injury or property damage. 
Fortunately, in Nebraska there is very little "law's delay." 
Both our state courts and federal courts are up-to-date, and a 
fairly speedy trial can be had if the attorney is energetic. How-
ever, in the large metropolitan cities elsewhere there are crowded 
dockets, and a litigant must wait two or tlu·ee years to get his 
case for trial. The impatient efforts to cure this condition may 
result in panaceas which will spread to our state, to our disad-
vantage. 
As the handling of personal injury business is important, it 
should be handled by counsel with businesslike efficiency. After 
the facts involved are known and the nature of the injury and 
property damage has been ascertained, then the counsel (if the 
case is one for settlement) should consult in a fair and frank man-
ner. This should be done at an early time and should not be left 
to a time when the case is sent out for trial. Settlements on the 
eve of trial are very common, but they discommode the court and 
may cause the jury to be idle for the rest of the day. I am sure 
that the average juror in Douglas County thinks that there is 
too much time wasted in the trial of jury cases. He sits around 
for long periods of time waiting to be called into the box; then 
the case has been settled and he starts to wait again. 
If attorneys for claimants allow their clients to demand un-
fair and unrealistic amounts in settlements, if they allow the 
business to develop into a racket and make of trials a means of 
extorting unconscionable verdicts by appealing to the prejudice 
and passion of the jury and by other questionable means, or if 
defendant's counsel arbitrarily refuse to make fair settlements 
and arbitrarily and stubbornly contest cases which ought to be 
settled, or if defense attorneys persist in stalling the trials, then, 
as I have said before, the impatience of the public may cause the 
adoption of poorly conceived plans and procedures to correct the 
evils involved. 
I have in mind that it is up to us to do the job. Let's keep 
in mind the importance of the matter to our clients and to the 
public and even to ourselves. 
The House of Delegates convened at 4 :15 P.M. to receive re-
ports of the sections, with members of the assembly also present. 
The following proceedings were had: 
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HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1955 
JEAN B. CAIN : Gentlemen, the House of Delegates will now 
be in order. 
The first item of business is the report of the Section on Real 
Estate, Probate and Trust Law, David R. Warner, chairman. 
DAVID R. WARNER.: Mr. Chairman and members of the 
House. I should probably apologize for not having a written re-
port. I will try to make the report brief anyway. 
The Section on Real Estate, Probate and· TruS't Law had its 
annual meeting this morning and conducted a program in accord-
ance with the printed program. The program was well received. 
We had some excellent speakers. I believe all of the attendance 
at the section meeting were well satisfied with the program. 
An election was conducted and two members of the Execu-
tive Committee were elected; Mr. George Farman of Ainsworth 
and Mr. Lynn Heth of Valentine. 
Following the section meeting a meeting of the Executive 
Committee was held and officers were selected for the coming 
year, with Herman Ginsburg as chairman, Bob Simmons as vice-
chairman, and Lynn Heth as secretary. 
There was one item in connection with the program which 
was held which I believe should be called to the attention of the 
House specifically, and that was the report of the Title Standard-
ization Committee of our section. 
The chairman of the section gave the report, and at the sec-
tion meeting asked that any members of the Association who 
have suggestions with respect to revision of the existing title 
standards or have suggestions as to new standards communicate 
the same to him or to the secretary of the Association. 
I believe now that a new chairman of the section has been 
selected, and it would be proper also to communicate any such 
suggestions to Mr. Ginsburg. 
Another item which the Executive Committee of the section 
asked me to bring to the attention of the House was ref erred to 
briefly at the close of his talk by Herman Ginsburg, and that re-
lates to the matter of some committee of the Bar Association tak-
ing an interest in and following up legislation which is before the 
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legislature in addition to bills which are actually sponsored by 
the Association. 
Any of you who heard Herman's talk had brought to your 
attention rather effectively, in my estimation, at least, a couple 
of bills that perhaps ought not to have been passed at all by the 
last session of our legislature, and had the Bar Association taken 
an active stand in connection with such matters perhaps they 
would not have passed. 
This is being submitted at this time as I stated at the re-
quest of the Executive Committee of the Real Estate Section. We 
are not submitting it as a recommendation but it is a matter 
which our section does feel should receive further consideration 
by the Association. 
I believe that completes the report of our section. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Warner. 
If there are no objections, the report of the committee on the 
Section on Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law will be received 
and made a part of the permanent record of the Association. 
ROBERT VAN PELT: Mr. Chairman, may I arise at this mo-
ment to inquire about a procedure, because I did hear Mr. Gins-
burg's splendid paper, and there was a point raised at a luncheon 
that I attended. 
Is there some procedure that the Bar Association, either by 
the Executive Council or this House of Delegates, can be expressed 
in disapproval of a bill, and who does it? Would it be for the 
Executive Council to take the action or the House of Delegates to 
take action on bills that should be disapproved by the Association? 
JEAN B. CAIN: Do you want to answer that, Mr. Turner? 
GEORGE H. TURNER: The Executive Council has all of the 
power of the Association between meetings of the Association. 
The Executive Council, I think, without question could authorize 
the section, for instance, to appear as a representative of the As-
sociation. 
ROBERT VAN PELT: Yes; and I think then what you have 
said probably answers it sufficiently, George, except that that 
procedure should be known so that, for instance on this real 
estate matter, I think Mr. Ginsburg appeared individually and 
tried to get some changes made and did get some changes made. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: Of course the Executive Council ses-
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sions are not held more than three or four times during the year, 
but if by the time that you know a bill is about to be introduced 
or has been introduced, inquire if there is going to be a meeting 
of the Executive Council, and I would anticipate no difficulty on 
that. 
ROBERT VAN PELT: I think it is a matter that will come 
up in the real property section. 
JEAN B. CAIN: The next report, Section on Taxation. Who 
is to make that-Hale McCown. 
HALE MCCOWN: In December, 1954, the Section of Taxation 
conducted the Association's annual institute on federal taxation 
in two-day sessions held at Alliance, Grand Island and Omaha. 
Members of the Association who appeared on the program were 
Hale McCown of Beatrice, Warren Dalton of Lincoln, Barton 
Kuhns of Omaha, Robert Moodie of West Point, Laurens Williams 
of Omaha and Washington, D. C., Robert Adams of Omaha and 
Flavel Wright of Lincoln. 
Registration at the Tax Clinic included 559 lawyers from 154 
towns in Nebraska. As evidenced by the registration, interest 
in the tax clinics is increasing and, in the opinion of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Section of Taxation, the annual Tax In-
stitute should be continued as a regular part of the program of 
the Association. 
Arrangements have been made to conduct the 13th annual 
tax institute to be held December 12 and 13 at Scottsbluff, Decem-
ber 14 and 15 at Kearney and December 16 and 17 at Omaha. 
Subjects to be covered and the personnel appearing on the pro-
gram will be announced in the near future. 
During the early months of 1955, the Section of Taxation 
collaborated with the Committee on Legislation in the preparation 
and presentation to the Nebraska State Legislature of the follow-
ing bills: · 
LB 223-which liberalizes the provision for giving a bond in 
cases where the amount of inheritance tax is un-
certain. 
LB 275-which keys the Nebraska estate tax to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954. 
LB 276-which provides for the taxation of powers of ap-
pointment. The portion of LB 276 which repealed 
the provisions relating to previously taxed property 
was not passed. 
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Except as noted each of these bills was enacted by the legislature 
in substantially the form suggested. 
This afternoon the section conducted its section meeting which 
included an interesting discussion by the Honorable Joseph Sewall 
of the changes in social security provisions and a panel discus-
sion (Jf developments under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 
Participating on the program were Hale McCown as moderator, 
Robert B. Denney of Fairbury, Leo Eisenstadt of Omaha, John 
C. Mason of Lincoln and John E. North of Omaha. 
The new members elected to the Executive Committee of the 
Section of Taxation are Thoms M. Davies and Keith Miller. Barton 
H. Kuhns was elected chairman; Thomas M. Davies was elected 
vice-chairman and Keith Miller was elected secretary of the sec-
tion. 
JEAN B. CAIN: The report of the Junior Bar Section, Albert 
G. Schatz, chairman. 
ALBERT G. SCHATZ: Mr. Chairman, members of the House 
of Delegates. The annual meeting of the Junior Bar Section was 
held this morning at 9 :30 as scheduled on the program, a discus-
sion, as you know, by Senator Hruska. 
Our attendance was not as large as it was anticipated be-
cause we had a pretty tough section to compete with, listening 
to the first section report here. 
But we had a reasonably good turnout, and we had a good 
meeting. 
We had an election of the Executive Committee, and the elec-
tion resulted as follows : Edward McEcham of Omaha is to serve 
on the committee for three years; Ray Simmons is to serve three 
years; DeWayne Wolf of Kearney, two years; Stu Stewart of 
Lexington, three years; Donald Boyd, Lincoln, one year; and my-
self, Albert Schatz, one year. 
After the election of the committee members, the committee 
itself met and the following officers were elected for the coming 
year: Ray Simmons of Fremont, chairman; DeWayne Wolf of 
Kearney, secretary, and Donald Boyd of Lincoln, vice-chairman. 
Also at the committee meeting held after the meeting a plan 
was adopted for a program for the coming year which the Execu-
tive Committee of the Junior Bar Section will undertake. Thank 
you. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Thank you, Mr. Schatz. 
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If there are no objections, the report of the Junior Bar Sec-
tion will be accepted and made a part of the permanent records 
of the House of Delegates. 
The report of the Section on Practice and Procedure, John 
L. Barton, Chairman. 
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the sec-
tion has asked me to deliver this report by reason of his absence. 
Your Executive Committee of the Section on Practice and 
Procedure respectfully makes the following report: 
The following members of the Executive Committee met on 
March 5, 1955, at the State House, Lincoln, Nebraska, with Presi-
dent John J. Wilson: C. Russell Mattson, Lowell C. Davis, Ray-
mond McGrath and John L. Barton. The president expressed his 
desire that those present organize and elect a chairman, vice-chair-
man and secretary. 
Pursuant thereto, the following officers of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Section were elected : John L. Barton, chairman ; 
Lowell C. Davis, vice-chairman; and C. Russell Mattson, secretary. 
Your Executive Committee then decided that the chairman 
select two eminent trial lawyers to appear and speak to the mem-
bers of this section at the annual meeting on October 6, 1955. 
Your chairman invited Lester P. Dodd of Detroit, Michigan, 
and William Knepper of Columbus, Ohio. They accepted. 
The sections program was given at 2 :15, October 6, 1955, in 
the ballroom of the Paxton Hotel, and was very well received. 
Your Executive Committee of this section believes that with 
the program just concluded the section has made a very fine and 
worthwhile contribution to the Association's activities. 
Following the program on October 6, the following lawyers 
were elected to the section's Executive Committee for three-year 
terms: George Healey, Lincoln, and Robert Hamer, Omaha. 
Subsequently the Executive Committee then elected the fol-
lowing named lawyers as its officers for the ensuing year: Lowell 
C. Davis, chairman; C. Russell Mattson, vice-chairman, and Ray-
mond McGrath, secretary. 
JEAN B. CAIN: The report o:f the Section on Municipal and 
Public Corporations. Mr. Leininger. 
VANCE LEININGER: This section was newly created, pursuant 
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to an amendment to the Association's by-laws adopted at the 1954 
annual meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Association. The first 
Executive Committee was named by the Executive Council and 
consisted of the following members: Albert T. Reddish, Alliance; 
Harold Rice, Creighton; Vance E. Leininger, Columbus; Charles 
E. McCarl, McCook; Jack M. Pace, Lincoln; and Edward F. 
Fogarty, Omaha. 
At the first meeting of the new Executive Committee, Vance 
E. Leininger was elected chairman; Harold Rice, vice-chairman; 
and Edward F. Fogarty, secretary. 
Subsequent meetings were held, as a result of which the pro-
gram at this year's Association meeting was planned and arranged. 
An attempt was made to arrange for a program which would 
hold as much universal interest for lawyers interested in matters 
involving municipal and public corporations as possible. The gen-
eral topic of eminent domain was settled on for this year's section 
meeting. 
At the meeting of this section held Thursday afternoon, Her-
bert M. Fitle of the Omaha Bar presented a concise and well ar-
1•anged discussion of the Uniform Eminent Domain Procedural 
Act, which was adopted in 1951, and called attention to some of 
the more pertinent decisions of our court since the adoption of 
this Act. 
The section was particularly fortunate in obtaining the as-
sistance of Mr. Henry B. Curtis, city attorney for the City of 
New Orleans, and president of the National Institute of Municipal 
Law Officers, who presented an authoritative and thorough dis-
cussion of the problems involved in "Just Compensation under 
Eminent Domain," including the principles of valuation and types 
of evidence available in establishing valuation. 
Mr. Curtis and Mr. Fitle were then joined by Mr. W. Ross 
King of the Omaha Bar, attorney for the Omaha School District, 
and Mr. Harold S. Salter, assistant attorney general assigned to 
the Department of Roads and Irrigation, who participated in a 
lively forty-minute panel discussion of procedural and substan-
tive problems in this field. There was splendid participation from 
the floor during this discussion. 
At the conclusion of the program, elections were held to fill 
the expiring terms of Mr. Albert T. Reddish and Mr. Harold Rice 
on the Executive Committee. Mr. Reddish and Mr. Rice were 
re-elected to membership on the committee, each for three-year 
terms. 
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The members of the section feel that this section affords an 
opportunity for expanded service to members of the Association 
who may be handling matters involving public and municipal cor-
porations. Stich further subjects as zoning, school district re-
organization, the proper handling of local bond issue proceedings, 
and the principles applicable to public bodies in the field of the 
law of contracts have been suggested for future section meetings. 
We believe they will be of wide-spread interest to members of the 
Association and recommend that future executive committees of 
this section take steps to expand the list of possible subjects and 
pursue their further study in an orderly fashion in future years. 
JEAN B. CAIN: Now, Mr. McCown, if you would please come 
forward. I first want to say that I very much appreciate the 
honor and the privilege of serving as chairman of the House of 
Delegates and it is with a great deal of pleasure and I congratu-
late you upon the selection that you have made of a successor, Mr. 
Hale McCown, and I now turn the gavel over to you and turn 
the meeting over to you. 
HALE MCCOWN: First, may I express again on behalf of 
all of you our appreciation for the job that Jean has done as the 
chairman this past year. I hope, Jean, that I will be able to ac-
complish as much in the coming year as you have been able to do 
for us already. 
I shall have to rely on the support and co-operation of all of 
you during the coming year. I hope that I will be entitled to 
have it, I will hope to do the best that I can with the job that I 
have. I appreciate it very much. 
Is there any unfinished business of this House? 
C. RUSSELL MATTSON: Since we have a quorum, I move 
that we adjourn. 
VOICE: Second. 
HALE MCCOWN: All those in favor say aye. 
Opposed, the same. The motion is carried. 
I turn the meeting over to our president, Jack. 
PRESIDENT WILSON: Gentlemen, I reconvene the 56th annual 
meeting of the Nebraska Bar Association. 
Is there any unfinished business, Mr. Secretary? 
GEORGE H. TURNER: I have none, Mr. President. 
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PRESIDENT WILSON: Is there anyone else who has any un-
finished business? 
(There was no response.) 
PRESIDENT WILSON : If not, will Wilber Aten come to the 
rostrum. 
Members of the State Bar Association, it has been indeed a 
pleasure to serve with this organization as your steward for the 
past year. During the past year I have appreciated the oppor-
tunity of being your president and acting as your steward. 
I hope that the good that has been accomplished will off set 
any misfortunes or unwise decisions. 
I think this Association is on the road to great success from 
the work of past presidents and past Executive Councils and the 
work of the House of Delegates. 
The remarks. that I have heard from the members present 
indicate that all are well aware of the duties and the responsibil-
ities of the House of Delegates. 
And now it gives me pleasure to present our president-elect, 
who in just a minute will be the president of this organization; 
and with that I hand to you your gavel of authority and con-
gratulations. 
WILBER ATEN: Fellow members of the Bar, I feel entirely 
humble. I appreciate the honor and I will do the best I can. 
I am going to need a lot of help. I am going to have to call 
on all of you for a lot of help. I'm going to rely considerably up-
on my co-workers George and Hale and the other officers of the 
Association. 
I would like at this time to congratulate Jack and his officers 
and the fellows that assisted him on a very successful year and 
a very successful convention. I think it has been one of the out-
standing years of the Association, and I think that we should at 
this time thank Jack, and I would like to do that on behalf of 
the Association, if I may. 
As to business, I believe that it is in order at this time that 
the assembly either approve or disapprove, at least take action up-
on the business that has been had by the House of Delegates. 
JUDGE SPENCER: I move the approval of the business that 
has been transacted. 
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JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: Second the motion. 
PRESIDENT ATEN: You have heard the motion that the ac-
tion of the House of Delegates be approved by the assembly. 
Is there any discussion 'l 
If not all those in favor-
LAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, I do not like to be ris-
ing to points of order, and I am not going to make a point of 
order, but I am going to suggest that under the rules the converse 
is true. The action of the House stands unless disapproved by the 
assembly. Now let us go ahead with the motion. I am all for it. 
JEAN B. CAIN : As I understand it, any affirmative action 
taken at this afternoon's session must be approved by the as-
sembly. I may be in error. 
JUDGE SPENCER: Question. 
LAURENS WILLIAMS: I did not make a point of order. 
VOICES: Question. 
PRESIDENT ATEN: Unless there is a point of order taken we 
will vote on the motion. 
All those in favor signify by saying aye. 
All those opposed the same sign. The motion carried. 
I believe, gentlemen, that this concludes the business of the 
session, and therefore at this time I will entertain a motion to ad-
journ the 56th annual convention of the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation. 
HARRY B. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, just before you ask for 
a motion I would like to make a remark, and I am perhaps as 
guilty as perhaps anybody else here. 
I sat here and I saw the new president being inducted before 
about twenty-five or thirty members of the State Bar Association. 
Now I have always felt that the presidency of the State Bar As-
sociation is an honorable position, something to be sought for 
with honor by a member of this Bar. I think it is unworthy of 
the honor of the position and the connotations that it carries with 
it to have an induction before a small body of the organization 
as a whole. 
I would like to suggest therefore that hereafter because of the 
fact you are going to run into the situation year after year after 
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year where nobody is going to be around at the end of the session, 
that the induction of the incoming president be made at the time 
of the banquet. It only takes a few more minutes while you have 
everybody there and while you have your biggest crowd, so to 
speak. I think that would be a most fitting way to induct our 
incoming president. 
PRESIDENT ATEN: Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 
Mr. Secretary, is there anything in regard to our rules in 1·e-
gard to that situation? 
GEORGE H. TURNER: No restriction against it. 
PRESIDENT AIKEN : I take it, Harry, that that is a sugges-
tion and not a motion. 
HARRY B. COHEN: That jg right. 
PRESIDENT AIKEN: Well, thank you for the suggestion, 
and we will see what can be done about it. 
If there is no further business we will vote upon the motion 
to adjourn. 
All those in favor signify by saying aye. 
All those opposed; the same sign. 
Motion carried and we are adjourned. 
(Thereupon, at 5 :20 o'clock p. m., the 56th annual meeting 
of the Nebraska State Bar Association adjourned, sine die.) 
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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
l f)': 
STATEMENT·OF;CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 
OCTOBER 1, 1954 TO SEPTEMBER 24, 1955 
Receipts: 
Active Memb~rs Dues .............................. $ 37,430.00 
Inactive Members Dues ............................ 4,865.00 
Reinstatements: 
1954 ...................................... $ 
1953 ..................................... . 
1952 ..................................... . 
1951 ..................................... . 
1950 ..................................... . 
1949 ..................................... . 








1938-1947 ······························ 12.00 94.00 $42,389.00 
l\iiiscellaneous ................................................................ 2.95 
Statute Books, Etc. Sold ........ 50.65 
Less : Remittance to 
State Library ...................... 50.65 
Over-payments 




Salaries and Payroll Tax ....................... . 
Office Supplies, Printing, Postage 
& Stationery ......................................... . 
Directory ................................................... . 
Telephone and Telegraph ....................... . 
Officers' Expense ..................................... . 
American Bar Association and House 
of Delegates Meetings ....................... . 
Annual Meeting Expense ........ 7,113.08 
Less: Food Cost Reimbursed 
and Display .......................... 2,256.00 
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Nebraska Law Review ............................. . 4,958.61 
Nebraska State Bar 
Association Journal ............ 1,433.21 
Less: Advertising .................... 1,058.00 375.21 
Public Service ........................ a,054.80-
Less : Reimbursements ............ 498.37 4,556.43 
Tax Institute ........................................... . 2,266.58 
Institute and New Legislation ............... . 770.46 
Aid to Local Bars ..................................... . 297.52 
Audit ......................................................... . 175.00 
Insurance and Bonds ............................... . 102.45 
Office Expense ......................................... . 264.75 
Dues ........................................................... . 50.00 
Binding Proceedings ............................... . 75.00 
Judicial Council ....................................... . 41.43 
Committee on Inquiry ........................... . 535.32 
Committee on Oil and Gas Law ........... . 69.25 
Committee on Crime and Delinquency ... . 267.63 
Committee-Advisory ............................. . 973.23 
Committee-Judiciary ............................. . 80.75 
Committee-Co-operation with 
American Bar Inst. . ............................ . 235.00 
Committee-Municipal and Public 
Corps ..................................................... . 87.04 
Committee-American Citizenship ....... . 61.03 
Committee-Practice and Procedure ..... . 67.35 
Committee-Real Estate Probate 
and Trust ............................................... . 48.90 
Equipment Purchased ............................. . 696.46 
Miscellaneous ........................................... . 35.46 
Football Tickets (See 
Note 1) ................................ 105.00 
A.B.A. Regional Meeting Ex-
pense (See Note 1) ............ 531.30 636.30 39,737.43 
Excess of Receipts Over Disbursements ....................... . 2,654.52 
===== Cash Balance, October 1, 1954 .. 653.25 
Excess of Receipts Over 
Disbursements .......................... 2,654.52 
Cash in Bank, September 
24, 1955 ···································· 3,307.77 
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Represented By: 
First National Bank ................ 666.95 
Continental National Bank .... 2,640.82 
3,307.77 
Note 1 : Disbui·sements for football tickets and Regional Meet-
ing expense represent amounts which are to be reim-
bursed. 
'. 
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ROLL OF PRESIDENTS 
1. 1900 cEleazer Wakely .................. Omaha 29. 1928 Robert W. Devoe ........... .Llncoln 
2. 1901 °William D. McHugh ........ Omaha 
3. 1902 *Samuel P. Davidson .. Tecwnseh 
4. 1903 •John L. Webster .............. Omaha 
5. 1904 •c. B. Letton. ................... Fairbury 
30. 1929 Anan Raymond .................. Omaha 
31. 1930 cJ. L. Cleary .......... Grand Island 
32. 1931 *Fred Shepherd .................... Llncoln 
33. 1932 *Ben S. Baker ...................... Omaha 
6. 1905 *Ralph W. Breckenridge .. Omaha 
7. 1906 cE. c. Calkins ............... ~.Kearney 
34". 1933 *J. J. Thomas ...................... Seward 
35. 1934 °John J. Ledwith ................ Llncoln 
8. 1907 *T. J. Mahoney .................... Omaha 
9. 1908 cc. C. Flansburg ................ Lincoln 
10. 19()8 •Francis A. Borgan .......... Omaha 
11. 1910 ccharles G. Ryan .... Grand Island 
12. Hill *Benjamin F. Good .......... Lincoln 
13. 1912 *William A. Redick ............ Omaha 
14. 1913 •John J. Halligan .... North Platte 
15. 1914 cH. H. Wilson .................... Lincoln 
16. 1915 •c. J. Smyth ........................ Omaha 
17. 1916 •John N. Dryden ............ Kearney 
18. 1917 *F. M. Hall... ....................... Lincoln 
19. 1918 cArthur C. Wakely ............ Omaha 
20. 1919 cR. E. Evans .............. Dakota City 
21. 1920 •w. M. Morning ................ Lincoln 
22. 1921 *A. G. Ellick. ....................... Omaha 
36. 1935 •L. B. Day ............................ Omaha 
37. 1936 J. G. lliothersead ........ Scottsbluff 
38. 1937 cc. J. Campbel! ................. .Llncoln 
39. 1938 Harvey M. Johnsen .......... Omalm 
40. 1939 James 2\I. Lanigan. ......... Greeley 
41. 1940 E. B. Chappell ................... .Llncoln 
42. 1941 Raymond G. Young .......... Omaha 
43. 1943 Paul E. Boslaugh. ......... Hastlngs 
44. 1943 Robert R. Moodie ...... West Point 
4'5. 1944 George L. DeLacy ............ Omaha 
46. 1945 Virgil Falloon. ............... Falls City 
47. 1946 Paul F. Good. ................... Lincoln 
48. 1947 Joseph T. Votava. ............. Omaha 
49. 1948 Robert H. Beatty .. North Platte 
50. 1949 Abel V. Shotwell ................ Omaha 
23. 1922 *George F. Corcoran. ........... York 
24. 1923 "'Edward P. Holmes ........ Lincoln 
51. 1950 Earl J. Moyer ............... .Madlson 
52. 1951 Clarence A. Davis ........... .lincoln 
25. 1924 *Fred A. Wright. ............... Omaha 
26. 1925 °Paul Jessen .......... Nebraska City 
27. 1926 "'E. E. Good ............................ Wahoo 
53. 1952 George B. Hastings ............ Grant 
54. 1953 Laurens Wllliams .............. Omaha 
55. 1954 J. D. Cronin. ....................... O'Nelll 
28. 19~7 *F. S. Berry .......................... Wayne 56. 1955 John J. Wllson .................. Llncoln 
ROLL OF SECRETARIES 
1. 1900-06 Roscoe Pound .............. Lincoln 
2. 1907-08 Geo. P. Costigan, Jr ... Lincoln 
3. 1909- W. G. Hastlngs ............ Lincoln 
4". 1910-19 A. G. Ellick .................... Omaha 
5. 1920-27 Anan Raymond ............ Omaih.a 
6. 1928-36 Harvey John·sen. ........... Oma.ha 
7. 1937- George H. Turner ........ Omaha 
ROLL OJ;' TREASURERS 
1. 1900- Samuel F. Davidson 6. 1914-16 Chas. G. McDonald .... Omaha 
.................................................... Tecwnseh 
2. 1901- S. L. Geisthardt .......... Lincoln 
7. 1917-22 Raymond M. Crossman 
............................................................ Orn.aha 
3. 1902-03 Charles A. Goss ............ Omaha 
4. 1904-05 Roscoe Pound ................ Lincoln 
5. 1906-13 A. G. Ellick .................. Omaha 
8. 1923-37 Virgil J. Haggard ...... Oma.ha 
9. 1938- George H. Turner ...... Lincoln 
ROLL OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIJ, 
1. 1900-04 R. W. Breckenridge .. Omaha 31. 1920-27 Anan Raymond ............ Omaha 
2. 1900-08 Andrew J. Sawyer .... Lincoln 
3. 1900-02 Edmund H. Hinshaw 
...................................................... Fairbury 
32. 1921-21 Alfred G. Elllck ........ Omaha 
33. 1921-23 Guy c. Chambers .... Llncoln 
34. 1922-24 James R. Rodman .. K1mball 
4. 1903-06 W. H. Kelligar .......... Auburn 
5. 1904-07 John N. Dryden ...... Kearney 
6. 1905-08 F. A. Brogan. ............... Omaha 
7. 1907-10 S. P. Davidson ...... Tecumseh 
35. 1923-26 E. E. Good .................. Wahoo 
36. 1924-26 Robert W. Devoe ..... .Lincoln 
37. 1924-24 Fred A. Wright. ....... Omaha 
38. 1925-28 Paul Jessen .... Nebraska City 
8. 1908-09 W. T. Wilcox .... North Platte 39. 1925-27 Clinton Brome .............. Omaha 
9. 1909-11 R. W. Breclrnnridge .. Omaha 
10. 1!:110-12 Frank H. Woods ...... Lincoln 
11. 1910-10 Charles G. Ryan 
.............................................. Grand Island 
·10. 1927-29 Charles E. Matson..Lincoln 
41. 1927-28 Fred S. Berry .............. Wayne 
42. 1928-29 Robert w. Devoe ...... Lincoln 
43. 1928-30 T. J. McGulre .............. Omaha 
12. 1910-19 Alfred G. Ellick ........ Omaha 
13. 1911-13 John A. Ehrhardt .... Stanton 
4'4. 1928-34 Harve3• Johnsen .......... Omaha 
·15. 19-29-31 E. A. Coufal.. ...... David City 
1-1. 1911-11 Benjamin F. Good .. Lincoln 
15. 1912-15 C. J. Smyth .................. Omaha 
16. 1912-12 William A. Redick .... Omaha 
46. 1929-29 Anan Raymond .......... Omaha 
47. 193.0-32 Paul E. Boslaugh..Hastlngs 
48. 1930-30 J. L. Cleary .... Grand Island 
17. 1913-15 W. M. Morning ........ Lincoln 
18. 1913-16 J. J. Halligan .. North Platte 
19. 1914-14 H. H. Wilson .............. Lincoln 
20. 1915-17 EdW1in E. Squires 
................................................ Broken Bow 
49. 1931-33 W. C. Dorsey .............. Omaha 
50. 1931-31 Fred Shepherd ............ Lincoln 
51. 1932-34 Richard Stout. .......... .Llncoln 
52. 1931-32 Ben S. Baker .............. Omaha 
53. 1933-35 Barlow F. Nye ........ Kearney 
21. 1916-16 John N. Dryden .... Kearney 
22. 1916-17 Frederick Shepherd .. Lincoln 
2:J. 1917-17 Frank l\!. Hall .......... Linco1n 
24". 1917-18 Anan Raymond .......... Omaha 
25. 1918-18 A. C. Wakeley ............ Omaha 
26. 1918-22 Fred A. Wright.. ........ Omaha 
•>7 1919-19 R. E. Evans ...... Dakota City 
28: 1919-2.2 Geo. F. Corcoran .......... York 
29. 1919-20 L. A. F!ansburg ........ Lincoln 
30. 1920-20 ,V. :.'II. :.'11orning ........ Lincoln 
51. 1933-33 J. J. Thomas .............. Seward 
55. 1934-36 Chas. F. McLaughlin 
............................................................ Omaha 
56. 1934-34 John J. Ledwith ........ Llncoln 
57. 1935-35 L. B. Day ...................... Omaha 
58. 1935-37 James M. Lanlgan .... Greeley 
59. 1935-38 H. J. Requartte ....... .Llncoln 
60. 1935-38 Raymond M. Crossman 
............................................................ Omaha 
61. 19~5-·IO F. H. Pollock ............ Stanton 
• Deceased 
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62. 1935-41 T. :r. Keenan .............. Geneva 
63. 1935-39 Walter D. :rames ...... McCook 
64. 1935-37 Roland V. Rodman .. Kimball 
65. 1936-36 :r. G. Mothersead 
.................................................. Scottsbluff 
66. 1936-36 :rames L. Brown ........ Lincoln 
Wi. 1937-39 David A. Fitch .......... Omaha 
68. 1937-39 Raymond G. Young .. Omaha 
69. 1937-41 l\I. M. l\laupin .. North Platte 
70. 1937-41 Golden P. Kratz ........ Sidney 
71. 1938-42 Sterling F. l\Iutz ........ Lincoln 
72. 1938-42 Don W. Stewart ...•... Lincoln 
7:3. 1940-46 George N. Mecham .. Omaha 
74. 1940-42 Abel V. Shotwell ........ Omaha 
75. 1940-42 Frank l\I. Colfer ...... l\IcCook 
76. 1941-43 Virgil Fal!oon ...... Falls City 
77. 19411-43 :roseph C. Tye ........ Kearney 
78. 1941-47 Earl J. Moyer .......... j.\fadison 
79. 1937-37 C. :r. Campbell .......... Lincoln 
80. 1938-38 Harvey Johnson .......... Omaha 
81. 1939-39 :fames' M. Lanigan .. Greeley 
82. 1940-4-0 E. B. Chappell .......... Lincoln 
83. 1942-45 Fred · J. Cassidy ........ Lincoln 
84. 1!141-41 Raymond G. Young .. Omaha 
85. 1942-48 Max G. Towle .......... Linooln 
86. 1942-42 Paul E. Boslaugh .. Hastings 
87. 1942-45 :rohn E. Dougherty ........ York 
88. 1942-49 Yale C. Holland ........ Omaha 
89. 1943-45 Robert R. Moodie 
.................................................. West Point 
90. 1941-4!5 B. F. Butler ........ Cambridge 
91. 1943-46 Fran!;: M. :rohnson 
.................................................... Lexington 
9" 1944-49 Floyd E. Wright..Scottsbluff 
93: 1945-50 John J. Wilson .......... Lincoln 
!14. 1945-4'8 Robert B. Waring .... Geneva 
95. 1944-46 George L. DeLacy .... Omaha 
96. 1945-47 Virgil Falloon ...... Falls City 
97. 1945-49 Leon Samuelson. ..... Franklin 
98. 194!6-48 Harry W. Shackelford 
.......................................................... Omaha 
99. 1946-48 Paul F. Good .............. Lincoln 
100. 1947-48 :roseph T. Votava. ..... Omaha 
101. 1947-48 :rohn E. Dougherty ...... York 
102. 1947-55 Lyle E. Jackson ............ Neligh 
103. 1948-49 Robert H. Beatty 
................................................ North Platte 
104. 1947-50 Frank D. Williams .. Lincoln 
105. 1947-50 Thomas J. Keenan .. Geneva 
106. 1948-51 Laurens Williams ...... Omaha 
107. 1949-51 Joseph H. McGroarty 
............................................................ Omaha 
108. 1949-54 Wilber S. Aten ........ Holdrege 
109. 194'8-50 Abel V. Shotwell ...... Omaha 
110. 1949·55 Paul L. Martln ............ Sldney 
111. 1949·55 Joseph C. Tye ............ Kearney 
112. 1949-51 Earl J. Moyer ......... .Madison 
113. 1950- Harry A. Spencer .... Lincoln 
114. 1950- Paul P. Chaney .... Falls City 
115. 1950- Paul Bek ........................ Seward 
116. 1950-52 Clarence A. Davis .... Lincoln 
117. 1951-55 Barton H. Kuhns ........ Omaha 
118. 1952- Thomas C. Quinlan .. Omaha 
119. 1951-52 George B. Hastinge .... Grant 
120. 1952-53 Laurens Wllliams ...... Omaha 
121. 1953-54 J. D. Cronin ................ O'Neill 
122. 1954- Norris Chadderdon 
........................................................ Holdrege 
123. 1954- John J. Wilson ........ Lincoln 
124. 1955- Wilber S. Aten ....... .Holdrege 
125. 1955- F. M. Deutsch ............ Norfolk 
126. 195.5- Clarence E. Haley 
................................................. .Hartington 
127. 1955- R. R. Welllngton .... Crawford 
128. 1955- Alfred G. El!lck .......... Omaha 
129. 1954-1955 Jean B. Caln ...... Falls City 
130. 1955- Hale McCown .............. Beatrice 
